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Arduous Business explores representations of immaterial labour in the Victorian realist 
novel. By “immaterial labour,” I mean labour that has economic and social value, but that 
does not fall within countable hours or produce tangible goods. The category includes 
the mysteriously profitable stock-broking of Anthony Trollope’s speculator villains, and 
the doomed scholarship of Thomas Hardy’s working-class philosopher, Jude Fawley. 
More central to the project, though, and ubiquitous in the Victorian novel, is the unwaged 
emotional labour of women: the coaxing, communicating, caring, and sympathizing 
through which societies—and, indeed, economies—cohere. From dominant nineteenth-, 
twentieth-, and twenty-first-century perspectives, these activities count only ambiguously 
as “work,” yet critical economists from Marx onward have noted that economic 
production depends on the material and ideological reproduction of workers, a task 
historically associated with the feminized domestic sphere. I argue that realist novels are 
uniquely equipped to demonstrate the economic importance of feminized immaterial 
labour, and the effects of industrial capitalism on the intimate processes of thinking and 
feeling that labour contains. Methodologically and thematically, novels resist the 
strategies of abstraction on which the contemporaneous discourse of political economy 
relied, instead engaging economic phenomena dialectically, forging dynamic theories of 
labour and value that connect parts to wholes, people to systems, and systems to 
history. By situating work in its manifold contexts, the novels I examine reveal immanent 
meanings of the shift to capitalism, including the insidious but consequential exploitation 
of caring and communicative labour, and the limitations of a historically specific, liberal 
form of subjectivity. Chapter one (on Gaskell’s Mary Barton) and two (on Eliot’s Romola) 
analyze critical responses to the appropriation of women’s immaterial labour. Chapter 
three argues that Trollope’s Palliser novels unfreeze reified notions of social and 
economic value, presenting value instead as an uncontainable relationship between 
people. Chapter four shows how Hardy’s reverse-Bildungsroman, Jude the Obscure, 
confronts liberal progressivism with its failure to resolve the antagonisms of class, 
gender, and sex, thereby revealing the false ground of a promised reconciliation 
between individuals and society.  
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“Women’s Work?”: Theorizing Victorian Labours of 
Love 
“If I saved one blow, one cruel, angry action that might otherwise have been 
committed, I did a woman’s work.” 
- Elizabeth Gaskell, North and South (191)  
What does it mean to call the management of thoughts and feelings—one’s own and 
one’s neighbour’s—a “woman’s work,” as Elizabeth Gaskell’s character, Margaret Hale, 
does in the passage above? What is the significance of that designation in a novel that is 
centrally about industrial labour relations, and that makes explicit references to the 
theoretical debates of classical economics? Finally, what distinguishes the “work” 
claimed by this novel’s heroine from that of her father, a pastor and educator?  
Brave, loving, intelligent, and moral, the heroine of North and South (1854) 
models a version of middle-class femininity that serves, in the novel, as a kind of cure for 
the social ills of industrialization. Plucked from her home in the south of England, 
Margaret has little choice but adapt to the dirty streets and foreign customs of the factory 
town of Milton, where she accidentally enchants—and eventually, reforms—tyrannical 
capitalist, John Thornton. The novel culminates in the couple’s marriage: Thornton, 
softened by the example of Margaret’s sympathy and saved from economic ruin by her 
inheritance, transforms from ruthless master to loving father for his workmen, and 
Margaret relinquishes her prejudice against the “shoppy” nouveau riche (19), 
acquiescing to her role in the creation of a new middle class energized by the 
enterprising and implicitly masculine spirit of work and commerce, yet tempered by the 
feminized skills of emotional management at which she is so adept.  
North and South is typically considered the more conservative of Gaskell’s two 
industrial novels, since its predecessor, Mary Barton (1848), presents class conflict 
almost exclusively from the workers’ perspective. The earlier novel’s portrait of the 
middle class is severe and unflattering; North and South, by contrast, positions middle-
class characters like Margaret and Thornton as leaders of social reform whose moral 
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restraint, maturity and education qualifies them to design economic solutions with 
minimal participation from the working class. The analogy between marriage and class 
harmony, the setting up of the bourgeois family as the ideal template for social 
organization, is difficult to miss in the novel, and while North and South was less 
controversial for Gaskell’s original audience than the worker-focused Mary Barton, it sits 
uneasily with many readers today. Put simply, it is hard to accept that a demonstration of 
fellow feeling—Thornton warmly accepting a lunch invitation from the workers in his 
reformed factory, for example (362)—could possibly make up for the hunger, disease, 
and desperation that leads some of the characters as far as suicide (298). The novel’s 
paternalistic solution to the problem of class conflict is, as Carolyn Betensky and others 
have noted, a fantasy, and one that raises more questions than it answers.1 However, as 
a rich body of secondary criticism testifies, there is more to the novel than its tidy 
conclusion.2 In particular, I shall argue that Gaskell’s contribution to our understanding of 
industrial society—and indeed, that of many realist novels of the period—lies in her 
presentation of the entanglement of immaterial forms of labour with the developments of 
industrial capitalism. 
In the novel’s most famous scene, Margaret defends Thornton from a mob of 
angry workers, attempting to influence their behavior with her “flaming arrows of 
reproach” and blocking the assorted missiles—stones, shoes, etc.—that they intend for 
Thornton (178-9). The scene, like the novel as a whole, obscures the economic 
relationship between Thornton and his men by foregrounding the sexual one between 
him and Margaret, but it also draws attention to the “woman’s work” of my epigraph, the 
complex, gendered manipulation of thought and feeling, at once abstract and embodied, 
that Margaret is at pains to define as labour throughout the novel. In addressing the 
                                                
1 See Betensky’s Feeling for the Poor and Jaffe’s Scenes of Sympathy for discussions of the role 
of sympathy in consolidating middle-class identity and moral authority.  
2 North and South has inspired excellent readings on a wide range of topics. Julie Nash’s 
Servants and Paternalism in the Works of Maria Edgeworth and Elizabeth Gaskell (2017) 
examines the concept and implications of servitude in the novel. Feminist readings by Wendy 
Parkins and Sarah Dredge highlight the agency Gaskell’s heroine achieves through the work of 
philanthropy (both finding this work a more positive force in the novel than I do). On the text’s 
glimpses of Empire, see Julia Sun-Joo Lee’s article, “The Return of the ‘Unnative’: Transnational 
Politics in Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South” (2007), Tara Puri’s “Indian Objects, English Body: 
Utopian Yearnings in Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South” (2017), and Carolyn Lesjak’s 
“Authenticity and the Geography of Empire: Reading Gaskell with Emecheta” (2002). On 
Gaskell’s representation of natural and built environments, see Ben Moore, “Invisible Architecture 
and Social Space in North and South” (2018) and Mary Debrabant, “Smoke or No Smoke?: 
Questions of Perspective in North and South” (2010).  
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crowd, she employs the persuasion and tact she has been trained to use in the home. 
Easily and sometimes willfully misrecognized as traits, these skills are presented in the 
novel as skills, empowering Margaret on one level, as Sarah Dredge points out (85), but 
also drawing heavily on her finite resources. Immediately after the riot, Margaret 
compartmentalizes her own distress so that she can help her father cope with his wife’s 
illness (“[Mr. Hale] wanted, as Margaret saw, to be amused and interested by something 
that she was to tell him”), a task she performs with “sweet patience” until the entire 
household has gone to bed, when at last she is free to experience her feelings: 
“[Margaret] let her colour go—the forced smile fade away—the eyes grow dull with 
heavy pain. She released her strong will from its laborious task. Till morning she might 
feel ill and weary” (191). Months later, in a rare moment of solitude, she reflects on the 
toll of this constant effort:  
It was astonishing, almost stunning, to feel herself so much at liberty; no 
one depending on her for cheering care, if not for positive happiness; no 
invalid to plan and think for; she might be idle, and silent, and forgetful—
and what seemed than all the other privileges—she might be unhappy if 
she liked. For months past, all her own personal cares and troubles had 
had to be stuffed away into a dark cupboard; but now she had leisure to 
take them out, and mourn over them, and study their nature . . . All these 
weeks she had been conscious of their existence in a dull kind of way, 
though they were hidden out of sight. Now, once and for all she would 
consider them, and appoint to each of them its right work in her life. (344)  
The passage reveals how necessary Margaret’s caring is for the smooth functioning of 
the family (and by the analogy everywhere present in the novel, society), but it also 
shows that Margaret has learned to think of her caring as labour. She has never worked 
for a wage, but she has internalized the alienating logic of the wage, and become 
estranged from her feeling-labour just as the worker, in Marx’s theory of alienation, 
becomes estranged from his or her manual labour. In one scene, Margaret explicitly 
compares the “burden” of emotional labour with the paid work of consumptive cotton-
spinner, Bessy Higgins (137). The degree of the two women’s hardship is beyond 
comparison, but the kernel of truth in Margaret’s claim is that both of them produce value 
for society that is routinely appropriated from them. If North and South suggests, albeit 
unsatisfyingly, that benevolence and sympathy can solve the problem of exploitation in 
the factory, it does not try to solve the problem of exploitation in the home. Instead, it 
draws attention to it, suggesting that the success of even a benevolent capitalism will 
depend on the appropriation of vast quantities of immaterial labour.  
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That insight is keen: underlying any productive economy is a network of 
domestic, sexual, affective, and pedagogical relationships that is, itself, productive, but 
that we seldom class with more obviously economic relationships distinguished by the 
wage. As North and South goes out of its way to show, immaterial labour holds 
societies—and, indeed, economies—together, but identifying exactly what and how it 
produces is no easy task. The product is frequently intangible, and the work of producing 
it, difficult or impossible to contain within countable hours. Historically, it has counted 
only ambiguously as work, and since the nineteenth century, it has been associated with 
a feminized domestic sphere, the ideological opposite of the public sphere of work and 
commerce. Yet in the Victorian novel—and even in novels that are, like North and South, 
plainly interested in work and commerce—immaterial labour appears at the center of 
social life. Undoubtedly the result of novels’ emphasis on interpersonal relationships, on 
the domestic sphere, and on the intricacies of characters’ emotional lives, the centrality 
and richness of Victorian representations of immaterial labour has much to teach us 
about the invisible costs of a form of capitalism that has outlived the nineteenth century, 
one in which the labour of hearts and minds as well as bodies is susceptible to 
commodification. Spanning four decades of the Victorian period and representing 
diverse subgenres of realism, the novels I examine in this dissertation—by Gaskell, 
George Eliot, Anthony Trollope, and Thomas Hardy—present feminized immaterial 
labour as fundamentally continuous with the masculine economies of factory production, 
scholarship, and governance, highlighting the economic importance of these forms of 
labour, but also the effects of a rapidly maturing capitalism on the intimate processes of 
thinking and feeling they contain. 
In fact, novels are uniquely equipped to demonstrate this two-way relationship. 
Methodologically and thematically, they resist the strategies of abstraction by which 
labour and value are assimilated to the wage, expanding those concepts to include 
forms of work that were largely excluded from the founding debates of political 
economy.3 As I discuss more fully below, definitive features of Victorian realism—the 
                                                
3 Many economists and historians have written about the omission of feminized domestic, 
emotional, and reproductive labour from the most influential texts of classical economics. For an 
overview of gender in Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, J. S. Mill and David Ricardo, see Dimand, 
Forget, and Nyland, “Retropsectives: Gender in Classical Economics.” Dimand and Nyland are 
also the editors of a 2003 collection of essays on that topic, The Status of Women in Classical 
Economic Thought. For more critical accounts, see Nancy Folbre, Greed, Lust, and Gender: A 
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proliferation of contexts, the emphasis on personal relationships, and the leveling of 
epistemological hierarchies between feeling and fact—dismantle reified notions of labour 
and value, presenting them instead as dynamic relationships that connect parts to 
wholes, people to systems, and systems to history. In the novels I discuss, economic 
production is inseparable from social reproduction: Gaskell’s workers brave the factory 
with the support of the household labour and sympathy of unwaged family members, 
and the tangible achievements of Trollope’s Liberals depend on an intangible public will 
built behind the scenes by women. More troublingly, my chosen texts show how the 
alienating effects of the wage and the division of labour exceed the bounds of the factory 
to reshape private life, transforming seemingly extra-economic phenomena like sexuality 
and romantic love into exploitable sources of value that are then experienced—by Eliot’s 
Romola and Hardy’s Sue Bridehead, for example—as coercive, alienating toil. Bringing 
together Victorianist scholarship on gender, sympathy, affect, and economics, I show 
how these novels depict the elusive operations of thinking and feeling as forms of labour 
that were both vital to and fundamentally transformed by the shift to capitalism. These 
transformations are immanent meanings of capitalism’s history, materially consequential 
but easily overlooked, for they seldom manifest as discreet objects. Brought to the fore 
of these Victorian texts, immaterial labour takes on a degree of visibility it is usually 
denied, declaring its role in economic production, and hinting at the exploitative patterns 
in which it is still caught today.  
Historical and Theoretical Contexts 
Although the focus of this project is Victorian, the relationship between capitalism 
and the novel begins well before the Victorian period, and that history is an important 
context of this project. In The Rise of the Novel (1957), Ian Watt argues that the novel 
owes its formation and success to the conditions of modern capitalism. In Watt’s 
analysis, a whole host of cultural developments that we now associate with the shift to 
capitalism—the consolidation of populations in cities and dissolution of rural 
communities, the privatization of the family unit, the division of labour and hardening of 
the ideological border between labour and leisure, and the emergence of the modern or 
“liberal” individual—leant novelty and legitimacy to stories about ordinary, individual 
                                                                                                                                            
History of Economic Ideas (2009), and Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Economics (2003), co-
edited by Edith Kuiper and Drucilla Barker.  
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people. In obvious and subtle ways, novels recorded the momentous social 
transformations of the period, but they did not do so passively. While realist novels in 
particular contain accurate depictions of conditions of life in the nineteenth century, they 
are frequently critical of those conditions, and always sensitive to the rippling effects of 
social change. Recent decades have produced a rich body of scholarship on the 
economic dimensions of novels, but there remains much to be said about feminized 
forms of labour and exchange that predominate in fiction, and that trouble the underlying 
premises of political economy and Victorian liberalism.  
A preliminary assumption of this project is that we cannot understand the novel’s 
engagement with economics unless we give primary placement to women. Indeed, many 
have argued (contra Watt) that a similar move is necessary to understand the history of 
the novel at large. If Watt’s version of the story stars Richardson, Fielding, Swift, Defoe, 
and, briefly, Jane Austen, few scholars today would omit Eliza Haywood, Maria 
Edgeworth, Mary Wollstonecraft, Charlotte Smith, and Sarah Scott from that list. With 
these names before us, the history of the novel starts to look a lot like a history of 
women’s writing, a non-coincidence that is at least partially responsible for Nancy 
Armstrong’s provocative claim that the “modern individual” Watt discovered in the novel 
was, “first and foremost, a woman” (8). Armstrong’s point rests not only on the names of 
famous women writers but on the subject matter of novels themselves: the domestic 
woman, ensconced in her private home, mistress of her personal affairs and, more 
importantly, of her character, provides the template for the monadic individual who was 
to be the subject of capitalism and of the vast majority of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century novels. The “gendered form of subjectivity” that originated in women’s literature, 
she claims, provided the “metaphysical girders of modern culture,” replacing long-
standing political identities with an ostensibly apolitical (though in reality, highly political) 
system of gender differences, and dove-tailing neatly with the ambitions of a newly 
enfranchised middle class. In retrospect it is no wonder that literate women started 
writing novels at mid-century: the subject matter that defines the novel—namely, private 
experience—was readily available to them, and the form of the novel, especially in its 
early years, differed only slightly from the letters and diaries middle-class women already 
knew how to write. Josephine Donovan identifies several other factors that contributed to 
women’s success in novel-writing, among them the cultural “transition to empiricist 
epistemology” that occurred in the seventeenth century, the growing acceptance of 
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“plain style” in prose, and the irrelevance of classical training for emergent genres of 
fiction (442).4  
However, it is not merely that women happened to have the skills and the 
experience necessary to write novels, and so they did; as Ruth Perry and Jennie 
Batchelor point out, the shift to industrial capitalism displaced large numbers of women 
from the working world, and made writing one of the few paid occupations still available 
to women in the middle class (for whom being married and middle-class did not always 
mean being provided for). At precisely the time that the novel became a legitimate and 
popular form of entertainment, new family patterns were forming around the capitalized 
economy, the division of labour, exclusive property relations, and urban living (Perry 27). 
The economic roles of men and women, Perry writes, were “reshuffled,” such that 
women lost economic rights they had had in the Middle Ages and became almost 
entirely dependent on the prospect of a favourable marriage (27-9). For pioneering 
women writers, the decision to pick up the pen was not only about intellectual expression 
but about self-determination. Figures like Scott, Smith, and Wollstonecraft countered the 
implicit hierarchies of labour embedded in the founding texts of political economy—
particularly Adam Smith’s distinction between “productive” and “unproductive” labour, 
which remained controversial throughout the Victorian period—with fictionalized 
testimonies to the value of women’s intellectual, affective, and domestic labour. In 
Batchelor’s analysis, the second half of the eighteenth century was a uniquely optimistic 
moment for women writers and intellectuals, one in which women leveraged the newly 
legitimized vocabulary of political economy to argue that “work could be positively 
constitutive of the female experience” (23). That moment, though, would be long in 
bearing fruit: as Victorian studies scholars know, the debate about the legitimacy and 
value of “women’s work” continued through the nineteenth century, and in some ways, 
became more embattled, thanks to unprecedented population growth, the expansion of 
                                                
4 She also argues that women’s habituation to use-value production in the home (as opposed to 
men’s production of exchange-values for the market) equipped them for the unalienated labour of 
artistic creation (447). The suggestion that housework and artistic production are inalienable 
forms of labour seems, to me, inaccurate; in fact, the chapters in this dissertation argue the 
opposite. The novels I examine demonstrate that affective, intellectual, artistic, and sexual forms 
of labour are equally susceptible to alienation.  
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the service economy, and shifting understandings of what counted as masculine and 
feminine work.5  
This project, like those of the eighteenth-century scholars I have cited, attempts 
to recover part of a history of complex thinking about feminized forms of work. However, 
I am not only interested in writing by women: I am interested in all that has been 
expelled from the history of work because of its proximity to woman. This includes 
women authors and women thinkers, of course, but while historical personalities like 
Elizabeth Gaskell and George Eliot are crucial for this project, so too are the fictional 
personalities populating their novels and those of their male contemporaries. A train of 
brilliant, dismaying, and, in some cases, forgotten, heroines carries this project from 
beginning to end. I owe my purpose and direction to Gaskell’s virginal Mary and to her 
damned aunt Esther; to Eliot’s exploited madonna Romola; to Trollope’s empress, 
Glencora Palliser, to his siren, Laura Standish, to whip-smart Violet Effingham and 
defiant, lost Alice Vavasor; and finally, to Sue Bridehead, rival protagonist of Hardy’s 
late-century Bildungsroman and prophet of Victorian woman’s end.  
At first glance, these characters have little in common: they belong to different 
social classes, different historical moments, and even different genres. However, each 
one poses challenges to our habitual understandings of labour and value. In a variety of 
ways, they problematize the assumption of universal commensurability that underlies the 
commodity form, disrupting the ideological circuits by which the capitalist status quo is 
                                                
5 Because this project focuses on unwaged, immaterial forms of labour, shifts in the official labour 
landscape factor in as contexts, but not as central objects of analysis. For more on the economic 
opportunities (and dead-ends) that emerged for women in the nineteenth century, see Kathryn 
Gleadle’s British Women in the Nineteenth Century (2001). Lynn Alexander’s Women, Work, and 
Representation: Needle Women in Victorian Art and Literature (2003) and Joshua Gooch’s The 
Victorian Novel, Service Work, and the Nineteenth-Century Economy (2015) discuss feminized 
occupations in relation to the novel, and Martin Danahay’s Gender at Work in Victorian Culture 
(2005) explores the effects of a changing economy (particularly the emergence of white-collar 
work for men and the expansion of economic opportunities for women) on Victorian conceptions 
of masculinity. The “New Woman” phenomenon is another crucial context, discussed at greater 
length in chapter four. Sally Ledger’s classic account, The New Woman: Fiction and Feminism at 
the Fin de Siècle has been instructive for me, as have Gillian Sutherland’s In Search of the New 
Woman: Middle-class Women and Work in Britain, 1870-1914 (2015) and Angelique Richardson 
and Chris Willis’s edited collection, The New Woman in Fiction and in Fact: Fin de Siècle 
Feminisms (2001). On manual housework, another feminized occupation not foregrounded in this 
dissertation, see Caroline Davidson’s A Woman’s Work is Never Done: A History of Housework in 
the British Isles, 1650-1950 (1982). On the position of housework in Victorian literature, see 
Patricia Johnson’s Hidden Hands: Working-class Women and Victorian Social Problem Fiction 
(2001), and Monica Cohen’s Professional Domesticity in the Victorian Novel: Women, Work, and 
Home (1998).  
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maintained. Unsurprisingly, they perform the kinds of work that were historically the 
province of women, and that were for that reason omitted from or misrepresented in the 
formative debates of political economy. Some of this work—the sexual labour of the 
prostitute, for example, or the domestic labour of the wife and mother—is obvious and 
visible, if it legitimized as work in the period; some of it (the stitching, sewing, nursing, 
and teaching) even earned a wage. Just as important, though, and far harder to trace, 
were the shadow-forms of work that women performed in the service of men’s self-
realization: the intangible but indisputably real work of maintaining the bodies and the 
morale of the masculine workforce. This latter form of work is the kind that tends, even 
today, to go unrecognized. Mediated by the hyper-naturalized forms of the family and the 
romantic couple, the line between labour and love bleeds past legibility.6 
Contemporary theory has many names for the phenomena I am describing: 
affective or emotional labour, intellectual labour, immaterial labour, and “care work,” just 
to name a few. I refer to and reflect on these terms throughout this introduction, but I 
should now say a few words in defense of my preferred term, “immaterial labour.” Like 
the best realist novels, “immaterial labour” complicates gendered and classed divisions 
of labour. Narrower categories, more likely to attract partial or even inaccurate 
connotations, are brought into relation by the more flexible term, so that the work of the 
intellectual, the caregiver, the mentor, the lover, etc., appear equally caught up in 
relations of production that prioritize profit over the wellbeing of individuals and 
communities. Emphasizing the connections between these kinds of work does not erase 
their differences, but it can help us avoid, for example, sentimentalizing care work while 
we ennoble the intellectual feats of the author. More to the point, “immaterial labour” 
reminds us that the intimate processes of thinking, feeling, and caring, are forms of work, 
and that they are susceptible to exploitation, regardless of the special, seemingly extra-
economic values we attach to them.  
The term, then, suits the capacities I attribute to the realist novel, for one feature 
of Victorian realism that makes it an effective medium for representations of immaterial 
                                                
6 Often in this dissertation, I use the term “mediation” instead of “representation.” The intent of 
that choice is to characterize the relationship between cultural forms and material structures as 
an active, dialectical one. The “forms” of greatest interest to me are realism and its subgenres, 
and the codes comprising gender, both in the Victorian period and in the present. I am also 
periodically concerned with material media of communication, especially in my discussion of 
information in chapter one.  
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labour is its scope. In striving to represent the social whole, realism inevitably contends 
with the way societies sustain and reproduce themselves, a process that draws heavily 
on the elusive forms of labour I have been describing. Novels set their view on the whole 
production cycle, not just on the valorization of the worker’s labour but on the creation of 
the worker as worker, on the ideological and material conditions that make qualitatively 
different objects and actions into commensurable goods. Moreover, novels emphasize 
the temporal, relational dimensions of wealth and work: where classical economics 
treats these factors as fixed or, at best, variable forms of capital, novels recognize them 
as contingent, social products. The texts I examine expose as fallacious the moral 
hierarchies we unthinkingly impose on work: the privileged work of the writer and 
intellectual, the necessary, “productive” labour of workers, and the un- or under-
acknowledged, feminized labour of maintaining those workers appear as linked 
components in a system of production whose negative effects, while they fall mostly 
heavily on working men and women, rob even those more fortunate of the possibility of 
an unalienated life.7  
I begin this study with Mary Barton, a novel that is unavoidably about labour and 
gender. An exemplary instance of the short-lived subgenre of the “industrial novel,” Mary 
Barton starkly contrasts the smoke and din of the factory with the working-class hearth. 
The most influential readings of the novel cast these contrasting scenes as extreme, 
autonomous poles, and some critics accuse Gaskell of abandoning the ethical concerns 
of the labour plot in favour of the more manageable ones in the domestic plot. I build on 
a tradition of feminist readings by treating the two plots as complementary, but while 
many have examined the relationship between sexuality and labour, I take a step back 
to look at Gaskell’s critique of the epistemological structures supporting the shift to 
capitalism, particularly what Max Weber called rationalization, a worldview that sees 
efficiency and abstract reasoning replace traditions, values, and emotions as the primary 
                                                
7 This project owes much to the prior discoveries of Raymond Williams, Nancy Armstrong, Mary 
Poovey, Catherine Gallagher, Carolyn Lesjak, and many others. Collectively, these scholars have 
shown how novels both record and contribute to the ideological formations by which capitalism 
and liberalism are preserved to this day. The projection of lost innocence onto a pre-urban, pre-
industrial past; the rise of a modern individual defined by his or her relationship to property; the 
domestication of women; the splintering of any sense of an integrated social whole and 
corresponding wane of felt responsibility for others; the dehumanization of the poor; the 
entrenchment of bourgeois values and the bourgeois way of life, such that escape from alienation 
is nearly impossible to imagine, much less obtain; these are just some of our continuities with the 
Victorian past, ones that the scholars I name identify, and that I hope to further elucidate in these 
pages. 
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motivators of human behaviour. I show how one pernicious effect of this worldview was 
to impose hierarchies on forms of labour, determining which ones workers would be 
obliged to sell, and which would simply be taken from them. Unsurprisingly, in the novel, 
“taken” labour turns out to be predominantly the labour of women: cleaning, cooking, 
educating, care-giving, and, more insidiously, sympathizing. These activities constitute a 
vast pool of socially necessary labour, the wholesale theft of which Gaskell’s novel 
documents.    
As this preview of chapter one suggests, the history I am exploring poses, at 
minimum, two challenges to the informed reader. It is not only that we have to look 
beyond obvious representations of work and money for glimpses of production’s 
feminized underside, but also that those glimpses confront us in unexpected forms. If the 
generic constraints of realist fiction discount some of the conceptual tools and rhetorical 
strategies that are available in the more conventional forms of the tract, the essay, and 
the article, they introduce numerous others, expanding the concepts of value, labour, 
production, and reproduction to dimensions that far exceed the limits of the discursive 
genres. The interweaving of differently scaled plots, the development of relatable (and 
sometimes, repulsive) characters, the slow, episodic revelation, reversal, and withdrawal 
of information, the deliberate manipulation of the reader’s feelings, are all indispensable 
tactics for fiction, but they are also characteristic of the way most of us experience 
economic phenomena in daily life. Moreover, whether we recognize them or not, literary 
devices abound in the most influential works of economic science.8 My aim here is not to 
diminish the achievements of that science, but to suggest that the intellectual 
contributions of fiction, and particularly fiction by and about women, might help us 
complete a picture that, until it shifts its focus to include all of the subtle supports 
permitting capitalist relations of production, will remain partial.  
                                                
8 Eleanor Courtemanche examines Smith’s use of literary devices in her 2011 book, The Invisible 
Hand and British Fiction, 1818 – 1860. Although it appears only fleetingly in The Wealth of 
Nations, the famous hand metaphor plays a crucial role in Smith’s theory of free market 
capitalism: according to Courtemanche, Smith needed the metaphor to “paper over” the breach 
between an imaginary, pure economic sphere and the actual human societies it was supposed to 
govern (24). Transforming vice into virtue, the invisible hand performs the “crucial work” of 
making capitalism “acceptable to the masses” and of making it “function smoothly by forestalling 
complaints about its apparent injustices” (4). Similarly, in Realizing Capital (2013), Anna Kornbluh 
suggests that the argument in Capital depends on literary (and specifically, novelistic) devices. It 
is only by appropriating the “aesthetic of Victorian realism,” she suggests, that Marx is able to 
depict capitalism’s “psychic economy” as one that makes capital itself into a “universal subject” 
(114).  
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If this goal requires a rethinking of economic categories, it also requires a 
rethinking of realism, and particularly the partitioning of realism into subgenres like the 
“industrial” and “domestic” novel. Building on Carolyn Lesjak’s earlier call to reconsider 
the industrial novel’s place in the Victorian canon (3), I suggest that the subgenre is not 
an ill-fated offshoot but an exemplary instance of realism, one that is fundamentally 
continuous with later developments in the genre. In fact, if we understand realism as the 
attempt to unearth and engage the causal mechanisms of a society, as I think we 
should, then the “industrial novel” may be synonymous with realism in the Victorian 
context.  
With this claim, I join a number of critics who have lately revived the question of 
realism’s cultural worth. The genre’s ubiquity in the nineteenth century means that no 
scholar of the period’s fiction can avoid it, but it has long been common practice to 
acknowledge and apologize for a certain amount of political and ideological 
complacency in our objects. The belief that realist narrative could be anything other than 
normative, that it could play host to a dynamic, dialectical engagement with the 
structures underlying our experience of the social world, fell out of favour in the 
modernist and postmodern periods, and though it never wholly vanished, it has, for 
decades, seemed in need of defense. However, recent debates about the theoretical 
and political possibilities of Victorian studies have renewed scholars’ curiosity about the 
latent possibilities of realism.9 Routine twentieth-century assumptions about the genre’s 
epistemological naivety have come to seem unfounded, and today, most critics agree 
that entering the debate about realism means “enter[ing] political territory” (Beaumont 2-
3). The “classic realism” associated with figures like George Eliot and Anthony Trollope 
is not a “passive, positivistic reflection of banal social reality” (as champions of 
modernism and postmodernism, including Virginia Woolf, assumed) but a sophisticated, 
                                                
9 In 2015, a group of scholars formed the V21 Collective, and published a manifesto condemning 
what was supposed to be the dominant paradigm of “positivist historicism” and calling for 
renewed theoretical rigour (and political relevance) in Victorian studies (v21collective.org). The 
manifesto’s characterization of the state of the discipline was polarizing, but it both indicated and 
fueled a desire, particularly among junior and emerging scholars, to ask new questions about the 
potential of historical research. Whether because of the V21’s activities, or because of the 
energetic ferment that gave rise to the V21, recent years have seen an explosion of theoretical 
and interdisciplinary approaches to Victorian topics. The most influential of these approaches 
goes by various names, including new formalism, new aestheticism, and political formalism. Often 
linked to Caroline Levine’s prize-winning book, Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network 
(2015), the approach is characterized by renewed attention to the political dimension of aesthetic 
features or forms, and has inspired much imaginative conversation about the formal possibilities 
of realism.  
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self-reflexive mode of representation, emphasizing “the materiality of writing, 
foreground[ing] the illusionistic character of representation, [and] playfully address[ing] 
the reader” (Beaumont 6). We might even claim, as Anna Kornbluh does in her latest 
project, that realism is architectural: “realism” she contends, “designs and erects 
socialities, imagines the grounds of collectivities, probes the mystique and encumbrance 
of materialities, [and] calibrates and modulates institutions and productions beyond the 
scope of the given” (“The Realist Blueprint” 199). For Kornbluh, a spatial approach to 
realism combats the genre’s reputation for being merely or passively representational. 
With this claim, she revives the spirit of Jameson’s characterization of literature, in 
Marxism and Form, as an “experimental or laboratory situation” (xi). Literature, Jameson 
writes, “with its characteristic problems of form and content and of the relationship of 
superstructure to infrastructure, offers a privileged microcosm in which to observe 
dialectical thinking at work” (xi). The value of these microcosms is that they render 
visible the relationships between “ideology . . . the work of art, [and] the more 
fundamental social and historical reality of groups in conflict” (xiv). That contribution is 
crucial, for “reality” frequently exceeds immediate perception, as Lauren Goodlad 
explains: 
[T]he long and ongoing process of capitalist globalization is empirically 
real and, yet, fundamentally absent to individual perception as the totality 
of that process. This is not because of any ideological ruse that critics 
must demystify. It is, rather, because certain historical phenomena, 
however materially consequential, are . . . not cognizable in the form of 
objects ‘in plain view’—not only globalization but also commodification, 
the turn to neoliberalism, the financialization of the world economy, the 
entrenchment of racism and sexism, the reduction of biodiversity, and 
climate change. (The Victorian Geopolitical Aesthetic 273-4, italics in 
original) 
What makes realist narrative so keenly fitted to the representational challenges Goodlad 
identifies is its orientation toward totality. Its content encompasses diverse spheres of 
action and thought that overflow subgenres like the industrial novel, domestic novel, 
Bildungsroman, sensation novel, and so forth. In Georg Lukács’s account, the 
distinguishing feature of realism is that it “does not portray an immediately obvious 
aspect of reality but one which is permanent and objectively more significant, namely 
man [sic] in the whole range of his relations to the world”; moreover, it “captures 
tendencies of development that only exist incipiently and so have not yet had the 
opportunity to unfold their entire human and social potential” (“Realism in the Balance” 
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48). For Lukács, realism is a dialectical practice, driven by the impossible aim of 
reconciling the concrete and the abstract, the particular and the universal—or, if we can 
think temporally as well as spatially, “destiny and the eternal present” (Jameson, 
Antimonies 26). Such a project is certainly underway in Gaskell’s Mary Barton, and is 
typical of the “Condition of England” novels, insofar as they dramatize collisions of 
private life with class-based oppression. Lukács believed that realism had lost dialectical 
character early in the nineteenth, but Goodlad discovers the traces of dialectical thinking 
much later, in the works of Eliot, Collins, and Trollope. 
Like Goodlad, I see realism as retaining its dialectical character throughout the 
century. Indeed, though the industrial novel was short-lived, Victorian realism never 
stopped probing the relationship between the macro-structures of a global economy and 
the micro-structures of private life. Even when it sidesteps the obviously economic 
arenas of the factory and the market, it perpetually confronts the productive relations of 
the societies it represents. Subtle, complex expressions of alienated labour, and 
particularly those fraught labours of love that we tend to imagine are inalienable, are 
focal points in each of my chapters. In Mary Barton, women’s communicative labour is 
rendered invisible by the commodified status of their bodies; in Romola, the 
unremunerated care work of multiple women enables the professional success of male 
intellectuals; in the Palliser novels, the alarmingly indistinct work of clerks, politicians, 
writers, socialites, and gamblers threatens to undermine received notions of moral and 
economic value; and in Jude the Obscure, the hopeless, inevitably downward trajectory 
of the disadvantaged stonemason is mirrored in the life of the sexualized lower-middle-
class woman. This diverse set of stories is brought together by their representations of 
the effects of capitalism on painfully intimate, immaterial forms of labour, and by the 
implications of immaterial labour for our broader understanding of economics. Ultimately, 
I argue that each text models a dialectical understanding of labour not as a reified 
commodity but as a contingent, ethically loaded social relation. 
My project contributes to existing scholarship on economics and the novel by 
bringing diverse conceptual realms into relation, elucidating patterns that might 
otherwise evade notice. To an extent, it overlaps with Joshua Gooch’s The Victorian 
Novel, Service Work and the Nineteenth-Century Economy, which sees domestic, 
intellectual and communicative labour as forming an autonomous “service economy,” 
developing alongside but lacking causal links to the industrial system. Gooch isolates the 
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service economy from the industrial one, claiming that “an examination of services 
provides unique insight into the Victorian understanding of work as an ambiguous 
political site that produces social connections and new subjects as well as social 
domination” (3). However, in my view, these insights are not exclusively the product of 
service work. Representations of immaterial labour in Victorian fiction are instructive not 
because they demonstrate completely different social relations than those found in the 
factory or the field; as I argue, it is the role they play in the overall production process—
crucial and yet frequently invisible—that merits critical attention.  
Historical analyses of economic technologies form another important backdrop of 
this project. Critics like Nancy Henry and Mary Poovey enrich our understanding of 
Victorian economics through their empirical interest in the rise of a monetary culture and 
its many institutions, but while their keen focus on financial documents and discourses 
produces rich, textured knowledge about, for example, limited liability and double-entry 
bookkeeping, it necessarily directs their commentary away from the feelings and 
relationships that, as Goodlad might say, are materially consequential and yet absent to 
perception as discrete objects. I draw significantly on Henry, Poovey, and others in the 
New Historicist school, but my own project differs from theirs in spirit and in aim. I focus 
on what are perhaps the most subjective and culturally mediated aspects of economies, 
on the feelings, values, and relationships through which an economy either coheres or 
breaks down. The significance of this position for my topic lies in the kinds of outcomes it 
makes available: my chapters develop an integrated picture of the most elusive—
because volatile, contingent, and subjective—elements of economic life, moving 
dialectically between systems and individuals, texts and readers, and history and the 
present to derive a Victorian theory of immaterial labour that has lost little of its 
relevance today. 
Other forbearers of this project are studies of economic metaphor by Deanna 
Kreisel and Anna Kornbluh. In Economic Woman: Demand, Gender, and Narrative 
Closure in Eliot and Hardy, Kreisel focuses on the “key metaphors” of surplus, excess, 
and circulation, as well as the “phantasmagorical figure” of “economic woman,” an 
“idealized model of feminine sexual restraint and wise domestic management [who] 
mobilizes a set of metaphors utilized by the discourses of political economy and realist 
novel alike” (14). For Kreisel, the wayward desires of characters like Hetty Sorrel and 
Maggie Tulliver figuratively signal the health (or malaise) of the Victorian economy, but 
16 
the reproductive labour that such characters perform is secondary in her accounr. Like 
Kreisel, Kornbluh explores the abstractions that link capitalism to the realist novel. In 
Realizing Capital: Psychic Economies in Victorian Form, she names “economy” the 
“seminal metaphor of late modernity,” arguing that it both “heralds desire as the motor of 
the macro-economy” and provides “the preferred prism for understanding subjectivity” 
(3). In opposition to historicist interpretations, Kornbluh denies that the novel 
“incorporates capital indexically,” claiming instead, “the rendering of capital in realism 
entails . . . aestheticization, crafting forms that engage the formal logic of capital” (13).  
Kornbluh’s formal critique is impressive, but she too readily accepts the 
evanescence of “fictitious capital” (3), and this leads her away from the traces of labour 
and exploitation that are central to the novels she examines. The concept of immaterial 
labour, which pulls both toward and away from metaphor, which captures the most 
illusive forms of work as it reminds us of the material cost of this work, allows me to 
position my own study at the intersection of historicist and formalist approaches, thereby 
bridging some of the gaps in existing scholarship on economics and the novel. I 
maintain, first, that the intangible relations sustained through communication, 
information, and affect are irreversibly transformed by the advent of industrial capitalism; 
second, that they are susceptible to the same processes of alienation by which skilled 
workers are made into interchangeable factory hands; and third, that because immaterial 
relations sustain the reproduction of capitalist society, they must be understood as 
fundamental rather than ancillary to that society. As I hope to show, the realist novel best 
teaches us about the ways we continue to understand and value labour when we 
approach it with an eye toward shifting distinctions between material and immaterial 
forms of work, and toward the distribution of that work.  
A further advantage of “immaterial labour” is that it unites nineteenth- and twenty-
first-century criticism of political economy. Throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century, Marxist-feminist critics fought to bring social reproduction to the foreground of 
economic critique,10 but the dawn of the millennium saw the emergence of a new 
                                                
10 That struggle achieved its most visible form in the “Wages for Housework” campaigns of the 
1970s, initiated by Selma James in Manchester, England, and soon an international movement 
with branches across Italy (coordinated by Mariarosa Dalla Costa) and in New York (under Silvia 
Federici). Other groups assembled to represent black women, prostitutes, and lesbians, such as 
Margaret Prescod’s “Black Women for Wages for Housework” and the still active English 
Collective for Prostitutes (https://prostitutescollective.net/). In addition to their activism, leaders of 
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discourse on immaterial labour, inspired by the perplexing economic conditions of a 
post-postmodern era that we have yet to satisfactorily name. The free-falling markets, 
failing industries, austerity measures, and xenophobia that came to define life in the 
West following the 2008 financial collapse led some cultural critics to declare a growing 
weakness in the status quo. With capitalism-as-usual edging closer to collapse, the 
possibility of meaningful critical intervention seemed newly attainable, and the (at times, 
doubtful) value of the critic’s labour, reaffirmed. Moreover, palpable shifts in Western 
labour markets—the result of a rapidly expanding information economy—meant that 
more and more labour was becoming “immaterial,” and more specifically, virtual. Michael 
Hardt called this shift “economic postmodernization,” and claimed that it positioned 
“affective labour in a role not only directly productive of capital but at the very pinnacle of 
the hierarchy of laboring forms” (“Affective Labour” 90).11 The newly dominant economic 
paradigm was one in which “providing services and manipulating information” were “at 
the heart of economic production” (90). Hardt is referring not only to the expansion of the 
service sector, but to the increasingly prevalent role of affect and information across 
sectors, from the incorporation of computer technology to the use of market data for “just 
in time” production to the management of worker behavior by now-ubiquitous Human 
Resources departments (91). For Hardt, the implication of the shift was twofold: while 
our very thoughts and feelings seemed newly subject to alienation, the potential for 
resistance, for that very reason, seemed greater. Indeed, Hardt claimed that “knowledge, 
information, communication, and affect” were the engines of the “postindustrial” 
economy. That idea has been challenged in years since, but it survives in the left’s more 
recent critique of financialization. Christian Marazzi, for instance, claims that language 
and communication are the principle means by which value is created in the New 
Economy. The ability of the financial market to generate profit, he claims, depends on 
contingently held assumptions that are “eminently linguistic,” such that the markets of 
                                                                                                                                            
the movement published now classic manifestos on women’s unwaged work, including James’s 
and Dalla Costa’s The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community (1972). For a 
detailed history, see Louise Toupin’s Wages for Housework: A History of an International 
Feminist Movement (2018).  
11 Hardt’s explanation of the value of immaterial labour is conflicted. Noting that developed 
economies are increasingly service economies, and that the path to economic dominance now 
lay through the mastery of information and not the advancement of manufacture, he places 
immaterial labour “at the pinnacle” of a “hierarchy of laboring forms” (90)—yet he also notes 
(without explaining the paradox) that many forms of work in the service industry are underpaid, 
gendered, and racialized (95). “Here begins to emerge a fundamental division of labour within the 
realm of immaterial processes,” he writes at the end of a paragraph, then moves on to delineate 
the intangible products of immaterial labour: social networks, community, and “biopower” (95-6).  
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the post-Fordist era can only be explained by “a linguistic theory of their operations” (27-
9). Like Hardt, Marazzi is hopeful, sensing in the New Economy’s linguistic structure the 
potential for an “explosion of the body of the multitude” that would expose the market’s 
reliance on the “negation of the bodies of real speakers” (35-6). For Hardt, Marazzi, and 
other members of the autonomist school, the commodification of the worker’s subjectivity 
constitutes the New Economy’s most deeply alienating aspect, but also its vulnerability 
to the disruptive energy of “biopower from below” (Hardt 98). 
Any politically committed thinker will feel the appeal of this perspective, but at 
whose expense comes the Italian New Left’s valorization of immaterial labour? It is 
simple enough to identify the features of the “New Economy” that were central to earlier 
capitalist regimes, or that remain today continuous with resource extraction and 
industrial production in all parts of the world. What is more, assertions of the novelty of 
immaterial labour’s position in the global economy undercut the work that feminist critics 
like Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Selma James and Silvia Federici have done to expose 
capitalism’s reliance on the appropriation of women’s labour, much of which is by 
conventional definitions “immaterial.”12 The Victorian novels examined here show that 
both the exploitation and radical theorization of gendered forms of immaterial labour 
significantly predate this recent wave of critical interest. There is no internet in the 
Victorian texts I discuss, but there is an information economy; similarly, Human 
Resources departments await their formal invention, but we can trace their origins at 
least as far back as nineteenth-century interventions into the management of poor 
working bodies. Our now not only includes these histories, but could change as a result 
of more serious engagement with them. Gaskell’s prostitute character, Esther, whose 
body conveys the information that frees entrepreneurial Jem Wilson and allows him to 
take the profits of his intellectual property to the New World, has much to tell us about 
the real cost of immaterial labour. Similarly, the negated desire that has made Hardy’s 
Sue Bridehead a continual enigma for critics shows us the limitations of sexual 
emancipation, some of which modern feminism has yet to overcome.  
                                                
12 Though Hardt links his own thinking explicitly to “feminist investigations . . . of kin work and 
caring labour” (89) his understanding of the postmodern proletariat, as Sianne Ngai observes, “is 
theorized on the basis of work in the culture industries rather than on women’s work in the home” 
(Our Aesthetic Categories 238). While it may seem plausible or even practical to group the 
activities of thinking and caring under the umbrella of “immaterial labour,” we cannot do so 
without acknowledging the historical processes by which forms of work and remuneration were 
and still are unevenly distributed. 
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 My point, then, is that as much as contemporary theories of immaterial labour 
can shed light on Victorian novels, novels can enrich, challenge, and complicate 
contemporary theory. My chapters strive toward a perspective that privileges neither 
theory nor text, but sees each as equally important ingredients in the creation of 
knowledge. The texts I examine help me respond to what I take to be gaps in some of 
the most exciting contemporary work on immaterial labour, not only the subtle bias 
toward creative labour that Hardt’s theory implies, but also the glorification of hard, 
muscular work that unexpectedly informs Sara Ahmed’s feminist theory of immaterial 
labour (which I discuss at greater length in chapter two). Taking my cue from the novels 
themselves, I treat the productive and reproductive aspects of the societies they 
represent as mutually constitutive, ontologically open categories, an approach that both 
demands and facilitates dialectical thinking.  
Dialectical Criticism 
In Marxism and Form, Fredric Jameson describes dialectical thinking as “a ceaseless 
generation and dissolution of intellectual categories” (336). “Doubly historical,” it 
apprehends both the objects and the processes of intellectual inquiry as products of 
particular human societies (336). Objects, the concepts we attach to them, and the 
rigidity of those concepts, their resistance to change, are all, from the dialectical 
perspective, historical phenomena in need of analysis. “Method” frequently follows 
“dialectical” in Jameson’s text, but as though permanently under erasure: “method” 
implies a standard procedure in which the same steps fall, predictably, in the same 
order, and perhaps more significantly, it implies a degree of separation between thought 
and its objects. Yet these suppositions are inimical to dialectical thinking, the “essence” 
of which lies in “the inseparability of thought from content or from the object itself” (338). 
The dialectic is not a self-contained critical lens that we place between ourselves and the 
object we wish to understand, but a conscious experience of our implication in that 
object, an “epistemological shock” that enlarges our perspective until it includes 
historical processes that were latent in our initial perception (375).  
Jameson’s qualification of the dialectic’s status as method expresses a negative 
impulse implicit in much Marxist criticism, including that of Marx himself. Diane Elson 
points out that Capital lacks a “methodological preface” to expound its view of the world 
as a “qualitatively changing continuum,” though it persistently implies this view (140). 
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Lukács and Adorno similarly model the dialectical method in their criticism, but refuse to 
explain it discursively. This is not an accidental omission, but a pre-emptive foiling of any 
explanation that would reduce dialectics to the reified categories of social science. Such 
a reduction would defeat the purpose of dialectical criticism, blinding us to the 
historical—indeed, ideological—character of our thinking, and strengthening the 
impression of inexorability by which the status quo reproduces itself. Genuine dialectical 
thinking, to use Jameson’s phrase, shatters the linked illusions of thought’s autonomy 
and the object’s inertia, developing the thinker’s awareness of the social processes that 
are immanent in objects. It helps us identify relationships between what often seem like 
separate spheres of our lives, stimulating the creative as well as the critical capacities of 
our thought.  
 Importantly, the dialectic is not itself exempt from this process of critique: 
dialectical thinking demands awareness of the form as well as the content of thought, 
yielding new insight through a process of negation and correction that applies the thing 
observed and to the act of observation. To an extent, it courts ambiguity as it builds 
understanding, sending the thinker in pursuit of fuller knowledge, but denying the finality 
and completeness of the knowledge found. Adorno goes so far as to reject the synthesis 
phase of dialectics entirely, replacing it with its opposite, “unswerving negation,” the only 
way, in his view, to mitigate the violence of thought’s assault on its objects (Negative 
Dialectics 159). A means not subject to one end, a method suspicious of results, 
dialectical criticism aims at dissolving the reified concepts that prevent us from drawing 
otherwise inevitable conclusion about our lives, training us to see the social processes 
embedded in seemingly alien objects: 
We start from the form we want to understand, and we do not go 
backwards in time; rather, we consider how to treat it as the precipitate of 
an ongoing process without detaching it from that process. (Elson 141-2)  
Elson’s explanation is rooted in Marx’s critique of political economy, perhaps the most 
thoroughgoing example of dialectical criticism in action. Capital situates economic 
agents and actions in historically specific relationships that unfold over time. The 
valorization of labour, the accumulation of capital, the exchange of goods in the market, 
all appear in Marx as ongoing processes from which particular forms—“value,” say, or 
“commodities”—cannot be detached. Instead of detaching objects from their conditions 
of possibility, Marx’s method encourages us to identify and follow the processes in which 
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they are embedded, recovering them as “precipitates” of those processes.13 Our 
knowledge of the form we set out to understand, then, honours the historical character of 
that form; in place of a discrete, bounded concept over which we have mastery, we 
grasp hold of a thread that exceeds us, one whose ends stretch far into the past and the 
future.  
It is through a similar dialectical process that Victorian novels conceptualize 
immaterial labour. In fact, dialectical thinking may be the only way to conceptualize 
immaterial labour, which is precisely not contained in bounded objects, which tends not 
to produce the same effect twice, and which cannot even appear to be realized outside 
of particular human relationships. Doubtless, these features contributed to its 
marginalization in the official discourse of political economy,14 but as I have suggested, 
realist novels achieve their epistemological potential precisely when they take on the 
contested middle ground between individual and social experience. Because novels are, 
on the whole, more interested in processes of formation than in final forms, and because 
they emphasize the emotionally charged relationships that comprise individual lives, they 
capture forms of labour and value that exceed the reified concepts of classical 
economics. As Gaskell’s Job Legh points out, neither the yield nor the cost of a working 
life can be tallied “as you would fixed quantities, and say, given two facts, the product is 
so and so, [for] God has given men feelings and passions which cannot be worked into 
the problem, because they are forever changing and uncertain” (Mary Barton 385).15 
                                                
13 Elsewhere in her essay, Elson draws attention to a number of chemical metaphors: 
“significantly, the metaphors used to characterize the relation [between labour and value] are not 
mechanical nor mathematical/logical but chemical and biological: ‘crystallization,’ ‘incarnation,’ 
‘embodiment,’ ‘metabolism,’ ‘metamorphosis,’” all of which, she suggests, help Marx convey the 
idea of a materially instantiated “change of form” (139).  
14 The under-representation of feminized labour in classical economics is multivalent. Folbre’s 
history, cited above, discusses the emergence of economics in relation to the gender binarism of 
Enlightenment political theory and Christian theology. Folbre argues that early political economy 
adopted the “moral double standard” already present in these earlier discourses, casting self-
interest as a benevolent quality for the rational and implicitly masculine subject of economics, and 
selfishness as a dangerous force to be policed against in female subjects, whose altruistic 
devotion to the family was necessary for the smooth functioning of markets (xxiii). “Over the 
course of capitalist development,” she argues, “women gained ‘self ownership’ but remained 
subordinate to men in large part because they continued to specialize in producing something 
that could not be easily bought and sold—the next generation of citizens and workers” (xxi)—a 
point that applies not just to child-bearing, but to many intangible products, as Marilyn Waring 
demonstrates in her classic analysis, Counting for Nothing (1988).  
15 For Job, the novel’s pacifist, uncertainty manifests in inaction, in a staunch refusal to join the 
Trade Union’s struggle, and in a hermetic desire to be left alone to pursue his hobby science. 
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Realist novels do not try to quantify or resolve these “uncertain” passions; instead, they 
contextualize them, and strive to create sympathetic experiences in readers. The 
subjective or sentimental emphasis of novels is not a naïve response to the utilitarianism 
of nineteenth-century social and economic theory, but a bringing to light of precisely 
what is made invisible by the rationalization of society and work such theory sanctions.  
  What can dialectical criticism bring to texts that are, themselves, dialectical? My 
readings start by identifying moments of tension or contradiction in the texts (always, in 
Jameson’s formulation, the sign of content seeking “adequate expression in form [328]); 
then, I reconstitute those contradictions on a larger scale, connecting aesthetic tensions 
to epistemological and social ones. Some contradictions, like the much-discussed union 
of melodrama and realism in Mary Barton, are glaringly obvious, if not in any sense of 
the word simple. Others are much more subtle: a word that is out of sync with the 
vocabulary surrounding it, such as the conspicuous, repeated intrusion of the latinate 
term “information” in the plot of Gaskell’s illiterate prostitute, or a generic category that 
continually undermines itself, like that of the gentlemen-hero in Trollope. Occasionally, 
contradiction takes the form of a subplot that denies or reverses the momentum of the 
story it takes part in, such as Romola’s symbolic marriage to her husband’s mistress at 
the end of the novel that bears her name. Sometimes, it is no more than a feeling of 
unease evoked by a character or setting, a challenge confronting our sympathy, often in 
the shape of a difficult girl: Violet Effingham, for instance, sinking the hero’s 
Bildungsroman in Phineas Finn with her flippant response to his impassioned plea for 
love—“No, why should I try?”—or the errant heroine of Hardy’s eminently modern (if 
crushingly bleak) romance, hinting to her lover that there are pleasures and freedoms 
more important to her than love. What may strike us as obstinance or even madness 
(and the cool temperature of Sue’s love has been called madness) is, in every case I 
examine, connected to an objective contradiction in the world outside the novels: the 
imposition of commodity logic onto the purportedly inalienable resources of the heart and 
mind—or, in other words, the exploitation of immaterial labour. 
In a variety of ways, then, the aesthetic contradictions in these texts mediate 
what would otherwise be unbearable points of tension in the social relationships they 
                                                                                                                                            
However, the novel it makes clear that Job’s privilege will not extend to all of the working-class 
characters, and especially not to the women, who are forced into action at incredibly high costs: 
life, in Esther’s case, and sanity, in Mary’s. 
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represent. While there has recently been some debate in our field about the validity of 
critics’ attempts to unveil the latent historical content of texts, that debate has tended to 
imply an either/or relationship between “surface” and “depth.”16 Dialectical criticism, as I 
understand and try to practice it, addresses surface and depth simultaneously. If 
reductive understandings of the classic Marxist distinction between base and 
superstructure suggest a unilateral privileging of the former, a genuinely dialectical 
understanding acknowledges the ever-present possibility of reversal, of imaginative 
possibilities in the superstructure becoming catalysts for material transformation, and of 
determinative forces in the base dismantling their own conditions of possibility. At no 
point in the chapters that follow do I suggest a straightforward or predictable relationship 
between culture and material production; the fictional mediations of immaterial labour I 
examine manifest their truths in unpredictable—though fortunately, recoverable—ways.  
Although my readings aim to clarify these mediations, they are, themselves, 
mediations. Criticism inevitably complicates its object, introducing the generative noise 
of language, and of the critic’s social and cultural bearings. In my view, this state of 
things is neither avoidable nor particularly lamentable, but it does demand self-
awareness, the reflexive counter-movement of the dialectic. In Marxist literary criticism, 
this awareness is expressed through the self-consciously mimetic character of critique. 
Adorno describes artworks—literary, musical, visual—as “self-likeness freed from the 
compulsion of identity,” a provocative phrase that turns on the difference between 
representing something aesthetically and trying to identify it through nominal description 
(Aesthetic Theory 121). “What is essentially mimetic,” he writes, “awaits mimetic 
comportment. If artworks do not make themselves like something else but like 
themselves, then only those who imitate them understand them” (121). The conviction 
animating this claim—the one that justifies the formal impenetrability of Aesthetic 
Theory—is that explaining things kills them. Discursive language imposes self-identity on 
                                                
16 I am referring to the provocative debate on “surface reading” that began with Sharon Marcus 
and Stephen Best’s 2009 special issue of Representations. Like the V21 Collective’s manifesto, 
this intervention responds to a widespread impression of disciplinary stagnation. However, while 
V21 attempts to revivify the legacy of ideology critique, Marcus and Best oppose the 
“hermeneutics of suspicion,” claiming that close attention to what is “evident, perceptible, 
apprehensible in texts” could liberate the critic from “political agendas” and “adversarial relations” 
to the objects of criticism (16-17). Although the two interventions move in opposite directions, 
both have inspired a great deal of reflection on the practice and purpose of Victorian studies in 
this era of anti-intellectualism and neoliberalized education. A heightened awareness of and 
greater willingness to argue about the social impact of our research has been, to me, the most 
exciting outcome.  
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the things it describes; it obliterates the countless ways in which things differ from 
themselves, yielding knowledge not about those things but about impoverished, reified 
versions of them. Art does not solve this problem, but it responds to it: if the closest 
discursive language can get to the truth is acknowledging a “taboo” against uttering 
truth, art is the “mimetic struggle against that taboo,” and critique, the mimetic 
reproduction of the struggle (127). A dissertation is not art, nor is it quite critique in 
Adorno’s sense of the word; it must be lucid, suspect as lucidity is. Nonetheless, the 
mimetic spirit described in these paragraphs is what animates my treatment of the 
primary texts.   
 With a novel, and especially with long novels, you have to spend time. A 
closeness grows, whether you want it to or not: a familiarity with the shape, the mood, 
the language, the hopes and fears that propel the story, and which register, however 
subtly, like changes in the temperature of the air. One can and should explain this 
familiarity, but it is better, when possible, to create it. Paraphrase and tableau are 
privileged modes of analysis in my chapters: I try to examine key moments in the texts 
less by taking them apart than by building them again, balancing the observable details 
of plot and style with the absent causes, the relationships and processes, the little 
histories that novels contain in such abundance, all of which demand inclusion in 
critique’s summative gestures. The language of the text, its formal peculiarities, the 
many ingredients that go into the impression or atmosphere it creates for readers, must 
inform each critical judgment. Direct quotation is an indispensable tool for illustrating 
these qualities, and one I certainly employ, but to demonstrate an unusual sentence 
form or choice of words by example is not the same thing as experiencing it over a 
protracted period of engagement with the text. As Jameson points out, the form of the 
example is, on its own, undialectical (338); dialectical criticism must strive, even if it 
frequently fails, to convey a more total impression of the text, a “sympathetic internal 
experience of the gradual construction of a system according to its inner necessity” (xi).  
To that end, I try to position even minute textual details in the larger 
constellations both of the work they take part in and of the history they express. I place 
considerable emphasis on the continuity and inner logic of each work, and while 
“continuity” may reside in an unfolding plot or developing character, it is just as 
frequently to be found in the affective tone of the work, in the range of feelings its author 
depicts and attempts to elicit in readers. So, if there is something nostalgic about my 
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chapter on Mary Barton, if it feels from time to time like an elegy for the character of 
Esther, and for the degraded status of “women’s work” which her figure evokes, this is 
because those irrational attachments are essential components of the novel’s critique of 
political economy’s utilitarian premises. My chapter on Romola strives to unite the 
contradictory feelings of exhaustion and hope, which I take to be a definitive experience 
of the liberal glimpsing the limits of liberalism, a position Eliot occupied, and one I think 
academics working under the protective (if emaciated) arm of the university, however 
passionately they disavow liberalism, owe a profound debt. Similarly, if there is a 
glibness to my discussion of Trollope’s normative sentence forms, a fatal, almost 
teleological progression in my analysis of Hardy’s reverse-Bildungsroman, these things, 
too, are intentional, features of my imperfect answer to what remains true in the call of 
each text. 
Chapters 
The four chapters in this dissertation range chronologically from the beginning of the 
Victorian period to the end, and document the emergence of increasingly creative and 
complex understandings of labour and value. To an extent, they range thematically, too, 
though as I have indicated, each one examines phenomena that fit under the broad 
heading of immaterial labour. The historical congruence of immaterial labour with 
feminine or feminized workers means that the chapters also share an emphasis on 
women, and particularly, on the challenges that women pose to received understandings 
of work. The first two chapters, on Gaskell’s Mary Barton and Eliot’s Romola, show 
female authors using female characters to bring feminized forms of labour into visibility. 
Both Gaskell and Eliot reject what was then (and to a shocking extent, still is) the 
dominant understanding of women’s sympathy as innate, natural, and freely given, 
presenting it instead as a vital resource that is not only exploited but appropriated from 
women under capitalism. Where past critics have taken these authors to prize sympathy 
as an extra-economic antidote to the evils of industrial society, I argue that they were, in 
fact, alert to the susceptibility of the subject’s innermost resources to commodification. In 
Mary Barton and in Romola, the intimate, ethereal processes of thought, feeling, and 
expression flow through the production cycle just like any other form of labour, becoming 
thing-like and alien to the subjects who enact them, but unlike other forms of labour, they 
remain invisible and unremunerated. Insofar as they replenish the bodies and the minds 
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of the workforce, they are socially necessary, but as both Gaskell and Eliot demonstrate, 
they are not socially valued; they constitute a deep but unseen well of accumulated 
value from which the “productive” economy continuously drew.    
At the centre of chapter one is a fiercely exploitative, undeniably gendered proto-
information economy. I show how the rational worldview undergirding industrial 
capitalism imposes relative values on different forms of knowledge, shunting the 
embodied folk wisdom associated with the female characters to the bottom of an 
economic hierarchy where it is unceremoniously appropriated, regardless of the 
consequences for its producers. Where working-class male characters survive their 
exploitation thanks (ironically) to their ability to distance themselves from the objects 
they produce, women are virtually assimilated to the yield of their labour. It is not just 
their labour that is commodified, then, but their bodies, personalities, and identities. For 
them, the stakes of economic participation are far higher than they could ever be for the 
male characters, even the most destitute among them.  
Chapter two carries the ethical concerns of Gaskell’s timely “social problem” 
novel backwards and forwards in time, to the fifteenth-century setting of Eliot’s 1862-63 
romance, Romola. Despite its historical setting, Victorian commentators immediately 
recognized its contemporary bearing: this was a novel about Renaissance Florence, to 
be sure, but the romantic, sexual, and political entanglements driving the plot struck 
many as being modern ones. Also modern are the novel’s depictions of emotional and 
sexual exploitation. Eliot’s villain, shipwrecked scholar Tito Melema, owes his rapid rise 
in Florentine society to the unsung efforts of two women: Romola, whom he marries and 
whose fortune and status he steals, and Tessa, a young peasant girl he pretends to 
marry, and who provides the rejuvenating domestic oasis that allows him to carry on with 
his taxing career in politics. Because even the novel’s male characters are artists, 
intellectuals, and politicians, dichotomies between “productive,” masculine/manual 
labour and “unproductive,” feminized immaterial labour are impossible to sustain; 
instead, the novel presents scholarship, politics, and care-giving as overlapping forms of 
skilled labour, and while the distribution of these skills is not determined by gender, the 
conditions governing each character’s choices are. By drawing attention to this 
difference, the novel primes us to react against the injustice of a system that extends 
opportunity and recognition to one kind of worker while stripping away the freedoms of 
the other, but where we might expect Eliot to extend the liberties enjoyed by men to 
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women, she rejects the instrumental paradigm entirely, proposing in its place a dialectics 
of duty as fraught as it is Utopian.   
Chapters three and four continue to document representations of immaterial 
labour in the novel, and to focus on the challenges female characters and feminized 
work present to that idea; however, where chapters one and two contrast immaterial, 
affective forms of labour with an idealized vision of masculine labour, chapters three and 
four reckon with an increasingly modern, gender-defying economy. Trollope’s Palliser 
novels, published between 1864 and 1880, span a period of significant social 
transformation, one in which the forces of globalization and financialization combine to 
render an inherited system of cultural values almost totally invalid. Just what is 
“valuable” in the Palliser world—what kinds of people, what kinds of work, what kinds of 
money—is a question Trollope cannot answer, but one that leads him to a bracing 
critique of the limits of our habitual understandings of value. If the challenge for Gaskell 
and for Eliot was to prove women’s capacity for work and to make that work visible, in 
Trollope, feminized, immaterial labour is impossible to ignore. What is more, it is no 
longer so easy to distinguish from “masculine” work: in the world of the Pallisers, 
distinctions between masculine and feminine forms of work are anything but clear. 
Middle-class men flood the market for a growing number of conspicuously feminine 
service-sector jobs, and women demand meaningful work outside of and in addition to 
marriage. While nominal heroes like Plantagenet Palliser appear weak, unproductive, 
ineffectual, and comically obsessed with retaining their purity, women demonstrate 
pragmatism, purpose, industry, and creative ability. Although Trollope tries to explain this 
confusing modern world with cultural patterns inherited from the previous century, the 
result is a series of dizzying reversals that send his characters and his readers well 
beyond the limits of his own historical perspective. Ultimately, in spite of themselves, the 
Palliser novels de-reify culturally dominant forms of value, presenting value instead as a 
social relationship that must be continually negotiated.   
My final chapter, on Hardy’s Jude the Obscure (1895), features a woman 
possessed of a veritable career outside of marriage, at least until she is kicked out of 
Teacher Training school for bad behavior. Often read as Hardy’s take on the late-century 
phenomenon of the New Woman, Sue Bridehead, I argue, exceeds the bounds of this 
historical type. Although she attempts to avail herself of opportunities specific to the 
1890s, she struggles against forms of systemized exploitation that survive to this day. 
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Sue is unwillingly made the emotional and sexual crutch of not one but two men: her 
lover/cousin, Jude, and her mentor/husband, Richard Phillotson. Her response to this 
impossible position—a maddening, willful indeterminateness—has been variously 
understood as coquetry, hysteria, repression, and/or coded queer desire, but I read it 
differently, as a determinate negation that diagnoses the liberal subject with unfreedom. 
While both she and Jude start down the well-trod path of the Bildungsroman hero—
discovering and developing their innate capacities, making mistakes, falling in love, 
stumbling toward some understanding of their place in the world—their stories, and 
especially Sue’s, reveal the falsity of the Bildungsroman’s promise of reconciliation 
between individuals and society. In Hardy’s depiction, the reconciled condition (to use 
the Adornian phrase) is barred by the objective imprisonment of individuals in the 
administered world. It is Jude’s deep investment in the idea that a better life can be won 
through individual effort that makes that life impossible. Sue’s persistent negativity, 
because it shifts her outside of the subject position Jude so desperately clings to, 
paradoxically yields a clearer view of the way forward. Tragically, she does not triumph; 
at the end of the novel, her life is wasted with Jude’s. The solidarity with other working 
people (and particularly with working women) that might have sustained her is blocked 
by the atomized order of her social world. But Sue’s failure to seize the radical freedom 
she glimpses is not predetermined, nor is it predictive of our failure. Her example 
illuminates a path that we did not, but could have and might still take.   
The concerns in each chapter are linked, then, but wide-ranging in effect. While 
the final pages of Gaskell’s novel admonish us with the image of the destitute sex 
worker, whose life is among the hidden costs of progress and liberty; while Eliot 
challenges self-interest with a defiant synthesis of duty and care; while Trollope both 
congratulates and mocks our indefensible habits of valuation; and while Hardy submits 
the secular faith of individualism to a critique it cannot withstand, each author’s texts 
nuance a story about the functioning of our economy that has come to seem as natural 
as gravity. Read together and with the particular set of emphases for which I have 
advocated, they illuminate the common fate of affective, creative, intellectual, and sexual 
labour, thereby allowing us to interrogate the very different fates of individuals and 
groups obliged to perform those types of labour. My organizing concept, immaterial 
labour, reveals the insidious continuity of economic exploitation with private life, but it is 
the novels themselves that reveal the consequences of that continuity. Taking their 
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contributions seriously means expanding the concepts of labour and value well beyond 
their usual parameters, but in doing so we will deepen our understanding of capitalism’s 
ethical compromises and, I hope, renew our resistance to them.  
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Chapter 1. Truth-telling in Gaskell’s Industrial 
Episteme 
At the centre of Elizabeth Gaskell’s first industrial novel, Mary Barton (1848), a 
disgraced and destitute Esther Barton stumbles upon the seemingly innocuous scrap of 
paper that will devastate the working-class family she once belonged to. Her discovery is 
hardly the event we expect to find at the heart of a novel about Chartist labour strikes: 
the paper is a repurposed valentine, inscribed with the name of the novel’s eponymous 
heroine and crammed into dimensions that immediately suggest its prior use as gun-
wadding. Nestled in the grass at the scene of an hours-old murder, it constitutes nearly 
irrefutable evidence of the guilt of the well-to-do victim’s rival in love, the factory worker 
Jem Wilson, but beyond this, it signals a turn away from the gritty realism of the novel’s 
opening chapters and toward the feminized terrain of romance. Illiterate, but all too 
familiar with the scrawl that decorates the valentine, Esther immediately (though 
erroneously) assumes Jem’s guilt, and takes it upon herself to deliver this insight to the 
novel’s heroine, who must against all odds exonerate her beloved from blame.  
Esther’s services have profound ramifications for the industrial plot, but her 
intervention leads the story away from the overtly political concerns of its Chartist hero. 
Following her discovery, the novel becomes increasingly concerned with its characters’ 
internal emotional states, and with the domestic spaces and relationships that mediate 
and are mediated by those states. The shift is surprising, and has received its share of 
criticism over the years. Early readers were puzzled (and sometimes, disappointed) by 
Gaskell’s decision to wed her economic critique to the apparently inconsequential stuff of 
romance, but later critics have found the novel’s awkward union of genres and concerns 
to be its most interesting and productive feature. Catherine Gallagher’s influential 
reading links the novel’s “generic eclecticism” to its paradoxical characterization of the 
working poor as, on the one hand, free agents deserving of respect and autonomy, and, 
on the other, hapless victims in need of rescue (Industrial Reformation 16-17). Marjorie 
Stone sees the splitting of genres, somewhat similarly, as an expression of the novel’s 
dialogization of “conflicting languages and ideologies,” designed to provoke “horizon 
change in its middle-class readers”  (196). Still others have explored the environmental 
and biopolitical themes linking the two plots, and feminist critics have celebrated 
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Gaskell’s radical foregrounding of working-class female sexuality.17 As Patsy Stoneman 
points out, the “domestic” plot is highly political: “the family is the mechanism which 
produces class attitudes, and parent-child relationships, as worked out in the 
‘extraneous’ sections of the novel, demonstrate how the personal becomes political” 
(70). Indeed, by contemporary standards, a shift in focus from the plight of the working 
man to that of the homeless prostitute hardly signals the abandonment of questions 
about labour, but rather the expansion of the category of labour to include de-legitimized 
forms of work that were then (and some extent, still are) relegated to a dark nether 
region of economic production.  
In this chapter, I build on the work of past critics who see the romantic and 
industrial plots as complementary, but while many have examined the political 
implications of Gaskell’s representation of working-class culture, gender, and sexuality, I 
take a step back to look at her critique of the epistemological structures supporting the 
shift to capitalism. It is in the romance plot, and more specifically, I argue, in the 
interactions between un- and under-waged characters, that these structures come 
closest to the fore. Esther is crucial in this regard: in the scene described above, she 
discovers something more than a piece of paper. No longer just a valentine or even a 
piece of gun-wadding, the paper transforms before her eyes into “evidence,” and more 
than that, into the apparently irrefutable fact of Jem’s guilt. That the paper’s status as 
evidence is not an objective quality but rather a reification of her own suspicions does 
not occur to her: she is fooled by an impression of objectivity that is actually the result of 
her own thinking.  
Esther’s mistake is formally analogous to one those of us living and working in 
capitalist societies make every day. She confuses the objectivity of the paper with her 
subjective suspicions, so that her interpretation confronts her as objective fact, rather 
than as the result of her own inductive reasoning. In a similar way, commodities confront 
                                                
17 In her 2017 article, “A Breath of Fresh Air: Eco-consciousness in Mary Barton and Jane Eyre,” 
Margaret Kennedy suggests that the conflicting classes and conflicting plots are ultimately united 
in response to the pervasive threat of environmental catastrophe. Michael Parrish Lee also sees 
intention and artistry in Gaskell’s play of genres: while early critics like Raymond Williams and 
John Lucas accused her of trading radical representation of working-class misery for a satisfying 
romance plot, Lee argues that Mary Barton is unique among Victorian novels in persistently 
foregrounding working-class appetite. A dramatization of the Malthusian tension between hunger 
and sexuality, Mary Barton’s “food plot” continually interrupts its love plot, denying readers the 
privilege of imaginatively disengaging sexuality from the other material needs of the body (514).  
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us as alien objects rather than as the realizations of our labour. Read in light of Marx’s 
theory of the commodity, Esther’s confusion evokes a reversal in logic that is 
characteristic of capitalist modernity. The implications of that reversal are borne out by 
subsequent events in the plot: the half of the novel that follows this pivotal point presents 
a continuation of the pattern, the result of which is that Esther’s body and later Mary’s 
become objectified vessels for the all-important proof of Jem’s innocence. Esther’s life is 
spent in her efforts to deliver the valentine/gun-wadding to Mary, and while the younger 
woman survives a race against time to present Jem’s alibi to the judge and jury, she 
emerges from the trial a shadow of her self, barely able to string words together. 
Combined, their fates suggest a world in which the objects of our making become 
ultimate ends and manifestation of value, for which we are merely the forgettable, even 
disposable means.  
Another way of saying this is that, like Gaskell’s tragic worker-hero, Esther and 
Mary live in a world characterized by alienation and the commodity-form. While the 
ideology of the middle class dictated that it was women’s job to help men recover from 
the damaging effects of work and trade, Gaskell’s women work for money, and are 
permanently alienated themselves. Indeed, in the novel, neither men nor women recover 
from their alienated state in the intervals between paid work hours. On the contrary, the 
novel’s chilling achievement is to show how alienation penetrates not only the home but 
also the mind, changing social formations and, more insidiously, changing the 
parameters of personhood. The specific horror of the industrial system that shocked 
Marx and Gaskell alike was the way it transformed a definitive human capacity—the 
capacity to create—into a process that degraded human beings. Where, in a happier 
state, Marx imagined labour to be the process by which man mediated his relationship to 
nature and realized his species-being (an ideal Gaskell also cherished, if her celebration 
of pastoral, pre-capitalist busy-ness is any indication) under the new system of industrial 
production, men, women and children were becoming the “appendages” of machines 
(Capital 719). If survival required man to metabolize nature, capitalism perverted this 
relationship so that industry metabolized men (290, 457). In Gaskel’s novel, the effects 
of this perversion are visible not only in the poverty and despair of the working-class 
characters, but in the machinic quality of their actions: poor men and women function 
like “automatons” (354), conversing with one another and consuming their meals 
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“mechanically” (62).18 Moreover, these effects are not limited to the characters who work 
in factories: the shock of Jem’s arrest renders Mary numb and doll-like, and Esther’s life 
of struggle starves her will and stunts her personality, so that she is left to drag her worn 
body from corner to corner, thinking singly and robotically of the next “dram” (298, 164). 
Working men, girls, and prostitutes seem alike to have lost their status as tool-using 
beings and become more like tools, the result of an economic system that alienates their 
labour, exploits their bodies, and strips them of agency. However, searching the novel 
for representations of obviously alienated labour—that is, labour sold for a wage—yields 
few results, and in fact, leads us away from Gaskell’s most probing critique. A more 
fruitful approach is to think of alienation as both underlying and exceeding the wage, as 
a near universal condition of being in an atomized, capitalist world. 
The wage expresses alienation, but as Gaskell well knew, the two are not 
equivalent. John Holloway claims that what differentiates labour-under-capitalism from 
other historical organizations of creative activity is the objectification of labour implied by 
the wage, or what he calls the “separation of doing from done”: 
The separation between subject and object, between doer and done or 
done-to, acquires new meaning under capitalism, leading to a new 
definition and a new consciousness of subjectivity and objectivity, a new 
distance and antagonism between subject and object. Thus, rather than 
the subject being the product of modernity, it is rather that modernity 
expresses consciousness of the new separation of subject and object 
which is inherent in the focusing of social domination upon the done. (31)  
Marxian theories of alienation imply that, under capitalism, it is not only one’s 
relationship to work that is alienated, but one’s total experience of the world. Georg 
Lukács makes the claim explicitly in History and Class Consciousness: “the fetishistic 
character of economic forms, the reification of all human relations, the constant 
expansion and extension of the division of labour which subjects the process of 
production to an abstract rational analysis, without regard to human potentialities and 
abilities of immediate producers . . . and these things transform the phenomena of 
                                                
18 In The Lives of Machines (2011), Tamara Ketabgian argues that some Victorian authors, 
Gaskell included, saw the factory’s fusion of humans and machines as extending rather 
destroying human agency (29). She points out that in Mary Barton, the characters’ leisure 
activities mimic the rhythm of the factory. Seeking to “recreate the immediacy, regularity, and 
intense physical excitation associated with machine work,” the characters develop “habits of 
consumption that simulate the factory’s own prosthetic systems and connections” (72). Her 
reading opens up the possibility that interactions with machines introduced new and previously 
inconceivable forms of pleasure, even as they facilitated exploitation.   
34 
society, and with them, the way in which they are perceived” (6). The “internal 
organization of the factory,” he writes, “could not possibly have such an effect—even 
within the factory itself—were it not for the fact that it contained in concentrated form the 
whole structure of capitalist society” (90).  
This understanding is pertinent to Gaskell’s novel because it highlights the total 
social effect of alienation, not just on characters like John who are forced to sell their 
labour by the hour, but on un- or ambiguously waged characters, many of them women 
and seniors, whose (often immaterial) labour is nonetheless appropriated and fed back 
into the production cycle. When Esther apprehends the valentine as evidence, she 
reproduces the fetishistic logic of the factory, mistaking her guess for a truth that exists 
independently of her perception.19 That she adopts this perspective, that in this crucial 
moment Gaskell’s novel about labour becomes a novel about processes of 
objectification, signals an interest not only in the material structures of capitalism but in 
its logic, in the historically specific worldview that it both produces and demands.   
Lukács and Max Weber called this worldview rationalization. The term is useful 
because it captures the inextricability of capitalism’s epistemological and ontological 
effects. In Mary Barton, Gaskell responds to the material changes wrought by 
industrialization, but also to the epistemological paradigm that accompanied it, that 
justified the division of labour and that privileged exchange-value over use-value, both 
with devastating consequences for the poor. For Weber, these interlocking 
developments exemplify the rational conviction that every aspect of the world can and 
should be calculated, predicted, and controlled (“Science as Vocation” 13); for Lukács, 
rationalization is the definitive mindset of the bourgeois individual, who, failing to grasp 
the dialectical interplay between subject and object, simply accepts the world as given. 
We might imagine Victorian realism to be exemplary of this project, and in many ways it 
is20—yet in Gaskell’s novel, the rational, bourgeois perspective is defamiliarized, 
                                                
19 The reversal is marked in the scene by the sudden introduction of the abstract term 
“information.” As I explain more fully below, this term has special significance in the novel, 
signaling the subordination of embodied forms of knowledge to a reified and infinitely 
exchangeable alternative. Put differently, “information” is knowledge in commodified form, bearing 
value but obscuring its history and the conditions of its making.  
20 Franco Moretti makes this argument in The Bourgeois. He claims that the defining aesthetic 
features of the Victorian novel are products of rationalization. The “diffusion of fillers” so typical of 
Victorian realism “turns the novel into a ‘calm passion’ . . . or into an aspect of Weber’s 
‘rationalization’: a process that begins in the economy and in the administration, but eventually 
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historicized, and contrasted against residual forms of knowledge and value. Truths that 
are complex, relational, and irreducibly rooted in context vie with and are superseded by 
a recognizably modern form of reified, exchangeable information. As I demonstrate 
below, Gaskell’s Manchester is a battleground, not just between working man and 
factory owner but between competing ways of understanding the world. On one side, a 
deeply social, creative synthesis between subjects and objects, and on the other, its 
Other, alienation.  
This chapter is also concerned with the gendered distribution of these effects. As 
a modern, instrumental paradigm takes hold, as communal resources are enclosed and 
men reduced to factory hands, as exchange-value trumps use-value and efficiency 
becomes paramount, there is less and less room for ways of being that prioritize 
creativity and sociality above profit. It is not that these ways of being become any less 
necessary an ingredient for human happiness; on the contrary, they remain as 
necessary as ever, but paradoxically, they lose their value. Capital’s solution, as Gaskell 
inadvertently demonstrates in her novel, is to relegate any essential but non-lucrative 
function to a lesser population. In Mary Barton, that population is made up of women. 
Thus it is no coincidence that Mary and Esther are the casualties of Jem’s trial: in the 
world that Gaskell depicts, women are denied the opportunities and the technical 
literacies that would allow them to occupy the subject position in an intensified 
subject/object binary. What the fates of characters like Esther, Mary, and the aged wise 
woman Alice Wilson show us is that the modern, rational paradigm entrenches existing 
hierarchies of class, gender, and ability, widening gaps in equity and installing an 
uneven system of value that is still with us today.  
Rational Victorians 
At first glance, Mary Barton’s critique of industrial society seems anything but 
subtle. An early chapter, tellingly entitled “Poverty and Death,” describes the derelict 
slums John Barton passes through on his way to assist the ailing Davenport family. The 
disparity between rich and poor is starkly illustrated: Barton has only to walk a short 
                                                                                                                                            
spills over into the sphere of free time, private life, feelings, aesthetics . . . rationalization 
pervades the very rhythm of the novel.” (82) As this chapter demonstrates, Mary Barton 
complicates Moretti’s thesis by challenging the rational perspective through an ethically charged 
focus on mediation.   
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distance from the grimy Davenport cellar to see bright lamps burning behind the plate 
glass displays of shops, and hardly any further to stand at the threshold of the 
comfortable, well-supplied Carson home (60-4). The juxtaposition between the middle-
class hearth and the unwholesome pit in which the Davenports live is powerful, and it 
plants a seed of resentment that, compounded by other misfortunes, eventually leads 
John Barton to kill. However, these obvious injustices are merely the tip of the social 
iceberg examined in the novel. Gaskell critiques the results of industrial capitalism, but 
she also critiques the production process, and, crucially, the commodity logic that 
pervades it.  
As Marx notes in Capital, the trick of commodity is to appear self-contained and 
self-evident. Commodities obscure the human relations and processes by which they 
come into being, presenting themselves instead as objects possessed of inherent value. 
To adopt the rational worldview means to fall for this trick, to take the object world for 
granted and to assume the possibility of immediate, non-dialectical access to objects. 
The problem with this view, for Lukács, is that it masks important realities and increases 
our susceptibility to alienation: by assuming an unmediated relationship to reality, 
rational, “bourgeois thought” forfeits those “immanent meanings [ie: exploitation of 
humans, environmental destruction, etc.]” that “inhere in objects . . . but [that] are absent 
from the immediate manifestation of those objects as well as from their mental reflection 
in bourgeois thought” (156). Gaskell’s novel testifies to the growing influence of 
rationalization, but it is also resists it. As my prior characterization of Esther’s discovery 
suggests, the novel self-consciously dramatizes and critiques the rational perspective, 
emphasizing again and again the mediated quality of our knowledge of the world, and 
highlighting the ethical costs and the mistakes we risk making when we ignore it.  
It is no surprise, then, that media objects like the valentine occupy crucial 
positions in the plot. The valentine is one of many objects that challenges characters’ 
habitual way of knowing, calling attention to a plurality of epistemological paradigms, 
each of them laden with material consequences. Its discovery drives Esther out into the 
streets when she would normally be asleep, where she lurks, “greedily listening to every 
word of the passers-by, and loitering near each group of talkers, anxious to scrape 
together every morsel of information, or conjecture, or suspicion” (235). Esther’s thirst to 
understand and the intrusion of that strange, polysyllabic word, “information,” into a 
strand of the narrative that has hitherto emphasized her illiteracy and failing powers of 
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speech calls out for analysis. The word substitutes for the “absent, abstract thing” of the 
murder, which Esther cannot bear to think about directly (237). As the narrator makes 
clear, she is caught between the seemingly undeniable, objective implications of the 
valentine—that Jem is guilty of murder—and her own deeply held conviction that he 
could not possibly have committed so gross a crime (236). The distinction is between an 
empirical, pseudo-scientific conclusion based literally on the evidence at hand and one 
determined by the emotionally charged memories of her relationship with Jem, the “only 
one,” she recalls, to have “spoken to her kindly” since her ejection from the Barton family 
(236). Although for Esther, the first conviction triumphs, the reader knows that Jem is 
innocent, and thus from the very beginning the supposedly objective, obsession-inducing 
value of the “evidence” is placed into question.   
Examples of this tension are present throughout the novel. Mary, who knows the 
truth about the murder, struggles as much as Esther to reconcile that truth with her own 
experience. No sooner has she received the remains of the paper from Esther than she 
steals into her father’s room to confirm her suspicions, discovering the missing half of 
the valentine in the pocket of his coat, just where she expects it to be. In that moment, 
the shocking confirmation of her father’s crime causes the written words on the paper to 
become estranged from their meaning. Suddenly, the words appear to Mary as they did 
to Esther: though the younger woman can read and write, she sees ink blotches instead 
of letters, and marvels at how the shapes “fitted; jagged end to jagged end, letter to letter 
. . . even the part which Esther had considered blank had its tallying mark with the larger 
piece, its tails of ys and gs” (243). As the revelation sinks in, Mary’s feelings battle with 
her intellect, and what she knows collides spectacularly with what she also knows:  
Her love for her father seemed to return with painful force, mixed up as it 
was with the horror at his crime. The dear father who was once so kind, 
so warm-hearted, so ready to help either man or beast in distress, to 
murder! (244) 
Like Esther, she must choose her course under the weight of paradoxical convictions. A 
deep knowledge of her father’s character, buoyed by love, loyalty, and a lifetime of 
experience, rests uneasily in her mind next to the apparently objective proof of his guilt. 
Reluctantly, she accepts that guilt as “fact,” but the accompanying injunction to reconcile 
“father” with “blood-shedder” is so profoundly alienating that it begins to wear on her 
sanity, contributing to the breakdown she suffers at the trial (354). That the exercise 
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should have so deep an effect is only right, for it requires her to trade a set of beliefs that 
are the culmination of all of her experiences and relationships for an impersonal truth 
that can only seem a hollow and meaningless by comparison.  
A savvy reader might object that in this scene, it is not the form of the information 
that is so estranging to Mary, but its content. Certainly, the competition between reified 
“fact” and more subjective forms of truth plays out with heightened drama in the murder 
plot, but conditions of knowing (and not knowing) are under examination from the 
beginning of the novel to the end. Gaskell’s oft-quoted preface frames her entire text as 
an antidote to the mutual ignorance of the middle and working classes. In that preface, 
she speaks of being “laid open” to the noble hearts of her working-class neighbours, and 
of realizing the depths of their undeserved suffering, thinly veiling the hope that her novel 
will have a similarly enlightening effect on her readers (3). Equally, though, she laments 
the gaps in the understanding of the labourers, imploring her readers to help “disabuse 
the workpeople” of their “miserable misapprehension” (4). Claiming to know “nothing of 
Political Economy or of theories of trade,” she assures the reader, “if my accounts agree 
or clash with any system, the agreement or disagreement has been unintentional”; her 
sole effort, she claims, has been to “write truthfully” (4).21 What she does not specify is 
the precise kind of truth she understands herself to tell.  
Intentionally or not, her preface sets up an opposition between the kind of truth 
that can be expressed through character and story and the kind espoused by the 
political economist. Jonathan Grossman has argued that the novel’s central conflict is 
between the epistemology of fiction and that of the judicial system: evidence and 
testimony, justice and sympathy, judgment and storytelling intersect and compete with 
one another until the climactic trial scene, when Mary’s impassioned speech manages to 
combine the rules of both (121). Her testimony reveals her hitherto unconfessed love for 
                                                
21 This oblique reference to the “truth” occurs numerous times in novel. The most famous 
occurrence comes in early in the novel, when the narrator, after describing the workers’ 
resentment of middle-class displays of luxury, admits “I know that this is not really the case; and I 
know what is the truth in such matters: but what I wish to impress is what the workman feels and 
thinks” (24). The line undermines the truth-value of the worker’s feelings, but it provides no 
compelling replacement for those feelings. If the worker’s perception is false, how else are we to 
understand the wealth gap between the rich and the poor? The answer to the question is 
withheld: supposedly, the narrator “knows” what is true, but she is not telling. Gaskell employed a 
similar tactic in letters to readers and critics of Mary Barton. “I wanted to represent the subject in 
the light in which some of the workmen certainly consider to be true,” she told Mary Ewart in 
1848; “not that I dare say it is the abstract absolute truth” (67).   
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Jem at the same time as it provides evidence in his defence; in a similar manner, the 
novel as a whole entertains as it educates, employing the devices of melodrama to 
engage readers and those of realism to assert itself as “proof” of the unjust conditions to 
which the working class were subject. The latter aim, Grossman asserts, gains validity 
from the backdrop of the Victorian legal system:  
Mary, like the author Gaskell, negotiates becoming a public figure and 
gives evidence for a differently plotted reality . . . The uneven parallels 
between the courtroom and the storytelling of the novel enable Gaskell 
not only to reflect on herself as author but also to imbue her novel with a 
testimonial form, as serious and ‘real’ as that which might be told in court. 
(122) 
In my view, the specific logic Grossman identifies exceeds the confines of the courtroom. 
The trial scene is important, but it is not the law that Gaskell takes issue with in her 
preface: the opposition she constructs is broader than that, encompassing, on the one 
hand, a diachronic, dialogic way of knowing and, on the other, a frozen, rational one. 
Given that it was the “romance” of being “elbowed daily in the streets” by the workpeople 
of Manchester that inspired Gaskell to write, it seems fair to say she privileges the 
former (3). Like the heroine of her later novel, North and South, she senses that the 
statistical surveys of the social scientists and the laws of Political Economy are not 
telling the whole story, and that they may be even be jeopardizing that story.22 As an 
irate Margaret Hale quips in response to Mr. Thornton’s claim that he must “take the 
facts as [he] finds them . . . without trying to account for them,” accounting for facts 
“makes all the difference in the world” (122). In the same scene, Margaret admits, “I do 
not care enough about schools . . . but the knowledge and the ignorance of which I was 
speaking did not relate to reading and writing—the teaching or information one can give 
to a child . . . what was meant was ignorance of the wisdom that shall guide men and 
women” (119).  
The allusion in the scene is to the bible, but the critique of facts here expressed 
by Margaret and espoused by Gaskell in the preface to Mary Barton should be 
                                                
22 As Mary Poovey notes in Making a Social Body, by the 1840s these epistemological positions 
had acquired distinct gender connotations: “the abstract reasoning of political economy was 
considered a masculine epistemology, while the aesthetic appreciation of concrete particulars 
and imaginative excursions was considered feminine” (133). I explore the implications of 
gendered knowledge (and of the forms of value associated with that knowledge) later on in this 
chapter. 
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understood as a reaction against the growing authority of a number of fact-laden 
discourses, not just political economy but a whole new field of science that promised to 
solve social problems through the collection and analysis of information. The 1830s saw 
the institution of a national census and the founding of statistical societies centred 
around topics like education and crime, along with the introduction of the New Poor Law, 
which was itself based on Malthusian principles. The Law transformed the meaning and 
experience of poverty by bringing into being a system of “fact-gathering, inspection, and 
legislation” that abstracted the living bodies of the poor into an aggregate population 
(Poovey 8-11). As Elaine Hadley notes, the implied theoretical equivalence of individual 
members within this population could hardly have been experienced as such, for it 
necessitated the destruction of customary relationships between the rich and the poor 
and introduced in their place a set of notoriously dehumanizing classifications (89). 
According to the law, poor relief was to be made available only through workhouses, 
which were designed to deter any but the most desperate from entering. Once inside the 
workhouse, married couples were separated, and the additional relief formerly available 
to the mothers of illegitimate children was stripped away. Such relief, in the words of one 
Commissioner, simply “promoted bastardy” (“The Amendment of the Poor Laws.” The 
Examiner. 20 April 1834.)23  
These conditions inspired a hostile public backlash. The inhumanity of the New 
Poor Law was obvious to critics like Gaskell and her occasional publisher, Charles 
Dickens, both of whom countered statistical representations of the poor with fictional 
narratives inspired by their experiences of living among the working class. Yet backlash 
or no, the logic supporting initiatives like the New Poor Law was powerful. Indeed, it was 
                                                
23 Malthus’s influence on this particular commissioner is clear. Malthus’s controversial but 
compelling argument was that human populations inevitably grow until an external limit is placed 
on reproductive sexuality. If governments did not intervene, these “limits” would take the form of 
catastrophe—famine, disease, war—or so Malthus and his followers believed. The influence (and 
refutation) of Matlhusiasn thought in Victorian fiction has been explored by a number of critics, 
most notably Catherine Gallagher. In her 2006 study, The Body Economic, she argues that the 
apparently divergent genres of fiction and classical economics shared a common emphasis on 
the importance of individual human bodies. For Gallagher, the single greatest consequence of the 
Malthusian obsession with sexuality and sustenance was that, in the nineteenth century, “issues 
of bodily well-being and of economic circulation [were] frequently articulated both through and 
against each other” (46). For economists like Malthus, Smith, and Ricardo, this articulation led to 
a paradoxical view of laboring bodies as both the source of and greatest threat to value (a 
paradox critics as different as Marx and Ruskin were quick to identify). For writers of fiction, the 
results were more varied. Gallagher examines Dickens and Eliot in particular, claiming that both 
authors develop “bioeconomic” and “somaeconomic” plots in their fiction (61).  
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not limited to specific policies or institutions but expanded to fill nearly every corner of 
social life. In Making a Social Body (1994), Mary Poovey calls that logic “modern 
abstraction,” and argues that, by the early decades of the nineteenth century, it had 
become the de facto standard for truth-claims in a wide variety of disciplines and 
contexts. Everything from the wage system to the study of demographics to Euclidean 
geometry depended on the prior imposition of “a conceptual grid that enabled every 
phenomenon to be compared, differentiated, and measured by the same yardstick” (9). 
The results of this shift were most dramatic in the hard sciences, where an older 
paradigm that emphasized the scientist’s role in representing and even correcting the 
natural world gave way to a new cult of objectivity. Where the task of the Enlightenment 
naturalist had been to discern ideal types from the flawed examples in nature, the 
nineteenth-century scientist sought to erase the traces of his subjectivity from the 
presentation of natural phenomena. Aided by ever-more-sophisticated technologies, 
practitioners of science increasingly believed that they could control “their own 
temptation to impose systems, aesthetic norms, hypotheses, language, and even 
anthropomorphic elements” onto their representations of nature (Daston and Galison 
174). A free-floating, reified form of truth, better known as information, seemed not only 
possible but readily attainable.  
The impression was not reserved for scientists: on the contrary, the impact and 
sheer amount of “information” that was becoming available to middle-class Victorians is 
difficult to overstate. Developments in print and transportation technology, educational 
reform, and climbing literacy rates contributed to a broad cultural movement that the 
Victorians recognized as the “march of the mind,” and the result was an “unprecedented 
public demand for unprecedented amounts of new knowledge” (Jenkins 7).24  Like so 
                                                
24 This was the age not only of totalizing Victorian realism but also of the ambitious, pseudo-
ethnographic undertakings of Henry Mayhew, whose London Labour and the London Poor 
attempted to create a comprehensive list of “types” of human beings in London’s poor 
neighbourhoods. London Labour began as a series of articles for the Morning Chronicle, but 
Mayhew persevered with the project after a quarrel with the Chronicles’ editors left him to conduct 
it on his own. The version most familiar to Victorian scholars is the final 1861-2 edition, which 
combines material from the Morning Chronicles period with Mayhew’s later, independent 
research into an impressive, four-volume text. That text is notoriously hard to describe; ostensibly 
a catalog, it undermines its own pretensions to completeness by splitting categories into smaller 
and smaller components and variations—not just those who work, won’t work, or can’t work, as 
Mayhew initially proposes, but an endless parade of shoe-makers, dock-workers, street sellers, 
prostitutes, beggars, vermin catchers and street performers. In Bryan Green’s words, Mayhew’s 
compendium “collapses under the weight of its Byzantine elaborations and ad hoc inventions, 
such as to sometimes seem a satire on classification” (104). Ungainliness aside, modern 
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many of our societies today, Victorian England was an information society, where new 
media technologies and information systems progressed rapidly in the eyes of their 
users from awe-inspiring novelty to indispensability (Menke 4). The photograph, the 
postage stamp, the telegraph, electric light, the telephone, the phonograph, and the 
typewriter are just a few examples of media devices that emerged in the period, and that 
permanently altered the way that information was perceived, disseminated, and stored 
(4-5). As Margaret Linley and Colette Colligan write in the introduction to their edited 
collection on the topic, “media ubiquity” was fast becoming the norm, and it brought with 
it a host of previously unimaginable ways of “knowing and experiencing the world” (1).  
Perceptions about the social worth of knowledge were in flux, too. Historian Toni 
Weller argues that the nineteenth century “witnessed a transition from pre-modern to 
modern understandings of information,” one premised on the “social and cultural 
acceptance that ‘information’ was something worth valuing and considering in its own 
right” (12).25 In George Eliot and Blackmail, Alexander Welsh explores the ramifications 
of that trend in fiction, concluding (as Margaret Hale would surely agree) that 
“information” represented something distinct from “knowledge” in the Victorian 
vocabulary. He describes “information” as a historically specific phenomenon, “not to be 
confused with wisdom, or practised skills, or common sense” (43).26 Unlike these time-
                                                                                                                                            
historians and ethnographers have found value in Mayhew’s approach. Green argues that 
Mayhew achieves the stance of the “impartial observer,” not wholly absorbed by his object, but 
also not wholly in command of it, either. Priti Joshi identifies an ethics of “recycling” in the text: 
“Mayhew’s presentation of the street-folk as involved in massive projects of reclaiming ‘utterly 
worthless’ items and adding value to them via their labour is,” she writes, “a mirror of his own 
project of reclaiming social ‘detritus’ and giving them cultural value and voice” (103). As these 
readings suggest, Mayhew’s taxonomy of the poor simultaneously employs and complicates the 
epistemology of abstract fact that so strongly influenced mid-Victorian social policy. Although his 
approach and final product differ significantly from Gaskell’s, he shares her concern with the 
ethics of representing and administering to the poor, and, like her, tries to fuse “objective” 
representation with “subjective” identification.  
25 Weber regarded this assumption with suspicion. In his 1917 lecture, “Science as Vocation,” he 
claims that science “assumes that the knowledge produced by any particular piece of scientific 
research should be important, in the sense that it should be ‘worth knowing,’” (17). As he points 
out, this is a presupposition that cannot itself be proved by scientific means (18). 
26 “Common sense” is a resource associated in the novel with Margaret Legh. This form of 
knowledge is highly contextual and seems to depend in some way on Margaret’s personality, and 
thus it is not “exchangeable” in the same way as Esther’s ill-informed tip about the murder. 
Nonetheless, it possesses a definite use-value for the other characters, as the following passage 
makes clear: “Margaret had the great charm of possessing good strong common sense, and do 
you not perceive how involuntarily that is valued? It is so pleasant to have a friend who 
possesses the power of setting a difficult question in a clear light . . . People admire talent, and 
talk about their admiration. But they value common sense without talking about it, and often 
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worn forms, “information” had to be “capable of storage and retrieval”; it could not remain 
“intrinsic to one mind,” but had to be “separable and potentially exchangeable” (43). The 
distinction sheds light on Esther’s identification of the valentine as “information”: what it 
represents—the likelihood of Jem’s guilt—in no way squares with her beliefs, 
experiences, or personal knowledge of Jem, but she recognizes it as something others 
will value. An “absent, abstract thing,” impossible to reconcile with her own knowledge 
(237), Esther nevertheless grasps hold of the paper with failing hands, and of its 
meaning, with her failing mind, determined to give it to the family that has shunned her—
in exchange, she hopes, for sympathy.  
Gaskell’s Info-drama 
As I have suggested, the reified form of “information” coexists in the novel with 
several alternatives. Every major turn in the plot—be it the love triangle, the “evidence,” 
the false accusation, Mary’s testimony, or the final dialogue between John and the father 
of the murder victim—hinges on the difference between knowing something in the sense 
of apprehending the facts and understanding that thing dialectically. The former 
paradigm suggests the possibility of truly objective knowledge, premised on a clean cut 
between the active, observing subject and the passive, observed object. The latter, by 
contrast, figures understanding as a metabolic process in which both the subject and the 
object are subtly (or, in some cases, significantly) changed. Welsh’s terms, “information” 
and “knowledge,” loosely designate these paradigms, and both appear at key moments 
in Gaskell’s text. “Knowledge” is associated with the street sense of the working-class 
characters, with emotional intelligence, with history and tradition, with moral sense, and 
even with premonition. By contrast, “information” is reserved for objects like the 
                                                                                                                                            
without knowing it” (43). Unlike the collection of petrified scorpions that is her grandfather’s pride 
and joy, Margaret’s “common sense” cannot be identified with any price; its value is felt, but it is 
not amenable to abstraction. Later on in the novel, Gaskell provides a striking contrast to 
Margaret’s shrewdness in her depiction of Mary’s obsession with the evidence of Jem’s 
innocence. After discussing the possibility of an “alibi” with Job, Mary “hurrie[s] home . . . like one 
who finds a jewel of which he cannot all at once ascertain the value, but who hides his treasure 
until some quiet hour when he may ponder over the capabilities its possession unfolds” (253). 
The strange miserliness that overcomes Mary in this scene suggests that the “value” of the 
evidence is more in line with the abstract, symbolic value of gold or jewels than the unsung use-
value of “common sense.” To use Welsh’s terms, the “evidence” takes the form of modern 
“information.” For more discussion of the distinction between use-value and exchange-value in 
the novel, see page 24.   
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valentine, which act very much like commodities, possessing a curious but indisputable 
value that is independent of their material properties. 
“Information” is also associated with technical literacy, but is by no means foreign 
to the working-class characters. On the contrary, Gaskell takes pains to emphasize just 
how much information the labourers of Lancashire possess. At the beginning of the 
novel she describes a little known “class of men” who “may yet claim kindred with all the 
noble names that science recognizes” (38). Despite spending long hours at the loom, 
these men find the time to study the Linneaen system and Newton’s “Principia,” and to 
set out on the weekends in search of plant and insect specimens for impressive personal 
collections (39). Gaskell’s narrator even recalls one instance where the founder of the 
Linneaen society, Sir John Edward Smith, turned to a Manchester hand-loom weaver to 
ascertain the location of an extremely rare plant species (39).   
Critically, this impressive group of working-class entomologists, botanists, and 
mathematicians is comprised of men. As we will see, the women in the novel are 
knowledgeable in their own ways, but they are largely excluded from the kind of hobby 
science described above. Nowhere is the division more clear than in the scene when we 
first meet Job Legh, a neighbour of the Bartons and an avid scientist himself. Formerly a 
weaver, Job fills the hours of his retirement with study, but his knowledge is of a 
decidedly abstract kind. He collects insects and scorpions, studies taxonomy, and 
adores Latin phrases, all passions that are mystifying to the other characters. When 
Mary first meets Job, she apprehends his science as wizardry, and the technical 
explanations he offers for her benefit do little to clear up the misunderstanding. In fact, 
as it turns out, the Latin names of Job’s specimens are like a “strange language,” and 
they “bewilder her more than ever” (40). Stepping into his workroom for the first time, 
Mary turns to his granddaughter, Margaret, to ask with sincere awe if her guardian is a 
fortune-teller (40).  
The source of Mary’s confusion is that she does not have access to Job’s way of 
knowing. She has never heard of entomology, and so draws on an older, more familiar 
mysticism to make sense of the strange instruments she sees before her. Yet despite 
her impression, there are no wizards in the pages of Mary Barton, and there are no 
women naturalists, either: Job’s science is impenetrable even to his devoted 
granddaughter, who confesses that though she has studied the relevant texts, she has 
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done so to please Job and not to satisfy any personal interest, admitting in confidence to 
Mary that she finds his collection “horrid” (40). Her dislike of scorpions is probably 
sincere, but even if it is not, she is rather too busy to undertake a hobby of this kind: 
despite debilitating cataracts, she works day and night as a seamstress to provide for 
herself and her grandfather. 
If Job’s taxonomies fail to capture the girls’ imaginations, the tales they hear from 
the visiting sailor Will Wilson do not. A cousin of Mary’s and a secret admirer of 
Margaret’s, Will enters the scene ready to amaze his listeners with stories of the 
wonders he has witnessed abroad. Unfortunately for Will, Job proves a tougher nut to 
crack than either Mary or Margaret. While the girls are fascinated by a report about 
mermaids, Job denies the existence of such creatures and the truth of the report. What 
he wants to hear about instead are the kinds of insects Will has encountered overseas, 
and reluctantly, the younger man obliges him: 
If you’re fond of grubs, and flies, and beetles, there’s no place for ‘em like 
Sierra Leone. I wish you’d had some of ours; we had rather too much of a 
good thing; we drank them with our drink, and could scarcely keep from 
eating them with our food. (150) 
As the line suggests, Will knows a thing or two about bugs, but the parameters of his 
knowledge differ quite drastically from Job’s. The same creatures that Job recognizes 
through the abstract schemes of entomology, Will knows by absorption through the 
body, having literally consumed them with his meals. Their earlier disagreement about 
the mermaid might be understood as an expression of the same difference we see here: 
simply put, the two men have diametrically opposed criteria for truth. As far as Job is 
concerned, the “truth” is written in the latest edition of his encyclopedia, but for Will, 
subjective experience is the only reliable standard. Frustrated by the older man’s 
skepticism, Will exclaims, “You’re one o’ them folks as never knows beasts unless 
they’re called out o’ their names. Put ‘em in Sunday clothes, and you know ‘em, but in 
their work-a-day English you never know naught about ‘em” (153). The outburst brings 
Job’s theoretical understanding into direct confrontation with Will’s practical one: insects 
from across the sea are literally foreign to both characters, but where Will absorbs them 
(becoming, I assume, stronger or weaker in body, depending on whether the bug was 
good to eat), Job keeps them foreign, preserving them behind glass and naming them in 
a dead language. Will’s understanding is metabolic and embodied, and erases the 
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distance between subject and object, but Job’s is highly mediated, and increases that 
distance. Tellingly, their ways of knowing have class connotations: Will associates his 
own beliefs and experiences with “work-a-day English,” and Job’s with leisure and 
display. Although both men belong to the working class, the accusatory tone of Will’s 
remark paints Job as a betrayer of class interests, or at the very least, a vulgar aspirant 
to middle-class respectability.  
Initially, the debate is inconclusive: Will seems to have the sympathy of his 
audience and even of the narrator, but he cannot offer satisfying answers to Job’s 
questions. Indeed, he is far less successful than Margaret Hale is in her economic 
debates with Thornton. After fumbling a few more responses, he is forced to admit that 
he never saw the mermaid, but only saw the comb that belonged to it, and that looked 
rather like an ordinary comb, after all. At this point, it seems he is headed for an 
embarrassing defeat, and in front of the woman he admires, no less, but he is saved 
from this fate when it dawns on him to offer Job a petrified fish obtained on a previous 
deployment: “a flying fish, I say it is. It were twenty feet out o’ water, and it flew near on 
to a hundred yards. But I say, old gentleman, I ha’ gotten a dried one, and if you’ll take it, 
why, I’ll give it to you” (154). Job enthusiastically accepts, and the tension between the 
two men evaporates:  
It was amusing enough to see these two, within the hour so barely civil to 
each other, endeavouring now to be ultra-agreeable. Will, as soon as he 
had taken a breath (a long, deep gasp of admiration) after Margaret’s 
song, sidled up to Job, and asked him in a sort of doubting tone: 
‘You wouldn’t like a live Manx cat, would ye, master?’ (154-5) 
What delivers Will from an emasculating debunking of his outmoded beliefs is his ability 
to understand the logic if not the words of Job’s language, which he demonstrates by 
proposing the exchange of the fish, and later, the cat. His grasp of Latin may be no 
better than Mary’s, but he understands how and when to execute the trade of patently 
dissimilar objects. In this case, a flying fish is on offer for the hand of one unmarried 
woman, Job’s granddaughter, Margaret Legh. That Margaret is at the centre of the 
men’s exchange is absolutely clear in the scene. Margaret’s song bewitches Will, and as 
Mary observes from her quiet corner, “his very lids refused to wink, as if afraid in that 
brief proverbial interval to lose a particle of the rich music that floated through the room” 
(154). Job, for his part, is as pleased by Will’s approval of Margaret’s singing as he is by 
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the offer of the flying fish (154). Through the medium of exchange, he is reconciled to 
Will, and convinced that the younger man is not quite as backward as his tales and 
superstitions suggested.  
If the men’s disagreement is rooted in a clash between competing 
epistemologies, it is resolved when one epistemology emerges victorious: the modern, 
abstract one that Welsh associates with “information” and commodity exchange. While 
Will’s folk knowledge initially threatens to feminize him, his understanding of the barter 
principle proves that he can indeed contend with Job in the masculine arena of 
abstraction and exchange. This is confirmed by his subsequent performance at the trial, 
which contrasts sharply with that of Jem’s mother: while an emotional Mrs. Wilson 
rejects the truth standards of the courtroom, insisting that her son’s character is more 
important than the literal smoking gun she is forced to admit is his, Will “understands the 
rules of the courtroom only too well” (Grossman 121). As Grossman observes, the young 
sailor “conform[s] to the trial’s procedures, a man manipulating the male-controlled 
space of the court”; as in his argument with Job, Will agrees to “use words to convey the 
necessary facts,” as opposed to the feelings that are, for Mrs. Wilson, far more pertinent 
(121). What Grossman leaves unexplored is the system of values underlying Will’s code-
switching: the flying fish and the Latin names of insects have obvious value in his debate 
with Job, but it is not so easy to describe that value. This is because it is not a use-value, 
which would be, in all likelihood, self-evident, but an exchange-value. Job’s “horrid” 
scorpions are horrid at least in part because it is difficult for the other characters to 
imagine what on earth one would do with such things, but “doing” things with the 
scorpions is not the point. Their value is more precise than that, and more abstract: “two 
shillings,” according to Job, who is in the habit of exchanging items in his collection for 
other goods and services, a point we discover after the murder, when he procures the 
aid of a barrister with whom he has previously traded specimens (260). Similarly, the 
value of the flying fish is mediated by the commodity-form: like Job’s scorpions, the fish 
is a material object, but its value is an abstraction that has little to do with its physical 
properties. The men proceed with their negotiation as if the fish is valuable in and of 
itself, but in fact it has no clear use-value. Its value is not intrinsic, but rather a sign of the 
relationship it establishes between the two men. That to Job it appears to “have” value is 
a simplification of the exchange scenario, an objectification of the relations in which the 
fish is suspended. 
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Critics often describe Job as the novel’s pacifist, but he is also Gaskell’s most 
rational character, in the Weberian sense of the word. He cultivates the objective, 
disinterested view of the scientist, and regards the world as fundamentally knowable, 
verifiable through empirical analysis and amenable to abstract representation. His 
perspective implies an unspoken faith in the exclusivity, autonomy, and stability of 
subjects and objects. Since this outlook is dominant today, it would be easy to overlook, 
were it not for the frequent comparisons Gaskell works into the text. The mermaid 
debate is one example, but there are may others, particularly when it comes to the 
novel’s female characters. Will’s elderly aunt, Alice Wilson, makes an instructive 
comparison to Job. Unlikely to call herself a botanist, she is apt to set out into the fields 
at a moment’s notice to find the ingredients for a medicinal tea. To her “invaluable 
qualities as a sick nurse and her worldly occupation as a washerwoman,” she adds “a 
considerable knowledge of hedge and field simples” (16). Her natural remedies owe little 
to modern science and she is ignorant of the Latin names of their ingredients; what she 
knows, she knows from experience, and presumably, from teachings of ancestors. We 
learn that she has relied on the capabilities of her body to develop these skills, having 
been wont in youth to “ramble off into lanes and meadows as far as her legs could carry 
her” (16). Midway through the novel, she suffers a stroke, and begins to lose these 
abilities: her sight deserts her, then her hearing, then slowly her mind. The very senses 
that, for most of us, render the world knowable, disappear for Alice, but the memory of 
her talents persists for her loved ones. Those talents are so closely tied to her physical 
body that she seems, to Mary, to heal even while unconscious: “even now, her bodily 
presence would soothe and compose those who were in trouble, changed, unconscious, 
and absent though her spirit might be” (225).  
This emphasis on “bodily presence” is characteristic: Alice’s physical abilities and 
limitations are the focus of nearly every scene she appears in. A highly sympathetic 
figure, loved and respected by the entire cast of characters, her functions in the plot are 
surprisingly few, for they are tethered to her physical presence. Mary places 
considerable faith in the elder woman’s powers, but those powers barely extend the 
reach of her wizened arms. As her health fails, her already modest sphere of influence 
shrinks to the circumference of the sickroom, but she urges a tearful Mary not to mourn 
for her, insisting that the loss of her sight and hearing are merely God’s way of 
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“hushabying” her to her “long sleep” (156). Gradually, she slips from the grim present 
into a more peaceful past: 
[Alice] was once more in the scenes of her childhood, unchanged and 
bright as in those long departed days; once more with the sister of her 
youth, the playmate of fifty years ago, who had for nearly as many years 
slept in a grassy grave in the little churchyard beyond Burton. (215-16)  
As the lines suggest, Alice is a pastoral figure, a creature not of Manchester but of the 
slopes and valleys of the Lake District where she was born. The mental return she 
achieves at the end of life—not just to the place but to the lost time of her youth—
solidifies this association. No matter how important she is to Mary, she represents an 
outmoded way of life, one that her decline and eventual death suggests is unsustainable 
in the context of a bustling factory town.  
I am not the first to notice the conflicting forms of knowledge associated with 
characters like Alice and Job. Recent work by Thomas Recchio and Jill Matus picks up 
on the very tension I have been exploring, and the two critics arrive at similar 
conclusions, though ones that differ slightly from mine. Both Matus and Recchio identify 
two epistemologies in the novel, the first associated with abstract reasoning and the fact-
based discourse of political economy, and the second with an impressionistic, intuitive 
form of knowledge rooted in the body and the emotions. According to Matus, Gaskell 
privileges the “knowledge of the heart,” for this knowledge is essential to her project of 
“changing hearts and therefore minds” (21). In the novel, feeling takes the place of 
words, allowing for the expression of what Matus calls a “sincere and direct message 
where words do not get in the way” (22). The claim is a tenuous one, given that Gaskell 
must employ words to communicate the supposedly inarticulate, emotional reactions of 
her characters. Moreover, the body itself is a medium, and not necessarily a more direct 
one than language, as I explain more fully below. Like Matus, Recchio detects in the 
novel a privileged form of “affective knowledge”: “the internal experience of sympathy,” 
he writes, “becomes a form of knowledge that supplements, contextualizes, or otherwise 
qualifies the facts of the matter and/or the conventional thinking on the matter” (299). 
Certainly, the novel counters the growing authority of instrumental reason with attempts 
to valorize more flexible forms of knowledge. However, neither Matus nor Recchio has a 
way of explaining the many scenes in which the instrumental paradigm proves more 
effective and more powerful than its “privileged” counterpart. No matter how much 
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narrative sympathy falls to Alice Wilson, the limitations of her embodied expertise are, I 
think, fairly obvious in the novel, as are the advantages of Job’s detached objectivity. 
Despite the disclaimers in the novel’s preface, Gaskell is alive to a hierarchy of value 
that, within modern industrial society, organizes discrete forms of knowledge. The 
conflict in the novel is, then, not just between forms of knowledge, but between the forms 
of value that accrue to them.  
Job never inspires the loving, reverent tones with which the narrator refers to 
Alice, nor is he held in such tender regard by the other characters, but his influence, if 
not so deep, ranges further than hers, and affords him social privileges that are 
inaccessible to her. Thanks to the devoted labour of his granddaughter, the old 
collector’s days are leisurely, and though he earns no regular wage by his research, it 
possesses clear social value, and can be translated with relative ease into the money 
system that determines the lots of the milliners and machinists. Job is well stocked with 
information, a commodity he can exchange not just with other men of his class but with 
those above him. Alice’s knowledge, by contrast, proves more difficult to abstract, rooted 
as it is in personal experience, and stored not in writing but in living memory. Gaskell 
does not tell us whether Alice can write, but it seems unlikely: her familiarity with the 
bible suggests possible literacy, but more poor women could read than could write. Job 
is both literate and numerate, and more than that, he is comfortable switching between 
qualitative and quantitative expressions of value. For Alice, value must be realized 
through use. An herb is valuable to her not because of its relative scarcity (as might be 
the case if it were a candidate for Job’s collection) but because it soothes the stomach or 
eases inflammation. Qualities like these that determine an object’s use-value, Marx 
described as “conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity,” having no 
existence apart from the physical reality of that object (Capital I.126). Exchange-value, 
by contrast, is abstracted from the physical body of the commodity, and is in this way 
able to serve as the common variable for a potentially infinite range of objects: 
The common element cannot be a geometrical, physical, chemical, or any 
other natural property of commodities. Such properties come into 
consideration only to the extent that they make the commodity useful . . . 
But clearly, the exchange relation of commodities is characterized 
precisely by its abstraction from their use-values. Within the exchange 
relation, one use-value is worth just as much as another, provided only 
that it is present in the appropriate quantity. (I.127)  
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It is through this process of abstraction that the wage can seem a tenable substitute for 
vastly different forms of labour, and yet in Mary Barton, Gaskell avoids describing the 
working man’s labour in such abstract terms. Indeed, as Caroline Betensky and Carolyn 
Lesjak have noted, she avoids describing that labour at all. Betenksy argues that serious 
questions about labour relations are sidelined by the Chartist characters’ quest to be 
recognized as human beings (108); Lesjak, similarly, calls labour the “guilty conscience” 
of the novel, a force that shapes the outcome of the plot but that cannot be 
acknowledged or resolved without endangering the bourgeois values of the novel’s 
narrator and intended audience (34). The fact that Gaskell steps gingerly around the 
factory-worker does not, though, indicate a lack of interest in the forms of value 
emerging from the capitalist organization of labour. On the contrary, once we recognize 
that the epistemological concerns of the novel stem from shifting hierarchies of value 
that accompanied the transition to capitalism, we see that even strange detours in the 
plot like the mermaid debate or the drawn-out requiem for Alice Wilson constitute critical 
investigations into the losses that transition entailed. If the novel’s “political” plot focuses 
on the most obvious and egregious consequences of industrialization, its “romance” plot 
reveals subtler effects that, while slower to unfold their full potential, have proved more 
persistent and more difficult to reverse.  
 Media and Memory 
One of these effects is a waning of memory and of history. The novel 
demonstrates in a variety of ways that capitalism’s subordination of use-value to 
exchange-value involves a strategic destruction of the past. Esther’s misapprehension of 
the valentine is one example, containing within it a pained denial of relationships she 
believes are lost. The death of Alice Wilson projects this concern onto a larger scale, 
representing the loss not just of one person but of a way of life. Her literally blind 
devotion to God seems quaint next to Job’s skepticism, and though the conclusion of the 
novel sees murderer John Barton seeking religious absolution, Jem is saved not by God 
but by Job’s connections and legal know-how: it is Job who finds him a lawyer, and Job 
who explains to Mary what an alibi is and why Jem needs one. By the time of Mary 
Barton’s publication, even the Lake District had ceased to be the place preserved in 
Alice’s memory, the railway having opened the region to mass tourism just a year 
before. Similarly, in the novel’s industrial moment, John Barton’s trade union 
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consciousness is challenged by the entrepreneurial spirit of the younger Jem Wilson, 
who is set for success up until his arrest, having secured a patent on a piece of 
intellectual property. Through her multigenerational cast, Gaskell explores the shifting 
value systems associated with economic regimes; if she seems hesitant to pass 
judgment on purely economic matters, she is far less so when it comes to the cultural 
domain.  
In Women, Writing, and the Industrial Revolution, Susan Zlotnick deconstructs 
the nostalgia of cultural production in the industrial period, claiming that writers as 
diverse as Thomas Carlyle, Charles Dickens, Matthew Arnold, and Samuel Bamford 
“mystified” the rural past, elevating a model of “patriarchal domestic relations that they 
believed modernity had overthrown” (184). Interestingly, she positions female authors as 
opponents to this trend: middle-class women writers like Charlotte Brontë and Elizabeth 
Gaskell, she claims, viewed “the fall into modernity as a fortunate one,” for industrial 
capitalism brought with it an array of unprecedented opportunities for women (5). There 
is no denying the significance of these opportunities, but I suspect few could read Mary 
Barton or even North and South and agree that Gaskell embraced industrial modernity 
wholeheartedly. Zlotnick is right to point out that Gaskell engages more deeply with the 
material conditions of the rural past and industrial present than many of her male 
counterparts, who, Zlotnick contends, “dematerialized” the problems of industrial society, 
favouring ideological resolutions like the transcendent ideals of “culture” (Anrold) or 
imagination (Dickens) (44). However, while Zlotnick paints Gaskell as an optimist who 
linked “women’s liberation to the liberating effects of capitalism” (66), there is a subtle 
but strong current of nostalgia in Gaskell’s work, too. It is present in Alice’s faith, in the 
uncomplicated happiness she feels in the company of family, and present too in the pain 
that fills Esther when she pawns her finery for a respectable gown to wear on her 
mission to deliver the valentine to Mary, thinking with an unbearable fondness of “that 
happy class to which she could never, never more belong” (236).   
Undoubtedly, this yearning for religious community and for a pre-industrial 
version of the family shares in the conservatism that Zlotnick associates with writers like 
Carlyle and Arnold. However, memory and tradition are not inherently—or at least, not 
only—conservative. If they trap us in habitual grooves, they also connect us to other 
people, and in this way defend against some of the most dehumanizing effects of 
commodification. Marx assigned this role to memory in Capital, arguing that the 
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exchange-value of commodities is challenged or even jeopardized by material traces of 
their history. Within the cycle of production and consumption, he argues, the fact that 
commodities are products of past labour is “as irrelevant as, in the case of the digestive 
process, the fact that bread is the product of the previous labour of the farmer, the miller, 
and the baker” (I.289) Objects, he claimed, make better commodities when “the role 
played by past labour” has been “extinguished” from their present form (I.289), for an 
object’s history is the single greatest barrier to the abstraction it must undergo to function 
properly as an exchange-value. The absence of these traces of history from mass-
produced commodities demonstrates the principle with startling clarity. When I purchase 
a bottle of water, I seldom think about the making of the bottle, the people involved, or 
the toxins that were released into the air during the process; I just buy the bottle. To 
recognize that the object I am buying has touched the lives of other people—that it has 
its own history and perhaps a troubling one—to account for all of this in my decision is 
crushing, debilitating. And yet it is crucial, because my forgetting is a condition of the 
economic system responsible for much of the inequity in the world. 
What happens when the object in question is not a plastic bottle or a piece of 
bread, but commodified knowledge—a fact, a message, a feeling? In these cases, the 
labour behind the “object” may not present itself to us as labour at all: the ephemeral 
processes of feeling, thinking, and expressing seem as natural as breathing. And yet, as 
we have already begun to see, they are as vulnerable to abstraction as the labour of the 
factory hand. In Gaskell’s novel, the social worth of facts is on the rise, but while the 
intelligibility of facts as facts depends on their abstract state, the novel is full of clues that 
lead us back to their material, human base. These clues are like seeds in the bread that 
get stuck in our teeth and that are slow to digest: they interfere with what would 
otherwise be a purely instrumental act of consumption, introducing a subtle hitch into the 
process by which the bread is converted into energy that we will use to do something 
else. This hitch, however briefly, focuses our attention to the bread itself; maybe it 
reminds us of the grains from which the bread is derived, or of the hands and machines 
through which those grains passed. In a different theoretical context, John Guillory 
describes a “darkening of the medium” that causes the medium itself to hinder 
communication. He observes that, much like past use-values in Marx’s discussion of 
commodities, communicative media work best when they disappear; it is only when 
“communication fails or is deliberately frustrated” that the medium is brought into visibility 
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(338). What I wish to emphasize is that the process of abstraction by which the fruits of 
human activity become inert commodities is structurally analogous to an understanding 
of communication that estranges messages from their media. No wonder, then, that 
knowledge can become a commodity: stripped from its mediating contexts, it already is 
one.  
By the same analogy, though, a more hopeful implication emerges: namely, that 
the commodification of labour and knowledge can fail. More than that, it is prone to 
failure. The memories and material traces of history that prevent the pure conversion of 
objects into exchange-values have their counterpart in the context of the more 
ephemeral products of the intellect and the emotions. Gaskell’s contribution to the 
critique of industrial society is that she recognizes and foregrounds these failures. 
Continually, her novel highlights the materiality of information, troubling its status as an 
exchange-value or commodity. Grossman notes this feature, but does not connect it to 
the novel’s economic concerns in quite the same way; frequent, self-reflexive 
interjections from the narrator, he argues, “paradoxically raise [Gaskell’s] book’s 
materiality as an idea represented in her text,” thus reminding readers of their own 
physical circumstances as they read (114). The political project of the novel depends on 
Gaskell’s ability to persuade her readers that the fictional text they are reading 
constitutes “real” evidence of injustices committed against the working class; Gaskell’s 
“concern,” he writes, “is that her almost-immaterial words be connected to the material 
reality in which they exist and persist” (114).  
To Grossman’s point, I would add that the same operation unfolds on a more 
minute scale, as well: readers and characters are continually reminded of the material 
effects of seemingly abstract, cognitive and communicative processes. The narrator 
rarely misses an opportunity to comment on the role that a specific fact or piece of 
information plays in shaping a character’s actions, nor does she forego assessing the 
origin of the fact in question and the layers of mediation through which it produces its 
effects. When Esther stumbles upon the valentine, the paper and the suspicions she 
associates with it take on the appearance of facts, seemingly unmitigated by her own 
perception, and yet the scene comes to us by way of a narrator who places special 
emphasis on the mediating act of perception. Esther’s thoughts—the flash of memory 
and the corresponding insight evoked by the familiar “graces and twirls” she discerns on 
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the paper (234)—take on a palpable weight, objectified by virtue of her illiteracy.27 She 
correctly identifies the script as Jem’s, but misidentifies its meaning: the words on the 
valentine function for her as a metonymic extension of their writer, and not as the code 
which they rightly are. Karin Koehler claims that the destabilizing effects of the valentine 
are ultimately contained in the novel, reduced, by the time it makes its way to Mary, to 
the single meaning of John’s guilt (403). However, I would argue that its most important 
meaning is, by definition, uncontainable. By triggering a clash of incompatible thoughts 
in its recipient, the valentine signals the existence of multiple epistemological criteria, 
themselves partially determined by changing media technologies and relations of 
production. In other words, the medium is, itself, the message, but if Gaskell anticipates 
some of the insights of Marshall McLuhan’s twentieth-century media theory, she is much 
more direct in her prioritization of the ethical dimensions of mediation.  
In Understanding Media, McLuhan describes media as “extensions of our 
physical and nervous systems, constitut[ing] a world of biomechanical interactions that 
must ever seek new equilibrium as new extensions occur” (181). The line recalls 
Gaskell’s machine-like characters, and Marx’s description of labour as a metabolic 
process in which humans are joined with their tools and with nature (or, under 
capitalism, where they are made into the appendages of machines). For McLuhan and, I 
would argue, for Gaskell and Marx as well, new media forms materially expand the 
parameters of human experience.28 However, McLuhan’s theory tends to flatten the 
social hierarchies that shape our relationship to media. His analysis of money is 
illustrative: 
                                                
27 Because Esther cannot read, the Samuel Bamford poem inscribed on the back of the valentine 
does not figure into her interpretation. However, Gaskell surely intended it to figure into the 
reader’s: the poem describes the hardships of the working class at the same time as it testifies, 
by its very existence, to their cultural achievement. The poem’s muted presence in this scene 
recalls the reasons for John Barton’s crime, and arguably renders that crime more tragic by 
reminding us of the workers’ well-developed sympathy and aesthetic sensibility.  
28 Although some in the Marxist tradition (Raymond Williams, for example) accuse McLuhan of 
technological determinism, McLuhan’s thinking on technology overlaps significantly with Marx’s. 
Marx claimed that historical circumstances (including the state of technology) shape human need. 
In Notebook V of the Grundrisse, “The Chapter on Capital,” he argues that “necessity” is “subject 
to change” (445). As societies develop, so too does the threshold of basic need: “needs are 
produced just as are products and the different kinds of work skills. Increases and decreases do 
take place within the limits set by these needs and necessary labours. The greater the extent to 
which historic needs—needs created by production itself, social needs—needs which are 
themselves the offspring of social production and intercourse, are posited as necessary, the 
higher the level has become developed” (444-45).  
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Currency is a way of letting go of the immediate staples and commodities 
that at first serve as money, in order to extend trading to the whole social 
complex. Trading by currency is based on the principle of grasping and 
letting go in an oscillating cycle. The one hand retains the article with 
which it tempts the other party. The other hand is extended in demand 
toward the object which is desired in exchange. (124) 
Here, money is figured as an extension of the human body, specifically an extension of 
the hand, but the hand itself is featureless, and substitutes for a human agent. Gaskell, 
we can assume, would be more precise about the condition of the hand, and about the 
person it belonged to, for she omits none of these details from Esther’s encounter with 
the valentine.    
That encounter is very obviously an embodied one, and we are never allowed to 
forget that Esther’s body is in rough shape. Weakened by hunger and infection, the 
process of thinking is almost more than she can bear, and she cannot think at all until 
she has a found a resting place and a way to shut out at least some of her senses. 
Following her discovery, she crouches in an abandoned doorway, and is nearly 
overcome by the chaos in her mind: 
Her elbows on her knees, her face hidden in her hands, she tried to 
gather together and arrange her thoughts. But still every now and then 
she opened her hand to see if the paper were yet there. (236) 
It is as though Esther’s thoughts are material objects that she might move around with 
her hands, if only she could mute the buzzing of the world, and dull the distracting 
symptoms of hunger and withdrawal. The abstract term, “information,” acquires a kind of 
solidity in the scene, accruing density through its repetition. Appearing four times in less 
than two pages, it acts as a fragile link between Esther’s interpretation of the paper and 
the material consequences that will follow from it.29 The valentine/gun-wadding is, then, 
a darkened medium, but for Esther, so too is the body: her failing health almost prevents 
her from delivering her message to Mary, and when she finally arrives on Mary’s 
doorstep, a “racking cough” troubles her speech (239).  
                                                
29 When Esther realizes that it may have been her own interference that spurred Jem to the 
crime, she curses herself for thoughtlessly divulging the “information and the warning” that led to 
such a “murderous action” (235). In her desperate desire to help, she strives to “scrape together 
every morsel of information” that might clear up the mystery (235); she even eavesdrops on the 
police delivering “the information they had gathered with regard to the all-engrossing murder” 
(235). Her last stop is at the court where Mary lives, where she goes to “pick up what she could 
there of information” (236).    
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Esther is not the only character to grapple with dark media. A second example 
comes when the narrator admits to a fear of legal persecution that is irrationally (if 
understandably) affixed to a specific medium: a type of document that the heroine of the 
novel happens also to fear:  
“Here’s somewhat for you, Mary! A policeman left it.”  
A bit of parchment.  
Many people have dread of those mysterious pieces of parchment. I am 
one. Mary was another. Her heart misgave her as she took it, and looked 
at the unusual appearance of the writing, which, though legible enough, 
conveyed no idea to her; or rather her mind shut itself up against 
receiving any idea. (255) 
The passage makes a clear distinction between the parchment and the immaterial 
meaning it is supposed to convey, and thus may seem to accord with the rational theory 
of communication that the novel elsewhere problematizes. However, even here, 
message and medium are not presented as discrete entities: instead, Gaskell 
emphasizes the interaction between the message and its mediating contexts.30 The 
piece of parchment is a subpoena, and even though Mary can read the words it 
contains, she cannot grasp the legal system that looms behind it. The Latin terminology 
is the first obstacle, for which she must procure Job’s help: “It’s a subpoena,” he 
declares, “turning the parchment over with the air of a connoisseur; for Job loved hard 
words, and lawyer-like forms, and even esteemed himself highly qualified for a lawyer, 
from the smattering of knowledge he had picked up from an odd volume of Blackstone” 
(256). However, Job cannot help her with the second and more significant obstacle: 
namely, her suspicion that she lacks the means to achieve her ends within that system. 
Fear and the awareness of her disadvantage combine to render the document as 
illegible to her as the written message on the valentine was to her aunt Esther. The 
result is that the subpoena’s claim to objectivity—to the vaunted and supposedly neutral 
status of “information”—is critically undermined, and the emphasis falls instead to the 
                                                
30 Grossman discusses this scene as well, concluding that the “material form” of the subpoena 
“outdoes the message itself . . . in delivering meaning” (114). For Grossman, Mary’s reading of 
the subpoena functions primarily as a model for readers, showing them that texts are “part of the 
material word,” but also warning them against “wallowing in the surface of the text’s physical 
reality” (114). While I agree with his initial point about the form of the subpoena, for me the scene 
is not just about textuality but about the mediation of “truth” or “fact” by the social categories of 
class, gender, ability, etc. 
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complex stages of mediation through which it must pass before it reaches Mary’s 
“distracted brain” (355).  
In both examples, Gaskell grounds the abstract process of comprehension in a 
material, social world. Gender, bodily state, class position, and a deep emotional stake in 
the outcome of Jem’s trial shape Esther’s reaction to the valentine and Mary’s to the 
subpoena. The sources of truth that both women habitually consult—feeling and 
experience, the guidance of elders, religion, and even empirical sense data—are placed 
under tremendous stress by the circumstances leading up to and following from the 
murder, and none sufficiently explain it. Against the discursive authority of economic 
abstractions or the analysis of fact-finding bodies like the Royal Commission, Gaskell’s 
novel suggests that there can be no “making sense” of the conditions that drive a poor 
man to kill. John Barton’s biblical refrain, echoed elsewhere by the narrator, is that he 
knows not what he does (367, 170), and even Job stumbles in his efforts to explain the 
crime: 
You can never work facts as you would fixed quantities, and say, given 
two facts, and the product is so and so. God has given men feelings and 
passions which cannot be worked into the problem, because they are 
forever changing and uncertain . . . I ask your pardon, sir; I can’t rightly 
explain the meaning that is in me. I’m like a tap as won’t run, but keeps 
letting it out drop by drop, so that you’ve no notion of the force of what’s 
within. (385) 
They are strange words to come from Job, who elsewhere, as we have seen, lauds the 
explanatory power of words and facts. Yet they are in keeping with the novel’s 
overarching critique: just as exchange-value cannot possibly capture the myriad uses 
and complex histories of objects, so the abstract reasoning upon which a universe of 
facts depends fails as an expression of the dynamic relationships between human 
beings and the world. To ignore this basic truth, as we habitually do when we accept and 
enter into the logic of exchange, is to sign off on the enclosure of whole fields of 
experience. In the view of many Marxist thinkers, including Lukács, Holloway, Adorno, 
and Marcuse, it is a step toward a regrettable forfeiting of totality.31 
                                                
31 Marcuse is instructive on this point. In One-Dimensional Man, he contrasts the instrumental 
logic of facts with dialectical logic, claiming that the “reality” apprehended through the former 
mode of thought is a false reality, insofar as it omits the historical processes that exist behind the 
apparent objectivity of things. Dialectical thought, by contrast, attends to the ontological tension 
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Far from being diversions from the topic of class struggle, then, the 
epistemological concerns in the novel are expressions of that struggle, materialized in 
objects that interact differently with different kinds of bodies. The cult of objectivity that 
flourished in the nineteenth century flourished because it accorded with the rising logic of 
commodity fetishism. Accordingly, no effort to historicize that logic is complete without an 
accompanying historicization of an understanding of object relations so thoroughly 
naturalized in our own society as to be invisible. The notion that objects possess a value 
independent of their use and that, therefore, in principle, any object can be exchanged 
for any other, requires the conceptual flattening of objects into commensurability, and 
that same flattening is what allows us to “construct the social world . . . as a collection of 
facts” (Feenberg 86-7). Put differently, the very conditions that paved the way for the 
development of the scientific method and the triumph of modern abstraction also 
enabled the rationalization of the work process. For Lukács and other thinkers in the 
Marxist tradition, the consequence of this multi-pronged development were devastating:  
The fetishistic character of economic forms, the reification of all human 
relations, the constant expansion and extension of the division of labour 
which subjects the process of production to an abstract, rational analysis, 
without regard to the human potentialities and abilities of the immediate 
producers, all these things transform the phenomena of society and with 
them the way in which they are perceived. In this way arrive the ‘isolated’ 
facts, ‘isolated’ complexes of facts, separate, specialized disciplines 
(economics, law, etc.) whose very appearance seems to have done much 
to pave the way for such scientific methods. (6) 
Lukács’s point is that the apparent existence of “facts” in the world is a product of the 
same reifying logic by which labour is transformed from a dialectical mediation between 
subject and object into an inert and measurable commodity. In his analysis, facutality is 
not a self-evident category. Andrew Feenberg goes so far as to claim that “the deepest 
function” of reification is to install and authorize “factuality” in the social world (87). If not 
for the rational worldview, if not for the privileging of abstraction that is internal to the 
rational worldview, the conception of value upon which capitalism depends would appear 
decidedly irrational. This is Ruskin’s point in Unto This Last: the fact that the capitalist 
                                                                                                                                            
between “is” and “ought,” and “precludes all abstraction which leaves the concrete content alone 
and behind, uncomprehended” (140). For Marcuse, thought can only attain truth if it has “freed 
itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind the facts—that is, if it 
understands the world as an historical universe, in which the established facts are the work of the 
historical practice of man [sic]” (141). Adorno, similarly, identifies dialectics as the only 
appropriate and ethical response to the “abstract monotony” of the “administered world” (Negative 
Dialectics 6).   
60 
measures his wealth according to the quantity of gold his possessions are worth and not 
the amount of life-giving goods his gold affords him ought to strike us as an incredible 
perversion of logic, and yet Ruskin’s position was controversial in his own time and likely 
would be in ours (31).32  
What concerns Ruskin and what certainly concerns Gaskell is the moral vacuum 
at the heart of the rational perspective, its independence from and seeming indifference 
to the “wisdom” Margaret Hale thought could guide men and women. In Max Weber’s 
more secular account, rationalization tells us (or purports to tell us) what we can know, 
but it does not tell us what we should know, or how we should use our knowledge 
(“Science as Vocation” 18). Hence the ease with which rational techniques can be 
employed to increase the efficiency of production at the expense of human life and 
wellness. As Weber intones, rationalization 
does not imply a growing understanding of the conditions under which we live. It 
means something quite different. It is the knowledge or conviction that if we only wished 
to understand them we could do so at any time. It means that in principle, then, we are 
not ruled by mysterious, unpredictable forces, but that, on the contrary, we can in 
principle control everything by means of calculation. (12-13) 
                                                
32 The negative reaction to the essays that eventually became Unto This Last is legendary, 
though like legend, not “true” in the strict historical sense. The essays were originally published in 
William Thackeray’s Cornhill Magazine, then a new periodical but one with a circulation of well 
over 100,000 in its first number. Given the size of the Cornhill’s audience, it’s not surprising that 
Ruskin received some feedback. Some of this was indeed negative: the Saturday Review 
positively eviscerated the first installment, but other responses were, for the most part, mixed. 
The Northampton Mercury, for example, conceded that Ruskin’s essays were “worth reading,” but 
criticized the extent of his charges against political economy (Northampton Mercury 4 August 
1860). A number of reviewers were more complementary, and many recognized the value of 
Ruskin’s critique, if they did not fully acknowledge its validity. Some periodicals, including the 
Westmorland Gazette, recommended the essays to readers, and many quoted from them 
extensively. However, the criticism must have hit Ruskin harder than the praise, because in the 
preface to the 1862 edition of the work, he begins with an allusion to the “violent manner” in which 
the original essays were “reprobated” (3). Ruskin’s view of the matter has been perpetuated by 
biographers and scholars, such that more nuanced responses to the essays have been lost. 
While the story is, of course, more complex than Ruskin makes it sound in his preface, it is true 
that his challenge to the entrenched economism of Victorian learned journals raised hackles. I am 
inclined to believe it still would today. Ruskin’s central claim—that “there is no wealth but life”—
seems trite and sentimental only until we consider the actual order of our own society’s priorities: 
promote work-life balance but exclusively reward productivity; protect the environment unless it is 
more lucrative to destroy it; guard human life save that which is subaltern. 
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As Weber’s words suggest, the rational worldview obeys a domineering impulse, 
one that we have already seen in the formation of the social sciences and the New Poor 
Law, in the killing blow Job delivers to Will’s mermaid, and in the elder man’s 
manipulation of a legal system he is privileged to understand. To abstract and to 
rationalize is to impose control, and the guise of neutrality that so often accompanies this 
control is ideological in the purest sense. Against the enduring assumption that data are 
value-neutral, thinkers like Weber and Lukács stress the complicity of scientific 
abstraction with the inequities of the modern world. Lukács makes the claim explicitly:  
When ‘science’ maintains that the manner in which data immediately 
present themselves is an adequate foundation of scientific 
conceptualization and that the actual form of these data is the appropriate 
starting point for the formation of scientific concepts, it thereby takes its 
stand simply and dogmatically on the basis of capitalist society. It 
uncritically accepts the nature of the object as it is given and the laws of 
that society as the unalterable foundation of ‘science.’ (7) 
For Lukács, we cannot arrive at truth without critically assessing the criteria of our truth. 
Gaskell was no Marxist, but on this count I think she would agree. Mary Barton is an 
exercise, if not a fully successful one, in this reflexive, dialectical practice. The 
juxtaposition between Job’s useless but seemingly valuable collection and Alice’s useful 
but seemingly valueless wisdom compels us to push back against sanctioned 
hierarchies of value, as does the distance between the truth about the murder and 
misleading evidence that very nearly overwrites that truth. At stake is not just some 
abstract, moral notion of the good and true but the lives of working people, deemed 
worthy or worthless by a set criteria that is designed to maximize profit and not human 
life.  
This is how “accounting for truth,” to use Margaret’s phrase from North and 
South, constitutes an expression of class struggle. The effort to understand the origins of 
our beliefs and the effects they have on our actions is the initial stirring of a kind of 
resistance, for it represents a refusal of what Holloway calls “hard fetishism”—a refusal 
of bourgeois categories of existence, a refusal to take the object world for granted. 
Holloway urges us to begin our analysis not with the reified categories of social class but 
with the “antagonism that is inseparable from living in a capitalist society” (89), with the 
“daily repeated violent separation of the subject from the object, the daily snatching of 
the object-creation-product from the subject-creator-producer, the daily seizure from the 
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doer not only of her done but her act of doing, her creativity, her subjectivity, her 
humanity” (143). When we take this perspective,  
the hardness of fetishism dissolves and fetishism is revealed as a 
process of fetishization. With that, the hardness of all categories dissolves 
and phenomena which appear as things or established facts (such as 
commodity, value, money, the state) are also revealed as processes. The 
forms come to life. The categories are opened up to reveal that their 
content is struggle. (89) 
I do not mean to make Mary Barton into a more revolutionary text than it is; clearly, the 
novel neither advocates for nor imagines radical change. But when the narrator casts an 
ironizing doubt on the merit of Job’s expertise, or when we see Esther’s vitality sacrificed 
in the exchange of a piece of “information” apparently more valuable than her life, we get 
an unvarnished look at ourselves and at the world we take for true. That look, I am 
arguing, is an opportunity to think again, to imagine conditions of being that allow for 
more than just those two ways of relating to objects: control or be controlled, fetishize or 
be fetishized, dominate or perish. 
 Some Critical “Truths”  
The reading I have offered is at odds with a critical tradition that has itself nearly 
graduated to the status of truth. To begin, few readers have taken the novel to be about 
epistemology in the way that I have claimed. Grossman, Matus and Recchio are 
exceptions whose insights have shaped my own, but I think the picture Gaskell paints is 
more complex than the one they describe. As I have suggested, “evidence” in the novel 
is not merely a product of legal or judicial discourse but of a fetishistic way of knowing 
that is inseparable from rationalization and the division of labour. Similarly, the affective 
and instrumental forms of knowledge that Matus and Recchio trace through the text are 
filtered through capitalist notions of value. Alice and her bug-ingesting nephew may be 
more likeable characters than Job, and perhaps we can prove that Gaskell places the 
experience of being “elbowed . . . daily in the busy streets” above the abstract teachings 
of political economy (3), but even if we could confidently identify them, Gaskell’s 
sympathies do not tell the full story, and are in fact at odds with the economic system 
she tries to represent. If the novel lauds the transformative power of feminized forms of 
knowledge, why do Esther and Alice die? Why does Mary exit Jem’s trial veritably 
disabled, an impression of her former self? No matter how much we pity Esther, no 
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matter how endearing we find Alice’s devotion or Mary’s declarations of love, there can 
be no question that these women inherit the losing end of the bargain, a point that is 
obscured by the claim in both Matus and Recchio that they represent a “privileged” form 
of knowledge (Matus 12).33 If in particular scenes Gaskell imbues her female characters 
with sentimental value, she retains a clear-eyed view of their dwindling social currency. 
While many of the male characters show some ability to divest themselves from the 
products of their labour (Jem’s patent, for example, or Job’s fetishistic attitude toward his 
own knowledge), female characters remain at all times resolutely embodied. Accordingly, 
the emotional and communicative labour that is required of them comes at a high cost, 
for it continually exposes their bodies to threat.  
These volatile, feminized forms of labour are key to addressing one of the most 
enduring truisms about the novel: that politically and aesthetically, it fails. Despite the 
efforts of countless critics to complicate this idea, its influence remains. “Something 
implicit in the novel’s reception history,” writes Jesse Rosenthal in 2017, stresses what it 
is “not about” (25). Theoretically, we have outgrown this reductive treatment, but it 
continues to haunt our criticism and our teaching. Students still learn that Mary Barton 
“should have been about John Barton,” and that it abandons the “public, political, male” 
figure for a romance that merely “sketches his outline” (25).34 That tradition stretches at 
least as far back as Raymond Williams’s assessment in Culture and Society (1958). 
Williams lamented the early demise of the novel’s journalistic impulse, which gives way 
after the initial chapters to the drama of Mary’s misplaced affections, and to what he 
                                                
33 Perhaps the reason that neither Matus nor Recchio reaches this conclusion is that neither one 
of them engages with Gaskell’s secondary characters. As is probably clear from my reading, 
characters like Job, Will, Alice, and Esther bring the difficulties and even the tragedies associated 
with shifting epistemological paradigms into the open. Matus focuses her reading on the “secrets” 
of Mary’s heart, which gradually reveal to her the error of her ways. Recchio—oddly, considering 
he is making a claim for an “affective knowledge” that he admits is feminized—takes the late 
exchange between John and Carson senior as his exemplary case. 
34 An irony here is that the “political plot” is undeniably more “domestic” than the “domestic plot.” 
Many of the most powerful “John” scenes take place in the home: we frequently find John out of 
work and staring into an empty grate, hunger gnawing at his insides, and the point of no return in 
his downward spiral is marked by a scene of domestic abuse. As the Bartons’s circumstances 
turn from bad to worse, we are told that John “seldom spoke, and when he did speak, they were 
sharp and angry words . . . and once, in his passion, he had beaten [Mary]” (117). Mary’s plot, by 
contrast, takes her from Manchester to Liverpool on a crowded train and culminates in the 
extremely public scene of the trial. Even her flirtations with Carson take place on the street, often 
(though unbeknownst to her) in front of peering eyes. Finally, despite the common complaint that 
the novel omits scenes of work, we do see Mary at work, stitching furiously in the home and at 
Miss Simmonds’s dress shop. 
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famously called the “familiar and orthodox plot of the Victorian novel of sentiment” (89). 
However, as feminist critics have noted, his reading asks us to forfeit important and 
highly political aspects of working-class life. Implicit in Williams’s dismissal of the “novel 
of sentiment” is the contention that only some of the relationships and processes that 
were of interest to Victorian authors offer anything to the critique of industrial society, and 
these are—problematically—the ones culturally gendered “male.” Yet, as Hilary Schor 
notes, “private plots are (particularly for a woman novelist in a time of intense social 
change) more likely to be the centres of political critique” (5). Indeed, Nancy Armstrong 
has shown that the definitive achievement of the nineteenth-century novel was to 
individualize and domesticate once-broad political identifications, but as she points out, 
the transposing of political problems from the public sphere to the private home equates 
neither to their disappearance, nor to their resolution.35  
If we accept the truth of these claims, as I think for the most part we have, why 
have we been unable to forget or fully move past twentieth-century dismissals of the 
Gaskell’s achievement? Why do critics writing in the 2010s feel compelled to defend the 
novel’s aesthetic and conceptual inconsistencies against attacks that should no longer 
seem relevant?36 That this contradictory text continues to inspire new explanations for its 
eclecticism suggests, to me, that we have not fully answered Williams’s questions—that 
the links between exploitation in- and outside of the world of waged work remain at least 
                                                
35 In Desire and Domestic Fiction, Armstrong argues that the paradigmatic modern individual was, 
in fact, a woman (8). What she means is that the qualities and relationships that make the 
modern individual “modern”—autonomy, psychological depth, and a now ubiquitous 
understanding of sexual desire as a subjective, romantic and extremely important force—were 
associated in the nineteenth century with women, and even more so, with fiction by women. She 
explains how the contradictory eighteenth-century concept of the “social contract” was 
transformed by Romantic and early Victorian authors into the more serviceable “sexual contract” 
(38). In the world of novels, stubborn political identifications and antagonisms could be translated 
into the less threatening terms of courtship and marriage and then fictively resolved. Gaskell’s 
“industrial novels,” Mary Barton and North and South, may be the most perfect examples of this 
process, but Armstrong argues that it is latent in virtually every “domestic” novel. The “good 
marriage” that so often concludes these texts, she claims, “could be used to resolve another 
order of conflict, the conflict between an agrarian gentry and urban industrialists, for one, or 
between labour and capital, for another”; as the household transformed into the “woman’s 
sphere,” it appeared to “detach itself from the political world,” providing a “compliment and 
antidote” to that world (48). Despite appearances, the domestication process was (and continues 
to be) highly political; for Armstrong, it remains a primary strategy in the consolidation of middle-
class power.  
36 It is difficult to find criticism of the novel that does not at least mention its aesthetic and political 
compromises, and many scholars—like Lynn Alexander writing in 2017 (“Diminishing Violence”), 
or Rosenthal in the same year—continue to launch their analysis from the starting point of 
Williams’s condemnation of the novel’s failures.   
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partially obscured—but also that the dismissal of feminized work still touches nerves and 
inspires reactions. If we no longer abide by Victorian separate spheres ideology, we still 
assign gender connotations to forms of work, and value them unevenly. The unpaid 
caring and communicative functions of Gaskell’s female characters are not coded as 
work in Mary Barton (though, as I note in my Introduction, they are coded that way in 
North and South), but they are clearly essential to the industrial economy as Gaskell 
represents it, and to the narrative economy of the novel. One of the convictions 
animating this dissertation is that we have not yet come to terms with the role of unpaid, 
immaterial forms of labour in our economies, or with the effects of modern capitalism on 
those forms of labour. We will never finish reading Mary Barton until we do.  
So, whether we emphasize disjunction in the novel or unity—whether we follow 
Gallagher and Mary Poovey in seeing it as a split narrative, or Marjorie Stone and Lisa 
Surridge in seeing it as one united by concerns about the family37—we should be 
prepared to admit that it exudes both of these contradictory impressions, and not 
because of any shortcoming in Gaskell’s art. Underlying the apparent inconsistencies of 
plot and style are contradictions that cannot be resolved, even imaginatively. The 
romance plot offers no solution to the problems in the political plot, but it is not an 
effective diversion from those problems, either. In fact, as I have tried to show, the 
opposite is true: the novel’s contribution is to reveal the extent to which alienation and 
reification flow out of the factory and into the world, surpassing the boundaries of the 
wage relation to reshape the way un- and under-waged characters relate to their bodies 
and their thoughts. In my view, this is less the symptom of an unacknowledged 
contradiction than the deliberate staging of a competition between value systems, 
inseparable from the economic concerns Gaskell has frequently been accused of 
neglecting. Indeed, those hard-to-shake complaints about the novel’s turn away from the 
privileged form of documentary record may reveal more about our own ideological 
                                                
37 Gallagher calls the novel an “eclectic” text, torn asunder by competing “paradigms of causality” 
(17).  Poovey also sees the narrative as split between John Barton’s material concerns and 
Mary’s emotional ones. In Mary Barton, she writes, “what takes the place of physical suffering is 
mental distress; and what takes the place of a concern to improve—or administer—the social 
domain are the faces of what is primarily a social emotion: the sympathy or imaginative 
engagement that binds the reader to Mary” (152). Stone counters the “split narrative” thesis by 
claiming that the novel is unified by the image of the “hungry child,” which is at once domestic and 
highly political (182). Like Stone, Surridge reads the novel’s multiple plots as being centrally 
about family, focusing specifically on the competing models of masculinity associated with 
working- and middle-class characters (339).    
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position than they do about the novel. In celebrating Gaskell’s “carefully annotated 
reproduction of dialect” and her “itemized description of the furniture in the Bartons’ living 
room,” Williams, for instance, employs the empirical, rational perspective that is 
hegemonic today, but that is explicitly problematized in the novel. He is not only reading 
for what is “not there,” as Rosenthal suggests, but dismissing what is there: an array of 
alternative values and knowledge-forms that challenge the authority of the commodity.   
Endings 
Alice’s stroke comes at a bad time, literally on the eve of Jem’s arrest. For 
Gaskell’s heroine, a more trying set of circumstances can hardly be imagined. There is 
not a spare moment for Mary to mourn, no time for her to come to terms with the 
inevitability of what will be a profound loss. She must set aside her grief—reluctantly, 
and not without guilt, but as she is forced to realize, the relentless forward motion of time 
stops for no one. It hurtles her onward to Liverpool in her desperate attempt to secure 
Jem’s alibi, and brings her face to face with the jury before she quite knows what she will 
say in his defence. There, in front of a hundred prying eyes, words are dragged from her 
body, alien products that hardly seem of her own devising: 
With all the court reeling before her . . . she heard a voice speak, and 
answered the simple inquiry (something about her name) mechanically, 
as if in a dream. So she went on for two or three more questions, with a 
strange wonder in her brain, at the reality of the terrible circumstances in 
which she was placed. 
Suddenly, she was aroused, she knew not how or by what. She was 
conscious that all was real, that hundreds were looking at her, that true-
sounding words were being extracted from her; that that figure, so bowed 
down, with the face concealed with both hands, was really Jem. Her face 
flushed scarlet, and then paler than before. But, in dread of herself, with 
the tremendous secret imprisoned within her [John’s guilt], she exerted 
every power she had to keep in the full understanding of what was going 
on, of what she was asked, and of what she answered. (324) 
In the context of the trial, with Jem’s life hanging on her words, spoken language 
becomes a dark medium. Mary struggles to understand the questions that are asked of 
her, and her responses demand an even more deliberate concentration of effort. This 
effort is not only mental but somehow also physical: Mary oscillates between total 
disassociation and an intense awareness of her body. Gaskell’s descriptions of the 
“flushed face” and “the reeling court” help us to inhabit that experience, to see Mary 
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vividly, clutching the sides of the witness box and setting her teeth against the 
encroaching breakdown. When the prosecutor asks her to reveal her “favoured lover,” 
humiliation catapults her back into bodily awareness:  
For an instant, a look of indignation contracted Mary’s brow, as she 
steadily met the eyes of the impertinent counsellor. But in that instant, she 
saw the hands removed from a face beyond, behind; and a countenance 
revealed of such love and woe,—such a deprecating dread of her answer; 
and suddenly her resolution was taken. The present was everything, the 
future, that vast shroud, it was maddening to think upon; but now she 
might own her fault, now she might even own her love. (325) 
The words Mary finally offers are not Job’s latinate terms, nor are they a “display of 
forensic eloquence” like the one the defence lawyer has in store for the court (330). They 
are not a form of evidence that Mary can separate from herself. In giving her testimony, 
she gives up part of herself. Soon after the conclusion of her speech, she senses “the 
composure, the very bodily strength which she had compelled to her aid for a time, 
suddenly giving way, and was conscious that she was losing all command over herself” 
(326). She is literally carried out of the witness box by the kind-hearted sailor’s wife who 
is her only connection in Liverpool, and it will be weeks before she regains her senses. 
To make matters worse, her testimony is not particularly effective. In fact, though 
it inspires “pity for the prisoner,” it also strengthens “the supposition of his guilt” (326). 
Jem is ultimately pronounced “Not Guilty,” but only because of the jury’s reluctance to 
condemn him on the strength of circumstantial evidence. Mary’s sacrifice, then, is almost 
completely in vain. What she provides at the trial is not compelling evidence but 
entertainment: a beautiful woman, wronged by one man and desperate to save another, 
her story thrills the audience. Her heartfelt words are beyond her control almost as soon 
as they are uttered, fated to become commodities for the consumption of an insatiable 
public. In fact, it is no stretch to say that Mary herself becomes a commodity. The 
narrator notes that she is paid for her “strange service” as a witness, and though she is 
certainly not paid for the fodder it provides the press, others are quick to capitalize on 
that opportunity (354). The tale of the working-class Helen makes it way back to 
Manchester in the newspapers long before the real Mary, who remains laid up in bed for 
weeks. “You can’t hide it now,” declares village gossip Sally Leadbitter when a still-frail 
Mary finally returns from Liverpool; “It’s all in print! Why! It was in the Guardian, and the 
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Courier, and someone told Jane Hodgson it was even copied into a London paper” 
(358).  
Sally’s gossip sours Mary’s homecoming, but only slightly: she returns to 
Manchester cured of her brain fever and fortified by the knowledge that she will soon be 
Jem Wilson’s wife. From almost every angle, the novel’s ending is a happy one: John 
confesses his crime and Mr. Carson, like a good Christian, forgives him; the 
misunderstanding between Mary and Jem is resolved; even Margaret’s blindness is 
cured. Shipped out to the wilds of Canada, Mary and Jem are given the opportunity to 
start anew. As far as Williams is concerned, the novel sweeps the festering wound of 
class conflict under the rug: “a solution within the actual situation might be hoped for, but 
the solution with which the heart went was a cancelling of the actual difficulties and the 
removal of the persons pitied to the uncompromised New World” (91). Williams is 
reacting to the contrived quality of the emigration ending, but his conclusion demands 
scrutiny. By no standards can we consider the New World “uncompromised”: on the 
contrary, European immigration to North America brought on compromises of massive 
proportions. Millions of slaves were shipped from Africa to the Americas to facilitate the 
sugar and cotton trades, and Indigenous peoples were not only dispossessed of their 
land and resources but actually slaughtered, both directly and indirectly, through the 
spread of European diseases. The “new beginning” Gaskell gives her newlyweds must 
then be understood as an ending for countless others, and not only those New World 
others who she tidily omits from the novel’s final pages. It is not clear, for instance, that 
Mary ever rebounds from her experience at the trial. While, for Grossman, Jem’s 
acquittal validates the emotional convictions that inspire Mary’s actions, and suggests, 
by extension, the hopeful possibility of reader sympathy leading to real political solutions 
(129), Mary is unambiguously, perhaps permanently traumatized by her experience. She 
is different woman following her fever, waking with her mind “in the state of a lately born 
infant’s” (348).  
This childlike version of Mary qualifies what many have taken to be a happy or 
complacent ending. We can view her as Jem’s saviour, or perhaps as his debtor, given 
that his love is what saves her from desertion by Carson junior. However, we can also 
view her as the last in a long line of women to be used up in the process of establishing 
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Jem in the colonies.38 Indeed, the path to that future is littered with the bodies and 
sacrifices of women. Alice is quickly forgotten in Jem’s eagerness to marry and begin his 
new life, and his mother complains that she too is displaced when he acquires his bride 
(342). More seriously, the Mary that marries is a broken woman, made alien to herself by 
the exploitation of her “heart’s secrets” at the trial (324). She recovers from her fever, but 
emerges “softer and gentler than she had even been in her gentlest mood . . . Her 
motions, her glances, her voice were all tender in their languor. It seemed almost a 
trouble to her to break the silence with the low sounds of her own sweet voice” (350). 
Neither the care-taking efforts of the elder generation nor Mary’s herculean quest are 
explicitly compared to the labour of men in the novel, but they are just as clearly—and 
more completely—exploited. Male characters like John and Jem must sell their labour to 
the capitalist, but the minds, hearts, and bodies of the female characters are simply 
taken.   
I want to return one last time to Esther, the only character to recognize the 
dangers of Mary’s flirtation with Carson and the one to communicate those dangers to 
her protectors; also, the unfortunate cause of Jem’s arrest and the deliverer of the fateful 
message that will change Mary’s life forever. Driven to the margins of the plot, she is 
pivotal to its functioning: her efforts on behalf of Gaskell’s protagonists are as misguided 
as they are sincere, but without them, there would be no Mary Barton. As Lesjak points 
out, she is “the cause of almost everything that happens” in the novel (36). For this 
crucial role, she is repaid with abuse and neglect: both John and Jem meet her efforts to 
intervene in Mary’s affairs with violence. Friendless and illiterate, she has only one way 
to make contact, and this is by placing her body in their paths. When she does so, they 
are repulsed by the marks of addiction and homelessness. John throws her forcibly to 
the ground: 
He gripped her arm—the arm he had just before shaken off, and dragged 
her, faintly resisting, to the nearest lamppost. He pushed the bonnet back, 
and roughly held the face she would fain have averted, to the light, and in 
her large, unnaturally bright grey eyes, her lovely mouth, half open, as if 
imploring the forbearance she could not ask for in words, he saw at once 
the long-lost Esther . . . He flung her, trembling, sinking, fainting, from 
him, and strode away. (124-5) 
                                                
38 To reiterate my previous point, women were not the only thing to be used up in the process of 
colonization. Environmental destruction and the exploitation of African and Indigenous peoples 
were also essential to the colonial design.  
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What happens in the scene is essentially a miscommunication. Esther is trying to warn 
John about his daughter’s dealings with Carson, but illness and fear make it almost 
impossible for her to speak. When she finally finds the strength, her words fall on deaf 
ears: John reads her emaciated form and tattered clothing long before she is able to 
stammer her warning. Ironically, he makes the same mistake she does when she 
discovers the valentine: he disregards the message, fixating solely on the medium and 
the assumption to which that medium gives rise. In this case, the “medium” is not a 
scrap of paper but the body of a woman, though it is almost hard to tell from the way 
John treats Esther. In her attempt to reach him, she risks her life and her freedom, 
receiving a month’s stay in the New Bailey when a police officer discovers her crumpled 
form in the street the next morning.  
More tragic than Esther’s interaction with John is the lack of regard Mary shows 
her when she arrives to deliver the valentine. Despite their long separation, Mary is so 
consumed by her own troubles that she fails to apprehend her aunt’s predicament. Far 
from extending the sympathy Esther hopes for, Mary is eager for her aunt to leave so 
that can process the implications of the valentine: “no faint imagination of the love and 
the woe of that poor creature crossed her mind,” and though “the wish was unexpressed, 
Esther felt herself unwelcome” (240-1). Despite an intense longing to open her 
“wretched heart, so hopeless, so abandoned by all living things, to one who had loved 
her once,” Esther refrains, playing the part of a respectable working-class wife to lend 
credibility to her claims (239). As the narrator informs us, she “overacts her part,” 
imposing rigid control over her emotions and impulses such that when she finally takes 
her leave, Mary has not so much as glimpsed the shadow of death that hangs over her 
(239). The effort is exacting, the “physical difficulty of utterance” so great that Esther is 
completely spent by the end of the scene (239). The meeting, I think, qualifies Koehler’s 
reading of Esther. Koehler suggests that the discovery of the valentine allows Esther to 
“assume agency from her marginal position,” temporarily transforming her into an “agent 
of truth” (403, 401), but what Esther communicates in this scene is not exactly the truth. 
Her suspicions about the valentine are incorrect, and the truth of her poverty, she masks 
with clothes borrowed from the pawnshop. To Mary, the existence of the valentine 
matters a great deal more than the existence of her aunt. Esther is little more to her than 
a medium—the bearer, in this case, of extremely bad news. But Esther’s life will not 
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carry on as usual after this point: the errand consumes her fading vitality, and initiates a 
speedy descent toward death.  
Esther crosses Mary’s threshold one more time before the novel concludes. The 
scene takes place a few days before Mary and Jem’s intended departure for Canada. 
The pair have just concluded a fruitless search for Esther, but to their surprise, Esther 
finds them. Seated next to Jem, Mary feels him start and turns her gaze toward the 
window that has caught his attention; there, she sees “a white face pressed against the 
panes on the outside, gazing intently into the dusky chamber” (391). It is Esther, of 
course, and though they rush to her aid, she collapses in a “heap of light or white-
coloured clothes, fainting or dead” before they can reach her (391-2). They carry her into 
the house and lay her in Mary’s bed, but it is too late: in just a few hours, Esther dies, 
“crying feebly and sadly as long as she had any strength to cry” (392). She is buried 
alongside John in an unmarked grave, both of them casualties of the industrial system, 
human tithes paid to the church of progress. If the two characters are at no other point in 
the story equals—if John’s labour and political significance has been visible to readers in 
a way that Esther’s has not—in the final moment Gaskell puts them in the same grave. 
The grievances of the working man and those of the fallen woman are folded into the 
same silence, but it is a silence that asks to be filled. The happy future of the soon-to-be-
weds is not separable for Gaskell from its dark underside, signified by the loss of John 
and Esther. Nor is the virginal Mary, after her performance at the trial, so easily 
distinguished from her prostitute aunt. The truth of Gaskell’s novel lies in its portrayal of 
the full range of industrialism’s consequences, from the instrumentalization of human 
beings, to the devaluation of history, to the alienation not just of physical labour, but of 







Chapter 2. The ‘Energetic Impulse’: Romola’s 
Dialectic of Duty 
In what may be the most discussed scene of George Eliot’s 1863 novel Romola, 
the Dominican friar Girolamo Savonarola persuades the novel’s heroine to return to the 
unhappy life she has recently fled. Neither the death of her father, nor her husband’s 
treachery—least of all, her own desires—permit her to forsake the duties of wifehood 
and citizenship, or so Savonarola maintains. She owes her humble servitude to a home 
and a city that until now have brought her little but pain.  
In a matter of minutes, the resolve that has carried Romola de’ Bardi beyond the 
gates of Florence, away from the only life she has known and toward the unknown and 
hoped for, gives way before Savonarola’s imperious will. The lot that, for the first time, 
Romola has “invented . . . for herself” (143), the dream of courting the tutelage of the 
“most learned woman in the world39” and, “by an indistinct but strong purpose of labour,” 
carrying on her father’s scholarship in her own name, wanes rapidly under the influence 
of Savonarola’s speech. When, in response to the spectre of filial duty with which he 
admonishes her, she protests that her brother, Dino, too turned his back on those duties 
to follow the light of inner conviction, she is immediately rebuked. That was different, 
Savonarola tells her: “you have no vocation such as your brother had. You are a wife” 
(159).  
And so with that, Romola turns her steps to descend the same hill she has lately 
climbed. She journeys back to her dead father’s house, back to a faithless marriage, and 
back to the violence, pestilence, and political conniving that has engulfed the city-state of 
Florence. In short order, Eliot’s rebellious madonna is again filling her days with 
conventionally feminine tasks, tending to domestic matters, caring for the city’s growing 
population of sick and poor, and ensuring that a warm hearth welcomes her husband on 
those rare evenings he chooses to spend at home. Taken in isolation, it is a galling 
moment in the text: already, we have spent thirty-five chapters with Romola. We have 
seen her suffer, and witnessed the series of revelations by which she gradually reclaims 
                                                
39 The person Romola has in mind is Cassandra Fedele, a renowned woman scholar and orator 
who lived and worked in Venice (and whose scholarly career, interestingly, ended after her 
marriage in 1499.) 
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her right to self-determination. At this point in the novel, our sympathies are thoroughly 
with the heroine: we want her freedom, almost as badly as she does. What, then, are we 
to make of this relatively brief struggle with Savonarola, spanning no more than a 
handful of pages, and culminating in the reversal of a decision Romola has been 
considering for weeks? 
Admittedly, I have emphasized the gender dynamics of Romola’s exchange with 
the Frate at the expense of its philosophical themes and broader function in the plot. It 
might be objected that Savonarola’s primary motive in this scene is to forward his 
political-religious agenda, and not to defend his or Dino’s gender privilege. Nevertheless, 
the intersection of gender, vocation, and duty is an obvious theme in the scene, and one 
that runs throughout Romola from beginning to end. Few would deny that Romola’s 
gender is one of the reasons Savonarola refuses to pardon a sin that he has already 
allowed Dino to commit. More importantly, despite the naturalizing assumptions built into 
Savonarola’s words, the feminized duties he assigns in place of vocation are not ones 
that come naturally to Romola. Her unconventional upbringing has prepared her for a 
rigorous intellectual life but not for the myriad forms of immaterial labour that, in her 
society and ours, accrue disproportionately to wives and mothers. It is no wonder that 
she imagines a different life for herself when she flees Florence, but when she is 
stopped at the top of the hill by Savonarola, she is not simply asked to trade her 
scholarly aspirations for the care-taking labours of a wife. The effects of Savonarola’s 
speech run deeper than that. The same words by which he reverses Romola’s progress 
cannily erase the status of domestic labour as labour. You are a wife, he tells her, and 
the implication is that the responsibilities associated with the role—the making of a 
home, the sexual performances, the coaxing, coaching, and soothing she will provide—
are not actions but elements of her state of being. The lines ontologize the concept of 
women’s work, fusing woman to her work.  
If this dynamic feels familiar, it is because we have encountered it before: in Mary 
Barton, men exercise their intellect, but women are their knowledge. In the previous 
chapter, I argued that the alienating effects of an industrial organization of labour 
extended with ease to the realm of thought, feeling, and expression, and that there was 
no special status to render the resources of the mind and heart immune to the processes 
of commodification that befell the labour of the body. Behind the sentimentalism and the 
uneven hierarchies of value that continue to structure our understandings of manual, 
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intellectual, and emotional forms of labour today, there lies a history, and it is one 
recorded and theorized to a significant extent in the Victorian novel. I have noted already 
that the novel evolved alongside much of what is now considered classical political 
economy. It provided a testing-ground for the principles espoused by political 
economists, but also an arena in which the neglected underside of those principles could 
be explored. In Mary Barton, we saw that the cost of an economic system that 
commodifies immaterial labour as well as material labour is much higher for those whose 
intelligence is assumed to be local, immediate, and locked in the body. Far more ancient 
than capitalism, the association of women with the material becomes in the nineteenth 
century a problem for the abstract notion of value upon which capitalism depends. For 
Elizabeth Gaskell and for Eliot, the particularity of women’s work provided an opportunity 
for critique, but where, in a parallel history that both authors imagine in their fiction, it 
might have seriously challenged the authority of free-market capitalism, in the life 
outside of fiction, it did not. Instead, important elements of private life became subject to 
economic rationalization. Notwithstanding powerful counter examples—among them, 
Eliot herself—nineteenth-century conceptions of femininity increasingly fetishized 
particular feelings and actions, framing domesticity, motherly affection, filial devotion, 
and moral rectitude as natural qualities rather than learned behaviours.40 You are a wife.  
These deceptively simple words signal a vast and ongoing process of primitive 
accumulation. While the term “primitive accumulation” usually refers to the appropriation 
of land for the purposes of generating surplus value, its application can and should be 
                                                
40 Mary Poovey and Nancy Armstrong have written extensively about the reification of domestic 
virtue through media like the conduct manual and, later on, the novel. As Armstrong points out, in 
the eighteenth century, it was understood that these “virtues” had to be taught (The Ideology of 
Conduct 97). Unlike the aristocratic ideal that preceded them, the active sympathy, thrift, and 
good sense that would come to typify the heroine of the domestic novel constituted a behavioural 
code that could be emulated by members of a growing middle class. Its rise to prominence 
represented a rejection of the aristocratic paradigm, but one that required concerted cultural effort 
to be realized, hence the litany of instruction manuals that appeared in the century leading up to 
the Victorian period, revealingly titled The Ladies Dictionary (1694), The Young Lady’s 
Companion (1740), The Compleat Housewife (1734), A Plan for the Conduct of Female 
Education in Boarding Schools (1798), or some variation thereof. By the 1820s, when the novel 
was taking its modern form, conduct manuals began to disappear. What had initially called for the 
didactic mode of the manual came to seem like a “natural law” (97), a shift that, for Armstrong, is 
captured in the move from Samuel Richardson’s “tediously protracted description of the 
household” to Jane Austen’s “minimalist representation” (100). Increasingly, she writes, “the rules 
governing sexual relations could be taken for granted” (100). By mid-century writings of Sarah 
Stickney Ellis, these “rules” are conveyed in the biologized language of evolutionary science. 
Behavioural patterns that had required instructional manuals only a century before now reflected 
the “fitness and adaptation of the female character” (Ellis, The Wives of England 91). 
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broader than this. Michael Perelman argues that it is a mistake to reduce primitive 
accumulation to “the one-time destruction of the peasant economy,” for doing so 
obscures its ongoing role in capitalist economies. Capitalism as a system cannot 
function without continually enclosing and appropriating new sources of value (34). As 
critical economists from Marx onward have noted, any value-generating process can be 
enclosed, including those we might prefer to think of as invaluable.41 In the previous 
chapter, I drew on Silvia Federici’s claim that women’s emotional and reproductive lives 
were enclosed in the early modern period to ensure the transformation of their labour 
into surplus value, and I explained how this arrangement was further entrenched by the 
emergence of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century. It is through this process 
that Mary Barton’s youth, virtue, and girlish beauty are transformed into commodities to 
be consumed by a judge and jury for the sake of a man whose house she will keep and 
whose children she will bear. Romola, likewise, relinquishes an independent life in 
Venice to support the ambitions of men like Savonarola and her husband, Tito. In both 
novels, male careerism rests on the wasted lives of women.  
 Where Romola departs significantly from Mary Barton is in the composition of 
the labour landscape it depicts. In Mary Barton, men are professionals, or they work in or 
manage factories, and women are largely confined to the private sphere (or, in Esther’s 
case, to dark corners that are neither public nor wholly private). Eliot’s novel features a 
very different slate of characters, one strikingly homogenous in comparison to Gaskell’s. 
In fact, almost all of the primary actors in Romola are immaterial labourers of one sort or 
another, and most of them are intellectuals. The social ladder of Eliot’s Florence is 
shockingly easy to climb: Tito enters the novel a penniless stranger, but in a matter of 
weeks he is rubbing shoulders with politicians and aristocrats. Notwithstanding the 
historical accuracy of this vision, it has the advantage of rendering the determining 
effects of gender all the more obvious. Tito, Savonarola, and Romola share similar goals 
and abilities, but the vocational status of Tito’s scholarship and Savonarola’s oratory 
gives both men a level of agency and choice in their work that is not available to 
Romola.  
                                                
41 In Capital, Marx argues that the education and maintenance of the workforce is as crucial a 
component of the overall production process as the labour each worker expends in producing. 
This “reproductive” labour is labour the capitalist does not pay for; instead, he counts on the 
“worker’s drives for self-preservation and propagation” to ensure that these conditions are met 
(718-19). His ability to grow his capital thus depends massively on the prior appropriation of the 
labour involved in educating, caring for and literally reproducing the workforce. 
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As a whole, Romola instructively contrasts the different relationships of male and 
female characters to the conditions of their work, challenging Savonarola’s opposition 
between masculine vocation and feminized duty by presenting scholarship, politics, and 
care-giving as overlapping forms of skilled labour. In Eliot’s novel, the distribution of 
these skills is not determined by gender, but the expectations guiding each character’s 
choices are. A comfortable distance distinguishes male characters from their 
professions, and allows them to assume an instrumental attitude toward their labour that 
is out of reach for the female characters. Women in the novel cannot instrumentalize 
their work because they are defined by it. In establishing and drawing attention to this 
difference, the novel primes us to react to the injustice of a system that extends 
opportunity and recognition to one kind of worker while stripping away the freedoms of 
the other, but where we might expect a conclusion that extends the liberties enjoyed by 
men to women, we get something very different: the rejection of the instrumental 
paradigm, and the elevation of an internalized form of feminine duty that is both Utopian 
and deeply fraught.  
 Feminism, Labour, Affect 
Eliot’s protagonists, Tito Melema and Romola de’ Bardi, exemplify these 
contrasting philosophies of labour, and their intertwined plots are the primary focus of 
this chapter. First, though, I want to consider a larger question that my reading of Mary 
Barton and my preliminary observations on Romola should prompt us to ask. The 
question links the central conundrum in Eliot’s historical romance to concerns that are 
very much with us today: if feeling, and particularly the restorative, caring feelings that 
the Victorian period relegates to the domestic sphere, can be exploited, if it is both 
convenient and advantageous to exploit them, does it follow that they are always 
exploited?42 How do we know when emotional labour is being appropriated, and if we 
                                                
42 “Sympathy” is an important term for both Gaskell and Eliot, but its meaning differs in their 
respective projects. In Gaskell, it means more or less what we expect it to: tolerance, 
understanding, and acceptance, tinged, occasionally, with a hint of paternalism. In Eliot, 
sympathy joins an epistemological bearing to an ethical one. In her essay, “Silly Novels by Lady 
Novelists,” she juxtaposes active sympathy to inert, reified information, condemning educational 
standards that prioritize the latter. For Eliot, true knowledge depends on sympathy: a “really 
cultured woman,” she writes, “see[s] herself and her opinions in something like just proportions; 
she does not make it a pedestal from which she flatters herself that she commands a complete 
view of men and things, but makes it a point of observation from which to form a right estimate of 
herself  . . . She does not give you information, which is the raw material of culture—she gives 
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knew, could we prevent it? Marx demonstrated in Capital that the amount of surplus 
labour appropriated from the worker during his eight-, ten-, or twelve-hour workday is 
neither obvious nor openly declared. Unpaid, immaterial labour makes this calculation 
even more difficult: if my work produces value but no tangible product, if it consumes my 
days but cannot be scheduled or contained within specific hours, and if the economic 
system under which I am forced to live understands redress only in terms of monetary 
compensation, how am I to ensure fair treatment?  
One answer is strike: I might refuse the work of caring altogether, on the grounds 
that it is rooted in an anti-feminist enclosure of reproductive labour. Unfortunately, this is 
one of those things easier said than done. I cannot voluntarily halt my love for the 
working fathers, brothers, and mothers in my life, no matter how fully I grasp the role of 
love in an exploitative economic system. As we will see, this is precisely the problem that 
Eliot that tries solve in her novel, but it is also a problem for contemporary feminism, and 
not just because so many forms of immaterial labour are feminized, but because 
feminism itself requires care work.  
 The struggle to free women from exploitative caring roles is a feminist struggle; 
at the same time, feminism needs women to care about one another. These points need 
not be in contradiction, but all too often they are: the line between voluntary and coerced 
caring is seldom clearly drawn, even in well-intentioned, progressive communities. The 
introduction of affect theory into feminism has brought this issue to the fore, showing 
how feeling, and caring-feelings in particular, can be understood as forms of labour. 
Sara Ahmed’s 2004 work, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, is exemplary in its 
reclamation of the work of feminist politics. The book concludes with a proposition that 
has proved influential both for theory and for practice in radical feminist subcultures:  
[E]motional struggles against injustice are not about finding good or bad 
feelings, and then expressing them. Rather, they are about how we are 
moved by feelings into a different relation to the norms that we wish to 
contest . . . Moving here is not about ‘moving on,’ or about ‘using’ 
emotions to move away, but moving and being moved as a form of labour 
or work, which opens up different kinds of attachments to others, in part 
through recognition of this work as work. (201) 
                                                                                                                                            
you sympathy, which is its subtlest essence” (317). In my reading of Eliot’s distinction, information 
is positivist, and sympathy, dialectical.   
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The idea that “feeling” is valuable and important work has taken hold in feminist 
discourse, and with good reason. Naming our labour is empowering, especially for those 
of us living in societies that have inherited Victorian (capitalist, Protestant) values about 
the sanctity of labour.43 Whether or not we are willing to place emotional labour on a 
level with more obviously exacting forms of toil (and I return to this question below), its 
share of the Western labour market has undoubtedly grown. The ongoing expansion of 
the service sector and the remodeling of so many professions (including university 
teaching) as services dictated by consumer satisfaction has made “emotional labour” a 
central component of more and more forms of work. Ten years after the publication of 
The Cultural Politics of Emotion and more than thirty after Arlie Russell Hochschild’s 
groundbreaking sociological study, The Managed Heart, these ideas have made their 
way from academic and activist contexts into popular culture and the mainstream media, 
inspiring editorials in The Huffington Post, The Atlantic, and a much cited Guardian piece 
by Rose Hackman, published in November of 2015. Hackman opens her article with a 
list of emotional tasks that she no doubt assumes are familiar to her female readers, and 
that Eliot’s Romola surely would have recognized: 
We listen to our partner’s woes, forgive them the absences, the 
forgetfulness, the one-track mindedness while we’re busy organizing a 
playdate for the kids. We applaud success when it comes: the grant that 
was received, the promotion. It was their doing, and ours in the 
background.   
Perhaps not all of us reach the level of self-effacement that Romola, at least temporarily, 
achieves, but the exercise and the expectations are familiar. Yet what if, Hackman asks, 
like childcare and housekeeping, “the sum of this emotional management is yet another 
form of unpaid labour?” From an academic point of view, this is not a novel proposition, 
but its appearance in a major mainstream media source speaks to its relevance and 
rhetorical power. The article proceeds through a series of interviews with women in 
                                                
43 Jean Baudrillard and, more recently, Kathi Weeks, detect this phenomenon even in Marx. In 
Weeks’s formulation, Marxism and the entire field of historical materialism share with classical 
political economy a tendency to fetishize labour. She writes, “the evidence of Marxism’s 
complicity [with political economy and the Protestant ethic] can be found in a naturalized ontology 
of labour and a utopian vision of a future in which this essence is fully realized in the form of an 
unhindered productivity” (81). I do not agree that unalienated labour is synonymous with 
“unhindered productivity,” but I find elements of Weeks’s critique persuasive, and think it applies 
to much recent feminist work on emotional labour, including Ahmed’s. 
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various professions about their experiences of emotional exploitation, and closes with a 
call to action that is half serious, half jovial: 
Is it time we started forgetting the birthdays too, time we stopped falsely 
screaming ecstasy, and demanded adequate, formal remuneration for 
emotional work provided in the workplace as a skill? Now that, right there, 
would probably be a shake-patriarchy-to-its-core revolution.  
Whether or not we agree that the kind of “formal remuneration” Hackman recommends 
would shake the patriarchy to its core (I am not so sure that it would), we can surely 
support the idea that feminized skills, including emotional intelligence, should be 
recognized and valued in the workplace. Yet a crucial ambivalence troubles the closing 
lines of the article. Knowingly or unknowingly, Hackman conflates types of emotional 
labour that occur in different places, at different scales, and for different reasons. Is the 
work involved in maintaining a collegial office environment, planning a child’s birthday 
party, or comforting one’s spouse comparable? What do we gain by rationalizing these 
forms of work so that they are comparable? 
 This is the problem with the productivist affirmation of emotional work as work. 
When Ahmed advocates for this perspective, she is not suggesting that this work should 
be paid. Historically, demands of this kind have been made, perhaps most memorably in 
the “Wages for Housework” campaigns of the 1970s. For Ahmed, the “work” of feminism 
is not so literal as that. When she describes the unending labour of the feminist “killjoy,” 
she is calling upon a resilient Victorian ethic to endow feminist political commitments 
with metaphoric value. Her recent book, Living a Feminist Life, mobilizes a series of 
what she calls “sweaty concepts,” ideas passed down through generations of struggle 
against patriarchal forces. “Sweat is bodily,” she reminds us: 
We might sweat during more strenuous and muscular activity. A sweaty 
concept might come out of a bodily experience that is trying. The task is 
to stay with the difficulty, to keep exploring and exposing this difficulty. 
We might need not to eliminate the effort or labour from the writing. (13) 
The distinctions between physical, mental, and emotional exertion in this passage are, I 
think, deliberately obscured. The point is to put each form of labour on the same level, to 
make them equally visible. But there is also an appeal in the passage to a hegemonic 
ideal of hard, muscular work, one that becomes more obvious later on in the book, when 
Ahmed calls for a “feminist army of arms”:  
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Feminist arms do not lend their hand to support the familial or the social 
order. We support those who do not support the reproduction of that 
order. The arm that keeps coming up might not be willing to do the 
housework, to maintain his house, to free his time for thought. When 
women refuse to be helping hands, when we refuse to clean for him, up 
after him, when we refuse to be his secretary, the keeper of his secrets, 
his right hand, we become willful subjects. We can understand why, of all 
her limbs, the arm matters. An arm is what allows you to reach, to carry, 
to hold, to complete certain kinds of tasks. Arms are identified throughout 
history as the limbs of labour or even the limbs of the labourer. (84) 
These lines reveal what kind of “work” feminist theory is supposed to resemble: manual 
labour is the archetype and exemplar for Ahmed’s theory of affective labour. The 
implication is that our thoughts and feelings have a value comparable to that of our 
bodies; less clear are the reasons we might have to celebrate and extend the 
valorization of bodies. In fact, the strategy seems to me a regressive one, for it relies on 
the model of the wage relation and transforms conventionally legible forms of work into 
platonic ideals. It is in its own way more fraught than the mid-century calls to pay women 
for their emotional and domestic labour, for as Kathi Weeks points out, these calls not 
only aimed to ease material suffering, but also offered a form of “condensed analysis,” 
disrupting the separate spheres model and providing an “alternative map of the working 
day” (130).  
 In a recent piece for GUTS magazine, Clementine Morrigan explores the limits 
of a well-intentioned effort to valorize women’s emotional labour. Emotional labour, she 
writes, “is the glue that holds our communities together”; increasingly widespread claims 
that emotional labour is not just frequently exploitative but “inherently exploitative” have 
had the unfortunate effect of diminishing the emotional support individuals elect to 
provide for one another. Moreover, that perspective forecloses the possibility of agency 
in allocating one’s energy and time. Were we to withhold emotional labour for fear of 
being exploited—or perhaps not out of fear but as a political action—the relationships 
that in turn support us would be endangered.44 The question is whether feminism can 
                                                
44 Hochschild’s analysis solves this problem, at least in part. She argues that individuals tasked 
with significant amounts of emotional labour self-consciously distinguish between a “working self’ 
and a “true self.” According to Hochschild, we “mentally subtract feeling with a commercial 
purpose to it from the total pattern of display that we sense to be sincerely felt . . . we make up an 
idea of our ‘real self,’ an inner jewel that remains our unique possession no matter whose 
billboard is on our back or whose smile is on our face” (34). This makes sense for Hochschild’s 
subjects, who are primarily flight attendants or other workers in the service industry. However, 
Hochschild does not explore the exploitation of feeling labour in private life. If I am not being paid 
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afford to go on a labour strike, especially now. There is no shortage of important and 
instructive debate among those who self-identify as feminist today, but it is also the case 
that women’s reproductive rights are under threat in the United States and across the 
world. In such a context, infighting has to proceed with and through impasse.     
Sensitive to this difficulty, Morrigan recommends that we develop strategies for 
ethically accepting the emotional labour of others. Whether or not it is possible to build 
enclaves of ethical practice within capitalism is a question she leaves unanswered, but it 
is one that Eliot’s novel can help us to think through. We may believe that it is 
impossible, but know that we have a responsibility to keep trying all the same. To be 
sure, this responsibility lands us in an uncomfortable place, committing us to an ideal in 
exchange for only the slimmest prospects of success, but for readers of Eliot, the feeling 
will be a familiar one. For some, it will bring to mind the fate of Maggie Tulliver, whose 
sacrifice on behalf of her hard-hearted brother is as deeply moving as it is futile. Others 
will think of Dorothea Brooke, a modern Theresa whose paltry social conditions 
foreclose greatness, but whose efforts to act rightly the narrator begs us not to dismiss, 
for “the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts” (613). Despite 
being Theresa’s contemporary, Romola achieves little more “greatness” than Dorothea. 
Like Dorothea, she spends her store of compassion on a relatively small circle of 
beneficiaries. Given the dreams with which both women begin their stories, it is hard to 
resist disappointment when we turn to those final pages, when we see Dorothea’s 
socialist projects absorbed in her sexual passion for Will Ladislaw, or Romola, at last 
freed from her marriage by Tito’s death, taking responsibility for his mistress and 
illegitimate children. In Romola and, more clearly, in Middlemarch, we are asked to 
sanction a set of choices that look in some ways like capitulations to a status quo both 
novels initially encourage us to criticize.  
Whether or not these scenes are “capitulations,” they have been points of great 
interest for twenty-first-century critics. Eliot’s female characters often challenge Victorian 
stereotypes, but the ethical mandates driving her plots read to many like tired, bourgeois 
scripts. Since Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel, critics have tended to agree that the 
genre’s history parallels that of the liberal individual, and Eliot, chief among England’s 
                                                                                                                                            
a wage, but my emotional efforts are still appropriated to produce value for the total system, it 
may be significantly more difficult for me to distinguish between the “true self” and the “working 
self.” 
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high realists, occupies a central place in this story, dubbed “the most profound liberal 
novelist” by Talia Schaffer (Romance’s Rival 162). For Rachel Ablow, Eliot’s 
“disappointing anticlimaxe[s]” evince a problematic ethics that is “less about preventing 
others’ suffering than [about] taking responsibility for it” (88). Fredric Jameson accuses 
Eliot of an “obsessive” and “intricate moralizing” of the most “minute psychological 
reactions” (Antinomies 120). These claims are persuasive, but I want to reconsider what 
Ablow and Jameson see as an assertive, even exploitative “moralizing,” for if we stop at 
condemnation of either the content or application of the characters’ morals, we risk 
missing Eliot’s insight into the gendering of immaterial labour. I will not claim for Eliot 
more radical politics than she in fact professed, but I share Isobel Armstrong’s conviction 
that there is more to politics than political affiliation.45 Appreciating the complexity of 
Eliot’s vision does not mean we have to excuse her lack of faith in the working class, or 
the unimaginative fates to which she often consigns her female characters, but it does 
mean we have to be willing to read her plots more generously. For the heroine of her 
historical romance, moral choices are complex and impermanent, often the result of a 
dialectical tension between reason and the emotions, between one’s inner life and the 
material world, and between the commitment to bear others’ suffering while also 
experiencing one’s own. The emotional labour Romola is compelled to perform for her 
father and husband is exploitative, but by the end of the novel, she succeeds in 
transforming this experience of exploitation into a mutually affirming relation of care with 
her husband’s mistress. Tito, by contrast, is defeated by his attempts to instrumentalize 
his own labour. The fantasy of transcendence, of freedom from history and moral law—
the idea that intellectual labour owes no debt to the body or to the world—comes back to 
reckon with Tito in the form of a vengeful parent, and he does not survive the encounter. 
As I have suggested, Romola and Tito model opposite ways of thinking about 
labour, and especially about immaterial labour. Tito, even before his demise, illustrates 
the poverty of a life given over to a rational worldview in which immaterial labour is 
assumed to be fully alienable. Romola, forced into a more attentive relationship with the 
body and the emotions because of her gender, offers an alternative, and while the 
                                                
45 In her 2016 book Novel Politics, Armstrong argues that the “democratic imagination” of the 
nineteenth-century novel exceeds the politics it professes at the level of plot and character. It 
emerges, instead, “through praxis in novels, through the capacity to image states and conditions, 
not through discursive definition” (18). The novel’s fascination with and frequent disruption of 
established genealogy is, for Armstrong, the site of its most radical possibilities. 
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coercive origins of this alternative demand careful parsing, it should not to be dismissed 
entirely on that count. That Eliot occasionally idealizes her heroine’s womanly sympathy 
does not change the fact that this quality is exploited by the male characters, nor does it 
erase the damaging effects of this exploitation, which are in fact emphasized in the 
novel. Romola is plagued by an unhappiness that originates as a reaction to injustice, 
but that transforms, inevitably, into guilt, thanks in large part to her internalization of 
feminine duty. Whether or not her guilt is deserved is less important than the role it plays 
in her ethical development, for it is precisely this feeling that carries Romola into more 
meaningful relationships and into a meaningful life. If her guilt is misplaced, it is not 
superfluous, nor is it wholly ideological. It functions, instead, like a negative dialectic: it 
preserves her own suffering, but denies its universality, spurring her to consider the 
suffering of others. Guilt suspends and socializes her instant, personal reaction to 
injustice, shuttling her between self-knowledge and a commitment to action in the 
material world, and allowing her to see her own mistreatment as a symptom of the 
systemic wrong by which her husband’s mistress also suffers.  
This is not the way we are used to thinking about the eminently bourgeois affects 
that give Eliot’s fiction its tenor, and it is not obviously compatible with a feminism like 
Ahmed’s, which urges us to be “killjoys” and “willful girls,” to insist on the value of our 
emotional labour, and to guard it jealously against appropriation. Ahmed’s affect theory 
is a powerful tool: brought to bear on Eliot’s Romola, it reveals how sympathetic acts can 
transform into sites of exploitation. Yet the novel resists what is in Ahmed’s theory a 
somewhat uncritical equation of feeling with labour. Like Ahmed, Eliot sees strength and 
vulnerability in affective labour, and claims it as a strategy of resistance. However, her 
novel offers a more sophisticated model of affect than the one Ahmed provides, one that 
recognizes a difference between the ethical value of affect and the value it takes on as 
alienable labour, even as it refuses to disentangle the two.  
My reading, then, demands that we look a little beyond Eliot’s liberalism: the very 
feelings that tend, in our post-Foucaultian moment, to evoke our suspicion, I suggest are 
responsible for what is progressive in her novel. With this claim, I follow the lead of 
Theodor Adorno’s post-war writings: Adorno argued that guilt, pain, and obligation, 
despite their potential to be co-opted as ideological weapons by the right, deserved a 
central place in the political projects of the left (Negative Dialectics 5). For Adorno, 
conscious unhappiness is 
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not a delusion of the mind’s vanity but something inherent in the mind, the 
one authentic dignity it has received in its separation from the body. This 
dignity is the mind’s negative reminder of its physical aspect; its capability 
of that aspect is the only source of whatever hope the mind can have. 
(203) 
Adorno’s writings offer no consistent theory of affect or of the body, and yet the negative 
dialectic powerfully figures the mind’s debt to physical sensation (Yun Lee 116). This is 
the source of its value for feminism and for the feminist study of affect in particular. The 
coincidence of feeling and cognition in Adorno’s work, of acknowledgement and action, 
and the invocation to look backwards and forwards at once matters for any feminist who 
seizes the opportunity to speak, for she shares an important condition with the post-war 
intellectual: her freedom, however large or small, rests on the continued oppression of 
many. From a perspective informed by mainstream or radical feminism, Romola, like all 
of Eliot’s heroines, fails.46 Read through the negative dialectic, her failure is what brings 
about her success. The anti-patriarchal, class-defying union she forms with Tessa at the 
end of the novel represents a more radical freedom than she would have achieved by 
becoming the next Cassansra Fedele.47 Guilt at Tessa’s mistreatment inspires the 
arrangement and ensures that Romola’s awareness of class and gender violence never 
wanes, but compassion makes them a family. Their unconventional household is both a 
critique of existing structures and a Utopian project. In this way, it maintains the 
ontological tension between what is and what ought to be, and is thus instructive for 
feminist politics.  
It is also instructive for the intellectual worker, for whom it is all too easy to forget 
about or withdraw from material suffering. Tito is a case in point: it is because of the 
sense of mastery his knowledge gives him, and because he understands his labour as a 
“game that employ[s] hypothetic skill, not a game that has stirred the muscles and 
heated the blood,” that he is able to sequester a positive self image from compulsive 
wrongdoing, remaining in curious denial of his own mortality (230). Yet even Tito is 
                                                
46 This is the conclusion Ahmed draws about another of Eliot’s heroines, Maggie Tulliver. Taking 
The Mill on the Floss as a feminist companion text, Ahmed nominates Maggie as a model of the 
“willful girl” trope she develops in Living a Feminist Life. Ahmed points out that Tom is more willful 
than Maggie, but is rewarded for his willfulness, whereas Maggie is punished for hers. “For girls,” 
Ahmed writes, “what follows being willful is unhappiness or death” (69). For Ahmed, this unfair 
treatment reveals a limitation of Victorian feminism that we have yet to fully overcome. She does 
not comment on the fact that Tom is also “punished,” perishing in the flood with Maggie.  
47 Fedele’s scholarly activity ceased altogether after her marriage to Giamarria Mapelli in 1499. 
Romola, by contrast, continues hers research in her new role as tutor to Tessa’s children.  
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eventually forced to reckon with the body’s irreducibility.48 An intellectual herself, the 
material realities of scholarly labour were never far from Eliot’s mind, least of all during 
the research and writing of Romola, which Nancy Henry describes as “the most difficult 
creative process she would ever experience” (The Life of George Eliot 123). Where Tito 
attempts, initially with great success, to efface these realities, Eliot foregrounds them. In 
fact, readers of Romola rarely fail to comment on the novel’s laborious aesthetic. Julian 
Corner attributes this quality to the circumstances of the novel’s composition, drawing on 
Eliot’s journal entries to construct an image of the author wearied to the bone by her 
ambitious undertaking:  
The project stretched [Eliot] to her fullest intellectual and emotional 
capacities . . . She speaks of writing Romola under a ‘leaden weight’ of 
illness . . . It is as though fusion with the material requires physical 
breakdown, the individual being laid open by the disintegration of 
boundaries. (67) 
The demanding research program Corner alludes to is well represented in the text of 
Romola, weighted as it is with historical detail. Daunting even to its Victorian audience, 
the novel proved the least popular of Eliot’s published works, and it more or less retains 
that designation among readers today (Tegan 169). My contention is that Romola owes 
this tepid reception to the residual effects of Eliot’s labour: the traces of the life spent in 
its making make it a difficult novel to consume. In place of the more immediately 
gratifying aspects of the novel form, Romola emphasizes the circumstances of its 
production, and the result is a narrative density that continually recreates the tedium of 
the authorial process, a “laborious” novel that, as David Kurnick suggests, “breathes an 
atmosphere of bookishness” such that “one’s reading of the text feels continually 
haunted by the prior reading that has produced it” (492).   
                                                
48 Romola has been called the most sensational of Eliot’s novels. Through the theme of adultery, 
Lauren Goodlad links it to Flaubert’s controversial Madame Bovary and even to British sensation 
novels like Lady Audley’s Secret (193). Mary Beth Tegan goes further in her article, “Strange 
Sympathies: George Eliot and the Literary Science of Sensation.” She describes Romola as 
Eliot’s “most significant sensational experiment,” arguing that Eliot represents her heroine’s highly 
refined sympathetic faculty in language that was current in both physiology and sensation fiction 
(170). She points out that Romola’s “sympathetic nature” leaves her “too susceptible to the 
feelings and desires of others,” thereby bringing “the blurred edges of sympathy and sensation” to 
the centre of narrative attention (172). In Tegan’s reading, Romola is a redeeming figure for the 
impressionable feminine readers who were the source of so much hand-wringing in mid-Victorian 
discussions of censorship and education.      
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 Romola is humourless and unevenly paced; its descriptions of Florentine streets 
and of the darker passages in its characters’ minds are thick and difficult to parse. Eliot 
was nearing the height of her career when she wrote Romola, but Romola does not 
make novel-writing look easy. On the contrary, it makes it look like hard work, and Eliot’s 
journals confirm that it drew heavily on her mental and physical reserves. It is a novel 
that feels like what it is: the product of a sustained effort at once intellectual and 
embodied. If Romola finds ways of emphasizing these normally elusive forms of labour, 
it does so in part by evacuating material production from its plot, and by clothing 
Victorian dilemmas in Renaissance costume.49 In this way, it is a partial story, yet it is 
one from which we may learn a great deal. As intellectuals who spend our time thinking 
and writing about inequity without always knowing how to effect change, or as women 
practicing the values of feminism in a world that continually undermines those values, we 
live in a state of contradiction. This, we have in common with Romola, whose 
personality-defining struggle is to avoid “the ideological misuse of [her] existence” 
(Minima Moralia 26). In what follows, I show how Romola crafts a solution from her own 
experiences and from her husband’s negative example. Reading Romola through 
Adornian affect theory, I argue that the novel transforms immaterial labour from its status 
as a commodity back into a relationship between people, enabling a shift in perspective 
that rejuvenates the sometimes-painful joy of emotional and intellectual work, and that 
promises to loosen the distinctions between intellectual, emotional, and manual labour 
by which injurious hierarchies of value continue to operate today.    
 “A Mere Instrument”: Knowledge Work in Romola  
Tito Melema wants, essentially and absolutely, to be free. 
Our first impression of Tito comes in the novel’s opening chapter, courtesy of the 
vendor Bratti Ferravecchi, who spies Tito sleeping in the shaded corner of a busy market 
                                                
49 While many readers have found Romola too historical, others declare that it is not historical 
enough. The Westminster Review criticized Eliot’s challenging depiction of gender on this count: 
“this long and elaborate disquisition on the relations between the sexes as a moral question is set 
forth too much in the colors of the nineteenth century . . . We cannot escape from the feeling that 
the chief interest of ‘Romola’ reposes on ideas of moral duty and of right which are of a very 
modern growth” (MacCormack 848). Writing in the present day and with more generosity than the 
editors of The Review, Arianna Reilly emphasizes the parallels between Eliot’s context and the 
fifteenth-century setting of her novel, observing that “the politics of fifteenth-century Florence 
provide an evocative parallel to those of nineteenth-century Britain and Italy” (635). 
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square (12). Through Bratti we learn that Tito is a Greek, raised in Southern Italy and 
shipwrecked at some undisclosed point before eventually turning up in Florence. This 
origin story tells us little about Tito, and for much of the novel, he remains an enigma, 
impossible to place. Indeed, he can hardly stand still: few of the characters in Romola 
are idle, but Tito is practically manic. Initially a friendless stranger, he manages, through 
sheer industry and force of will, to launch careers in scholarship and politics before the 
first few weeks of his stay in Florence are up. Indifferent to the loyalties and blood ties 
that structure Florentine social life, Tito courts the patronage of nearly everyone he 
meets, from the gossipy barber Nello to the proud old Bardo de’ Bardi. Handsome, 
clever, and inherently likeable, he establishes these relationships with ease, but even at 
the beginning of the novel, his radical uprootedness is a faint source of alarm for some. 
Romola’s godfather, Bernardo del Nero, immediately takes note of Tito’s restless nature, 
and confides to Romola, “it seems to me that he is one of the demoni, who are of no 
particular country . . . His mind is a little too nimble to be weighted with all the stuff we 
men carry about in our hearts” (90).  
Bernardo’s insight is keen. Before long, we learn that Tito has a profound fear of 
the “stuff” of the past, stemming in large part from his having given up a little too easily 
on his adoptive father’s life. This fear becomes a veritable aversion to stasis: as long as 
he is moving, Tito succeeds in forgetting the past and the responsibility he bears for a 
series of morally dubious choices. It is no wonder that he leaps at the chance to become 
a messenger for several of the city’s most prominent political figures, not at all deterred 
by the frequent travel this role requires. Also no wonder that he splits the time that he 
does spend in Florence a dozen different ways: between two marriages (a legal one to 
Romola and a false one to the peasant girl, Tessa), multiple commissions, and a hectic 
social calendar that is essential to the advancement of his career.  
As a messenger, and later on, as a spy, Tito is highly effective. His willingness to 
forsake the filial duties of his past and the marital duties of his present mean that he 
strikes acquaintances and even friends as an empty, neutral container. This unusual 
quality is reflected in his physical appearance:  
[T]here was no brand of duplicity on Tito’s brow, neither was there any 
stamp of candour; it was simply a finely formed, square, smooth young 
brow; and the slow absent glance he cast round at the upper windows of 
the houses had neither more dissimulation in it, nor more ingenuousness 
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. . . Was it that Tito’s face attracted or repelled according to the mental 
attitude of the observer? Was it a cipher with more than one key? The 
strong, unmistakable impression in his whole air was a negative one, and 
it was perfectly veracious; it declared the absence of any uneasy claim, 
any restless vanity, and it made the admiration that followed him as he 
passed among the troop of holiday-makers a thoroughly willing tribute. 
(50) 
In this passage, Tito’s emptiness is expressed by the contours of his pleasing face. 
Apparently without intrinsic qualities of its own, the face seems merely to reflect its 
surroundings. Tito’s body is then a medium in the highest degree: his face reveals no 
causal link to his character, but it efficiently stores, channels, and amplifies 
phenomenological data that originates outside the boundaries of his physical and mental 
self. His presence passively invites the holiday-makers to attach what no doubt begins 
as directionless glee to the object of his handsome personage, and the ambient feeling 
of festivity transforms into an experience of admiration that is directed at him. The 
reader, privy to the flaws in Tito’s character, knows that there is in fact little in him for the 
crowd to admire, but it is Tito’s unique ability to disguise his own lack by mediating 
content that is provided to him by others. This is certainly what causes Romola to fall in 
love with him, and it is also what allows him to replace Dino in the eyes of her father. 
Tito, though, is not a perfect substitute for Dino. The two men are ideologically 
opposed to one another, and opposed—again and for different reasons—to Romola. 
Dino, Fra Luca by the time he enters the story, has long since abandoned the Bardi 
family to join Savonarola’s religious mission. Subject since youth to the kinds of fanatical 
visions that Tito’s hyper-rational utilitarianism cannot tolerate, Dino exhibits a feverish 
singleness of purpose that is directly opposed to Tito’s facile duplicity, not to mention an 
asceticism, which Bardo charmingly describes as an inclination to “lash himself and howl 
at midnight with besotted friars” (31) that would chill Tito’s blood. Romola, with her wide 
sympathy, is as repulsed by her brother’s zeal as she later is by Tito’s indifference. 
When she discovers that Dino is ill and sets aside her anger at his departure to pay him 
a visit, she is subjected to one of his visions and can only respond with indignation. His 
“monkish aspect” is to her “the brand of the dastardly undutifulness which had left her 
father desolate” (73); his vision, despite the significance it will have for her later, 
devastates her hopes for reconciliation.50 “Dino,” she cries, “I thought you had some 
                                                
50 For analysis of the foreshadowing supplied by Dino’s vision, see Caroline Levine, “The 
Prophetic Fallacy: Realism, Foreshadowing, and Narrative Knowledge in Romola,” in From 
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words to send to my father. You forsook him when his sight was failing . . . Have you 
never cared about that?” (74) She is not reassured; Dino’s answer is a resolute “no” 
(74).  
And yet, the vision that Dino shares with Romola turns out to be true. He 
accurately predicts the trouble that will come of her marriage to Tito. In his vision, a 
mysterious and, importantly, faceless figure weds Romola, only to leave her at the mercy 
of a horde of demons (75). The faceless figure is a good match for Tito, who stands by 
the Bardi family only until he has finished fleecing them. However, while Dino is 
technically right, his clairvoyance in no way makes up for his cruelty. He adheres to a set 
of principles, but cannot apply them ethically; his hardness to Romola undermines the 
value of the warning he is trying to give her. Consequently, the lament at the close of the 
scene is not “why doesn’t Romola listen to Dino?” but rather, “why doesn’t Dino listen to 
Romola?”:   
[T]he prevision that Fra Luca’s words had imparted to Romola had been 
such as comes from the shadow region where human souls seek wisdom 
apart from the human sympathies which are the very life and substance 
of our wisdom; the revelation that might have come from the simple 
questions of filial and brotherly affection had been carried into irrevocable 
silence. (77) 
Like Tom Tulliver in The Mill on the Floss, Dino is a man of maxims; where Romola’s 
“vivid intellect” is “keenly alive to the constant relations of things,” Dino’s worldview is 
static, undialectical (76). The accuracy of his vision, like the hollow justice of Tom’s 
condemnations of Maggie, has relatively little worth, for in Eliot’s novels, being “right” is 
ultimately less important than being responsive—to others, to the physical world, and 
even to the body. Here, unexpectedly, the fanatic and the hedonist have something in 
common: Dino and Tito see themselves as passive instruments, a fantasy that liberates 
                                                                                                                                            
Author to Text: Re-reading George Eliot’s Romola. In this piece, Levine argues that 
foreshadowing, or the “proleptic narrative moment,” trains readers to adopt a “skeptical 
epistemology” (136). Temporal gaps built into the story allow readers to test “deceptive 
appearances” against “later understanding,” thereby validating the epistemological worth of 
experience (136). Romola, she claims, “follows the pattern of empirical science . . . testing 
provisional hypothesis against the evidence of experience” and finally coming to “her own 
conclusion, one that “fits her experience” (137). As I argue in this chapter, I think Romola’s 
outlook is more dialectical than empirical, and her choices more constrained than they appear in 
Levine’s analysis. However, I certainly agree that the novel trains us to be wary of surfaces.  
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them from any sense of responsibility to other people.51 A second, related commonality 
is their denial of the relationship between body and mind. Tito fantasizes about a 
limitless life of the mind, and Dino imagines a spiritual realm free from bodily temptation. 
Philosophically and temperamentally opposite, both men are seduced by an illusory idea 
of freedom that destroys their relationships and traps them in isolation.    
Bardo, too, is seduced, not by freedom but by Tito, who promises to help him 
complete his life’s work, a cumbersome, Causabon-esque treatise on Platonism, 
forestalled by the onset of his blindness and Dino’s departure. He can barely contain his 
excitement in his interview with Tito, and immediately suggests that they collaborate:  
I will aid you—yes, I will spend on you that long-accumulated study which 
was to have been thrown into the channel of another work—a work in 
which I myself was to have had a helpmate . . . But who knows whether 
that work may not be executed yet? For you, too, young man, have been 
brought up by a father who poured into your mind all the long-gathered 
stream of his knowledge and experience. Our aid might be mutual. (36) 
The venture is highly agreeable to Tito. Smitten with Bardo’s daughter, he delights in the 
prospect of spending his afternoons at the Bardi library, where he might win her 
affection, and consequently, her status and fortune. What Romola interprets as a 
charitable willingness to accommodate Bardo’s whims is in fact another example of 
Tito’s selfishness, as he perceives that kindness to Bardo will in time procure him an 
attractive and well-born wife. Tito is now, as always, looking out for number one: in every 
situation, he seeks to pay as little as he can for as much as he can possibly get. In 
personal relationships, as in the holiday scene I cited earlier, he invites the emotional 
(and financial) investment of others, but avoids at all costs returning those investments. 
After all, he muses at an early point in the novel, “what was the end of life, but to extract 
the utmost sum of pleasure? And was not his own blooming life a promise of 
incomparably greater pleasure, not for himself only, but for others?” (56) 
                                                
51 At different points in the novel, both characters literally describe themselves as instruments. It 
is in these terms that Dino understands his religious mission. He tells Romola, “in visions and 
dreams we are passive, and our souls are as an instrument in the Divine Hand” (74). Much later, 
in a conversation with Savonarola, Tito calls himself a “mere instrument,” claiming that his true 
calling is scholarship and not politics (228). I analyze this scene in more detail near the end of my 
discussion of Tito. 
91 
The line invites us to take Eliot’s condemnation of Tito for a critique of economic 
utilitarianism.52 Ilana Blumberg makes the case for this reading in her essay, “Sacrificial 
Value.”53  For Blumberg, Tito is a Carlylean nightmare, representing “the dangerously 
self-seeking tendencies of utilitarianism and the worst abuses of the cash nexus” (81). 
Her characterization is apt, but what makes the novel interesting is that it does not allow 
us to absolve ourselves of Tito’s wrongs simply by condemning his selfishness. We can 
nod our heads along with Carlyle if we like, and shudder the moment Tito reveals to 
Romola that he has sold off Bardo’s library, directly contradicting the old man’s dying 
wish and breaking Romola’s already-grieved heart, but the language that Eliot uses to 
describe Tito’s relationship to his work invokes a more expansive set of abstractions 
than what is captured by the utilitarian idea. In fact, the convenient slips by which Tito 
distances himself from the consequences of his actions are not unlike the ones that 
power the service and information economies of late capitalism. In his role as a scribe, 
messenger, and spy, and even in the more intimate role of lover and spouse, Tito wishes 
to be nothing but a medium, to allow information to flow through him without resistance 
and without trace. In this way, he demonstrates his belief in the powerful myth that 
information transcends the limits of the material world. This myth, we have not outgrown. 
                                                
52 The line also rhymes with the near-contemporary Aestheticism of Walter Pater. Pater’s Studies 
in the History of the Renaissance was published several years after Romola, but given Pater’s 
fascination with the period Eliot chose for her historical novel, their very different appropriations of 
Italian culture and history should be considered. Pater claims, in words we could almost attribute 
to Tito, that a successful life is one that “burns always with a hard, gem-like flame,” that 
continually “test[s] new opinions and court[s] new impressions” never “acquiescing” to “facile 
orthodoxy” (152). Art, for Pater, “propose[s] frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your 
moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake” (153). Although Eliot’s passion for 
art and history is, I think, demonstrably equal to that of Pater and the later Aesthetes he inspired, 
it is hard to imagine her subscribing to an “art for art’s sake” doctrine. In her art and in her 
criticism, she is explicitly and also specifically political. To claim that that Aestheticism escapes 
contemporary politics by retreating to an exoticized past would be inaccurate; much has been 
written of the movement as a rejection of industrial society, and many of its affiliates were 
outspoken in their political commitments (the Rossetti family, for example, were supporters of 
Italian nationalism.) However, Eliot’s art is more narrowly instrumental in its depiction of 
Renaissance Italy than that of her Aesthete and pre-Raphaelite contemporaries. The proto-
political science of Machiavelli and Savonarola’s abuse of religious power are more central to her 
thinking in Romola than the sculptures that will stun Dorothea in Middlemarch, and the movement 
for Italian unification, ongoing during the writing of Romola, shaped not only that novel but also 
the Zionist vision in Daniel Deronda.  
53 Dermot Coleman makes a similar argument in George Eliot and Money. Coleman charges Tito 
with attempting to “control his own behaviour according to a reductive and strictly individualistic 
interpretation of the greatest happiness principle” (136). In Tito, he argues, Eliot foreshadows 
Durkheim’s criticism of the individualistic Utilitarian basis of social theory” (136). 
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On the contrary, as N. Katherine Hayles has shown, the understanding of 
information as bodiless, immortal pattern became hegemonic in the twentieth century. “A 
defining characteristic of the present cultural moment,” she wrote in 1999, “is the belief 
that information can circulate unchanged among different material substrates” (1). The 
emergent field of cybernetics adopted and popularized the idea that humans, animals, 
and machines were “information-processing entities” and thus fundamentally alike (6). 
This hypothesis had alarming implications for subjectivity, but while visions of sci-fi 
cyborgs may seem inherently radical, especially in light of Donna Haraway’s 
groundbreaking work on that topic, Hayles suggests that they tended, instead, to extend 
the legacy of the liberal subject. What she calls the “posthuman” subjectivity has in 
common with its Enlightenment predecessor its debasement of the body and its dream 
of absolute freedom. “Information viewed as pattern and not tied to a particular 
instantiation,” she writes, “is information free to travel across time and space . . . The 
great dream and promise of information is that it can be free from the material 
constraints that govern the mortal world . . . [I]f we can become the information we have 
constructed, we can achieve effective immortality” (13).  
The question at the centre of Hayles’s work is one we might pose to Tito as well 
as to modern-day proponents of the posthuman: what happens when information loses 
its body? What are the consequences of a vision of subjectivity that wants to rid itself of 
physical constraints? An obvious answer is “ignorance,” for as Hayles points out, 
information cannot exist independently of its substrate. But there are more insidious 
consequences, too: those culturally reduced to their body—by gender, by race, or by 
disability—may find their claims to subjectivity compromised, as they were under the 
Enlightenment paradigm. The knowledge we owe to embodied experience will also be 
devalued, and our connection with and responsibility to our physical environment, 
weakened. However, despite Hayles’s prescient warning, posthuman fantasies have 
rolled over into the era of Web 2.0, enabling widespread ignorance about the material 
foundations of the digital economy and furthering our ideological investment in the ideal 
of personal freedom. The liberal subject of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
transforms, in Alan Liu’s assessment of the postindustrial era, to a “cyber-libertarian” 
devoted to “freedom . . . as a universal human right taking precedence over competing 
political systems that vest independence in the first instance in collective entities” (The 
Laws of Cool 242). The seemingly endless possibilities of digital capitalism blind us to 
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the fact that digital capitalism is still capitalism; similarly, the sheer amount and 
availability of information in the digital age makes information seem like a free and 
universal resource, though in fact it is neither. The internet makes us feel empowered 
and at liberty, but our every click is traced and sold. The cyber-libertarian’s liberty is, 
then, un-liberty, un-freedom, and not only because of the way his actions are traced, 
commodified, and sold back to him, but because of the ontological premises he has had 
to accept as the cost of his freedom.  
It is with these insights in mind that I want to consider Tito. A scholar and political 
informant, “information” is Tito’s stock-in-trade. His willingness to instrumentalize his wife 
and father-in-law is obvious and shocking; more difficult to recognize, let alone criticize, 
are the ways in which he instrumentalizes himself, yet this process is a necessary part of 
his work. If Tito’s attitude toward his duties as a scholar and politician is less obviously 
reprehensible to us than it would have been to Eliot’s original audience, this is because 
he represents a point of view that is hegemonic today: for Tito, knowledge work is in 
every sense immaterial labour.  
One of the most striking patterns in Tito’s plot is the frequency with which he is 
compared to other forms of media. Bratti, Tito’s first Florentine acquaintance, compares 
Tito to written language in a conversation with Nello. “I picked up a stranger his 
morning,” he says, “and I can spell him out no better than I can the letters on that scarf I 
bought from the French cavalier” (17). The painter Piero di Cosmi shares Bratti’s 
puzzlement: following his introduction to Tito, he exclaims, “Young man, I am painting a 
picture of Sinon defeating old Priam, and I should be glad of your face for my Sinon” 
(25). In response to Nello’s offence at the suggestion that the handsome Tito model a 
villain, Piero explains, “he has a face that would make him a perfect traitor if he had the 
heart of one, which is saying neither more nor less than that he has a beautiful face, 
informed with rich young blood, that will be nourished enough by food, and keep its 
colour without much help of virtue” (25). We might push Piero’s remark a step further: to 
say that Tito has a “beautiful face,” but one that reflects the painter’s whim, and that, like 
a language, possesses the capacity to express all manner of semantic content with more 
or less the same proficiency, is really to say nothing at all about the young man Tito. It is 
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to reduce him to the capacity of medium, to instrumentalize him in the most literal 
sense.54 
This strange quality is more than an individual quirk of Tito’s. Tito’s performance 
of neutrality is a way of subjecting his actions and even his personality to alienation, and 
it prevents him very early on in the novel from feeling any identity with the malign fruits of 
his labour. The secrets that pass through him, the intrigues he facilitates, seem to slide 
effortlessly from his conscience. He is unable or unwilling to foresee the deaths that will 
follow his betrayal of the Medician party (“his proffer of a little additional proof against 
them would probably have no influence on their fate; in fact, he felt convinced that they 
would escape any extreme consequences” [208]) and is similarly blind to the danger in 
which his own treachery places him (“[Tito] felt now no more than a passing twinge of 
uneasiness at the suggestion of Ser Ceccone’s power to hurt him” [226]). Meditating on 
his hopes for the future, he wonders why he might not strip himself of the deeds of the 
past, “as of rehearsal clothing, and throw away the old bundle, to robe himself for the 
real scene?” (208). Tito’s actions, the “skills” he is paid so handsomely to use, seem to 
exist independently of him, like garments he can don or discard without altering anything 
essential in himself. To be sure, this perspective is a mystification, very like the one Marx 
identified in the commodification process: 
The worker . . . only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels 
outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is 
working he does not feel at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, 
but coerced; it is forced labour . . . Labour in which man alienates himself 
is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. . . . [T]he external character of 
labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but 
another’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs not to 
himself but to another. (The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844 30) 
                                                
54 Another dimension of Tito’s instrumentalization is sexual: sodomy was notoriously common in 
fifteenth-century Florence, as were amorous relationships between men and boys. Such practices 
were among the targets of Savonarola’s Puritan reforms, and Eliot certainly would have known 
about them. However, as Nancy Henry has shown, her references to male-male sex are carefully 
coded so as not to offend Victorian sensibilities (“The Romola Code” 344). Thus while Tito’s 
relationships with other male characters are not obviously sexual, there is undeniably an erotic 
element in Nello’s admiration of his beauty, and likely also in the patronage of such figures as 
Gianozzo Pucci, Lorenzo Tornabuoni, and Dolfo Spini. With this in mind, Tito’s willingness to be 
instrumentalized may be, more accurately, a desire to be instrumentalized, and his fantasy of 
transcending materiality through intellectual work, one possessing distinctly erotic appeal. Indeed, 
the split between message and medium that defines the modern informational paradigm might 
have had extra appeal for those who satisfied the body’s appetites through practices that had 
increasingly come under censure. 
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Under these conditions, the worker’s own activity appears, to him, “alien activity,” 
forfeited the moment he sells it, in potentiality, to the capitalist on the open market.  
Marx was thinking, largely if not exclusively, of the factory, but what authorizes 
Tito’s fantasy is the fact that his labour is of the mind, and not of the body. To him, it is 
all a “game of hypothetic skill” that barely “heats the blood” (230). This attitude becomes 
explicit in a later scene, when Tito attempts to lure Savonarola into a political trap by 
offering to deliver a sensitive letter. At this point in the plot, Florence has become so 
volatile that Tito, ever the opportunist, has carved out an alternative position for himself 
in Milan, where he plans to escape should Florence become too dangerous. Now a triple 
agent, Tito has maintained his facade of impartiality in the minds of all but a few 
characters. Remarkably, not even his wives suspect the depth of his treachery. In private 
conversation with Savonarola, he undertakes an act of manipulation that crowns his 
escalating duplicity, affecting a wish to retire from the political scene in Florence: 
I find . . . that I have mistaken my real vocation in forsaking the career of 
pure letters . . . The politics of Florence, father, are worthy to occupy the 
greatest mind . . . When a man is in a position to execute his own ideas; 
but when, like me, he can only hope to be the mere instrument of 
changing schemes, he requires to be animated by the minor attachments 
of a born Florentine. (228-9) 
The statement is an impressive bending of the truth that Tito has dreamt up to win 
Savonarola’s trust, but it captures, more fully than anything else he says, his view of his 
own predicament. Where Marx denounced the instrumentalization of human beings in 
the labour process, Tito whole-heartedly accepts it, failing to see why he should oppose 
his own instrumentalization. After all, it has worked out well for him so far: where the 
reification of communicative labour stripped Gaskell’s female characters of their agency, 
Tito finds, at least temporarily, a freedom in alienation. But what kind of freedom is this?  
As I have suggested, it is a freedom that should be familiar to twenty-first century 
readers: an individualistic, illusory liberation from history, from the future, from the 
consequences of one’s actions and from one’s obligations to other people. Tito’s status 
as a knowledge worker is what makes it so easy for him to adopt this perspective. After 
all, it can be difficult to see the ways in which immaterial labour is exploitative, or to trace 
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its connections to a wider system that exploits the labour of others.55 This blindness is 
helped in Tito’s case by a denial of the body; the blood that in him stays cool is the thing 
that, in Adorno’s theory, drives us to alleviate suffering, what Adorno calls the “last 
epistemological quiver of the somatic element . . . the physical moment [that] tells our 
knowledge that suffering ought not to be” (Negative Dialectics 203). In Adorno and in 
Eliot, embodied experience offers a check to the lure of abstraction, and yet equally, a 
check to positivism. Pain is singular and universal, expressive yet inarticulate; it places 
the mind in dialogue with a finite body, existing in time and space. Our capacity to 
experience the pain even of labour we have sold tell us that the process of alienation is 
always secretly but essentially incomplete, in need of continual reenactment and 
therefore susceptible to dialectical reversal.  
The ethical and emancipatory potential of pain is, then, an obvious theme in 
Adorno and in Eliot, but it is one that deserves more serious consideration in our 
contemporary context, as well.56 In the West, more and more of us are knowledge 
workers of one sort or another. Like Tito, we may live in relative comfort, shielded from 
the full extent of our alienation and from the link between our labour and material 
suffering in other parts of the world. The outsourcing of the extractive and industrial 
foundations of the modern economy creates the illusion that we have entered a historical 
moment in which Western prosperity is supported by a resource, information, that is 
                                                
55 As Christian Fuchs puts it, global capitalism has “dispersed the walls of the wage-labour factory 
all over the globe” (111). Fuchs is referring to the distribution of labour in the information 
economy. Highly paid knowledge work—much of it located in the West—depends on dozens of 
other industries that are increasingly shipped out to the developing world—but the spatial politics 
of the modern economy can make these links difficult to see. Ursula Huws states the problem 
more explicitly, calling the end products of the ICT industry (commodities designed and sold by 
Apple, Microsoft, IBM, etc.,) the “tip of an iceberg of labour encompassing the miners who extract 
the minerals that are their raw materials, the factory workers who assemble them, transport 
workers, warehouse workers, service workers, software engineers, call center workers, and many 
more” (“iCapitalism and the Cybertariat” 47-8). 
56 Recent work by Rachel Ablow and Claire Jarvis explores elements of the representation of pain 
in Victorian fiction. Though neither author deals with Eliot specifically, both make interesting and 
relevant points about how the Victorians understood pain as an intersubjective, social 
phenomenon. Ablow claims that the invention of anaesthetics in the nineteenth century 
problematized the idea that pain had anything to do with divine punishment, and made pain the 
centre of medical and moral debate (Victorian Pain 2). It is possible to view Eliot’s interest in pain 
as an attempt to secularize the idea of divine punishment, but I think there are more layers to it 
than that. For Adorno, pain and suffering are indicators that all is not right with the world. The 
sense of loss and insufficiency internal to the negative dialectic is, he claims, “the world’s agony 
raised to a concept” (Negative Dialectics 6). I think we can see something similar in Eliot. It is 
perverse, in both Eliot and Adorno, to be too comfortable; to be too comfortable is to have gone 
too far inward, and to have relinquished one’s stake in collective life. 
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ample, ethereal, and infinitely renewable. In the networked present, time and even space 
seem “infinitely malleable” (Mosco 92); communication technology “permits people to 
meet anywhere at any time, thereby making possible the ubiquitous exchange of 
information from the simplest two person exchange to the operation of a multinational 
conglomerate” (85). Bill Gates marked an era with the declaration that computers would 
eliminate geography, at least, for those in possession of a computer (6). These remarks 
do not denote reality so much as they conjure fantasy: with our personal and 
professional lives online, the fantasy goes, we can be demoni, of no particular country, 
just like Tito.  
However, as we have seen, Tito’s freedom is actually alienation: it consists in 
relinquishing personal debts and giving himself over to instrumentalization as a medium. 
Initially, the effects of this sacrifice do not trouble him: he understands his self to be 
separate from his labour, and his mind to be separate from his body. Eliot, though, will 
not permit us to forget the role of the body in what seem to be intangible, cerebral forms 
of labour. If Tito initially finds the work of the intellectual “easy” and “hypothetic” (206, 
226), Eliot did not. On the contrary, periods of research and writing were for her almost 
always accompanied by depression and chronic pain. Her journal entries during the 
writing of Romola are punctuated by illness and expressions of doubt. In an entry dated 
February 17-26, 1860, she admits “I have written only the first two chapters of my novel 
besides the Proem, and I have an oppressive sense of the far-stretching task before me, 
my health being feeble just now . . . I have a distrust in myself, in my work, in others’ 
loving acceptance of it which robs my otherwise happy life of all joy. I ask myself, without 
being able to answer, whether I have ever before felt so chilled and oppressed” 
(Selections from George Eliot’s Letters 271). This oppressive cloud remained in place, 
even when the “far-stretching task” was at its end. An entry from June 1863 reads as 
follows:  
I have not yet finished Romola, and am made stupid and depressed by a 
slight cough . . . Sunday: ill with hemicrania, unable to do anything all day. 
Still suffering from my cough and headache. Tuesday: put the last stroke 
to Romola. (SL 287)   
The symptoms that these journal entries describe were for Eliot an inevitable result of 
mental exertion, and throughout her professional life, she relied on lengthy trips to the 
continent to recover from “the strain of composition” (Henry 123). Unlike her creation, 
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Tito, she was deeply, physically affected by her work, and the effects of this fraught 
relationship are manifest in her texts. I have already mentioned the impact of the sheer 
denseness of Romola on its reception. Alicia Christoff detects a similar aesthetic in 
Middlemarch, and her formulation is edifying. She describes Middlemarch as a “weary” 
text, one whose primary aesthetic is of “continued endurance, [the] experience of 
tedium” and “habitualness” (141). For Christoff, narrative weariness is an ethical project: 
it serves up an acknowledgement of “the obtrusive complexity and enormity of another 
person and of the task of trying to imagine their subjective experience” (141). In Eliot’s 
hands, she insists, “the medium of feeling . . . becomes something palpable and almost 
material, something that has its own density and viscosity” (142). Contra contemporary 
hysteria about the chaotic, transporting power of feeling, Eliot’s novels present feeling as 
a medium that slows things down, that impedes communication and compels self-
reflection. As such, it is very different from the medium that Tito imagines becoming, yet 
even Tito is eventually drawn back down to earth. For him, the reminder comes in the 
dramatic return of his father, Baldassarre Calvo. A projection, or better yet, a 
manifestation of the contradiction in Tito’s attitude toward his work, Baldasserre 
represents the relationships, obligations, and even the bodily infirmity that Tito has tried 
to reject. The older man pledges to avenge himself by taking Tito’s life, and though his 
efforts are eventually successful, they are slowed by poverty, weakness, and by the 
amnesia he suffers as a result of physical and emotional trauma.  
If Tito has persuaded himself that knowledge work is hypothetical and without 
consequence for the body and the self, the Baldassarre plot testifies that the opposite is 
true. The body’s role as a (troublesome) medium for knowledge is foregrounded, and the 
trope of amnesia implies that self and work are inextricably bound. Like so many other 
characters in Romola, Baldassarre is or was a scholar, but the skills he once employed 
in that realm are lost to him. He has lost even the ability to read. It returns to him 
occasionally in flashes triggered by strong emotion (121), but for the most part, he sees 
only “black weather-marks” when he peers at a printed page (148): a life’s worth of 
knowledge, “that laboriously gathered store . . . had all slipped away from him” (121). 
Baldassarre can no longer think of information as an ethereal and infinitely duplicable 
resource, for he has discovered that it can be taken away. Knowledge he might once 
have understood himself to possess (“laboriously gathered”) has been rendered 
inaccessible by physical shocks to the brain. Unlike Tito, he no longer has the option of 
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suppressing the body’s role in intellectual work, for his own body’s failure has made 
intellectual work impossible. His illness and amnesia-induced illiteracy mean that he now 
has more in common with Esther Barton than with Tito: like Esther, he is not eligible for 
the position of liberal subjecthood. Like her, his sphere of influence is reduced to the 
limited range of his weakening body. The mobility that Tito has, until this point, enjoyed, 
will never again be Baldassarre’s. Unfortunately for Tito, it won’t long be Tito’s, either.  
The conclusion of the novel brings about the long-awaited reunion of father and 
son, and with it, the irreducibility of the very muscles and blood that Tito has so ardently 
tried to forget, for the two meet at last to die: 
[Baldassarre] pressed his knuckles against the round throat and knelt 
upon the chest with all the force of his aged frame . . . Then, he sat on the 
body, still clutching the neck of the tunic . . . No eyes descried afar off the 
two human bodies among the tall grass by the riverside. (237)  
Tito dies at Baldassarre’s hands—in fact, in Baldassarre’s arms—his corpse a 
stubbornly material reminder that undermines the fantasy of transcendent form. Hours 
later, after the struggle has ceased, a passing wagon discovers the bodies:  
The aged man had fallen forward, and his dead clutch was on the 
garment of the other. It was not possible to separate them; nay, it was 
better to put them into the wagon and carry them as they were into the 
great Piazza, that notice might be given to the Eight. (237) 
So much for the game of hypothetic skill. In the end, the physical body, a moral debt, 
and a “claim from the past” (67) combine in the figure of Baldassarre, and Tito’s freedom 
is exposed as the ruse it always was. The conclusion is not particularly surprising for 
readers: there are seldom villains in Eliot’s novels, but Tito comes close. An 
irresponsible, uncaring opportunist, he seems in some ways to get what he deserves. 
However, if we resist the temptation to peg Tito simply as villain, and read him instead 
as a cautionary experiment in liberal subjecthood—the perfected form of the liberal 
subject that knowledge work and the information economy seem, according to Liu and 
Hayles, to promise—then the conclusion ceases to be expected, and hits much closer to 
home. Information turns out to be mortal, and immaterial labour, admittedly an appealing 
alternative to more obvious forms of toil, still has consequences for the body and the 
self. In reality, we are less likely to die from the exploitation of our minds than from the 
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exploitation of our bodies; the liberty Eliot takes in Tito’s plot is to imagine otherwise: to 
literalize the death of self we risk when we confuse alienation with freedom. 
Romola and the Alternative 
The fantasy of freedom through alienation is further complicated by gender. We 
saw in chapter one that expressions of immaterial labour are labeled and valued 
differently in Gaskell’s fictional Manchester, and that these differences are organized 
along gendered lines. The same is true in Romola: its two protagonists are, alike, 
immaterial labourers, and are very often shown in the midst of their work, but their 
relationship to that work differs drastically. Tito’s reckoning with the condition of 
embodiment is delayed until his late struggle with Baldassarre, but his female 
counterpart is reduced to her body in countless scenes. Like Tito, Romola is explicitly 
described as a mediator and an intellectual. We first meet her in her father’s study, 
where she is helping him with his work. Indeed, her labour is instrumental to that work: 
elderly, fragile, and blind, Bardo de’ Bardi is a more fortunate Baldassarre, who 
overcomes the obstacles of failing health to continue his research only because of the 
support he receives from a devoted child. In an exemplary scene from the early pages of 
the novel, Bardo sends Romola to inspect the shelves of his library, deploying her as an 
extension of his own eyes and hands to ascertain the position of a particular volume in 
the collection: “‘Is it in the right place, Romola?’ asked Bardo, who was perpetually 
seeking the assurance that the outward fact continued to correspond with the image 
which lived to the minutest detail in his mind” (29). In these lines, the mediation of the 
library for the blind man is accomplished through the living, thinking, feeling instrument 
that is his daughter. If there lingers any temptation to forget the material base of the 
researcher’s knowledge, or to disengage the activities of reading and thinking from the 
body that makes them possible, that temptation is removed for Bardo by his state of 
dependence on Romola. His blindness means that he cannot take the object world for 
granted, and that must consider, constantly, its mediated condition, something that the 
novel, through its thematic play with the concealment and revelation of information, 
suggests should be as much of a concern for the sighted as for the blind.57  
                                                
57 Levine explores Eliot’s troubling of the visual in her “Prophetic Fallacy” essay, observing that, 
for Eliot, “appearance does not correspond to essence, exteriors can be misleading and vision is 
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In fact, in stark contrast to Tito, Bardo is obsessed with the mind’s reliance on the 
body. His disability is a potent reminder of the obvious but easily forgotten fact that we 
read with our eyes and write with our hands, and, in Eliot’s Florence, human knowledge 
depends on the medium of writing, which in turn depends on the body. Just as Plato’s 
Thamus predicted, writing has come to substitute for memory, or so it would seem from 
Eliot’s depictions of both Bardo and Baldassare. Baldassarre’s amnesia is repeatedly 
conflated with his illiteracy, and Bardo admits to Romola that his faculties have become 
“blunted” since he lost his ability to read with his sight: “blindness acts like a dam,” he 
says, “sending the streams of thought backward along the already-travelled channels 
and hindering the course onward” (30). This personal struggle is linked to a social one, 
as Bardo, in the middle of an exasperated rant to Romola, connects his feelings of 
ineptitude to the obsolescence of manuscript culture that he expects to follow from the 
introduction of mechanical printing: 
What hired amanuensis can be equal to the scribe who loves the words 
that grow under his hand, and to whom an error or indistinctness in the 
text is more painful than a sudden darkness or obstacle in his path? And 
even these mechanical printers who threaten to make learning a base 
and vulgar thing—even they must depend on the manuscript over which 
we scholars have bent with that insight into the poet’s meaning. (29) 
Bardo’s defensive remark masks a technophobic conviction that mechanical printing will 
lead to the devaluation of the scholar’s labour, an anxiety that Mattie Burkert sees as 
reflective of Victorian fears (not shared by Eliot) about the expansion of the popular 
press.58 It also maps competing ideas about media, information, and immaterial labour 
onto a generational time scale: youthful Tito embraces abstraction and wilfully denies the 
body, but an older generation represented by Bardo and Baldassarre remains deeply 
                                                                                                                                            
epistemologically problematic from the outset” (139). Although blindness, illiteracy, and secrecy 
are recurrent themes in the novel, Levine’s point is made most emphatically by Tito, “whose 
‘blank’ face becomes the ideal vehicle for an exploration of the epistemological failures of the 
visual” (139). 
58 As Burkert points out, the novel is deeply interested in changing media cultures. She notes the 
reference to the “early glories of the Florentine press” in the novel’s Proem, the mix of manuscript 
and print materials lying about in Nello’s shop, and the importance of the handbills that circulate 
as propaganda in advance of Savonarola’s trial. These clues, she argues, align Romola’s 
“Renaissance moment” with a Victorian “transformation in information technology” brought about 
by the lifting of the paper tax and the invention of wood pulp paper (n. p.). The larger claim of 
Burkert’s piece is that Romola’s willingness to engage with mechanically printed materials mirrors 
her creator’s optimism about an expanded and increasingly democratized press. Citing the many 
formats and editions through which Romola made its way to the public, Burkert suggests that 
Eliot recognized and accepted “the many contingencies involved in the printing process,” and that 
she was “not distressed by the mutability of her text.” 
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invested in material objects and material history. Bardo’s appreciation of media and of 
his own bodily limitations generates resistance to the abstraction that knowledge-work 
will undergo in the modern, rational paradigm, yet even Bardo takes the ministering 
labour of his daughter for granted.  
To illustrate this point, we need only return to the aforementioned scene, this 
time inhabiting Romola’s perspective instead of Bardo’s. From this vantage point, it is 
clear that the act of drawing the desired book from its place on the shelf entails more 
than the extension of the arm and the exercise of a discerning eye. Romola’s patient 
response to her father’s request exemplifies the complex labour of care-taking:  
A fine ear would have detected in [Romola’s] clear voice and distinct 
utterance a faint suggestion of weariness struggling with habitual 
patience. But as she approached her father, and saw his arms stretched 
out a little with nervous excitement to seize the volume, her hazel eyes 
filled with pity; she hastened to lay the book in his lap, and kneeled down 
by him, looking up at him as if she believed that the love in her face must 
surely make its way through the dark obstruction that shut out everything 
else. (29) 
It is not simply that Romola is obliged to obey her father, but that she must obey him with 
compassion and grace, and without the expectation that she might one day pursue her 
own interests and self-actualization through labour. What is more, she must not allow 
her performance to be affected by Bardo’s persistent attempts to undercut the value of 
her work. Despite the crucial support she provides for him, Bardo is adamant in 
declaring Romola useless to his scholarly enterprise: “the sustained zeal and 
unconquerable patience demanded from those who would tread the unbeaten paths of 
knowledge are,” he insists, “still less reconcilable with the wandering, vagrant propensity 
of the feminine mind than with the feeble powers of the feminine body” (30). Bardo’s 
prejudice could not be more clear: masculine, intellectual labour is valuable, and 
feminized intellectual labour, a contradiction in terms. Although Romola is, in truth, his 
research assistant, he acknowledges only the part of her work that can be categorized 
as naturalized, feminine caring, a “feeble power” not to be compared with his own 
scholarly undertakings.  
Romola, though, is not the only character whose intellectual labour involves a 
significant emotional or sympathetic component. Scholar, spy, and mediator Tito is an 
intellectual worker whose success hangs on his ability to please, an ability that is 
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arguably more developed in him than it is in Romola. In countless scenes, Tito sets his 
interlocutors at ease by greasing what initially promise to be awkward interactions. It 
takes only moments for him to win Bardo’s trust, and his political career more or less 
depends on his ability to be liked by everyone he meets. Tito’s interpersonal skills may 
seem to undermine my claims about the gendering of immaterial labour, but there are 
two crucial differences that we should note: first, unlike Tito, Romola never imagines her 
emotional labour to be isolable from her material conditions. Tito’s extreme rationalism is 
not an option for her, as she is continually reminded that her lot is determined by her 
body’s feminine presentation. Second, the skill and effort Tito puts into the task of being 
agreeable is recognized as labour for which he ought to be rewarded or compensated. In 
Romola’s case, that labour is simply expected. She is a wife, Savonarola asserts when 
he catches her fleeing Florence; her duties define her.  
Not so with Tito, whose social skills are recognized by the other characters as 
skills. In fact, this is the very word that Gianozzo Pucci uses to describe Tito’s talents in 
a conversation with Tito and Lorenzo Tornabuoni (154). In this scene, Tito is invited by 
the two covert Mediceans to take on a set of commissions that will employ every ounce 
of his tact and ingenuity: he must travel to Rome to facilitate an agreement between the 
French and the ousted party of Piero de’ Medici while, at the same time, maintaining 
pleasant relations with Savonarola’s popular party and courting the confidence of a third 
contender to power, the Arrabbiati. In their efforts to convince Tito to take the job, Pucci 
and Tornabuoni are effusive in their praise, and they have no trouble naming the skills 
they wish Tito to employ. “In truth, Melema,” Torabuoni professes, “I know of no man in 
Florence who can serve our party better than you . . . Except yourself, I know of no one 
else on whom we could rely for the necessary discretion” (153). Pucci is even more 
direct:  
The fact is, Tito mio, you can help us better than if you were Ulysses 
himself, for I am convinced that Ulysses often made himself disagreeable. 
To manage men one ought to have a sharp mind in a velvet sheath. And 
there is not a soul in Florence who could undertake a business like this 
journey to Rome, for example, with the same safety that you can. (153) 
The risks are great, but the rewards Tito stands to obtain are proportionately so: “There’s 
a cardinal’s hat at the end of that road,” Tornabuoni hints, but Tito waves him off; “my 
joints are not so stiff yet . . . that I can’t be induced to run without such a high prize as 
that. I think the income of an abbey or two held ‘in commendam,’ without the trouble of 
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getting my head shaved, would satisfy me at present” (154). Of course, Tito is not 
counting on the Medicean party’s success: as a triple agent, he conjectures that “all 
results . . . must turn to his advantage” (176). We know that Tito has omitted some 
important factors from this calculation, but if not for Baldassarre, his scheme might 
conceivably have worked.59 Moreover, by this stage in the novel, he exercises a 
surprising amount of control over his commissions, almost always setting the terms of 
negotiation. While this control is illusory to the extent that Tito has literally sold out, it is 
still a better deal than the one initially offered to Romola. 
Indeed, Romola discovers that her labour is little more valued by her husband 
than it was by her father. Her marriage to Tito is fulfilling only for a handful of weeks, as 
the more Tito comes to understand her abilities, the more he begins to fear her. He 
desires his wife to be part of “the furniture” of his life (125); she exists, in his mind, to 
provide the same “loving, pitying devotedness” he saw her provide to Bardo, and like a 
piece of furniture, he imagines this function to be a natural consequence of her form 
(57). Tito’s forecast of their married life—which he commissions Piero di Cosmi to 
paint—is one of contentment, luxury, and plentitude in which neither his labour nor 
Romola’s appears. He presents Piero’s painting to Romola with a command:  
While I am away, you will look every day at those pretty symbols of our 
life together—the ship on the calm sea, and the ivy that never withers, 
and those Loves that have left off wounding us and shower soft petals 
that like our kisses; and the leopards and tigers, they are the troubles of 
your life that are all quelled now. (93) 
His words are painful to read once we have found out the fate of their union. Their 
marriage is less the end of Romola’s troubles than the beginning; her life as Tito’s 
spouse is one of neglect and toil, in which she must balance her wifely duties with the 
immense and emotionally trying task of putting her father’s affairs in order after he dies. 
It is alarming for Tito when she begins to demand recognition for this work, support, and 
                                                
59 Romola certainly encourages us to believe that Tito gets what he deserves, but this does not 
mean that the novel consistently punishes bad behaviour and rewards good. In fact, Fredric 
Jameson argues that Eliot’s novels, despite their apparent didacticism, trouble the ethical binary. 
In his account, Eliot’s “moralizing style” and her attempt to represent every “inner movement and 
reaction” serve to “undermine the ethical binary and to discredit the metaphysical and moral 
ideologies of evil” (Antimonies 120, 137). In other words, Eliot’s effort to ground good and evil in 
something more substantial than religious tradition testifies not to the authority but to the eclipse 
of those established ethical systems. 
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the right to make decisions about their shared life. A later confrontation between the two 
spells out the terms of their growing estrangement:  
The good-humoured, tolerant Tito . . . felt himself becoming strangely 
hard toward this wife whose presence had once been the strongest 
influence he had known. With all his softness of disposition, he had a 
masculine effectiveness of purpose and intellect, which, like sharpness of 
edge, is itself an energy, working its way without any strong momentum. 
Romola had an energy of her own which thwarted his, and no man, who 
is not exceptionally feeble, will endure being thwarted by his wife. (181) 
This determination not to be “thwarted” shapes Savonarola’s interactions with Romola as 
well.60 We see this in the contest of wills by which Romola’s flight to Venice is reversed, 
and again, more clearly, in the challenge she proffers to Savonarola after his refusal to 
intervene in the Florentine Council’s decision to execute a group of virtually harmless 
“traitors,” among them Romola’s godfather. Romola points out Savonarola’s hypocrisy, 
exclaiming in passionate anger, “It is not that you feel bound to be neutral; else why did 
you speak for Lorenzo Tornabuoni? . . . It is not as a Medicean that my godfather is to 
die; it is as a man you have no love for!” (213) But Savonarola is not to be persuaded: he 
has, we learn, that “readily roused resentment toward opposition, hardly separable from 
a power-loving and powerful nature” (213). He requires submission from his disciples, 
and especially that of his errant “daughter,” Romola. Savonarola’s privilege—and Tito’s, 
and Bardo’s—depends on the transformation of Romola’s work into wifely duty. It 
depends, in other words, on the appropriation of her labour. 
Tessa, too, is swept up in this destructive current. When marriage to Romola 
turns out to have fallen a little to the side of Tito’s expectations, he wastes no time in 
reviving his flirtation with the pretty contadina. The rationale for this decision, sheltered in 
the deeper, darker folds of Tito’s consciousness, comes to us from the narrator:  
It is true that once or twice before Bardo’s death the sense that there was 
a Tessa up the hill, with whom it was possible to pass an hour agreeably, 
had been an inducement to him to escape from a little weariness of the 
old man, when, for lack of any positive engagement, he might otherwise 
                                                
60 Eliot’s language is mirrored almost exactly in Sarah Stickney Ellis’s published advice to wives. 
In The Wives of England (1834), Ellis warns women against revealing any aptitude that might 
diminish her husband’s powers by comparison. Having once incited his jealousy, the wife cannot 
hope to influence his decisions, for he will “naturally prefer to thwart her, for the purpose of 
proving his own independence and power” (87). However, where Ellis accepts this course of 
events as a “natural” constraint within which married women must operate, Eliot challenges it by 
positioning marriage within a larger set of competing social relations and responsibilities. 
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have born the weariness patiently and shared Romola’s burden. But the 
moment when he had first felt a real hunger for Tessa’s ignorant 
lovingness and belief in him had not come till quite lately . . . It was the 
day when he had first seen Baldassarre, and had bought the armour . . . 
He wanted a little ease, a little repose from self-control, after the 
agitations of the day and exertions of the day; he wanted to be where he 
could adjust his mind to the morrow, without caring how he behaved at 
the present moment. And there was a sweet adoring creature within 
reach whose presence was as safe and unconstraining as that of her own 
[goat] kids. (135) 
We could hardly ask for a better definition of emotional labour than the one that Eliot 
provides in these lines. In “Why Sexuality Is Work,” Silvia Federici argues that 
sexuality—in her analysis, a good disproportionately produced by women and consumed 
by men—acts as a “release . . . from the discipline of the work process”; it is the form of 
compensation which supposedly makes our alienation bearable, “ideologically sold [to 
us] as the ‘other’ from work” (23). The problem for women is that this ‘other’ from work is 
often just more work; women are taught to prioritize men’s satisfaction so that men can 
return to the office or the factory the next day, refreshed and ready to labour without 
complaint. In Stickney Ellis’s words, the wife provides her husband a retreat from “the 
tumult of the world” (89) and a moral boost meant to “raise the tone of his mind from the 
low anxieties, and vulgar cares which necessarily occupy so large a portion of his 
existence” (82). In Eliot’s novel, this turns out to be a larger and more complicated task 
than Ellis’s instructions suggest, requiring not one but two women. Romola keeps Tito’s 
house, accounts, and reputation in order so that he can go on climbing the ladder of 
Florentine politics. Tessa, ignorant of his other life, whisks away his troubles and helps 
“adjust his mind to the morrow.”  
She also bears his children. Eliot reveals little about the sexual relationships 
within the marriages (how Romola remains childless for over three years of marriage is 
left for us to wonder) but, by the middle of the novel, Tessa has a little Lillo and an even 
littler Ninna to account for. She is thus a provider of reproductive labour on more than 
one level: not only does she act as the emotional outlet that allows Tito to carry on with 
his taxing career in politics, but she plays her small part in producing the flesh and blood 
of the future workforce, too. Despite many indications in the novel that Tessa is 
somewhat lacking in mental acuity, she turns out to be a skillful nurturer, first for her 
mules and goats, then for Tito, and then for her babies. She adores her children, and if 
she is slow to discipline them, she is ever responsive to their needs, and takes genuine 
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pleasure in tending to them. “I don’t much like work,” she declares, “but I like sitting in 
the sunshine and feeding things” (133). Although in the beginning of the novel, feeding 
animals is Tessa’s job, and although it is a job in which she is treated poorly, she finds a 
way to take some pleasure in the work. Skirting the beatings and verbal abuse to which 
she is subject, Tessa emphasizes the parts of her job that she likes. It is powerful 
creative act, but one that does not fully compensate for her inability to scrutinize the 
wider social conditions that limit her freedom—though as we will see, this wider vision is 
precisely what her predicament teaches to Romola. 
Tessa’s aptitudes are again on display in an unlikely encounter with Baldassarre, 
whose relationship to Tito she little suspects. When Baldassarre seeks shelter in a hut 
on the piece of land where Tessa and her deaf old relation, Monna Lisa, reside, Tessa is 
thrilled to have a new recipient for her store of sociability and care. Despite 
Baldassarre’s illness and his snappish, unpredictable temper, Tessa patiently feeds him 
macaroni, protects him from Monna Lisa’s unreasonable demands, and entertains him 
with her chatter (131). When she asks for his name and his amnesia prevents him from 
answering, she immediately recognizes and responds to his embarrassment: “ignorant 
as Tessa was, the pity stirred in her by his blank look taught her to say, ‘Never mind; you 
are a stranger; it is no matter about your having a name’” (134).    
As Romola surmises when the two finally meet, Tessa has “a child’s mind in a 
woman’s body” (203), but the novel does not dismiss her doting personality as 
childishness. Tessa is an important character, and a sympathetic one, and the tasks she 
so readily opposes to work are shown to be incredibly onerous ones for Romola. Soon 
after her first failed escape, Romola takes to the streets of Florence to administer food, 
drink, and compassion to the victims of a plague that is sweeping the city, and even 
though she does not fall ill herself, the effort drains her. She has never learned let alone 
mastered these skills:  
She had no innate taste for tending to the sick and clothing the ragged, 
like some women to whom the details of such work are welcome in 
themselves, simply as an occupation. Her early training had kept her 
aloof from such womanly labours; and if she had not brought to them the 
inspiration of her deepest feelings, they would have been irksome to her. 
(169) 
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This passage, coming late in the novel, will hardly strike us as strange or significant, as 
well acquainted with Romola’s personality as we are by this point, but it is a crucial one 
because it overturns the understanding of “women’s work” that Savonarola, Tito, and 
Bardo have variously expressed, presenting care work as skilled labour rather than 
naturalized duty. That it happens to be a skill Romola does not have only makes its 
status as skill more apparent, and, at the same time, challenges the understanding of 
femininity upheld by the male characters. If Romola has been raised to excel at forms of 
immaterial labour that are normally gendered male, this only goes to show that the 
gendered organization of labour and, indeed, the organization of gender itself, are social. 
Romola and Tessa are both women, but Romola is not Tessa. Education and privilege 
have expanded the horizon of her duties and her needs: she cannot unlearn her passion 
for scholarship, history, and politics, nor can she bring herself to turn inward as Tito 
does, to ignore the suffering that surrounds her.  
Although Romola longs to be free of the labour that has come with the titles of 
wife and daughter, she is immobilized by a dilemma that contemporary feminism has not 
yet solved. To renounce her own exploitation seems to entail turning her back on her 
suffering neighbours, since it is her care for them that is being exploited. The execution 
of her godfather and her discovery of Tito’s affair with Tessa are what finally inspire her 
decision. She has laboured for the sake of a “common life,” a “general lot” that 
Savonarola’s teaching has led her to exalt over her own (205), but the treachery of her 
collaborators leads her to doubt the possibility of this collective life. She determines, at 
last, to die, and in a spectacular scene that critics have struggled to take seriously, casts 
herself into the ocean aboard a derelict boat, taking neither food nor water along.  
As those familiar with the novel know, the suicide attempt fails. Romola washes 
up on some other shore, and it is only moments before the cry of a child, “darting 
through her like a pain,” calls her back to the care-taking labour she has just fled (238). 
The child turns out to be one of the few survivors of a village decimated by the plague. 
Freed temporarily from the entanglements of Florentine society and from the ill-fitting 
guise of the self-sacrificing wife, Romola appears in a new state, focused, pragmatic, 
and clear-sighted. Over the span of a few short chapters, she sets about re-assembling 
the village, coaxing the plague survivors through the thicket of fear and superstition that 
has prevented them from rallying against defeat. It is tempting to read the scene as a re-
staging of Romola’s earlier escape, one that concludes in the same fashion, by putting 
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her back in her place, and reminding her of her womanly duties.61 However, there is 
something markedly different about Romola’s second escape, and different too about 
the labour she performs in the village. Her decision to help the villagers is not coerced. 
Her response to the child’s distress is motivated by a desire to alleviate suffering, and 
while this desire is social, the strange experience of waking up in a distant, unknown 
place has temporarily loosened Romola from the particular, patriarchal social she has 
known.62 Moreover, the work she performs in the village far exceeds the limited set of 
tasks to which her former life confined her. During her time with the villagers, she takes 
on her share of nursing and childcare, but the majority of her time, energy, and natural 
ability are realized in exercises of leadership, mediation, and resource management. 
After months of work in the village, Romola reflects on a new perspective that the 
experience has made available:  
In those silent wintry hours when Romola lay resting from her weariness, 
her mind, traveling back over the past, and gazing across the undefined 
distance of the future, saw all objects from a new position . . . from the 
moment after her waking when the cry had drawn her, she had not even 
reflected, as she used to do in Florence, that she was glad to live 
because she could lighten sorrow—she had simply lived, with so 
energetic an impulse to share the life around her, to answer the call of 
need, and do the work which cried aloud to be done, that the reason for 
living, enduring, labouring, never took the form of argument. (241) 
Romola’s experience renews her belief in the possibility of collective life. In the village, 
labour is not alien by default, but rather an expenditure of energy meant to help the 
community thrive. Social and sexual distinctions are looser than the ones she has 
known, and though she receives special treatment from the villagers, this treatment 
serves not to reinscribe her privilege but to remind her of the inequality she has fled, 
causing her mind to travel “back over the past,” and to see it from her “new position” 
(241). Some readers have taken Romola for a kind of colonizing figure who imposes her 
                                                
61 Daniel Malachuk, for instance, argues that she becomes a “surrogate mother” for the fishing 
village and for Florence upon her return (51). 
62 Lauren Goodlad makes a similar point in her reading of the scene, albeit in more abstract 
terms. In her analysis, Romola’s watery sojourn makes of her a “dislocated subject,” an “exile with 
no firm anchor or calling” (202). In this way, Goodlad suggests, Romola is endowed with a kind of 
sympathetic otherness, and thereby invites the identification of Victorian readers who might have 
felt themselves adrift amid contemporary crises of faith, value, and imperial sovereignty. 
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own values on the villagers,63 and others have expressed skepticism about the oddly 
instinctual character of her actions.64 These are important, even necessary criticisms of 
the scene, but they do not exhaust its meaning. The impulsiveness of Romola’s decision 
to respond to the villagers’ cries is not so much proof of her saintly disposition as it is a 
sign that her journey has carried her beyond the rationalist injunction to suppress the 
body and the emotions, permitting what Adorno called the “somatic element” to advance 
in her a materialist, non-identitarian method of relating to others, an “impulse to share 
life,” as the narrator describes it (Adorno 203, Eliot 241). Romola is never quite one of 
the villagers: they never cease to view her as an outsider, and she never overcomes her 
own feelings of unbelonging. From the day she steps foot in the village to her departure, 
months later, she remains “a blessed Lady” come from “over the sea” (240). It is though 
Eliot wishes to remind us that even those actions that seem natural and instinctual are 
socially and materially mediated. However quaint and unusual the villagers are to 
Romola, her time with them is no prelapsarian vacation from reality. On the contrary, it is 
as real as anything in the novel: every day, she commits her intelligence and bodily 
strength to the project of helping them flourish, and every day, her sympathy looks less 
like an intellectual or moral exercise and more like an energetic “impulse” to share life.  
When Romola takes her leave of the villagers, she carries this altered 
perspective back with her to Florence, where she is met almost immediately with the 
news of Tito’s death. She does not hesitate; she knows the course she will take. Racing 
ahead to a point ten years after her return, the novel brings its weighty commentary on 
the ethical conundrums of political and religious systems to a close in a scene of family 
life, but it is not the scene we might have expected, nor is it quite the scene that critics 
have interpreted. While Daniel Malachuk describes Romola’s conclusion as a moment of 
“apolitical domestic bliss” (41) and Caroline Levine as a “happily ever after” (138), I see 
a more challenging if not less hopeful upheaval of the Victorian domestic ideal. In the 
final pages of the novel, Romola is free at last from the work of nurturing for which she 
was never really cut out. She has built a new life with Tessa, one that brings each 
woman into a different relationship with each other and with their own labour. Tessa 
                                                
63 Goodlad describes Romola’s response to the Jewish plague victims as a “heroized civic 
practice of care” in “herculean form,” and argues that it evokes a “millennial conversion of the 
Jews” (203). 
64 Malachuk opines that Romola’s “instinctive” service in the green valley is somewhat clumsily 
executed and serves a “didactic purpose,” illustrating Eliot’s personal solution to the liberty 
problem (51). 
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continues what is for her the gratifying task of caring for her children: the scene shows 
her weaving wreaths with a daughter considerably more dextrous than she, content, 
well-fed, and nourished by consistent, kind treatment for the first time in her life (248). 
Romola has assumed the role of educator, presumably a task more suited to her 
inclinations and abilities. She sits opposite Lillo, who is quickly losing interest in a 
volume of Petrarch, and patiently lectures him when he utters a pronouncement about 
glory that could have easily come from his father’s lips (249). We might imagine that 
Romola has made herself into the father of this little family, an interpretation that is 
supported by Romola’s habit of providing for Tessa even before they are united by Tito’s 
death, and by her suggestively sitting in “Babbo’s chair” during the visit when she first 
discerns Tessa’s relationship to Tito (202). However, I do not think the scene obliges us 
to maintain these gendered terms. Rather than assume Romola and Tessa are fitting 
themselves into pre-determined family roles, we can imagine them re-inventing the 
family, transforming it into an arrangement that ensures each of its members are 
provided for, and that allows them to take on, without fear of judgment, the work to which 
they are suited.  
In this regard, the scene is Utopian: it suggests the possibility of trading 
exploitative relationships for caring ones, and alienated labour for an energetic 
engagement with the world that transforms work into a form of self-actualization. Lauren 
Goodlad’s reading is similarly optimistic: she characterizes the scene as the conclusion 
to Romola’s Bildungsroman and the moment in which she finally becomes the author of 
her own history (203). However, many critics have expressed less favourable views of 
the novel’s closing tableau. In “Drifting through Romola,” David Kurnick argues that 
Eliot’s heroine is fundamentally abstracted from her surroundings, and never more so 
than in this closing scene. Kurnick criticizes the manner in which Romola refers to Tito, 
arguing that “she seems to be describing a book she’s read more than a man she’s been 
married to, as always . . . maintain[ing] an oddly external or supplementary relationship 
to what is after all her own life” (494). Kurnick’s claim implies that there is some more 
correct way for Romola to relate to her past, but I am reluctant to judge her for distancing 
herself from past trauma. More significant to me the actions she undertakes to create a 
better future. When Romola arrives to relieve Tessa from her long wait for the already 
deceased Tito, she chooses to relinquish the possession of his memory, and to let go of 
the moral debt she is owed. She chooses to recognize what Tessa has to offer over and 
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above what she will need to give to Tessa. Moreover, the two women commit to this life 
in a society that renders forgiveness and generosity irrational. This is, again, where 
Adorno can help: 
We cannot eliminate from the dialectics of the extant what is experienced 
in consciousness as an alien thing: negatively, coercion and heteronomy, 
but also the marred figure of what we should love, and what the spell, the 
endogamy of consciousness, does not permit us to love. The reconciled 
position would not be the philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien. 
Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact that the alien, in the proximity it 
is granted, remains what is distant and different, beyond the 
heterogeneous and beyond that which is one’s own. (Negative Dialectics 
190) 
Eliot’s novel gives us a rare opportunity to take Adorno literally. Although they have their 
gender in common, Romola and Tessa share little else: they are temperamentally 
opposed and belong to different social classes, and while Tessa continues to abide by 
the religion of her youth, Romola is more or less, by the end of the novel, an atheist. 
Moreover, each has unwittingly trespassed on the other’s marriage to Tito, which, under 
the written and unwritten laws of a society in which property is inherited, ought to have 
made them enemies.  Yet they have overcome the endogamy of consciousness to marry 
one another, and to share in a resistance against the tide of alienation that threatens to 
make commodities of their bodies and their labour.  
At the beginning of this chapter, I argued that the position of paradoxical 
togetherness Romola and Tessa achieve has something to offer contemporary 
feminism, beset as it is with its own history of too-partial successes. This position is also 
the one Adorno assigned to the intellectual, and, in some ways, the one I think Eliot 
imagined herself to occupy, at least during the composition of Romola. Offered a larger 
cash advance for the novel than she had ever received, Eliot had little choice but to 
come to terms with the commodification of her own efforts to breath life into a history that 
was by all accounts deeply meaningful to her.65 The hefty pay check must have served 
as a reminder that her desire to do justice to her material was less important in the eyes 
                                                
65 Eliot was initially offered £10,000 for the novel by the publisher George Smith, a sum, she 
supposed, to be “handsomer than almost any terms ever offered to a writer of Fiction” (Haight 
273). To accept meant damaging her relationship with her trusted publisher, John Blackwood, for 
the purposes of monetary gain—an act that could not have sat easily with Eliot, who retained 
throughout her life a “puritanical belief in the renunciation of wealth” (Henry 135). Nevertheless, 
she accepted the offer, talking Smith down to £7000 in exchange for more flexibility in the 
scheduling of serialized parts, and more control of the copyright. 
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of the world than her ability to produce a best-seller. In accepting the offer, she sold out, 
or so she seems to have believed, given the efforts she made to justify the decision in 
letters to friends and to John Blackwood.66 However, if she felt some guilt at the money 
she made on the novel, there is no evidence that she believed her artistic integrity to be 
compromised. She accepted the concessions of participating in a literary marketplace, 
but kept alive her desire to write a truly “incarnate history,” maintaining a tension 
between what she felt obliged to do to survive and what she needed to do to make work 
meaningful.67 The product of this tension is a novel that is hard to read, a commodity 
that paradoxically resists consumption, and that continually manifests the struggle of its 
creation. At the levels of form, plot, and character, Romola invokes a dialectical 
movement between the feeling body and the objects of mental labour. It is this motion 
that continually inspires Romola to action, and that incited Eliot to call this densely 
researched novel the effort of her “best blood” (Haight 481). Necessarily insufficient, 
negative because something of the concrete always escapes the concept, this dialectic 
has the potential to induce us to struggle toward more equitable relations even while we 
recognize that an emancipatory society will not be achieved through individual effort. For 
feminism, which still strives to free women from the snares in which Eliot’s Renaissance 
characters are caught, the negative dialectic permits solidarity within conflict, and a 
forward-thinking that does not forget.  
 
 
                                                
66 After accepting the £7000, she wrote to John Blackwood to explain her decision. She insisted 
that she was “not willing to exchange [her] relations with [Blackwood] for any new ones without 
overpowering reasons”—but admitted that an “overpowering reason” had indeed arisen, namely, 
that Smith’s estimation of the value of her work was “hopelessly beyond” Blackwood’s usual one 
(Haight 273). In letters to friends, she routinely claimed that she was glad of her material fortune 
only because it allowed her to live independently, and to provide for her own family and Lewes’s 
children (Haight 253). 
67 Here, I diverge from critics like Leah Price who have portrayed Eliot as a savvy purveyor of 
popular goods. In The Anthology and the Rise of the Novel, Price argues that Eliot wrote in a 
deliberately moralizing style because she recognized that sage, quotable snippets made her 
novels popular, all the while “disclaiming responsibility” for her own popularity, and blaming it on 
compilers and publishers (120-1). It is true that Eliot was embarrassed by the ways in which her 
work was repurposed, especially by anthologizers, but if extractability and recirculation had been 
primary goals, she surely would have written very different novels from the ones she did. Put 
simply, there is much in Romola that is not quotable, and, as Eliot famously claimed about Daniel 
Deronda, everything is related to everything else.  
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Chapter 3. Castle-breaking: Value and Collapse in 
Trollope’s Palliser Novels 
There is something disarmingly pleasant about the novels of Anthony Trollope. In 
fact, a veritable mastery of all things pleasant may be the most identifiable feature of his 
fiction. The familiar characters and witty dialogue, the expected conclusions, and 
Trollope’s soothing reproduction of social ritual have endeared an admittedly repetitive 
catalogue of novels to generations of readers. To be sure, these same qualities land him 
lower in the ranks of Victorian realism than, say, Dickens or Eliot: the “nondescript style, 
the absence of symbolism, the refusal to abandon low mimetic and ironic views . . . and, 
worst of all, the attachment to romantic comedy formulas,” James Kincaid admits, 
demand explanations from the conscientious critic (3). Indeed, by the aesthetic 
standards of the New Critics and the genealogical aims of Victorian Studies’ Foucaultian 
moment, these features proved serious offenses, but no check to Trollope’s reputation 
has quite extinguished the enthusiasm with which he is read and discussed today.68 The 
most exciting treatments of his work are those that discern an easy or complacent 
Trollope superimposed on a more challenging and subversive one. According to Kincaid, 
Trollope presents, paradoxically, an “exposition of traditional values” and a “running 
counter-exposition which casts doubt on the validity or existence of these values”; 
“values,” he writes, “are countered but not subverted; the shape of the whole is made 
elastic, but it is not destroyed” (4). In The Victorian Multi-plot Novel, Peter Garrett 
associates this peculiar duality with the formal allowances of the “loose, baggy monster” 
that Henry James abhorred. Proliferating plots and vast casts of characters generate 
subtle deconstructions within the novels themselves, a feature that Trollope exploits by 
                                                
68 Trollope has always been popular, but until the final decades of the twentieth century, his 
literary merit was much less certain than that of almost any of his contemporaries. Indeed, 
Margaret Markwick and Deborah Denenholz Morse suggest that Trollope’s “popularity has been 
his downfall” (The Politics of Gender in Anthony Trollope’s Novels 1). Henry James’s gentle 
condescension slowed his novels’ entry into the Victorian canon (“The Art of Fiction” 379), and 
their position was not much improved by subsequent reconsiderations of and challenges to that 
canon, their social conservatism and straightforward, prosaic style making them targets in the 
heyday of the hermeneutics of suspicion. In recent decades, critics have found new value in 
Trollope, in his complex, arguably proto-feminist heroines, his glimpses of Empire, and his 
engagement with economic and political theory. I draw on discussions of each of these topics in 
the pages below; for an overview of Trollope’s critical reception and a snapshot of contemporary 
Trollope studies, see the 2016 Routledge Research Companion to Anthony Trollope, edited by 
Morse, Markwick, and Mark W. Turner.  
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simultaneously emphasizing “individualizing differences” and showing how the figures 
most strongly associated with individuality could be “assimilated, suppressed, expelled, 
or destroyed” (Garrett 223). Mary Hamer makes the point concisely when she claims 
that Trollope’s method consisted in “using contradictory narratives to produce a 
subversive statement” (59). 
Collectively, these readings indicate the centrality of value and valuation in 
Trollope criticism. They also identify contradiction as a defining trait of the novels, and 
one that continues to challenge readers today. In what ways does Trollope’s fiction 
reinforce the dominant values of Victorian society, and in what ways does it undermine 
them? Was Trollope a hack or a “novel machine,” to borrow Walter Kendrick’s 
provocative phrase, or was he the author of intellectually substantive, self-aware, and 
therefore valuable pictures of contemporary life? The answer most likely to come from all 
of the critics I have cited so far is “both,” but the paths to that answer are as numerous 
as the novels themselves. To come to terms with the contradictory impression of 
Trollope’s texts, we must determine what they value, how they value, and how we value 
them.   
In Trollope studies, value is usually understood in economic or in vaguely cultural 
terms, in part because Trollope wrote so frankly about culture, business, and the 
business of culture in Autobiography. A “self-consciously literary man who was also self-
consciously obsessed with money” (Hensley 147), Trollope is, to my knowledge, the only 
Victorian author to have pubished an exact tally of his authorial earnings (Autobiography 
224-5). His musings on money reveal much about the economic value of fiction in a 
literary marketplace,69 but he has often been cast as a representative defender of 
English cultural values, too—to a far greater extent, Mark Turner notes, than 
contemporaries like Dickens or Eliot, who were more openly critical of Victorian society 
(2). A rising professional man whose most productive years coincided with his society’s 
most opulent ones, Trollope signifies, among many things, a “golden age of Victorian 
optimism,” a period of wealth, comfort, opportunity, and relatively uniform cultural beliefs 
(Turner 2). 
                                                
69 This chapter focuses on processes of valuation in the fiction, and touches only briefly on 
Trollope’s professional trajectory and theories of authorship. For discussions of the influence of 
market conditions (especially serialization) on Trollope’s craft, see Mary Hamer, Writing by 
Numbers (1987), and Mark W. Turner, Trollope and the Magazines (2000).   
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Like many before me, I draw on this history of overlapping values to interpret the 
texts, but I am less interested in values themselves than in the processes underlying 
them, both the taking of positions and the elaborate justifications that, in Trollope’s case, 
invariably fail. As I will show, his fiction consistently thematizes the process of valuation, 
exposing in that process an inherent instability that has also figured prominently in the 
reception of his work. From my point of view, the most interesting and subversive 
element in his texts lies neither in the values they endorse, nor in the ones they repress, 
but in the thought process that the push-and-pull of competing value systems sets into 
motion. In what follows, I examine the dialectical processes that characterize Trollope’s 
late novels, both at the level of their smooth, palatable surface, and the more disturbing 
one of their affective depths. These processes work against the ideological investments 
of his narrators and characters, dissolving reified expressions of value and replacing 
them with contingent relationships, such that value ceases to be containable either in the 
cultural institutions Trollope admired, or in the systems of money and credit he criticized. 
Decoupled from production, value transforms in the Palliser novels from a measure of 
economic and/or social worth into an opportunity for genuine, ethical connection with an 
Other. 
This perspective gives us new ways of thinking about Trollope’s historically 
contested literary merit, and particularly about his reputation as a complacent writer. 
Despite his interest in controversial topics like suicide, adultery, and domestic abuse, his 
work long been considered suspiciously “easy” to consume (Kendrick 62). Certainly, the 
moral demands he makes of his reader are exceedingly modest: where Dickens, Eliot, 
and Gaskell exploit readers’ sympathy for downtrodden characters, Trollope ironizes his 
characters’ suffering to such an extent that it is difficult to feel genuinely bad for them. 
The fact that most of them belong to the upper and middle classes increases this 
difficulty: in the political novels especially, starvation and tuberculosis are rarely on the 
table, and tragedy tends to strike in the comparatively mild form of social 
embarrassment. 
 However, the easeful quality in Trollope’s writing is more than lightheartedness 
and a judicious selection of subject matter. According to Kendrick, Trollope teaches us to 
read in way “so easy that it seems natural,” persuading us that “certain things are true 
about life,” and that “good fiction (Trollope’s) is equivalent to life (all life)” (62). To read 
Trollope’s novels “in the Trollopian way,” Kendrick suggests, “means nothing more 
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demanding than to accept them as stories about real people” (62)—which, of course, 
they are not. To an even greater extent than is typical in realism, Trollope positions as 
true what is patently false. D. A. Miller describes his texts as the kind of “boring” 
armchair reading that lulls us into a stupor so that ideology can do its work (107). The 
cumulative effect of a whole array of Trollopian tricks—familiar characters, predictable 
plots, repetitive diction, and the critical role of tacit social knowledge—is to convince us 
that the world we experience is real and amenable to representation. His novels, then, 
work in the opposite direction from the one we explored in Gaskell and in Eliot. Where 
Gaskell’s female characters troubled an identitarian logic of facts, and where Eliot 
subjected feminized forms of duty to the vicissitudes of the negative dialectic, Trollope 
tries to convince us that things are, in fact, just as they seem. Similarly, where the first 
two subjects of this study struggled to make immaterial labour visible, Trollope’s 
“pellucid” prose makes it almost disappear.70  
And yet, forces within the work muddy the conclusions of this attractive critique. 
There is undeniably in Trollope an ontological impulse: a desire to posit the existence of 
real, a priori entities whose role is to retroactively justify a system of values in danger of 
seeming arbitrary. These entities may be as concrete as the gentleman or the landed 
estate, or as abstract as a moral truth, and they may operate simultaneously at several 
different scales. In the course of this chapter, I examine a range of examples to show 
how Trollope’s uniquely affirmative style engages the ontological impulse at the micro 
level of the sentence, and his predictable comic resolutions, at the medium level of plot 
and character. At a still larger scale, his distinctive, substantial realism carries the 
impulse into his negotiation of the relationship between fiction and history: his 
constructed histories aspire to—and, for some readers, achieve—the ontic status of lived 
ones.  
                                                
70 This is Trollope’s characterization of the prose he aspired to write: “it is not sufficient that there 
be a meaning that may be hammered out of the sentence,” he claimed in Autobiography, “but that 
the language should be so pellucid that the meaning should be rendered without an effort of the 
reader” (147). In chapter two, I linked the laboriousness of George Eliot’s prose to a larger project 
of making immaterial labour visible, but Trollope’s style achieves the opposite effect. Eliot’s long 
paragraphs, complex sentences, and mind-stretching vocabulary slow us down and heighten our 
awareness of the labour of writing, but Trollope’s style urges rapid consumption. In fact, Trollope 
criticized Eliot for “struggling too hard” to produce “excellent” results, a struggle which he claimed 
was “impossible not to feel” when reading her work (154).  
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Yet close on the heels of this ontological impulse runs a counter-impulse, borne 
out by the very examples Trollope uses to fulfill the promises of the first. Surprisingly 
often, the effects of his sentences, the interactions of his characters, and the resolution 
of his plots contradict the assertions that serve as their premises. In some cases, a 
sentence designed to imply self-evident truth buckles beneath the weight of that truth; in 
others, an assertion that gentlemen are good calls into being the gentleman who is not; 
often, the most realistic outcome is the one that we struggle to accept. These minor 
disappointments point toward a larger paradox in the worldview implied by the novels: 
the investment in a static, stable system of values that is so palpable in Trollope’s texts 
inadvertently exposes the contingency of value. Value turns out to be not a thing that 
you can refer to, pick up, and hold, but a dynamic relationship that is never fully under 
your control.  
Trollope’s assertions and negations—his ontic impulses and immediate 
withdrawals—exemplify the axiological thinking Barbara Herrnstein Smith theorizes in 
her study of literary evaluation. The “project of axiology,” she writes, “the justification of 
the claim of certain norms, standards, and judgments to objective validity, which is to say 
the demonstration of the non-contingency of the contingent” is destined, by its own 
definition, to fail (54). This is demonstrably the case in Trollope’s novels, but as I have 
suggested, their failure makes available an alternative process of valuation, one more 
closely aligned with the “radically contingent” vision of value as the “product of the 
dynamics of a system” for which Herrnstein Smith advocates in the context of literary 
criticism (30) and which Trollope’s own unstable position in the canon would seem to 
demand. More important for this project, though, are the implications of these visions of 
value for immaterial labour: as I will demonstrate, Trollope’s axiology shapes the style, 
structure, and content of his writing, generating the frustrating circularity that Herrnstein 
Smith calls an “illusion” of value (54)—but in Trollope, the circle is not closed. It opens in 
a dialectical spiral, transporting us form a position of ontological closure to one of 
dizzying openness, where value appears not as the fixed property of a material good, 
but as receptivity to difference. The latter understanding has the potential to redeem 
forms of labour that are devalued under the former paradigm, and though Trollope 
seems unable to form this conclusion himself, instead, forcing the work of his gentlemen-
heroes into ill-fitting molds, the requisite materials are there in the texts for us to 
assemble, revealing themselves in the many lapses and failures of Trollope’s logic. 
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I begin by showing how axiological thinking works—and collapses—in Trollope’s 
fiction, starting at the micro-scale of the sentence, where miniscule features of style both 
advance and undermine his ontological project. Taking my examples primarily from 
Phineas Finn (1867), I demonstrate what I take to be the goal of habitual Trollopian 
sentence forms and idioms, namely, the fashioning of a concrete, rational social world, 
but I also show how this fashioning looks more like creative labour than explanation—or, 
in other words, how Trollope’s fictional constructions precede and generate the 
phenomena they claim to explain. The middle sections of the chapter take a step 
backward, observing a similar process at the level of plot and character in the The Prime 
Minister (1876). That novel both asserts the reality of a system of moral values, and 
undermines the system through its unsuccessful attempts to pin characters along an 
axis of good and bad. Two over-determined figures, the “gentleman” and the “cad,” 
serve as test cases for my larger claim that Trollope posits people as statically valued 
entities, only to prove, in spite of himself, that their value is made up of complex, volatile 
relationships.  
 The final section of the chapter examines the kinds of objects that most reliably 
trigger transitions between fixed and contingent understandings of value. Whereas the 
typical Trollopian object falls somewhat short of the thing it is supposed to be, these 
objects openly rebel. As we might expect, some of them are human, and tellingly, they 
are women, but some, too, are inanimate. Land is among the most troublesome and 
provocative objects for Trollope’s characters. Seldom only property, it evades total 
acquisition in its capacity as environment. Like Trollope’s opaque and unpredictable 
heroines, land periodically becomes an unassimilable Other, testing the limits of the 
subject’s authority, and exposing as illusory the belief in a knowable, dominable world. 
The fiction perpetuated by language and arguably even more so by realism—that actor 
and acted-upon are discrete, stable entities—gives way in these scenes, and the 
contrived objectivity of social phenomena erodes. Laboriously built castles recede into 
the distance, and an incomplete but still shocking sense of the gap between 
subjectivities rushes to the fore. These moments of ethical education, these sudden, 
sharp expansions of awareness, wrest value free from its association with the production 
of wealth and tangible goods, for it is when land is infertile, ruined, and relatively 
worthless, and when women circumvent sexualization, that they inspire this response, 
effectively realigning value with receptivity. Unruly objects in Trollope’s fiction interrupt 
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the social processes he is famous for depicting, exposing the untruth of reified 
understandings of social, culture, and economic value, so that value appears, 
uncharacteristically, for what it is: a shifting but objectively real relationship between 
people.  
Forming Trollope’s Realism 
In Autobiography, Trollope quotes Nathaniel Hawthorne’s reaction to his novels 
with undisguised delight. Hawthorne had the following to say of Trollope’s craft: 
Have you ever read the novels of Anthony Trollope? They precisely suit 
my taste,—solid and substantial, written on the strength of beef and 
through the inspiration of ale, and just as real as if some giant had hewn a 
great lump out of the earth and put it under a glass case, with all its 
inhabitants going about their daily business, and not suspecting that they 
were being made a show of. (qtd in Autobiography 93) 
Critics have since questioned the solidity that Hawthorne attributed to Trollope’s fiction, 
pointing out that Trollope’s obliging narrator seems more often immersed in the 
characters’ milieux than outside it.71 However, the description is at least in one sense 
appropriate: it acknowledges and calls attention to Trollope’s special brand of weighty, 
“substantial” realism. Chief among Trollope’s talents is his ability to conjure something 
that seems really to exist—that feels self-contained, self-evident, and complete. 
Although Hawthorne links this success to an English diet of beef and ale, and Trollope 
himself to engrossing, imaginative sojourns with his characters (112), it is, in fact, the 
result of a number of identifiable tactics. The most obvious of these is Trollope’s use of 
the series: his most popular works belong either to the Barchester or Palliser chronicles, 
as do his most memorable characters. A number of important figures, including the 
eventual Duke of Omnium, appear in both sets of novels, and even those with shorter 
tenures can be seen as examples or adaptations of a more basic type (the noble squire, 
for example, or the resolute, impulsive young woman).   
                                                
71Amanda Anderson finds Hawthorne a little off the mark. In “Trollope’s Modernity,” she argues 
that the image of the spectator watching the characters’ interactions from behind a plate of glass 
fails to capture the immersive, on-the-ground feel of Trollope’s narration. Trollope’s characters, 
she claims, “inhabit the same plane of existence” as their creator; Trollope speaks of his fictional 
progeny with the same “affective immediacy” we would generally use to describe real people 
(510). For Anderson, Trollope’s narrator is better understood as a kind of co-conspirator of the 
characters than as a god-like overseer.   
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The effect of this continuity, no doubt aided by Trollope’s canny grasp of human 
psychology, is to make characters seem eminently familiar to readers. Rachel Ablow 
suggests that Trollope’s habit of “carrying characteristics and situations from one novel 
to another . . . would seem to increase the likelihood of experiencing those characters as 
real people” (142). Katherine Voyles makes a similar point in slightly different terms, 
comparing Trollope’s use of the long durée to the “way that the stereoscope takes 
multiple views of the same object from slightly varying distances” (289).72 A Plantagenet 
Palliser or a Phineas Finn acquires something like density through his continual 
presence in our imagination. His every action seems plausible in large part because of 
precedent: we have seen him act in a particular way before, expect him to do it again, 
and are rewarded when the expectation is confirmed. Trollope exploited the capabilities 
of the series (and the serialization of individual numbers within those series) to 
strengthen this impression of weight and dimension. Serialized fiction allowed authors to 
stretch the lives of fictional characters over the actual lives of readers, fostering deep 
connections to stories and enforcing pauses for reflection, anticipation, and speculation 
(Hughes and Lund 10). By the time of the last Palliser novels, the intimacy enabled by 
the series and serialization may have been the chief attraction of Trollope’s work: the 
novelty of his psychological insights had worn thin, but readers still wanted to hear about 
the characters they had come to love. Responding to one of the serialized parts of The 
Prime Minister, a reviewer for the 22 July 1876 Examiner wrote that “the old characters 
with which we have already some acquaintance are more interesting than the new. It is 
like meeting old friends whom we have not met for some years, and who have made for 
themselves in the interval a story worth telling” (qtd. in Hughes and Lund, 113). 
To stress the importance of the characters’ continuity is not to call them flat, for 
Trollope took pains to ensure that their experiences left lasting marks on their 
                                                
72 Voyles argues that Trollope uses “temporal elongation” to construct “various views of the same 
character over time” (289). I agree with Voyles’s basic point, but given Trollope’s career-long 
commitment to “living with” his characters, metaphors drawn from the study of visual perspective 
seem somewhat misleading. Although Trollope certainly wanted to “know” his fictional creations, 
he never seems particularly interested in “seeing” them. In fact, David Heddendorf suggests that 
this is a distinctive feature of his novels, which are among the least visual in the period: “it is 
remarkable, and a tribute to the power of Trollope’s characterization, that we think of seeing his 
characters at all when he excelled so little at visual description . . . Trollope’s readers are drawn 
instead to his thorough and precise rendering of the ways we negotiate moral quandaries, and to 
his uncanny feel for written and spoken language” (411). I would agree with Heddendorf that the 
psychological consistency of the characters (along with their longevity) is what establishes their 
“reality.”  
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personalities. The impression they exude is rather one of internal consistency, a 
measure of artistic success that Trollope mentions specifically in his discussion of 
“realistic” characters: 
The Duchess of Omnium, when she is playing the part of the Prime 
Minister’s wife, is the same woman as that Lady Glencora who almost 
longs to go off with Burgo Fitzgerald, but yet knows that she will never do 
so; and the Prime Minister Duke, with his wounded pride and sore spirit, 
is he who, for his wife’s sake, left power and place when they were first 
offered to him;—but they have undergone the changes which a life so 
stirring as theirs would naturally produce. To do all this thoroughly was in 
my heart from first to last; but I do not know that the game has been worth 
the candle. To carry out my scheme I have had to spread my picture over 
so wide a canvas that I cannot expect that any lover of art should trouble 
himself to look at it as a whole. (Autobiography 117)  
The inclinations of Trollope’s hypothetical “lover of art” aside, his fans certainly did (and 
still do) appreciate his entire canvas. As the 1876 Examiner review implies, much of 
success as a novelist rested on the strength of his characters, whom some readers even 
mistook for real people.73 
The solidity that Hawthorne admired is, then, connected to the formal 
characteristics of Trollope’s preferred medium. The serialized, multi-volume chronicle 
combats the non-reality of fiction by transforming the transient fancies of an author into 
abiding presences in readers’ lives. That said, we need not read an entire series to 
experience what is particular in Trollope’s craft: while the reality-effect of his novels 
depends in part on the willingness of readers to spend time with the characters and the 
story, it draws support from numerous other stylistic features, as well. Miller groups a 
whole host of micro-tactics under the awkward umbrella term, “unlike supports” (137). In 
Trollope, he writes, “normalization . . . never issues from a single or constant source, but 
is rather floated across the text on a number of unlike supports, with none of which it is 
actually identified. It speaks variously in the voice of the novelist, of characters, of the 
                                                
73 This was apparently the case for archdeacon Grantly, from Barchester Towers (1857). “My 
archdeacon,” Trollope boasts, “has been said to be life-like . . .  [but] was, I think, the simple 
effect of my moral consciousness. It was such as that, in my opinion, that an archdeacon should 
be . . . and lo! An archdeacon was produced, who has been declared by competent authorities to 
be a real archdeacon down to the very ground. And yet, as far as I can remember, I had not ever 
spoken to an archdeacon” (Autobiography 62-3). Whereas Eliot and Hardy were offended by 
readers’ attempts to seek out the real-life “models” of their characters (a fate Eliot suffered 
especially after publishing The Mill on the Floss, and Hardy, Jude the Obscure) Trollope seems to 
have found it rather flattering—a testament, surely, to the different aims of their respective 
realisms.  
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fictive reader (not to mention the ‘dual voice’ of style indirect libre), and in a mode that 
may be hyperbolic, direct, understated, or ironic” (137). With similar attention to the 
nuances of Trollope’s style, Anna Kornbluh identifies a mimetic link between his satire of 
mid-Victorian money-worship and his reliance on “metaleptic formulations,” reversals of 
sentence-level causality that mirror the larger irrationality of the finance economy (100). 
Building on these observations, I suggest that Trollope’s sentences perform an even 
more consequential task, imbuing social relations with a deceptive, thing-like firmness. 
Among the handiest tools for the job is a phrase that is simultaneously ubiquitous and 
easy to overlook: the idiom, “of course.”  
It is startling to note just how many of Trollope’s sentences these two words 
adorn.74 Often, the phrase is stacked on top of itself in a series of lines that repeat and 
fortify the same idea. So strong is Trollope’s reliance on the phrase that one can find it in 
almost any chapter of any of his mature novels, but several examples from Phineas Finn 
will illustrate its function in his realism. The novel is the second in the Palliser series, and 
tells the story of its hero’s unlikely rise in the world of British politics: young, ambitious, 
and naive, Phineas becomes enamoured with politics, and though his superiors warn 
him that Parliament is for wealthy men and not for doctors’ sons with £200 a year, he 
decides to follow his passion anyway. Through a combination of luck and his own 
likability, Phineas achieves far greater success than his advisors could have imagined, 
landing not only a seat in the House but a spot in the Liberal Cabinet less than two years 
after beginning his career.  
In romance, he is somewhat less fortunate, proposing too late to his first love and 
too soon to his second. And yet, through the ups and the downs, in his profession and in 
love, the chips seem to fall where they should. Whether reeling from the blow of Lady 
Laura’s marriage to Mr. Kennedy or basking in the warmth of promotion, Phineas is 
surprisingly quick to accept that things really could not have gone any other way. Indeed, 
no sooner does he discover that he has a rival for Lady Laura’s hand than he begins to 
                                                
74 Jonathan Farina counts over 400 occurrences in The Last Chronicle of Barset alone (143). In a 
reading of Rachel Ray, he claims that Trollope’s prose “portrays the ordinary as a feeling of 
insignificant deviation from a presupposed regular course,” depicting life as “a series of small 
deviations . . . from otherwise certain, if sometimes ineffable, norms” (143-5). The phrase “of 
course,” he suggests, marks points in the narrative when “the ordinary” is experienced as 
“extraordinary,” as when Rachel Ray unexpectedly encounters Luke Rowan on her daily walk, 
and feels as though something simultaneously expected and momentous has taken place in her 
life (148).  
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rationalize the failure of his still active suit. Spying a man walking with her just days 
before he intends to propose, his thoughts run immediately to teleology: 
He had not recognized the man, but he had very little doubt that it was 
Mr. Kennedy. Of course it was Mr. Kennedy, because he would prefer 
that it should be any other man under the sun . . . He remained still, and 
began to throw stones into the river. But he had not thrown above a stone 
or two when he was called from above. He looked up, and then he 
perceived that the man who called him was his host. Of course it was Mr. 
Kennedy. (136) 
In this case, Phineas guesses right, but the rightness of his guess matters less than his 
certainty that Kennedy has edged ahead of him. He is determined to propose to Lady 
Laura before his short stay at Kennedy’s Scottish country house is up, but he is hardly 
hopeful of success. On the contrary, “the more he saw of Lady Laura the more he feared 
that it was impossible that she should become his wife” (149). Sure enough, when he 
makes his offer, he discovers that she has already accepted Kennedy. The revelation 
devastates, but it does not surprise: “What a fool he had been to let her know his secret! 
. . . What an ass he had been in supposing that she cared for him! What a fool to 
suppose that his poverty could stand a chance against the wealth of Loughlinter!” (154) 
Thanks to the narrator’s gratuitous mind-reading, the reader is no more surprised than 
Phineas. Of course it was Mr. Kennedy! Charmed as she is by Phineas, we are never 
quite allowed to believe Lady Laura will accept his offer of marriage. The young 
politician’s gloomy “of courses” deflate our confidence well before the proposal scene, 
and besides, it is too early in the novel for the hero to marry.     
Were the novel’s prophetic assertions confined to its hero’s internal monologue, 
they might be taken for forms of self-preservation, simply Phineas’s attempts to guard 
his ego against disappointment. But this is not the case: on the contrary, they 
reverberate in streets and in drawing rooms, through the whole social world of the novel. 
Hardly a year after Lady Laura’s refusal, Phineas is rejected by his second love, Violet 
Effingham, to whom he proposes after losing a duel with her acknowledged lover, Lord 
Chiltern. Despite his efforts to keep the affair a secret, it is soon common knowledge to 
his entire circle of acquaintances. What is more, both the duel and Phineas’s love are 
confirmed and buttressed by the participation of these acquaintances in the same kind of 
teleological storytelling that Phineas used to rationalize his first defeat. The following 
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exchange between Phineas and the wealthy German widow, Madame Max Goesler, 
teems with assumptions that the reader is invited to take for true: 
‘But of course we all know where your heart is. Men do not undertake 
perilous journeys to Belgium for nothing.’ 
‘That unfortunate journey to Belgium! But, dear Madame Max, really 
nobody knows why I went.’ 
‘You met Lord Chiltern there?’ 
‘Oh yes;—I met Lord Chiltern there.’ 
‘And there was a duel?’ 
‘Madame Max,—you must not ask me to criminate myself!’ 
‘Of course there was, and of course it was about Miss Effingham, and of 
course the lady thinks herself bound to refuse both the gentlemen who 
were so very wicked, and of course—‘  
‘Well,—what follows?’ 
‘Ah! If you have not wit enough to see, I do not think it can be my duty to 
tell you.’ (504)   
As it turns out, “what follows” is that Phineas will marry Madame Max, though not until a 
subsequent volume. What concerns us about the exchange at present is the chain of 
assertions by which the stages of Phineas’s romance are naturalized and made to seem 
inevitable. For poor Phineas, there is nothing straightforward about courting Violet 
Effingham: her sophisticated town manners confound his village simplicity, and he 
mistakenly assumes he has no rival because Violet has already rejected a proposal from 
Lord Chiltern. Until the exchange with Madame Max, Phineas is wholly caught up in the 
drama and mystery of the love triangle—as are, in all likelihood, many readers. With 
Madame Max’s remarks, everything changes, as though a blinding stage light has come 
on to expose the true nature of the props and the set. All of a sudden the duel seems an 
ordinary thing, the expected result of a quarrel over a woman (though, as Phineas knows 
very well, duels were no longer considered a civilized way of solving such conflicts). To 
his surprise, his “secret” is no secret; his passion follows a script that Madame Max 
seems already to have read. Their conversation leaves him baffled, but it gives us the 
impression that human behavior is objective and rational. Put differently, it confirms an 
incorrect but extraordinarily useful assumption, without which the social sciences 
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(including economics) would be unthinkable: namely, that people, even in their most 
agitated states, follow predictable, dependable patterns. Trollope’s seemingly innocuous 
“of course’s” work overtime to support a reified view of social relations, masking the 
contentious processes by which individual behavior is wrestled into conformity with 
unstated values and social norms.   
As long as we are speaking of love, the predictability of people matters little, 
except to the lovers themselves. In other contexts, though—in politics, in trade—it 
matters a great deal more. As the novel unfolds, Phineas scrambles to learn the 
unspoken rules of the House and of London society. His friends regard his political 
career with the same confidence we saw in Madame Max’s reaction to the scandal of the 
Belgian duel. When a reform bill costs Phineas his seat at Loughton, he is almost ready 
to give up on Parliament, but his more experienced connections consider the elimination 
of the borough to be no great tragedy. “Of course you’ll get a seat,” Madame Max 
declares, “If I understand it at all, they never throw over an ally so useful as you are” 
(506). Violet Effingham is similarly assured of his success: “Of course we shall see each 
other in London. Don’t talk of not being in the House. Of course you will be in the House” 
(509). Against considerable odds, the novel delivers yet again on the promise of these 
repeated affirmations: an elderly rival for the borough of Loughshane dies just in time for 
the election, and Phineas takes the seat. To use another of Trollope’s favourite phrases, 
he achieves his victory “as a matter of course.”  
For Trollope’s characters, things are always happening “as a matter of course.” 
In the fifth Palliser novel, The Prime Minister, the dour old baronet Sir Alured Wharton 
begrudges his rank because he imagines that “every prosperous tallow-chandler 
throughout the country [is] made a baronet as a matter of course” (100). When Lopez 
and Emily’s brother, Everett, are attacked by thieves in St. James Park, they tell their 
story to a nearby policeman, who is filled, “as a matter of course,” with a “desire to arrest 
them both” (171). When the directors of the San Juan Mining Company decide—with 
good reason—to forego hiring Lopez as their site manager, Lopez, “as a matter of 
course . . . [begins] to fume and be furious” (445). Finally, the Duke of Omnium uses the 
phase to explain his political affiliations: “I began life with the misfortune of a ready-made 
political creed. There was a seat in the House for me when I was twenty-one. Nobody 
took the trouble to ask me my opinions. It was a matter of course that I should be a 
Liberal” (514). 
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 As these examples demonstrate, Trollope employs the phrase in a range of 
contexts and with several different inflections. In the case of the policeman, and, 
possibly, in the repeal of Lopez’s job offer, the phrase is humorous, because the reader 
knows that the feeling it positions as natural and self-evident is, in fact, ridiculous. Lopez 
and Everett have just been assaulted and are seeking the policeman’s assistance, and 
so it is anything but obvious that they should be arrested. Similarly, when the executives 
of the San Juan Mining Company begin to reconsider their offer, it is in the context of 
Lopez’s public ruin, shortly after his dastardly threats to blackmail the Duke of Omnium 
have been published in the newspapers and debated in the House. That Lopez still feels 
entitled to the job and to self-righteous anger only confirms his depravity. Perhaps more 
importantly, Lopez and the policeman are characters we are encouraged to laugh at: the 
policeman is a pompous nobody who has obviously failed to keep St. James Park free of 
crime, and Lopez, by the time of his dealings with the mining company, is a villain of 
almost cartoonish proportions.75   
The same is not true of the other examples I have cited. Sir Alured Wharton and 
Plantagenet Palliser are land-owning, title-bearing characters, and though their positions 
are distinguished by a sizeable gap in wealth and social privilege, they belong to the 
same broad type in Trollope’s catalogue: they are refined, intelligent, honorable 
defenders of tradition whose opinions we are encouraged to trust. If there is a single 
protagonist in The Prime Minister, it is surely the Duke. Sir Alured is a secondary 
character, but an influential one, serving as a mentor to Emily’s father, Mr. Wharton. 
When the assumptions of these characters are given to us “as a matter of course,” they 
carry considerably more weight than do those of Lopez or the nameless policeman. If we 
are not quite expected to believe that all candle-makers are made into baronets, or that it 
is right to be born into a political orthodoxy, we are at least assured that there is 
something true about the sentiment. After all, the title of baronet could be bought at a 
relatively low price, and political allegiances, if not literally inherited, tended to run in the 
family.  
Depending on the context, then, a declaration that something is obviously a 
certain way may mean that it is more or less that way, or that it is not that way at all. 
Remarkably, the narrative effect is the same in either case. The phrase cues us to 
                                                
75 Lopez’s vilification is bound up with his racialization, a point I discuss at greater length in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter.  
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consult our own social knowledge, and to agree that yes, things really are that way, or to 
counter with an answering declarative: no, of course it is not like that; we know better. 
Thus whether we are affirming or denying the proposition in question, our response 
leads us to mimic the text’s ontological impulse, to invest in the objectivity of social 
phenomena, to lean into the belief that human behaviour obeys laws at least as regular 
as those of the physical world. This is one way of explaining the apparent solidity of 
Trollope’s fiction, and is the source of his reputation as an ideological writer. The sheer 
number of his sentences that take the form of assertions, not to mention the audacity of 
a title like The Way We Live Now, lend much to the charge that Trollope’s realism is of a 
normative rather than a critical character.  
And yet, there is something conspicuous and even a little desperate about 
Trollope’s efforts to find solid ground for his “castles in the air.” It is not long before 
phrases like “of course” and “as a matter of course” wear thin with overuse. Moreover, 
the social rules that the narrator assumes we know and understand turn out to be 
subject to an alarming number of exceptions. This is true even of the all-important 
distinction between a scoundrel like Lopez and a gentleman like the Duke. Although 
Trollope’s project in the Palliser novels and especially in The Prime Minister is to define 
and justify the ideal of gentility, his attempts are by no means successful.76 His 
arguments come to us in the form of characters’ convictions, anchored in the 
changeable media of feeling and reputation. The fact that two men as different as Lopez 
and Sir Alured Wharton can be so equally sure of their understanding of the world 
testifies to a world in flux, and as far as Lopez is concerned, that world awaits 
determination by enterprising young men like himself. The assumption is brash, but not 
groundless: in the mid-century London of the novel, value has come unhinged from the 
formerly stable signifiers of land, wealth, and nationality, such that a penniless man with 
no history and no friends can infiltrate and wreak havoc on the ancient, Anglo-Saxon 
                                                
76 All of Trollope’s novels concern themselves, to some extent, with demarcations of social class, 
particularly those subtle boundaries organizing members of the middle and upper-middle class. 
Trollope’s obsession with social status may have something to do with his own battle to obtain it: 
Autobiography frames Trollope’s boyhood struggles against poverty, neglect, and social rejection 
with defensive reminders about his genteel ancestry (9). Biography aside, the desire to justify the 
class system is conspicuous in the novels, and particularly in The Prime Minister, where it is 
expressed with unusual frankness. As we will see, the novel pits authentic gentlemen against 
spurious imposters, and even cites a dictionary definition of “gentleman” in its quest for certitude. 
Only in The Prime Minister and, Robin Gilmour suggests, in Doctor Thorne does gentlemanliness 
emerge “above the soil” as a “subject or problem in its own right” (149).     
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family of the Whartons. The agent of invasion, Lopez serves as a figure for a series of 
evils, including foreignness, presentism, finance capital, and abstraction itself, but as a 
figure, he fails to contain them. Behind the predictable, orderly social world that Trollope 
fashions through his plots and his prose looms the possibility of chaos, and what is 
worse than chaos from Trollope’s point of view, misanthropy. Flashes of destructive anti-
sociality are a ruling anxiety in the Palliser novels, and though they often wear Lopez’s 
face, they threaten to burst through the seams in the moments when we are least 
prepared for them.  
Making a Gentleman 
If anti-sociality is the real villain of the Palliser novels, and discrete villain figures 
like Lopez merely personifications of a larger and more ambiguous threat, then who or 
what can we call the hero of the series? The answer to this question will strike some 
readers as obvious: at the helm of virtually every novel is one (and usually more than 
one) of Trollope’s genuine, tried-and-true gentlemen characters. Hardly heroes in the 
classical or storybook sense, Trollope’s gentlemen are comically flawed, but are 
nonetheless recipients of his narrators’ constant, enthusiastic praise. In fact, it is difficult 
to read Trollope without reacting to what seems like naïve faith in the unquestioned 
value of the gentleman. But what is gentility, exactly, and how does Trollope justify the 
value of gentleman characters in his fiction?  
To put the cart somewhat before the horse, my answer to this question—what is 
a gentleman?—is that a gentleman is a hero in a Trollope novel. The novels themselves 
go to considerable lengths to convince us that the opposite is true, that you become the 
hero of a Trollope novel by being a gentleman, and that gentility is a real thing existing in 
the world outside the novels. However, a careful reading of the texts, informed by the 
contentious history of gentility, reveals the circularity of Trollope’s claims about this 
special figure. Trollopian gentility evokes real historical phenomena, but it is also a 
literary invention that serves a particular purpose in the fiction. Trollope’s gentleman-
protagonists manifest the same ontological impulse we saw operating at the level of the 
sentence: more than any other object or institution, they are called upon to contain and 
enact the values of a threatened social order, much as the “cad” figure is summoned to 
contain those threats. But just as the threats exceed the containing power of cads, value 
overflows the vessel of gentility. In Trollope’s novels, that vessel is a fragile paper boat, 
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tossed about by waves of change that he both understood more fully and resisted more 
forcefully than any of his contemporaries. His investment in the gentlemanly ideal follows 
a pattern that is becoming familiar: an assertion of positive value summons proofs that 
are destined to fail, but the failure yields fuller knowledge than was possible in the realm 
of assertion alone. 
In fact, once we know the pattern, it is difficult to ignore. Trollope consistently 
attaches value to the idea of the gentleman, but he cannot specify that value without 
immediately retracting or contradicting most of what he has said. Despite repeated 
attempts to ontologize the differences between characters, Trollope’s realism compels 
him to acknowledge, perhaps subconsciously, the growing obsolescence of the rentier 
class. His novels cannot help but show that it is only prejudice dividing real gentlemen 
from dangerous pretenders, and thus a second strategy becomes necessary, namely, 
the strained attempt to redeem the gentleman by showing that he produces value for 
society through his labour. Unfortunately for Trollope, that labour is almost always 
immaterial, and so poses by-now familiar challenges to Victorian understandings of 
value production (and, I would add, to modern ones, as well). Although Trollope’s 
perspective on value is a slippery, shape-shifting amalgamation of competing ideas, 
even he fails to provide a convincing justification for the gentleman’s privilege on the 
basis of his social and economic contributions. In the end, the line dividing heroes from 
villains, good work from bad, and clean money from dirty, is not a line at all. It is more 
like an optical (or perhaps a literary) illusion: the whole alters with each slight shift of 
emphasis.   
Critics have long debated the definition of gentility in Trollope’s novels, and with 
good cause: as Audrey Jaffe observes, he “makes it the business of his novels to 
delineate the distinctions in feeling that separate the gentleman from the non-gentleman” 
(150). Her words make apt summaries for texts like Can You Forgive Her?, The Way We 
Live Now, and The Prime Minister, in which the resolution of the plot depends on the 
exposure of devious, imposter gentlemen and the delivery of just deserts to their more 
authentic colleagues. Echoing Jaffe’s emphasis on gentility are numerous other critics, 
many of whom stress the limitations of the concept as well as its importance in Trollope’s 
work. Robin Gilmour asserts that Trollope’s gentleman was “fundamentally 
conservative,” “unaffected by the period’s modernizing tendencies” (150). The 
characterization of gentlemen in Trollope’s novels reveals a “blend of honesty, realism, 
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defensiveness, and self-assurance” that explains—at least, for Gilmour—why Trollope 
“shrank” from offering clear definitions, for to do so would have put him at odds with the 
more progressive outlooks of his contemporaries (150). On that point, Kincaid seems to 
agree: at the end of The Prime Minister, he argues, the authentic (inflexible, racist) 
gentleman, Mr. Wharton, is shown to have been “right all along”; “[Wharton’s] protective, 
ugly bigotry, his narrow, pinched-in, joyless life is thrust at us, forced on us as 
exemplary. He is made to stand against youth and the values of the heart, and it is 
upsetting to find that we are to applaud rather than hiss” (219). Nathan K. Hensley and 
Lund and Hughes nominate Arthur Fletcher as the model gentleman, a younger 
character than Wharton, to be sure, but just as stubborn and just as racist (Hensley 150, 
Lund and Hughes 120).77 
While there is much in the novels to support these perspectives, they imply a 
more substantial and decisive take on the gentleman than we ever actually get from 
Trollope. Wharton is among the most outspoken representatives of conservative values 
in the series, but even he struggles, when pressed, to say what he means when he 
lauds the superior qualities of the gentleman (26). Gilmour, Kincaid, Hughes, and Lund 
are critical of Trollope’s confidence in the gentlemanly ideal, but they take it for granted 
that the confidence is there. Contra that assumption, I read Trollope’s late novels as 
deeply ambivalent about the gentleman’s continued relevance. Highly ideological 
statements from characters like Wharton, along with twists in the plot that seem to 
support them, should be read not as evidence of Trollope’s compliance with those views, 
but as concerted and ultimately doomed efforts to make those views align with some 
version of reality.  Somewhat more abstractly, they are the signs of a thinker attempting 
the alchemy of valorization, and while the performance is obviously flawed, it merits 
                                                
77 Hensley also places Roger Carbury of The Way We Live Now among Trollope’s privileged 
gentlemen-heroes (150), a claim I think is complicated by that character’s emasculation and 
rejection by the heroine. Carbury keeps his honor in tact, but he ends the novel a lonely bachelor, 
unable to thrive or reproduce in the “now” of Trollope’s novel. Hughes and Lund map Emily’s 
movement from the unsuitable Lopez to the highly suitable Fletcher onto a bourgeois education in 
self-restraint and sensible decision-making, a movement they suggest is bolstered by the slow-
burn form of the serial. Fletcher, they describe as “patient,” “deliberate,” and gifted with the 
“qualities of leadership” (120); they do not mention his peevishness, his sense of entitlement, his 
marginality in the plot, or his complete lack of sophistication relative to characters like 
Plantagenet Palliser or even Lopez himself. Their casting of Fletcher as the enlightened marital 
choice seems, to me, strained, and the narrator is certainly more aware of Fletcher’s 
shortcomings than their reading implies. I offer an alternative reading of Fletcher in section III of 
this chapter. 
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attention because it reveals fault lines in the concept of value that tend even today to 
escape our notice. 
Trollope’s ambivalence about the gentleman is, in part, historical, and while the 
history is well known, it is worth revisiting some of the details here, as they motivate and 
trouble the ideological claims of the fiction. By Trollope’s time, defining gentility meant 
taking sides in a political contest between the dwindling aristocracy and an increasingly 
enfranchised bourgeoisie. The inherited notion of a demi-noble class born into land and 
leisure had by mid-century to contend with the Smilean self-made man, and from the 
fray emerged two compelling but contradictory understandings of the genteel way of life. 
The well worn paradigms of the Restoration libertine, the eighteenth-century rake, and 
the Regency dandy now found themselves in the unusual company of the hard-working, 
morally upright family man, and while the two types coexisted for much of the period, the 
middle-class ideal gradually wrested more and more ground from its aristocratic 
predecessor.78 If the middle-class gentleman emerged triumphant, he owed much of his 
success to the efforts of Victorian writers and intellectuals—Dickens, Gaskell, Eliot, 
Arnold, Ruskin, Carlyle—who helped to enshrine the qualities of discipline, industry, 
modesty, truthfulness, and personal warmth as virtues in the public’s imagination 
(Gilmour 27). This redefinition of gentility made it relevant for and theoretically attainable 
by a much larger segment of society, but the rank could not be fully democratized 
without compromise to the social exclusiveness that was the source of its appeal for 
much of the middle class in the first place. Nor, as Gilmour points out, could the style 
and power of the rakish “man of leisure” be cursorily dismissed.79 For these reasons, 
Victorian perspectives remained “if not confused, then at least much more uncertain” 
than those they had inherited from the previous century (3). The task of navigating this 
uncertainty fell to the makers and interpreters of culture, Trollope not least among them.  
                                                
78 My gloss of these competing paradigms owes much to Gilmour’s study of the history of 
gentility. Gilmour traces shifts in the values associated with the gentleman from the end of the 
eighteenth to the later decades of the Victorian period. The fact that, by the ‘60s, the industrious, 
kind, and socially responsible heroes of Dickens and Gaskell could share the status of gentleman 
with the roguish protagonists of Thackeray shows the extent to which the middle class had 
managed, over those decades, to redefine gentility in their own image. 
79 The combination of the gentleman’s genealogical link to the rake and his newfound proximity to 
the domestic sphere significantly complicated Victorian models of masculinity. This is an 
important context for Trollope’s gentlemen-heroes, but one I touch on only briefly. For more 
thorough discussions of Victorian masculinity, see James Eli Adams, Joseph Kestner, Herbert 
Sussman and Martin Danahay. 
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Curiously, Trollope’s boldest and most sustained exploration of gentility defines it 
only negatively. The Prime Minister, which Jaffe and Gilmour treat as Trollope’s 
definitive statement on the topic,80 abounds with “real” gentlemen, but what drives the 
plot and seals its moral lesson is the spectacular downward trajectory of the false 
gentleman, Ferdinand Lopez. Lopez fails every test the narrator throws at him, but his 
failure is a difficult and drawn out process, lasting nearly the length of the novel. The 
older, more traditional characters react at once to his strangeness, and while these 
characters are often assumed to express Trollope’s point of view, their perspective is 
repeatedly and seriously qualified in the novel. If Mr. Wharton and the Duke of Omnium 
take the validity of gentlemanliness for granted, the novel itself does not; instead, it 
submits that ideal to a series of trials, and the results are not as clear-cut as the elder 
Whartons of the world would like to believe.  
The early pages of the novel go to great lengths to itemize the gentleman’s 
qualities. Clearly, this is not a neutral act of description: on the contrary, Trollope’s 
narrator is assigning an inherent, ontological value to the gentleman and, at the same 
time, pretending it was there all along. In these moments, value is imagined as an 
definable property, capable of justifying the gentleman’s existence and his lofty position 
in the social, economic, and moral hierarchies the novel seems to obey. Definitions 
abound, but none are stable: like so much else in Trollope, the ideal of gentility relies on 
tacit understandings that lose much of their power under close examination. Lopez 
seems to possess many of the needful qualities: he is handsome, educated, clever and 
industrious, and while he struggles to overcome the prejudice of Mr. Wharton, he is 
quick to win over younger, less suspecting hearts. Both Emily and Everett are taken in 
by his charms, seemingly unable to tell his acting from what their father would no doubt 
call the “real thing.” The young Whartons are not alone: at the beginning of the novel, 
                                                
80 Gilmour argues that the gentlemanly ideal is so deeply ingrained in Trollope’s consciousness 
that he seldom felt obliged to define it, Doctor Thorne and The Prime Minister being exceptions 
(149), and Juliet McMaster names the latter novel as the one in which Trollope’s “perfect 
gentleman,” Mr. Palliser, achieves full expression (117). Jaffe, similarly, singles out The Prime 
Minister as the novel in which Trollope “teaches” gentlemanly intuition:  “despite the novel’s 
insistence on the intuitive quality of gentlemanly knowledge,” she writes, “Trollope himself had to 
make his way to it. And Trollope’s awareness of the necessity of such activity leads . . . in several 
ways, to the novel: that vehicle par excellence both for teaching the nineteenth century how to 
look upon things and, in Trollope’s case as in others, for securing the admission of middle-class 
authors into gentlemanly circles” (51). She points out a connection between the class ambitions 
of the author and of the speculator (51), an idea I build on by presenting them as analogous 
forms of ambiguously valued “immaterial labour,” comparable in surprising ways to the political 
work of aristocratic characters like the Pallisers.   
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Lopez has nearly everybody fooled. If the narrator struggles to pen an exact definition of 
gentlemanly conduct, he has no trouble conveying society’s consensus on Lopez: 
It was admitted on all sides that Ferdinand Lopez was a ‘gentleman.’ 
Johnson says that any other derivation of this difficult word than that 
which causes it to signify a ‘man of ancestry’ is whimsical . . . The 
chances are very much in favour of a well-born man, but exceptions may 
exist. It was not generally believed that Ferdinand Lopez was well-born;—
but he was a gentleman. (8) 
In this passage, a weak definition is immediately undermined by the admission of 
exceptions. We are told that gentility is inherited, but Lopez seems to have got it by 
some other means. While he is not immediately condemned for this, his appealing 
surface raises red flags. Facades, the novels implies, are easy to erect, and one of the 
first things we learn about Lopez is that he knows how to look the part, disguising his 
visibly foreign body through an impeccable grasp of English fashion.81 While his tailor 
regards him as “simply extravagant in the number of his coats and trousers,” his friends 
imagine that he is “one of those fortunate beings to whose nature belongs a facility of 
being well dressed” (10). Style, though, is never wholly natural: as the narrator reminds 
us, it depends as much on “money and time” as on personal taste (10). For a man as 
good at the game as Lopez, the money need not even be real: so capably does he play 
the gentleman that he is able to satisfy most of his wants on credit, or on the rumour that 
he is bound to marry the wealthy Wharton daughter. 
More telling is the rapidity with which the list of positive features (“Johnson 
says…”) gives way to a more tenuous exploration of the tension between surface and 
                                                
81 It is hard to avoid seeing Lopez as a racialized scapegoat for everything Trollope imagines to 
be wrong with the modern world: disregard for history, threats to English cultural values, and even 
the financial sector’s obfuscation of material value. For Lauren Goodlad, Lopez is Trollope’s 
attempt to “isolate the pernicious effects of capitalist globalization in the figure of the Jew” (83). 
Trollope is certainly accountable for the anti-Semitism in his novels, but Lopez is more than a 
stereotyped Jewish villain. Goodlad suggests that race is merely an alibi for the untenable 
contradictions of capitalism, and points out that the narrator “distances himself” from overt racists 
like Mr. Wharton (84). Amanda Anderson makes a similar point about The Way We Live Now, 
which was published only a year after The Prime Minister: “the character of Brehgert,” she writes, 
“makes it clear that Trollope does not absolutely associate Jewishness with a corrupt form of 
rootless cosmopolitan finance” (526). An “insider/outsider critic with characterological integrity,” 
Breghert, like Lopez, “challenges the limits of the gentlemanly ethos” (526). That anti-Jewish 
sentiment exists in both novels is undeniable, but the final judgment of both Lopez and Brehgert 
is not an anti-Semitic one. Brehgert turns out to have stronger principles than most of his English 
neighbours, and Lopez’s suicide at Tenway Junction humanizes him, generating sympathy in 
spite of his treatment of Emily. 
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depth. Sartorial extravagance allows Lopez to affect gentility, but it is no substitute for 
the real thing. On the contrary, it comes across as an unflattering, ungentlemanly trait, 
and not because of any association with vanity. Vanity is no great sin in Trollope’s moral 
universe, as long as it is honest; what attracts the narrator’s criticism is not Lopez’s taste 
for luxury but his attempt to conceal his actual material position. His dress fails to align 
not just with the truth of his poverty, but with a whole array of unsavory traits. Through 
costume, he misrepresents his class, nationality, and character, opening an unsettling 
gap between image and reality and presenting himself as a bigger, better man than he 
is. It makes him an untrustworthy person, and hence, a villain, but it also evokes 
historically specific anxieties about the growing gap between value and its signifier.  
Indeed, in The Prime Minister, fidelity between essence and appearance is not 
just a moral issue, but a social and economic one as well. Trollope’s generation bore 
witness to an immense national accumulation of wealth, but it also saw that wealth 
subject to increasingly mystifying mediations. By the 1870s, Britain had secured its 
position as the most developed economy in the world, supported by global trade 
networks, a highly advanced manufacturing sector, and a permissive legal framework for 
business, but it was in this period, too, that British banking was consolidated and 
modernized, and by the second half of the century, the cheque-book had thoroughly 
taken the place of cash for much of the urban middle class (Michie 83). These changes 
became fodder for Trollope’s satire, and by the later Palliser novels, “worthless paper” is 
in everyone’s hands as a spurious stand-in for wealth (The Way We Live Now 203). The 
infamous gambling circle in The Way We Live Now runs entirely on IOUs for which no 
one is ever made accountable, and the transaction that finally undoes the villain of that 
novel is his attempt to mortgage a property he has “bought” but never paid for. When 
pressed to deliver the sum, the doomed Melmotte simply asserts that we will “speak to 
his banker,” prompting the narrator to hypothesize, “as for many years we have 
exchanged paper instead of actual money for our commodities, so now it seemed that, 
under the new Melmotte regime, an exchange of words was to suffice” (369). The 
implications of the quip are clear: from Trollope’s point of view, the mediation of wealth is 
a steep and much eroded slope. No sooner do we take our first cautious steps down that 
slope than we are at risk of sliding right to the bottom, where we presumably find Lopez 
telling Parker that actual commodities are but a “clumsy addition” to the business of 
trade (The Prime Minister 332).  
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Vertiginous, unpredictable swings in fortune make for entertaining reading, but 
they were not only the stuff of fiction. As the century wore on, wealth was increasingly 
abstracted from anything that could be understood as its source, mediated by paper 
forms of money, by banks and signing-clerks, and by ever more elaborate systems of 
credit. This opaque relationship between the signs and substance of value was made 
more alarming still by the instability of the British financial sector, which went against the 
grain of Victorian bureaucratization in being extremely under-regulated.82 A property-less 
adventurer like Lopez could make money on the stock market because it was relatively 
easy to float one’s investments along until the exact moment when it became profitable 
to sell. Problems emerged only if this moment failed to come, which is, unfortunately, 
exactly what happens to Lopez. With the mania of money-making upon him, he makes a 
series of rash investments in South American commodities (among them “guano,” or 
manure) whose prices plummet instead of rise. Although such reversals of fortune could 
and did happen to any class of investor, the implication in the novel is that Lopez is 
somehow to blame for his bad luck, having endeavoured to “get rich too quick” (353). 
Sexty Parker’s wife refuses to mince words when she discusses the matter with Emily: 
“what is it but gambling that he and Mr. Lopez are a-doing together,” she asks; “they 
goes and buys things that they haven’t got the money to pay for, and then waits to see if 
they’ll turn up trumps. Isn’t that gambling?” (352) 
Mrs. Parker unambiguously equates speculation with gambling, an association 
that was well established by the middle decades of the period. Just how any sort of 
investment was to be distinguished from out-and-out gambling was a serious problem for 
the Victorians, the more so because speculative manias threatened to cast a shadow 
over aspects of the finance economy that many wished to redeem. Tamara Wagner 
argues that speculation served as the necessary foil against which “legitimate” 
investment could be defined, much as Lopez’s false gentility gives meaning to the “real 
                                                
82 The Limited Liability Act (1855) and the Companies Act (1856) demolished the last significant 
barriers to incorporation, shielding individuals from any losses companies might sustain beyond 
the amount of their initial investment. At the same time, it was becoming easier for casual 
investors to enter the stock market, and by the 70s, anyone with a few pounds to spare could 
venture them on the London Stock Exchange if they chose. The 70s also saw the development of 
a mechanism that allowed investors to delay paying for or delivering stocks for a potentially 
indefinite period of time, as long as they were willing to pay a small fee for the privilege. The 
mechanism was called “contango”; what it meant was that investors could deal in “futures” 
instead of actual commodities (Itzkowitz 106-7).  
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thing” in Trollope’s novel.83 Tempting as it is to apply this dualistic model to the financial 
plot of The Prime Minister, the model will not suffice: in Trollope’s text, distinctions 
between legitimate and illegitimate forms of investment are no more stable than the 
shifting social gradations onto which they are mapped.  
A closer look at Lopez’s business dealings illustrates the point: though not 
“absolutely penniless,” Lopez is “altogether propertyless,” but his propertylessness 
poses no immediate threat to his respectability, nor does it prevent him from trading 
recklessly on the stock market (185). For a time, he floats his reputation on the grounds 
of a “somewhat intimate” alliance with the more successful Mr. Mills Happerton (185), 
and when that ground begins to crumble, he bullies Sexty Parker and, later, Mr. Wharton 
into signing bills he cannot back himself. The affront to Victorian standards of good 
behavior that these actions represent hardly needs elaboration, but though the novel 
tries to contain the threat of rootless cosmopolitanism and free-floating capital in the 
easily vilified figure of Lopez, the attempt is not convincing. Some of Lopez’s money 
comes from South American commodities, true, but just as much of it is British. The 
“good,” clean, honestly earned (or inherited) money that Lopez borrows from characters 
like Wharton and Mr. Palliser is indifferent to the hands that spend it and to the objects 
on which it is spent.  
Perhaps more importantly, Lopez is successful in his bid for the heroine’s heart: 
he not only courts but successfully marries and impregnates Emily Wharton, who is 
driven to him in the first place by the shortcomings of her authentically English suitor, 
Arthur Fletcher.84 Emily does eventually realize that she has misjudged Lopez’s 
                                                
83 “Within economic discourse,” Wagner claims, “investment could operate as the term for a 
secure monetary transaction, whereas financial speculation constituted by definition a form of 
risk-taking. Speculation’s association with gambling made it possible for nineteenth-century 
economists to distinguish it from investment, with the latter embodying the professional, 
trustworthy, secure, and stable, whereas speculation became linked to the amateurish as well as 
the risky and the ruthless” (8).  
84 Emily’s child dies shortly after birth, leaving her unencumbered and available for redemption by 
her original suitor after Lopez’s suicide. However, while this conclusion might lead us to assume 
that evil is, in fact, “contained” in the racialized Lopez, that reading ignores important details in the 
plot, such as the fact that Emily is thoroughly contaminated before Lopez’s death, and that the 
primary (albeit reluctant) backers of Lopez’s evil financial schemes are Mr. Wharton and Mr. 
Palliser. Moreover, as Regenia Gagnier points out, the narrator and characters admit numerous 
times that the racism and inequity of London society have Lopez what he is: “Lopez is an 
accomplished example of Victorian resentment,” she writes; “he feels the unjustice of uninformed 
prejudice and unearned status and cannot accept them” (243). After Lopez’s suicide, Glencora, 
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character, but Lopez’s activities are not, at least, at the beginning of the novel, 
exceptionally unethical. Indeed, it is not Lopez’s business but business itself that proves 
incompatible with the requirements of gentility, a troubling revelation for the Trollopian 
gentleman, since none but the wealthiest of his class could afford to opt out of business 
entirely. Increasingly, gentility had to be won in spite of one’s association with business: 
This most precious rank was acceded to [Lopez] although he was 
employed,—or at least had been employed—on business which does not 
itself give such a warrant of position as is supposed to be afford by the 
bar and the church, by the military services and by physic. He had been 
on the Stock exchange, and still in some manner, not clearly understood 
by his friends, did business in the City. (8-9)  
Business in “the City” fails the test of gentility because it neither requires nor 
automatically bestows the benefit of rank, but this is not the only thing that distinguishes 
it from the other professions named in the passage. For one thing, it is too obviously 
about the making of money: the doctor helps his patients and the soldier serves his 
country, but the single goal of the investor is to turn a profit.85 The imperative to earn 
one’s bread clashed mightily with the ideals passed down to the Victorians from the 
eighteenth century, which dictated that the gentleman should live not only without labour 
but also without “too much visible attention to business” (Gilmour 7). Genteel 
respectability may have been the hoped-for reward of many middle-class Victorians, but 
it presented an uncomfortable challenge to the Carlylean “dignity of work” rhetoric that 
had helped form the identity of a newly industrialized society. Although Trollope’s focus 
on the professional and aristocratic classes means that he is seldom thought of as 
writing explicitly about labour, the tension between the glorification and denigration of 
work reaches a more painful pitch in his texts than in those of any other major novelist of 
the period. His novels circumvent the obvious (and perhaps, to his eyes, degrading) 
labour of the working class, and yet go to extreme lengths to prove that true gentlemen 
produce value for society, and that cads like Lopez do not.  
                                                                                                                                            
the most erring but also the most emotionally intelligent of Trollope’s characters, acknowledges 
responsibility for the death, admitting to Madame Max, “I have a sort of feeling, you know, that 
among us we made the train run over him” (The Prime Minister 582).  
85 The inclusion of medicine in Trollope’s list of genteel professions indicates how significantly 
attitudes toward work and rank changed over the course of the century. In Middlemarch, written 
just a few years before The Prime Minister but set in the 1830s, Lydgate’s medical aspirations are 
a serious count against his claims to gentility. By the 70s—at least in the mixed urban milieu of 
Trollope’s novels—doctoring comes to seem like good, honest, and even respectable work 
compared to the dealings of fortune-chasing speculators like Lopez and Melmotte.   
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I will have more to say about these “true gentlemen” in a moment, but first I want 
to point out the second problem with Lopez’s business: that his friends do not know or 
understand what he does. The very existence of mystery suggests that there is 
something to conceal, and in Lopez’s case, there certainly is. More generally, though, 
there is a confusion about the kind of value produced by the buying and selling of the 
stockbroker. This is true almost regardless of the particular theory of value we subscribe 
to. Trollope had more than one influential theory to choose from: the labour theory of 
value dominated early Victorian political economy, but by the time Trollope was writing 
The Prime Minister, it faced a serious challenge from the more consumer-focused 
marginal utility school.86 Trollope vacillates between these two schools, at times lauding 
the inherent value of a hard day’s work, and at others, preaching the supreme 
importance of consumer preference and choice. On the value of authorial labour, he is 
adamant but strangely unclear: a work of fiction that makes money or builds its author’s 
reputation is void of real value unless it is also “useful,” but what, exactly, he considered 
“useful” is hard to determine (Autobiography 234). Vaguely Aristotelian claims about 
“delighting” and “instructing” readers fall flat, since Trollope’s most fascinating characters 
are not particularly good examples for readers (139). However, despite his inability to 
make a compelling case for fiction’s use-value, he continually asserted its existence, 
perhaps because, should fiction turn out to be useless, he would have found himself 
condemned by his own creed: “labour that is useless,—unproductive,” he wrote in 
Autobiography, “will break the heart of even a convict” (234).  
                                                
86 Smith, Marx and Ricardo all endorsed variations of the labour theory of value. In the Victorian 
context, marginal utility theory is most strongly associated with William Stanley Jevons and Carl 
Menger. Both schools recognize a difficulty in the concept of value: namely, that objects have 
exchange-values in addition to their use-values, and that neither form of value straightforwardly 
determines the other. Unsurprisingly, the labour theorists considered labour the chief source of 
value. Thomas Hobbes first departed from the Aristotelian emphasis on use to argue that value 
derived from two sources (land and labour), but Smith went further than Hobbes, claiming in The 
Wealth of Nations that all value originated in labour (Dooley 127, Smith 10). Exactly how relative 
quantities of labour could be said to determine the price of goods, Smith never satisfactorily 
explained, an oversight that both Ricardo and Marx attempted to correct. Jevons and Menger 
responded differently, by returning to and revamping the Aristotelian paradigm, emphasizing the 
role of consumer preference and technical knowledge in determining price (Dooley 211). They 
argued that the value of objects had more to do with their capacity to satisfy human wants than 
with the labour required to produce them, a capacity that was understood to be subjective and 
contingent on numerous external factors (Howey, 2). Marginal utility theory contained its own 
problems and oversights, not least of which was its inability to explain how subjective factors like 
consumer preference could be measured (Howey 47), and both sets of ideas remained influential 
in Trollope’s lifetime. 
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Whether we agree with Trollope that value is a measure of usefulness, or we 
think of it instead as the amount of congealed labour contained in the commodity, or 
even as a representation of the consumer’s whim, it is difficult to see how Lopez’s “work” 
is valuable. At first glance, his stockbroking might remind us of Tito’s labour in Romola, 
but I think it is still more enigmatic. Both Lopez and Tito are slippery outsiders whose 
labour produces intangible things, but Tito, at least, makes people happy: the “product” 
of his political maneuvering is a generous share of undeserved trust. Lopez, by contrast, 
produces nothing, not even pleasure, through his buying and selling, and, more 
shockingly, he expends nothing. Through verbal exchanges and the signing of bills, he 
makes a show of parting with capital, but the reader knows that he has seldom had this 
capital in his bank account, let alone in his hands. Nor does he engage in any 
straightforward expenditure of effort: while there is presumably some kind of work 
involved in the management of his investments, it is rarely described in the novel and 
seems to take little of his time, again in opposition to Tito’s politicking, which is a major 
dramatic focus in Eliot’s novel. An early scene in The Prime Minister finds Lopez 
dropping in on Sexty Parker to ask why he bothers to work through the miserable, wet 
days of early spring. “Business is too good,” Parker responds, “A man has to stick to it 
when it does come. Everybody can’t do like you;—give up regular work, and make a 
better thing of an hour now and then, just as it pleases you” (12).  
Lopez makes no effort to refute Parker’s charge. Much to his wife’s distress, the 
mystery of his daily activity remains, interminably, a mystery. Where Lopez goes, 
nobody knows, but repeated testimonies from Parker confirm that he is not spending his 
time at the office. Speculation is, then, a peculiar business, requiring no time, no bodily 
exertion, and seemingly practicable without a supply of ready money. Moreover, it yields 
value without producing (or, in Lopez’s case, having anything to do with) tangible things. 
Is it any wonder that it strikes the other characters as black magic? Even the gullible 
Parker recognizes that there is something fishy about Lopez’s business, and Emily, 
whose intuition is far sharper than Parker’s, realizes soon after her marriage that her 
husband is a fraud. When she confronts Lopez on their honeymoon, he is forced to 
admit that his “profession” is not generally recognized as one, and his credibility takes a 
hit in Emily’s eyes and in the reader’s:  
“What is your business, Ferdinand?” . . .  
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“It is generally commercial. I buy and sell on speculation. The world, 
which is shy of new words, has not yet given it a name. I am a good deal 
at present in the South American trade.” She listened, but received no 
glimmering of an idea from his words. (192)  
The difficulty Emily has in parsing Lopez’s explanation is due to the explanation’s 
fogginess, and not to any deficiency on her part. If there is any doubt about that, it is 
resolved by the narrator’s sympathetic outcry: “Poor girl! That she should have been 
allowed to marry a man, and then to have to ask such a question!” (192) Notwithstanding 
the narrator’s side-taking, Jaffe sees an analogy between the Emily and Lopez plots: 
“Emily’s feeling for Lopez,” she writes, “ may be understood as the characteristic attitude 
of the speculator . . . she must be taught to invest her emotions, as she would her 
money, wisely. The terms of romance and those of finance are interchangeable” (49). 
Like Hughes and Lund, Jaffe sees the movement from bad husband to good husband as 
constitutive of Emily’s normalizing bildung. It is a compelling interpretation, but the 
equation Jaffe draws between “romance” and “finance” is too neat: Trollope never puts 
Emily’s misplaced heart on a level with Lopez’s greed. Moreover, he continually 
suggests that feelings about people are different than feelings about money, because 
the people we feel for feel too. As I demonstrate more fully in the final section of this 
chapter, Trollope’s late novels place ethical weight on the ability of the beloved object to 
alarm us through its autonomy, to remind us forcibly of the mediated quality of any value 
we attempt to find in it. Money, of course, does the very opposite: it masquerades as 
value, obscuring the human interactions that comprise the value relation. This is what 
Lopez fails to grasp: the value he thinks he is producing is actually a relationship to 
individuals whose claims he ignores.  
What Gentlemen Make 
Lopez’s sporadic and seemingly useless work invites comparison with the 
unflagging industry of many of the novel’s protagonists. If Lopez proves himself a villain, 
surely one of his opposites—Plantagenet Palliser, say, or Arthur Fletcher—will turn out 
to be the hero the series demands. The gentleman-cad binary that organizes Trollope’s 
male characters includes a set of assumptions about work: if the cad’s business is 
irregular, the gentleman’s will be methodic; if the former deals in half-truths and mystery, 
the latter will be simple and honest; if it is unclear whether Lopezian speculation 
produces anything of real value, the value of gentlemanly work will be stable, self-
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evident, and explicable. Gentlemanly industry in the Palliser novels easily satisfies the 
first two of these conditions, but whether it is truly more valuable than Lopezian 
adventuring is much less clear. In fact, the work performed gentlemen characters 
frequently seems pointless:  
Mr. Vavasor was appointed assistant commissioner in some office which 
had to do with insolvents, and which was abolished three years after his 
appointment. It was at first thought that he would keep his eight hundred 
a year for life and be required to do nothing for it; but a wretched 
cheeseparing Whig government. . . would not permit this; it gave him the 
option of taking four hundred a year for nothing, or of keeping his whole 
income and attending three days a week for three hours a day during 
term time, at a miserable dingy little office near Chancery Lane, where his 
duty would consist in signing his name to accounts which he never read, 
and at which he was supposed never even to look. He had sulkily elected 
to keep the money, and this signing had been now for nearly twenty years 
the business of his life. Of course he considered himself a very hardly 
used man. (Can You Forgive Her? 10)  
What is it that distinguishes Lopez’s mystifying business from Vavasor’s shabby-genteel 
occupation? The vagueness of Vavasor’s appointment (“some office” that “had to do with 
insolvents”) calls to mind Lopez’s description of his “generally commercial” business, 
and Vavasor, like Lopez, spends little time at his desk. We might even accuse Vavasor 
of dishonesty, given that he authorizes accounts without reading them. And yet, Vavasor 
is no villain: a crotchety old man, occasionally the butt of the narrator’s good-natured 
jokes, he belongs unambiguously to the novel’s list of good characters, and his flaws are 
treated gently. Nor is it likely, given his many years of devoted service at the Post Office, 
that Trollope intended to belittle clerical work. Indeed, he devotes part of a chapter in 
Autobiography to refuting the charge that he gave up on the Post Office after finding a 
more meaningful (and lucrative) calling in authorship. Trollope resigned from his position 
when he was passed over for a promotion, but he recalls his time in the department with 
fondness and pride. “I was attached to the department,” he writes, “and had imbued 
myself with a thorough love of letters,—I mean the letters which are carried by the 
post—and was as anxious for their welfare as if they were all my own . . . It had been for 
many years my ambition to be a thoroughly good public servant, and to give the public 
much more than I took in the shape of a salary” (174). What we might imagine to be 
mindless paper-pushing, Trollope characterizes as necessary and noble work:  
That the public in little villages should be enabled to buy postage stamps; 
that they should have their letters delivered free and at an early hour . . . 
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that letter-carriers and sorters should not be over-worked; that they 
should be adequately paid, and have some hours to themselves, 
especially on Sundays; above all, that they should be maid to earn their 
wages . . . these were matters by which I was stirred to what the 
secretary was pleased to call an energetic performance of my duties. 
(176) 
This “energetic performance” was by Trollope’s own account just as important (and at 
times, more important) than his writing practice (176). He describes himself as a “public 
servant” and not a bureaucrat; his work at the Post Office was a vocation suited to his 
talents and abilities, and one that he found purposeful, despite its apparent banality.  
And yet, if impassioned passages in Autobiography reveal Trollope’s esteem for 
the immaterial labour of the clerk, the examples in the fiction are much more ambivalent. 
Vavasor is not “givi[ng] the public more” than he “takes in the shape of a salary.” On the 
contrary, he seems as much a parasite as Lopez, and not because the public pays his 
salary. The issue is rather that he produces nothing of value in exchange for that pay. 
Admittedly, showcasing the fruits of one’s labour is a more difficult task for the 
immaterial labourer than it is for the man who mends shoes or makes candles 
(Trollope’s favourite examples of productive labour); how are we to prove that the 
signing of unread accounts constitutes a valuable contribution to society? If Trollope has 
the answer to this question, he withholds it. Perhaps we would never think to ask, if his 
enthusiastic endorsements of the gentlemen’s value did not render the silence 
conspicuous.  
The value of gentlemanly labour is a primary concern in The Prime Minister. 
Emily’s childhood companion and eventual match, Arthur Fletcher, bests Lopez in the 
contest for Mr. Wharton’s approval, and while the victory owes much to the father’s 
prejudices, the justification Wharton offers for his preference relies on a productive 
capacity that he imagines one man to have and the other to lack. Mr. Wharton insists 
that Fletcher is ten times the gentleman that Lopez is, and more importantly, that “he 
works” (77). The impression of Fletcher’s value is so strong that even Emily is forced to 
admit his superiority (234), but the substance of this value is more difficult to determine. 
The novel implies that Fletcher’s good qualities are not accidental—that the gentleman is 
really made of different stuff than the pretenders vying for a share of his privilege87—but 
                                                
87 When the realization of Fletcher’s superiority finally strikes Emily, she admits to herself, “you 
[cannot] make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear” (234).  It is not just behavior that distinguishes the 
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Fletcher, like so many of Trollope’s gentlemen, makes a poor show of his potential. Like 
the similarly dull John Grey in Can You Forgive Her?, he is absent for most of the story 
and contributes little to the heroine’s growth. When he does appear, it is only to complain 
that he is not the preferred suitor. He feels entitled to Emily as to any other part of his 
inheritance, but it is difficult to sympathize with this feeling, given the long list of 
advantages he has over his rival. “No young man of his age was more courted by both 
men and women,” the narrator informs us; “there was no one who in his youth had 
suffered fewer troubles from those causes of trouble which visit English young men . . . 
So much had been done for him by nature that he was never called upon to pretend 
anything” (111). The passage suggests that Fletcher’s virtues are better understood as 
privileges, and they are never seriously tested. Moreover, despite Mr. Wharton’s claims, 
he “works” only if the definition of “work” is fairly loose.  
Like so many of Trollope’s heroes, Fletcher’s vocation turns out to be politics, but 
the question of whether parliamentary work counts as work is never clearly answered in 
the novel. Parliament is the chief ambition of Emily’s lackadaisical brother, who, by the 
time he confesses this dream to Lopez, has tried his hand at law, in the banking-house, 
and even on the stock market, finding each career a poor fit for his “special genius” (17). 
Of middling intelligence and little purpose, Everett is a sorry advocate for the vocation of 
politics, but it is politics, he decides, that will best engage his “genius,” a revelation to 
which Lopez responds with undisguised scorn. “For myself,” Lopez declares, “I can 
conceive of no vainer object than a seat in the British Parliament. What does any man 
gain by it? The few who are successful work very hard for little pay and no thanks . . . 
The many who fail sit idly for hours, undergoing the weary task of listening to platitudes, 
and enjoy in return the now absolutely valueless privilege of having M. P. written on their 
letters” (15).  
What makes Lopez’s critique so cutting is that it applies not just to the thriftless 
Everetts of the world, but to extraordinarily hard-working men like Plantagenet Palliser. 
Ostensibly the hero of the series, Mr. Palliser is a tragi-comic Don Quixote, made 
miserable by his own ideals. Palliser is born into privilege, but lives and works among 
men of the upper-middle classes, whose industry and intelligence have won them 
                                                                                                                                            
gentleman from the cad, she thinks, but the actual substance from which he is made. As I have 
tried to show, the events in the novel do not support Emily’s fantasy. It is yet another ontological 
assertion undermined by the proofs summoned in its defense.  
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esteem in the Liberal party. Caught between the residual value system of the aristocracy 
and the emergent (albeit somewhat illusory) meritocracy of his party, Palliser is doomed 
to fill neither set of criteria adequately. His characteristic obsession with work might be 
seen as a semi-conscious acknowledgement of the eclipse of his class, a capitulation to 
the middle class’s valorization of productivity. Unfortunately, Palliser’s “work” falls into 
the troublesome category of immaterial labour: like Lopez’s speculation, it requires no 
tangible exertion and produces no tangible result. The Prime Minister dramatizes 
Palliser’s struggle to come to terms with this fact, but one can feel Trollope struggling 
along with him, particularly when Trollope’s essays on work are read alongside 
representations of work in the novel.88 The challenge confronting the Duke is one that 
seems to have troubled his creator, as well: if productive capacity determines an 
individual’s value—particularly, we might add, a man’s value—how can we evaluate 
those whose work is immaterial, who produce things we cannot see, touch, or in some 
cases, understand? 
The great crisis of the Duke’s plot comes when he is named Prime Minister, for 
the position obliges him to relinquish the work that has hitherto defined his worth. His pet 
project throughout the series is the introduction of a system of decimal coinage, but 
there is no room in the portfolio of the nation’s leader for such menial concerns. The 
Duke is proud of his post, but he soon begins to long for his former occupations: 
There were men under him who were really at work. The Lord Chancellor 
had legal reforms on foot. Mr. Monk was busy, heart and soul, in regard 
to income tax and brewers’ licenses,—making the poor Prime Minister’s 
mouth water . . . Lord Drummon was active among the colonies, Phineas 
                                                
88 Trollope’s efforts to make novel writing seem the same as any form of manual labour are well 
known. He is famous for writing in a highly regimented, clockwork manner, and published several 
rhetorically fascinating essays on the nature of authorial labour. In his criticism of Thackeray, he 
calls the creative efforts of the writer the “elbow grease of the mind,” and likens writing to the 
scrubbing of a mahogany table (Autobiography 260). It is a laborious attempt to prove the 
laboriousness of thought, the metaphor testifying as much to the differences between manual and 
intellectual labour as to the similarities. The explanation is little clearer than the one Lopez gives 
to Emily when she asks about the nature of his “business.” We are forced to accept not only that 
thinking is “work” because it is hard, but that thinking is valuable work because it is hard. In other 
words, a conspicuous display of effort is presented as sufficient proof of thought’s value. Patrick 
Brantlinger is not convinced: in his reading of The Way We Live Now, he aligns the value of 
popular fiction with the fraudulent profiteering of Trollope’s villains. “Trollope’s novels,” he writes, 
“dramatize the underlying identity, based on credit, between the commodity forms of fiction and 
money,” ultimately presenting authorial labour, including Trollope’s own, as kind of “counterfeit 
writing,” in league with Lady Carbury’s ridiculous romances, but also with the fake IOUs at the 
gambling table and the advertisements for Melmotte’s fictitious railway (Fictions of State 165-6).  
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Finn had at any rate his ideas about Ireland. But with the Prime Minister . 
. . it was all a blank. The policy confided to him and expected at his hands 
was that of keeping together a Coalition Ministry. That was a task that did 
not satisfy him. And now, gradually—very slowly indeed at first, but still 
with a sure step,—there was creeping upon him the idea that his power of 
cohesion was sought for, and perhaps found, not in his political capacity, 
but in his rank and wealth. (132) 
Clearly for the Duke, the pseudo-ontological value of being a Duke counts for less than 
the tangible value of doing important work. His self-worth depends on the latter: he 
wants to be valued for his intellectual contributions and not for his rank, and thus it is 
distressing to find that as Prime Minister, he is not expected to do much of anything. 
Such, at least, is his perception; we might counter that the immaterial labour of 
mediation, of building consensus among the warring factions of a government, is difficult 
and valuable work, but it is not so from the Duke’s point of view. When he thinks of work, 
he thinks of reports and blue books, of tables and totals, of measured, accurate 
speeches delivered before a full house of listeners and of debate lasting long into the 
night. Even after resigning himself to the hollow duties of leadership, he is wont to 
escape to his office to pour over the figures, a task so much more gratifying to him than 
the social rituals he is now expected to perform (154).  
Importantly, though, the Duke’s point of view is not the only one sanctioned in the 
novel. He is not the sole adjudicator of value, just because he happens to be the novel’s 
hero. Indeed, if he fails to see the value in his new set of tasks, his wife, Glencora, does 
not, and she goes to great lengths to make up for his short-sightedness. Possessed by 
nature with twice the ambition and twice the energy of her husband, she decides when 
he is placed at the head of the Coalition that he will entertain as no prior leader has 
done. Much to the Duke’s dismay, the Palliser government soon becomes associated 
with Glencora’s lavish garden parties, so much so that he begins to wonder if she is 
more rightly Prime Minister than he is (132).  
Notwithstanding the Duke’s reservations, the parties are an impressive 
undertaking. When the Duke and Duchess arrive at Gatherum castle on the eve of their 
debut event, Glencora feigns sleepiness to get out of an evening walk with her husband, 
but sleep is the last thing on her mind:  
As to lying down, that she knew to be completely out of the question. She 
had already found out that the life which she had adopted was one of 
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incessant work. But she was neither weak nor idle. She was quite 
prepared to work,—if only she might work after her own fashion and with 
companions chosen by herself. (140) 
The language in this passage foregrounds the labour of sociality: the life of a public 
figure is one of “incessant work,” and though we must assume this work is gentler than 
that performed by Glencora’s cooks and maids, it requires strength and industry all the 
same. In the days following the couple’s arrival, Glencora is apparently one of the 
busiest people on the Gatherum grounds—but is busy-ness, the expenditure of effort 
and consumption of time, a reliable indicator of value? Are Glencora’s parties any more 
“useful” than the decimal coinage system, or than the political reforms of the Duke’s 
colleagues? As far as Glencora is concerned, the parties are a crucial part of the 
government’s success, and her feeling is corroborated by the narrator’s hints about the 
effects of her popularity on the Coalition’s longevity. Never idle, she is “always making 
up the party . . . doing something to strengthen the buttress, writing little letters to little 
people who, as little as they were, might become big by amalgamation” (202). At the end 
of a particularly trying day, she falls “exhausted by her labours” into a chair, declaring to 
her confidante, Mrs. Finn (formerly Madame Max Goeseler), “I’m not a god . . . that I 
should be able to do these things without ever making a mistake. And yet they must be 
done. And as for him [the Duke]—he does not help me in the least. He wanders about 
among the clouds of the multiplication table, and thinks that a majority will drop into his 
mouth because he does not shut it” (202). 
Glencora’s words pinpoint the hypocrisy of the Duke’s inability to appreciate her 
labour: the good will and collegiality she takes pains to create are intangible products, 
but the Duke’s world of ideas is hardly less so. The intellectual labour that feeds his self-
worth is just as abstract (and perhaps more abstract) than the emotional labour of 
Glencora’s one-person public relations department. Although both characters are 
protagonists whose aspirations the novel takes seriously, the intangible quality of their 
labour means that they share something with the cheats and ne’er-do-wells they initially 
seem to oppose. It is not clear, for example, that Glencora’s schmoozing is any less 
vulgar than Lopez’s gambling, or that the Duke’s calculations about decimal coinage are 
more meaningful than Vavasor’s account signing. Trollope derides commercial men as 
gamblers, makes well-intentioned fun of Vavasor’s busy-work, and lauds the Duke’s 
devotion to politics, but the reasoning behind this implicit hierarchy of labour is difficult to 
reconstruct from the novels alone. Rather, what reasoning we can reconstruct is circular, 
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axiological, beset with contradictions. We cannot even be sure that the object of 
prolonging the Coalition’s lifespan is desirable. The Duke himself spends a considerable 
amount of time fretting about this question, and must continually seek reassurance from 
his advisors that their labours have not been for nothing. “What have we done,” he asks 
the elder Duke of St. Bungay, but the reply does little to placate him: 
Carried on the Queen’s government prosperously for three years. Is that 
nothing for a minister to do? I have never been a friend of great 
measures, knowing that when they come fast, one after another, more is 
broken in the rattle than is repaired by the reform. We gave done what 
Parliament and the country expected us to do, and to my poor judgment 
we have done it well. (549) 
The fear haunting the younger Duke is of precisely the state of affairs that his mentor 
describes: his ministry, if it has prevented the nation from careening off some 
metaphorical cliff, has made no positive, measurable contribution. It has done nothing to 
build the nation’s wealth, whether “wealth” is understood in social or economic terms, 
and thus the Duke’s labour, from his own point of view, has been worthless—
“unproductive,” and so by Trollope’s definition, heartbreaking.  
 Unruly Objects  
We have seen now operating at several scales the dogged and ultimately 
doomed axiological impulse: Trollope tries again and again to invest particular ideas, 
institutions, figures, and expressions with a weight and value that they cannot contain. 
Although his efforts result in a realism that feels uniquely solid and substantial, they by 
no means transform abstractions like “gentility” or “society” into discrete manifestations 
of value. Trollope treats these ideas as if they are stable, material phenomena that can 
be observed, recorded, and tested in a nearly scientific fashion, but scrutiny unravels 
this assumption rather quickly. As we have seen, the assertions and axioms that 
characterize Trollope’s style create rather than describe the objects they refer to. 
Similarly, the figures of the cad and gentleman that are supposed to prop up an 
overarching moral code actually place it into question. Trollope posits these figures as 
knowable, bounded entities whose status as protagonist or villain is determined in 
advance, but the novels themselves do not deliver on this promise: Trollope’s fictional 
gentlemen never live up to the standard their privilege implies, and despite their energy 
and industry, the yield of society’s sizeable investment in them is troublingly evanescent. 
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The difference between a hero and a villain in a Trollope novel is not really that one is a 
good person, and the other, a bad one, however often this belief is expressed by the 
characters and the narrator; rather, as the comparison of Fletcher and Lopez suggests, 
the “difference” is circumstantial. This revelation may be underwhelming, but it deserves 
attention, because as much as our attitudes toward class and race have shifted since 
Trollope’s time, our understanding of value has not.89 
 Let me restate my point in the terms I used at the beginning of the chapter. The 
problem, as I have characterized it, is that Trollope attempts to assign positive values to 
things, and, increasingly, to people: a hard-working gentleman like Plantagenet Palliser 
is good, a lazy one like Vavasor, less good, and a cheat like Lopez, definitely bad. We 
have seen that the social and economic yield of these men seldom maps onto that moral 
assessment, and that the act of assessing is, itself, logically flawed. Whether we are 
thinking in social, moral, or economic terms (or, as is often the case in Trollope, all three 
at once) value is a complex process of mediation, and not a property or attribute. This is 
why the assignation of values in the fiction invariably breaks down: the proofs Trollope 
summons to validate his judgments inadvertently reveal the contingency of value. Value 
turns out to be not a quality that he can identify and describe, but a relationship that 
works against the teleology of his plots.  
The most striking examples of this relationship are ones we have yet to explore. 
The false dichotomy of the cad and gentleman demonstrates Trollope’s inability to 
substantiate his world-conjuring claims, but there are scenes in which his efforts to 
objectify social phenomena fail much more spectacularly. As we would expect, these 
scenes feel like anomalies in the otherwise smooth, predictable flow of the narrative, a 
                                                
89 I have avoided conflating Lopez’s villainy with his ambiguous racial status, in part because I do 
not think the novel conflates them, but also because I am wary of falling into some of the traps 
that Carolyn Betensky identifies in her recent essay, “Casual Racism in Victorian Literature.” 
According to Betensky, when we treat Victorian racism as safely historical and remote from 
contemporary attitudes toward race, we lose an opportunity to acknowledge and critique the 
continuing legacy of white supremacy. “If we portray the Victorians as if they were different from 
us in their ignorance and in the throwaway casualness of their racism . . . we are effectively 
portraying our own culture as one that has, to some unexamined degree relative to the Victorians, 
transcended racism and, equally, as one that actually holds itself up to our own standards” (733-
4). Although this chapter has not focused specifically on racism, my argument about 
understandings of value (be they moral, cultural, or economic) follows a similar logic. As much as 
we recoil from the obvious classism of Trollope’s value-system, we have not really left it behind. 
As long as we continue to treat value as a static property that only some people have, we will be 
susceptible to erroneous, damaging moral and economic hierarchies.  
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feature that has the strange effect of making them seem both extremely important and 
completely unnecessary. Having familiarized ourselves with the pattern through our 
initial inquiries, we are now in a position to see these scenes as more than anomalies, 
as the logical result of a persistent, dialectical movement in the writing. 
The first scene I wish to examine owes its disruptive quality to an unlikely cause: 
the landed estate. Although I am about to argue that land significantly challenges reified 
notions of value in the novels, Trollope criticism has tended to assume the opposite: that 
land in Trollope’s universe provides the ultimate container for social and economic value. 
Hensley attributes to Trollope a “property-based or ‘conservative’ fantasy of value” (151), 
and Patrick Brantlinger calls land the “ultimate form of wealth” in Trollope’s fiction, 
opposed to the “counterfeit gambling” of the stock market (171-2). Martin Daunton 
expresses as similar sentiment as follows:  
Of course, land offered one safe haven for investment. Land was at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from speculation on the stock exchange. 
Above all, Trollope saw wealth based on land as stable and moral, and he 
feared that society would be corrupted by stock market money. (212) 
Is this a true observation about the novels, or a truth imposed on the novels that they do 
not actually support? Daunton’s use of the Trollopian idiom might make us suspect the 
latter, and in this case, I think we would be right. His claim about land rhymes with 
Lauren Goodlad’s useful idea of the “heirloom,” a form of property that transcends its 
status as property, taking on an extra-economic value thanks to its capacity to embody 
history. And yet, as Goodlad admits, Trollope’s novels gradually cease to represent land 
as a safe harbor for positive value (be it wealth, Englishness, virtue, etc.). That land 
continues to signify status in Trollope’s late work is undeniable, but owning land is no 
safeguard against the threats to the cultural values he made it his mission to defend. As 
we have seen, arch-swindler Augustus Melmotte very nearly manages to purchase an 
estate on his baseless credit alone.   
Even when it is not being threatened by foreign capital, land makes a leaky 
container for value. Trollope’s late novels are full of land-owning characters whose 
property yields a significant part of its value to non-owners. Phineas Finn’s rival, Mr. 
Kennedy, is one example: Kennedy is rich and owns a beautiful estate, and he 
successfully outbids Phineas for Lady Laura’s hand, but there is something 
conspicuously lacking from his good fortune. He is the beneficiary of yet another vaguely 
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commercial business, and need not trouble himself with the management of it, since it 
now goes on “prospering almost by its own momentum” (Phineas Finn 47). However, 
having money—or having any form of wealth, for that matter—does not guarantee that 
we benefit from its value. Much to Phineas’s ire, Kennedy is indifferent to the privileges 
his wealth affords him. He owns “a magnificent place in Perthshire . . . [and] a house in 
London, and a stud of horses in Leicestershire, which he rarely visit[s]” (47). 
Compounding the crime of the unridden horses, Phineas observes that Kennedy “never 
spoke much to anyone, although he was constantly in society . . . he rarely did anything, 
although he had the means of doing everything . . . [and] he had very seldom been on 
his legs in the House of Commons, though he had sat there for ten years” (47).  
In short, Kennedy accumulates comforts that he seems constitutionally unable to 
enjoy, an example of the world’s injustice that strikes Phineas (and arguably, the 
narrator) as completely perverse. With Phineas as our guide, we are likely to conclude 
that privileges like Kennedy’s are valuable to those who can use them, but Kennedy 
values Loughlinter chiefly because he owns it: “I do delight in it,” he tells Lady Laura and 
Phineas, “when I come up here all alone, and feel that in the midst of this little bit of a 
crowded island I have all this to myself—all this with which no other man’s wealth can 
interfere” (137-8). Kennedy’s cool delight in the mere fact of ownership seems not only 
selfish, but well nigh anti-social, especially when we consider it in light of his 
unengaging, cardboard personality (and later, his persecution of Laura). Moreover, it 
runs counter to alternative paradigms of land-use that are treated more favourably in the 
novel. Phineas, for instance, is struck by the “beauty” of Loughlinter far more so than by 
its historic or economic value (134). Although it is a new property—the crude attempt of 
the commercial class to imitate the holdings of the aristocracy—Phineas deems it a 
“finer place” than the properly aristocratic Standish estate, and the novel devotes several 
plot-interrupting pages to descriptions of the “gentle slopes,” the “greensward falling from 
the front entrance down to the mountain lake,” the rushing Linter, and the seemingly 
“interminable” parkland (134-5). These features charm Phineas’s passionate heart, and 
though he does not own Loughlinter, he cannot help but enjoy it in a deeper and more 
absorbing way than Kennedy does. While we might accuse Trollope of treating his 
characters unfairly—of presenting Kennedy in a deliberately unfavourable light in order 
to render Phineas’s defeat more poignant—I think it is fair to recognize a difference in 
the two men. Kennedy is self-assured and close-minded; Phineas is acutely sensitive 
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and open. While this openness makes him impressionable and at times, weak-willed, it 
also inclines him to a relational view of the world that is at odds with his rival’s reified 
one.90   
Kennedy’s insensitivity to the poetry of Loughlinter is redoubled in his 
misapprehension of the woman he takes for a wife. Much of the sting of Phineas’s failed 
suit comes from the knowledge that Kennedy is incapable of appreciating Laura’s 
beauty, intelligence, and political savvy. Lady Laura’s passions and abilities are starved 
in the marriage, and before the end of the novel, she deserts Kennedy to live with her 
father in Dresden. We hardly need analyze the failed marriage to see that Kennedy is 
one in a long line of over-civilized, vaguely emasculated gentlemen characters, including 
the aging bachelor Roger Carbury from The Way We Live Now and the exceedingly dull 
John Grey. The latter man’s over-pruned garden makes it seem impossible that he will 
ever really know the Alice he claims to love. Much like Phineas, Alice possesses a 
heightened emotional receptivity to the aesthetic qualities of land. An early scene in Can 
You Forgive Her? finds her rambling over the stark moors that surround Vavasor Hall. A 
“good walker” who “love[s] the mountains,” Alice finds a use for and a pleasure in land 
that lacks almost any conventional charm. Situated “on the intermediate ground between 
the mountains of the lake country and the plains,” Vavasor parish is “unproductive, ill-
drained, and poor,” and moreover, possesses “little or none of that beauty which tourists 
go to see” (381). The scene goes on to describe, at some length, the “stern sameness of 
the everlasting moorland” (382). Neither beautiful, nor fertile, nor particularly well 
situated, Vavasor is a Brontë-esque blot in the middle of country that no one except 
                                                
90 The question of whether sensitivity and openness should be valued over integrity and purpose 
is one Trollope continually probes. While many of his protagonists are rigid defenders of the 
established order, just as many are reactive agents like Phineas. Phineas wavers in love and in 
politics. In Phineas Redux, he wins his seat at Tankerville thanks to impassioned demonstrations 
for the disestablishment of the Church, a cause he initially accepts with “lukewarm 
acquiescence,” but about which he becomes “zealous, fiery, and enthusiastic,” quickly convincing 
himself of its rightness through his own oratory (41). He is not unprincipled, but he is 
impressionable. Surprisingly for a series that also stars hyper-scrupulous characters like the 
Duke, this impressionability comes across as a virtue in Phineas more than as a flaw. It allows 
him to succeed in politics, and it grants him a higher degree of sympathy with women than any 
other male character in the series. By the time of his marriage to Madame Max, Phineas has 
several meaningful (and only mildly erotic) friendships with women, such as Lady Laura and 
Violet, who prove important mentors in politics. Phineas’s ethnicity and religious identity are parts 
of this puzzle. Mary Jean Corbett argues that Trollope uses Phineas’s Irishness and Roman 
Catholicism to inflect “manliness” in a new direction: “Trollope’s narrator . . . suggest[s] that 
Phineas’s ‘womanly’ susceptibility is not incompatible with being ‘manly’: the problem lies not in 
Phineas, but in the falsely polarized gender norms that the world’s wife, Phineas’s friends, and 
even the narrator himself . . . enforce and reinscribe” (129).      
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Alice admires. Her emotional response to the ever-same moors is an important mark of 
her character, distinguishing her from the cousin she almost marries, and for whom the 
land’s (admittedly meagre) economic value is the only thing that matters, but also from 
the gentleman she does marry, John Grey, whose association with the sickeningly 
quaint Nethercoats symbolizes everything that, in the beginning of the novel, repels 
Alice. Grey’s property is tellingly described as “pretty” and “delightful”—as “excellent a 
residence for a country gentleman of small means as taste and skill together could 
construct” (123). The gardens are undoubtedly its chief attraction: 
Fine single forest trees there were none, nor was it possible that there 
should have been any such. Nor could there be a clear rippling stream 
with steep green banks, and broken rocks lying about its bed. Such 
beauties are the beauties of landscape, and do not of their nature belong 
to a garden. But the shrubs of Nethercoats were of the rarest kind, and 
had been long enough in their present places to have reached the period 
of their beauty. Nothing had been spared that a garden could want. (123) 
Is it any wonder that Alice, accustomed to ranging across miles of muddy moorland, 
shrinks at the thought of becoming an ornament in Grey’s garden? Or that she first 
strays from her promise to him in response to an appeal from her cousin during their 
stay at a Swiss resort, with the Rhine thundering below them on the hotel balcony? 
Whatever the appeal George Vavasor has for Alice, it is bound up in the sensual 
memory of the river’s “mysterious” song, the “soft light” of the moon, and the “half feeling 
of danger” that comes over her when she realizes she has been left alone with him (61). 
The opposition between landscape and garden, forest and shrub, rushing Rhine and 
pruned fruit tree is, perhaps obviously, over-determined, but we might choose to 
understand it as an opposition between kinds of objects. Not every object is as easily 
confined to its bounded status as property; some have a way of exceeding our efforts to 
objectify them.  
The wild man/worthy man dichotomy is similarly over-determined, but more 
interesting than the dichotomy itself is the aesthetic sensibility that belongs neither to 
John nor to George, but to Alice. To value land above and beyond its status as property 
requires a particular bearing, an open, non-proprietary willingness to experience land as 
something stubbornly separate from our selves. It is tempting to think of the difference 
as one between exchange-value and use-value: Kennedy and George Vavasor are 
concerned with the exchange-value of land, and Phineas and Alice, with its use-values. 
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However, these terms are somewhat misleading, because “use-value” implies a 
functionality that Trollope deliberately withholds from properties like the Vavasor moors. 
The average onlooker would deem the moors useless, too poor even to serve the 
purposes of nature tourism. Their value, like the value of Kennedy’s estate for its non-
owner, Phineas, reverses the association of value with productivity so that value 
emerges, instead, from receptivity, from an experience of intimacy with an unassimilable 
and, in this case, non-human Other.   
As it turns out, Alice is as ill suited to be a man’s property as the misanthropic 
Vavasor bogs, and this may be the source of her appreciation. However, she shares at 
least two other relevant qualities with Phineas: an enthusiastic aesthetic sensibility and a 
relative lack of interest in ownership. Like Phineas, whose happiest moments come 
when he is speaking in the House, Alice wants to do things more than to have things. 
Can You Forgive Her? is ostensibly about her struggle to “get” a husband, but despite 
Trollope’s efforts to bend his character into the shaped required by the romance plot, it is 
fairly obvious that a husband is not what she wants. In fact, the most interesting thing 
about Alice is the intense inner drive that fuses her sexual choice with much larger (and 
overtly politicized) desires. Her mind is filled from the beginning with the “vague idea that 
there was something to be done; a something over and beyond, or perhaps altogether 
beside that marrying and having two children;—if only she knew what it was” (133). 
Violet Effingham will state the problem more clearly in a later novel:   
Men are so seldom really good . . . What man thinks of changing himself 
so as to suit his wife? And yet men expect that women shall put on 
altogether new characters when they are married, and girls think they can 
do so. Look at this Mr. Maule, who is really over head and ears in love 
with Adelaide Palliser. She is full of hope and energy. He has none. And 
yet he has the effrontery to suppose that she will adapt herself to his 
wave of living if he marries her . . . Girls will accept men simply because 
they think it ill-natured to return the compliment of an offer with a hearty 
‘No.’ (Phineas Redux 35) 
As we will see, Violet herself is an exception to this rule, but the rule applies to Alice, 
who spends the length of Can You Forgive Her? torturing herself because she feels she 
has been ill-natured in refusing John Grey. Like Adelaide Palliser, whom Violet refers to 
passingly in her speech, Alice is more intelligent, refined, and capable than any of the 
men who court her, but at this point his career, Trollope seems not to have been able to 
imagine a better future for her than the disappointing marriage to Grey. Perhaps the 
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reason Alice disappears from the series after the end of the first instalment is that he 
knew he had done her a disservice; with his arch-heroine, Glencora Palliser, he was 
more daring.  
Like Phineas and Alice, Glencora is, by nature, enthusiastic and receptive. 
Although she possesses immense wealth, she is little happier than Alice, and 
considerably less free: at the beginning of the series, decisions are made for her, and in 
the interest of her property, rather than herself. The relationship between Alice and 
Glencora is of primary importance in Can You Forgive Her?, and it is one of the best 
examples in the series of a mutually appreciative, non-reifying recognition of Otherness. 
Unlike the many romantic pairings in the novel, neither Alice nor Glencora tries to 
assimilate the other to her way of life (as Violet suggests is the norm of marriage), and 
neither asserts ownership or authority over the other. Moreover, despite their closeness, 
the narrator insists that “they did not perfectly understand each other” (315). 
Remarkably, this lack of understanding proves no barrier to intimacy: the two become 
confidantes, and share more of their personal struggles with each other than with any 
other character. Fittingly, it is the affective power of another middling, un-picturesque yet 
not-quite-sublime landscape that quickens their bond.  
The scene I have in mind dramatizes the transformation of the Matching Priory 
into something more than property. The women, and Glencora especially, self-
consciously aestheticize the ruins on the property, and in their aestheticized form, the 
ruins mediate a connection that would be unthinkable under ordinary circumstances. As 
the two roam among the ruins on a December night, Glencora gradually unveils her 
miserable state to Alice. “There is a peculiar feeling about the chill of the moon,” 
exclaims the future duchess, much affected; “it seems to go into your senses rather than 
into your bones” (337). Unchaperoned, they come upon the roofless church, halting 
before a window of which “very little remained”: 
The top of it, with all its tracery, was gone, and three broken upright 
mullions of uneven heights alone remained. This was all that remained of 
the old window, but a transom or cross-bar of stone had been added to 
protect the carved stone-work of the sides, and to save the form of the 
aperture from further ruin. That the transom was modern was to be seen 
from the magnificent height and light grace of the workmanship in the 
other windows, in which the long slender mullions rose from the lower 
stage or foundation of the whole up into the middle tracery of the arch 
without protection or support, and then lost themselves among the 
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curves, not running up into the roof or soffit, and there holding on as 
though unable to stand alone. (341) 
 The passage is unusual for Trollope: on the whole, he is not a descriptive writer, and 
seldom dwells on setting, filling his pages instead with dialogue and excessive amounts 
of free indirect discourse. Here, though, he intentionally summons a set of expectations 
bound up with the gothic setting of the ruins, yet immediately qualifies those 
expectations by drawing attention to the restoration efforts that are underway. The 
restorations remind us that Matching is property, and that it has an exclusive value as 
property, belonging to Mr. Palliser. Yet Alice and Glencora elect to find the ruins 
“poetical” (342), adding new value through an interpretation that is (as Glencora points 
out) unavailable to Palliser. “I made him come once,” she tells Alice, “but he didn’t seem 
to care about it. I told him part of the rectory wall was falling; so he looked at that, and 
had a mason sent the next day” (343). Obviously, Mr. Palliser has missed the point. The 
ruins are beautiful: they entice Glencora’s senses, and she wants him to experience this 
enticement with her, but he lacks the aesthetic sensibility that would allow him to do so. 
The Priory ruins are his property, and their historical value necessitates their 
preservation, but they have none of the magic for him that they have for Glencora.  
According to Juliet McMaster, “Glencora loves the Priory because it is a ruin, 
remote from everyday concerns, and hence a site for the accumulation of romantic 
association, for the entertainment of wild speculations which she will indulge but not 
apply. For Palliser the place is the less useful in being ruinous, and he thinks moonlit 
walks there in winter are silly and imprudent” (129). McMaster is more interested in 
Trollope’s characterization of the married couple than in the uses of the ruins, but her 
comment is astute: this peculiar, romantic function of the ruins is a use, if a strange one. 
Glencora’s highly aestheticized experience of the scene inspires a torrent of confessions 
that she has been desperate but unable to express. She admits that she does not 
consider herself Mr. Palliser’s wife, that she bitterly regrets missing the opportunity to 
elope with her former lover, Burgo Fitzgerald, and that she is desolate and without any 
other consolation than the beauty of the moonlight falling over broken slabs of stone.91 
                                                
91 As with Alice, Glencora’s romantic preference has more to do with the kind of life she wants 
than the kind of man she wants. “Every day and every night,—every hour of every day and every 
night,” she tells Alice, “I am thinking of the man I love. I have nothing else to think of. I have no 
occupation—no friends—no one to whom I care to say a word. But I am always talking to Burgo 
in my thoughts; and he listens to me” (340). At first glance, these lines may seem to centre the 
157 
Her usual self-possession vanishes, and she throws herself entirely at Alice’s mercy, an 
act of submission that turns out to have been her sole purpose in dragging Alice out to 
the ruins. “Do you remember that night I brought you home from the play to Queen Anne 
Street?” she asks Alice, “do you remember how the moon shone then?” (343). Glencora 
has wagered that moon’s magic will affect Alice in the same way it has affected her, and 
that it will help Alice accept and share in, if not precisely understand, her pain.92  
If Trollope is ordinarily a teller of substantial, no-nonsense, beef-and-ale tales, 
why do particular characters and relationships push him into aesthetic modes that 
trouble the predominantly normative aims of his fiction? The too-obvious answer is that 
this scene is not normative: Glencora is breaking social rules in vocalizing her desire to 
abandon her husband and her estate, and in rashly placing her faith (and fate) in Alice’s 
hands. Her unhappiness, combined with the strange effect of the moonlit scene, drives 
her out of the self-assured, reifying subject position that is the more typical home of 
Trollope’s narrator and characters, and into a liminal zone where she willingly exposes 
herself to an Other who does not and cannot understand her. 
Aestheticized as landscape, Matching triggers self-knowledge, expression, and 
connection, and while we might consider this a use-value, it is not the same as 
Matching’s property value, nor is it quite in line with Goodlad’s “heirloom.” Where the 
heirloom concept finds extra-economic value materially inscribed in representative 
objects and institutions, value in this scene is a kind of vector, possessing weight and 
direction, and drawing distinct points into relation with one another. Nothing about 
Glencora’s admiration for the moon-bathed ruins of Matching is fixed: under her 
receptive eye, Matching takes on a temporary use-value that is at odds with its reified 
value as a property, mediating a series of personal revelations and solidifying her trust in 
Alice. It is as though, in the course of her midnight walk, a cluster of stars align in 
Glencora’s sky, such that new constellations, new representations of her problem and its 
                                                                                                                                            
absent love object—Burgo—but what they actually centre is Glencora’s need for action and a 
platform. After all, the memory of Burgo fades after the first number of the series, but those other 
needs do not: on the contrary, this is the woman who will become, by the fifth Palliser novel, the 
de facto Prime Minister of England.  
92 A staunch defender of middle-class morality, Alice advises Glencora to give up the elopement 
scheme immediately, advice Glencora both anticipates and ignores. This is what the narrator 
means when he says the women do not understand each other: Alice cannot sympathize with 
Glencora because her definitions of right and wrong are simpler and more rigid than Glencora’s, 
but she need not understand Glencora’s pain to witness it.    
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solutions, come into view. This is not value as we are used to thinking of it, but value as 
it really is: a complex, shifting matrix of relationships.  
Scenes like the one above are as jarring for readers as they are for characters. 
They change the direction of the plot, disrupting our immersion in the story and 
reminding us that despite everything Trollope has tried to teach, people are not 
predictable, not programmable, and not wholly bound by reified social rules. The 
revelation transpires in the Alice/Glencora friendship not because of the two women’s 
affinity, not because they are subjected to near-identical versions of the same love plot, 
but because despite their shared circumstances, they are not joined. The break between 
their subjectivities is absolute; neither trust nor sympathy erases it, and yet, they become 
allies all the same. Like Romola and Tessa in the final act of Eliot’s historical romance, 
Alice and Glencora find a way to love one another in the absence of understanding, as 
do Glencora and Plantagenet by the conclusion of the marriage that spans the series.  
The Palliser marriage is, from the beginning, an uneasy compromise, and invites 
interpretation as an idealized model of liberal tolerance: “with the best will in the world 
and with by now a love for one another as convincingly portrayed as any in the English 
novel, [Glencora and Plantagenet] can manage only a very imperfect union” (Kincaid 
224). Temperamentally opposed and disagreeing about their responsibility as members 
of the aristocracy, the duke and duchess continually butt heads, but their respect for one 
another is never seriously in question, and they manage to work together, recognizing 
that their common goals supersede their disagreements about how to get there. The 
echoes between their private disputes and the clashing of Whigs and Tories in the 
political plots are hard to miss, and it takes only a little imagination to see marital and 
political conflicts as linked examples of how differences could be settled in a smoothly 
functioning democracy. As Courtney Berger points out, Trollope is uncontroversially a 
master of “tolerance, relativism, pluralism, or liberalism” (317). Whether this is a positive 
or negative feature of his work has been more hotly debated. Miller treats the subject 
severely, condemning compromise in Trollope’s novels as an oppressive form of 
normalization (“insiders . . . eloquently defend and practically cultivate a pluralism that 
stands thus revealed as not just a mechanism of social consolidation but also and 
coincidentally an ideology of social dominance” [121]), and Hughes and Lund suggest 
that the “blandness and tolerance found in Trollope’s fiction” evince a complacent “faith 
in the system of life in the nineteenth century” (125). Amanda Anderson and Ruth 
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apRoberts take a more favourable view, pointing out that Trollope’s “tolerance” gives 
more room to racial and religious minorities than we might expect from a novelist who 
saw himself as belonging to a more traditional gentility (Anderson 526, Roberts 39). I do 
not wish to contest Trollope’s privileging of tolerance, but to suggest that it tells only part 
of the story. When qualified as “liberal,” tolerance is a loaded term, implying that 
difference is annulled or obfuscated by compromise. While this may be true of Trollope’s 
political plots (in Phineas Redux, he goes so far as to claim that the two political parties 
are basically the same [335]), it is not always so in the relationships between his 
characters. In fact, some these relationships preserve and even foreground difference, 
to the extent that it threatens accepted forms of sociality.  
This threat is the threat of non-transparency, of alterity, of the incommunicability 
of experience. If it is hinted at but overcome in the friendship between Alice and 
Glencora, and arguably in the Palliser marriage, it is present in and destructive of the 
engagement between Alice and George. In one scene, Alice receives a visit from 
George in which he demands that she either overcome or justify the muted state of her 
feelings for him. She begs for some time to process her guilt at having jilted John Grey, 
but George is deaf to her pleas, and insists that she provide some clear, tangible 
expression of love. “Doubtless her money had been his chief object when he offered to 
renew his engagement with her,” the narrator tells us, “but, nevertheless, he desired 
something more than money . . . As he would no means have consented to proceed with 
the arrangement without the benefit of his cousin’s money, so also did he feel unwilling 
to dispense with some expression of her love for him” (431). He requires a degree of 
sympathy that is not in her power to give: “she was not happy now that she had 
accepted [him] . . . And now, at this moment, she feared with an excessive fear that 
there would come some demand for an outward demonstration of love” (432-3). Alice’s 
“fear” is that he will strike her if she cannot produce the requisite feeling, and she 
trembles with relief when he storms out of the room (436). Although she escapes the 
engagement before George fully capitalizes on the promise of physical violence, that 
promise is ever-present: George assaults John Grey and entertains a plot to kill him, and 
in one meeting with Alice, he throws a paper-cutter, an ivory ruler, and a ring at her, all 
while shouting at her for a kiss she is unwilling to give. In Miller’s reading of Barchester 
Towers, squabbles between characters are expressions of “moderate schism” that clarify 
social boundaries and reinforce the impression of a stable, predictable world (139), but 
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the scene in Can You Forgive Her? is not moderate schism: it is abuse. It does not 
stabilize a normative narrative of courtship and marriage: it perverts that narrative. “I find 
it very hard to understand you,” says George to Alice, and it is true that his 
understanding fails; no one in the novel understands Alice—not even Glencora—but the 
plea in the novel’s title is not for understanding but for acceptance, and that, too, is 
beyond George.  
Ultimately, Alice explodes the courtship plot by refusing to play her role, by 
becoming opaque, non-responsive, and even resistant to George’s commands. If she is 
the object of his wooing, she is an unruly object, revealing to him the limits of his 
subjective authority. He can influence her behavior through the threat of violence, and 
this is no trivial thing, but he cannot control how she feels. Just as land in Trollope’s 
novels exceeds its status as property, something in Alice evades totalization as friend, 
wife, servant, or sexual object. George is offended by and rejects this excess, but 
rejection is not the only possible response. Glencora, after all, finds a way to accept it, 
and so does Phineas when he encounters a similar opacity in Violet Effingham. 
Phineas falls in love with Violet shortly after losing Lady Laura to Kennedy, but 
utterly misapprehends his position with her until the moment of his declaration. The 
scene draws on numerous clichés: valiantly, Phineas addresses a letter to his rival, Lord 
Chiltern, declaring his intention to propose. When he enters the gates of Portman 
Square, he finds Violet unattended in the drawing room. What better circumstances 
could be dreamt up for a marriage proposal? Indeed, because of these circumstances, 
and because Phineas has already been rejected once, and because the scene takes 
place in the second half of the novel, and because it is a Bildungsroman and we expect 
the second love to be the “right” one, we are all but certain of Phineas’s success. But the 
proposal flops: 
“Can you never love me?” 
“What is a woman to answer to such a question? No;—I believe never.” 
“It is because—?” He paused, hardly knowing what the question was 
which he proposed himself to ask. 
“It is for no because,—for no cause except that simple one which should 
make any girl refuse any man whom she did not love. Mr. Finn, I could 
say pleasant things to you on any other subject than this,—because I like 
you.”  
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[ . . . ] 
“Will you try to love me?” 
“No,—why should I try?” (476-7) 
This is the narrative equivalent of being slapped in the face with a cold, damp cloth. The 
finality of Violet’s “no” sucks the air out of the imaginary drawing room we have been 
conjuring in our minds, and it leaves us gasping. Her refusal to explain or justify 
herself—her refusal to gratify Phineas—is a rare turn for a Victorian love story to take, 
and it is not one we are accustomed to seeing in modern romances, either. Violet offers 
no condolences, no “it’s not you, it’s me,” and though she eventually marries Lord 
Chiltern, at this point in the story there is no “other love” blocking the path to her heart. 
She simply does not feel what Phineas wants her to feel, and she stuns him by turning 
the invisible table of his proposal, transforming from the passive love-object that she 
appeared to be into a subject acting of her own accord.  
Violet’s response is instructive for at least two reasons: one, it obliterates the 
fantasy that individuals can transcend their alienated condition through romantic love;93 
and two, it halts and then diverts the hitherto smooth progression of the narrative. With 
Violet’s refusal, the romantic plot of the novel steers itself off a cliff, but unexpectedly—
indeed, awkwardly—the story carries on. In fact, Phineas’s rejection precedes 400 more 
pages of parliamentary “action” on the question of Irish tenant-rights, at the conclusion of 
which no bill is passed, a non-event that spurs Phineas to resign anti-climatically from 
politics and from London life. Where the other novels in the Palliser series achieve some 
semblance of balance between their “domestic” and “political” plots (in The Prime 
Minister, for example, the two plots trade off almost chapter for chapter), Phineas Finn 
frontloads its romance and then seemingly forgets about it. If we actually wanted realist 
novels to mimic the rhythm of real life, this might be appropriate, but the popularity of 
more conventional romance plots suggests that this is not what we want. Trollope’s 
organizational choices render Phineas Finn barren of the rewards it conditions readers 
to expect: in place of the satisfying story of romantic and social triumph that the early 
                                                
93 As I discuss at greater length in the next chapter, Thomas Hardy’s Sue Bridehead, like Violet in 
Phineas Finn, refuses the conventions of courtship and romantic love, creating serious problems 
for the bildung of the novel’s male hero. However, where Violet is a secondary character in 
Trollope’s novel, Sue is at the very centre of Jude the Obscure, and thus the effects of her 
insubordination are even more damaging to the narrative and to the fantasies of selfhood it 
attempts to construct.  
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chapters seem to forecast, we get an unsettling picture of half-victories and unfinished 
business that falls well short of the dignity of tragedy. Although Phineas Finn draws on 
the conventions of the domestic novel and the Bildungsroman, it ends up problematizing 
rather than affirming their underlying assumptions. The feasibility of both genres 
depends on a hardening of social forms—or, more specifically, a rendering of contingent 
social relationships as hardened forms—and while Trollope’s late novels typically set out 
on this path, they almost always stray from it.  
The narrative sleight of hand in Phineas Finn brings us full circle to a distinction I 
made at the beginning of the chapter, and it is here that I want to end, in the grey area 
between the cultivated values and scripted interactions of genteel society, and the more 
volatile, almost anti-social relationships that periodically interrupt Trollope’s castle-
building. By now, it should be clear that these two kinds of relationship evince different 
ontologies: the first suggests a reified understanding of the social world as consisting of 
stable, self-contained, identifiable phenomena, and the second, a dialectical movement 
along the vectors that tie innumerable conditions to innumerable actors. Although these 
impulses co-exist in Trollope’s fiction, they pursue different kinds of truth: the first aspires 
to understanding and mastery, and the second, the dialectical impulse, to intimacy and 
acceptance. Adorno uses the metaphor of the constellation to explain dialectical 
knowledge: the stars in a constellation exist objectively, but the meaning of the whole 
coheres only in relation to history and to a perceiving subject. To think and to read 
dialectically requires acknowledging the difference between objects and our 
understanding of them, and accepting that the best our thought can do is take 
“objectivity” out on loan, much as language, the representative instance in Adorno’s 
discussion of constellations, lends objectivity to thought by organizing it around the thing 
it wishes to understand (Negative Dialectics 162). There is both an ethical and an 
epistemological reason to privilege this method of thought. The ethical reason is that 
cognitive constellations minimize the violence of thought, granting proximity to the object 
without demanding that it fulfill our conception of it. The epistemological reason is that 
they add dimension to our knowledge: 
Cognition of the object in its constellation is cognition of the process 
stored in the object: as a constellation, theoretical thought circles the 
concept it would like to unseal, hoping that it may fly open like the lock of 
a well-guarded safety deposit box: in response, not to a single key or a 
single number, but to a combination of numbers. (163) 
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The point is not to make knowledge into pure abstraction: cognitive constellations carry 
the material deposits of history, and for Adorno, the process of analysis is no less than 
that of “becoming conscious” of “immanently sedimented history” (Aesthetic Theory 85), 
though from his point of view, even those traces are subject to change. 
Unruly objects ignite this dialectical or constellatory thought process, dismantling 
the axiological scaffolding of Trollope’s fiction. They work against the aims of narrative, 
both by disrupting the progression of plot and by defamiliarizing the naturalized social 
forms on which those plots depend. In this way, they exert a counter-force on the 
process of reification, creating pockets of intimacy where alienation formerly prevailed. 
Unsurprisingly, they cannot be assimilated to the social codes Trollope shares with and 
even imposes on his audience. They demand the kind of flexible cognitive engagement 
that dialectics permits, but in instigating the dialectic, they also give something back. 
I have called this something a value, or, more accurately, a process of valuation.  
If Trollope’s texts initially present value as a reified, intrinsic property, the inadequacy of 
that presentation gives us glimpses of a more promising approach: value as a process 
that connects people, rather than a property that divides them, precisely not reified, not 
self-identical, not reproducible, not thing-like. When Alice admires the barren moors, 
when Glencora entrusts her secrets to Alice, when Phineas accepts Violet’s “no,” the 
valued Other is not flattened into commensurability but experienced in its alterity. There 
is a critical truth in this understanding that is not expressed by money, or by any of the 
ossified social or moral codes we call “values”: in accepting the contingency of value, we 
penetrate the seeming inexorability of the way we live now, a necessary step on the way 
to living better.  
164 
Chapter 4.  ‘One Person Split in Two’: Non-Identity 
in Hardy’s Double Bildungsroman 
Together at the piano, with the feeling of the lately struck notes still hanging in 
the air, the protagonists of Thomas Hardy’s 1895 novel Jude the Obscure grasp hands 
(192). It is a simple but striking tableau that comes in the middle of the novel, just a few 
chapters after Sue has relinquished her half-acknowledged feelings for Jude to marry his 
one-time mentor, Richard Phillotson. Her regret is keen; together at the bench, the two 
characters are drawn to each other as if by some magnetism. Each recognizes an 
uncanny likeness in the other, and though they jest about the feeling, they cannot dispel 
its power. “You are just like me at heart!” Jude exclaims, and Sue, denying the 
accusation at first, admits moments later to feeling that she, like Jude, would stop at 
nothing to discover the composer of a favourite song (192).  
The erotic charge of this moment is difficult to ignore: the proximity of the pair on 
the bench, the touch of hands, the shared, sensual response to music, and the 
knowledge that circumstance forbids further intimacy combine to heighten the innuendo 
of their meeting, and yet the bond these two characters share extends beyond sexual 
compatibility, and beyond this scene. In fact, their “extraordinary sympathy,” as 
Phillotson describes it (218), runs through the novel from beginning to end, driving the 
plot to its bitter conclusion. The two are lovers, intellectual equals, and, the novel 
implies, spiritual soul-mates, but they are also cousins, sharing the genetic material that 
gives each their dark hair and eyes, as well as their impulsive temperaments. Less 
obvious than their compatibility or even than these shared traits are the parallel 
trajectories of their professional lives. As many critics have noted, the novel is structured 
around Jude’s doomed aspirations, first to become a university graduate and then to be 
ordained as a minister. Less frequently observed is the fact that each of these 
disappointments has its counterpart in Sue’s story: her expulsion from Teacher Training 
college coincides with Jude’s rejection of the university scheme, and her disastrous 
married life with his crisis of faith. On these levels and many others, they are, as 
Phillotson calls them, “one person split in two” (218). 
Phillotson’s remark is more than the lament of a jilted lover, serving here and 
throughout the novel as shorthand for the equivalency Hardy establishes between his 
165 
two protagonists. In this chapter, I ask what it would mean for us to take this equivalency 
seriously: what can we learn by setting aside the biases that have encouraged past 
critics to distinguish between the class-based oppression that prevents Jude from 
trading manual labour for the intellectual work he prefers, and the sexual oppression that 
weighs so heavily against Sue? The novel continually sets Sue’s domestic, emotional, 
and sexual labour against the paid work that Jude is always either doing or seeking. 
While critics have tended to treat Hardy’s representations of productive and reproductive 
labour separately—focusing either on Jude’s thwarted bildung or on Sue’s “New 
Woman” credentials—I view the two characters as collaborators in a struggle to survive 
the effects of an inhuman system of production. My reading, then, expands the ethical 
implications of the novel by linking the individual choices of characters to a shared social 
responsibility, but just as importantly, it extends overdue compassion to Hardy’s heroine, 
who has long been subject to a different set of critical standards than her male 
counterpart.  
 Sue is, admittedly, a source of narrative and characterological frustration. 
Hardy’s name prepares us in some degree for the novel’s cynicism and tragic 
conclusion, but Sue withholds even the luscious sensuality for which his heroines are 
known. Next to the earthy, full-lipped Tess, the flirtatious Bathsheba, or the exotic, 
insatiable Eustacia, Sue is a mere outline of anxious, fleeting girlhood. Her halting, soft-
spoken aceticism seems to cede the limited ground won by her spirited predecessors, 
and though many reviewers condemned her behavior as immoral, she is not even 
authentically adulterous, straying from her legal spouse only after obtaining permission, 
and “seldom” acquiescing to Jude’s passion (Letter to Edmund Gosse, Collected Letters, 
vol. 2, 99). Mild as Sue’s sins are in comparison with those of Hardy’s other heroines, 
fate punishes her ruthlessly for them, taking the lives of her children, her companion, 
and eventually resigning her to repeated instances of what she can only experience as 
rape. Sue is denied even that gruesome satisfaction extended to Tess. We part ways 
with the heroine of the earlier novel in a striking sunlit scene: as the orange beams of 
dawn rise over Stonehenge, Tess rests, having only days prior slayed the rapacious 
Alec D’Urberville with a carving knife. Policemen surround her sleeping form; she opens 
her eyes, knowing, somehow, that they are there, but unafraid, undaunted. “It is as it 
should be,” she tells Angel Clare; “I have had enough . . . I am ready” (417). By contrast, 
the last we hear of Sue is through the reported speech of the widow Mrs. Edlin, who 
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confirms Jude’s greatest fear: that his former beloved’s spirit has finally broken, that she 
has relinquished her struggle against the tyranny of convention and given herself entirely 
to the husband she detests (379). Tess of D’urberville perishes, but she perishes in a 
bright flare of defiance; Sue simply fades to black.  
To speak conclusively about Sue is, in some ways, to misrepresent her; 
nevertheless, I will declare her a uniquely negative figure among Hardy’s heroines. By 
this, I mean that she is defined more by what she is denied—and by what she, in turn, 
denies—than by any positive trait. No sooner do we think we understand her, and no 
sooner does the novel convince us that we have foreseen the next stage in her journey, 
than she finds some way of undercutting that confidence: a claim lately made with all 
possible enthusiasm is contradicted, a course taken that no reasoning mind can fathom. 
In this way, she functions like a black hole or sandpit, the untold depths of which 
consume the libidinal and narratological investments of any character (or reader) she 
encounters. Seemingly random impulses and swift changes of heart befuddle even 
those characters who ought to know her best, and critics have been only slightly more 
assured in their responses. Mary Jacobus re-names the novel “Sue the Obscure,” and 
Samir Elbarbary takes Sue for a Derridian “pharmakon figure,” representing “postmodern 
ontological instability” and a “decentered” identity that allows for “the free play of 
differences in the individual” (203). Importantly, though, Sue’s negativity is not just a 
figure. On the contrary, however much it tests the boundaries of realism, Jude is still a 
realist novel. Consequently, it embeds its characters in a complex social field that is 
derived in no simple fashion from the historical realities of the society in which it was 
produced. In the spirit of the most ambitious—and, to my mind, most interesting—realist 
novels, Jude depicts one slice of social totality that exceeds its own limits as a novel. In 
this context, the significance of the negativity I have associated with Sue expands 
dramatically: the person she refuses to be, and the relations she refuses to sanction, are 
not contained within the bounds of the story that is told about her, but stretch outwards, 
into the history the novel is part of. While the Bildungsroman typically narrates the 
formation of a self-identical, bourgeois subject, Sue’s Bildungsroman collapses, and in 
its collapse, tugs at the structures that support modern subjectivity more generally, 
undermining the ability of desire—and especially sexual desire—to serve as proof of the 
subject’s autonomy, and interrogating the alienated state in which, under capitalism, we 
encounter both our pleasures and our pains. While she has been labeled coquettish, 
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hysterical, frigid, or in more recent years, repressed, Sue becomes in my reading an 
alienated worker whose cessations of sexual labour are political acts. From this point of 
view, her notorious ambivalence is neither madness nor malice, but a conscious 
rejection of historical conditions that transform desire into fetishism and sexuality into an 
exploitable source of value. Where she has been pathologized or relegated to the 
supporting cast in Jude’s Bildungsroman, she now appears a revolutionary subject in her 
own right, standing in solidarity with the working man against relations of production that 
are inimical to all.   
Obscuring Form: Jude and the Bildungsroman 
The last of Hardy’s great novels, Jude is seldom considered his greatest. 
Rumored in advance of its publication to be Hardy’s swan song, it seemed to many 
readers a deliberate rejection of the limits of the novel form (Wright, Hardy and his 
Readers 188). With few exceptions, reviewers on both sides of the Atlantic condemned 
the book as immoral, with one English reviewer calling it a “literary suicide” and a writer 
for the New York Critic, a “contaminating” story of “morbid animality” (qtd in Wright, 192). 
Even sympathetic readers like Edmund Gosse lamented Hardy’s choice of subject 
matter. For Gosse, Hardy erred in trading the “pastoral loveliness” of his Wessex stories 
for the “grimy” urban scenes of Jude (“Mr. Hardy’s New Novel” 63). Novelist and 
conservative commentator Margaret Oliphant shared few of Gosse’s impressions, but 
agreed on this count, claiming that Hardy’s decision to stifle his “genius for rustic 
landscapes” hurt Jude severely (“The Anti-Marriage League” 138). Unsurprisingly, 
opposition to the suicide of little Father Time poured in from every corner, and while 
most opposed the scene on moral grounds, George Gissing and, later, George Orwell 
found it stylistically deplorable (Wright 197-8). In more recent years, the novel has lost 
some of its ability to shock, but many still consider it to be inferior to its predecessors.94 
Of all Hardy’s novels, Jude suffers most from the class anxiety that led Hardy to “strain 
against the colloquial in an awkward and self-conscious attempt to prove that he 
                                                
94 Exactly how much the shock-value of Jude has paled is difficult to determine. Open 
relationships and extra-marital affairs are now the stuff of prime-time TV, but the graphic pig-
slaying scene and the murder-suicide of the children still have the power to turn stomachs. I 
recently taught the novel to undergraduate students and was asked to introduce the novel with 
trigger warnings in the future.  
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belonged among those graduates of Oxford who did not have to write for a living” 
(Levine 4).  
 As Levine’s comment suggests, offense at the novel’s moral content has given 
way over time to criticism of its style. Although Hardy heard more of the former complaint 
in his own lifetime, he would not have been deaf to the latter: known for his defensive 
responses to critics, he readily admitted to friends that Jude fell short of his original 
design.95 The text was severely bowdlerized for serial publication, but even in volume 
form, it presents a story suspended between extremes, one that flaunts its learning a 
little too plainly and that veers at times into didacticism. If modern-day readers are 
generally more receptive to Hardy’s critique of marriage and the family than were his 
Victorian contemporaries, Jude remains no less a troublesome and contradictory text. In 
the words of Mary Jacobus,  
The bare bones of its design lie dangerously close to the surface, and the 
urgency of Hardy’s commitment constantly threatens its imaginative 
autonomy. Its realism and its diagrammatic plotting pull in opposite 
directions, and Hardy’s disconcerting tendency to translate ideas into 
physical realities sometimes leaves us uncertain of the intention behind 
his effects. (304) 
Indeed, if anything unites the reactions of Victorian reviewers and twentieth-century 
critics to Hardy’s final foray into the novel form, it is this perception of failure. For 
contemporary reviewers, the novel’s objectionable content spelled corruption and a 
moral fall, and later critics, less likely to be fazed by Jude’s free union or even by the 
gruesome end of Father Time, dock points for its formal imperfections.  
Still under discussion is the precise nature of these imperfections. For Jacobus 
and many others, it is Jude’s realism that is most under strain: the violent death of the 
hero’s children is a tragedy at once too perfect and too grotesque to seem wholly 
plausible. The uncanny symmetry of the plot and the ruthless, exaggerated misfortune 
that befalls the characters seem contrived when we compare them with realism’s more 
usual emphasis on the ordinary and mundane.  “The problem with Jude,” George Levine 
opines, “[is] that “art” feels almost like “craft,” too strict for the realist mode that Hardy 
                                                
95 In an 1895 letter to Gosse, Hardy described Jude as follows: “Of course the book is all 
contrasts—or was meant to be in its original conception. Alas, what a miserable accomplishment 
it is, when I compare it with what I meant to make it!” (Hardy, The Later Years of Thomas Hardy 
42). 
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ostensibly adopts” (78). Penny Boumelha detects an even more serious breech of 
generic conventions: the devastation that so often follows the written word in Jude 
represents for her a “cracking open” of the “ideology of realism as a literary mode,” 
throwing into question the whole “enterprise of narrative” (153).96 To be sure, the novel 
contains many scenes that challenge the limits of the realistic, but these scenes do not 
necessarily overthrow its claims to realism. Given that our understanding of realist 
narrative routinely stretches to accommodate writers as different as Dickens and Eliot, a 
more precise explanation of Jude’s formal anomalies is needed. In fact, it may not be the 
realism of the project that fails: a better explanation is one that takes into account the 
tension between Hardy’s content—the dismal lives of itinerant labourers who know 
enough about the class above them to understand what they are denied—and the 
bourgeois form of the Bildungsroman.  
I am not the first to position Hardy’s Jude within the tradition of the nineteenth-
century “novel of formation”: D. H. Lawrence, Frank R. Giordano, and Jerome Buckley 
have each described the novel as a sterling example of the Bildungsroman. Giordano 
identifies five central characteristics for the genre:  
(1) The idea of Bildung, or formation . . . of a single main character, 
normally a young man; (2) individualism, especially the emphasis on the 
uniqueness of the protagonist . . . (3) the biographical element . . . (4) the 
connection with psychology, especially the then-new psychology of 
development; and (5) the ideal of humanity, of the full realization of 
human potential as the goal of life. (581-2) 
Jerome Buckley’s definition is similar. Canvassing European and English examples, he 
compiles a list of standard plot points, including heightened self-awareness and ambition 
on the part of the hero, the corresponding move from a familiar, rural environment to an 
urban metropolis, the sexual education that proceeds through wrong and eventually right 
partners, and finally, the hero’s “accommodation to the modern world” (18). Curiously 
                                                
96 Boumelha’s discussion of realism comes at the end of her provocative chapter on Jude, and is 
suggestive but fairly brief. She juxtaposes the “ideology of realism” against Jude’s epigraph, “the 
letter killeth.” In her understanding, realism “has as its project to effect an imaginary resolution of 
actual (but displaced) social contradictions” (6), but Hardy’s novels work against that project. His 
use of epistles constitutes a special point of interest for Boumelha: she cites several examples, 
among them Sue’s letters to Jude, Joan Durbeyfield’s letter of advice in Tess, and Tess’s written 
confession, which is never received because it accidentally slips under a carpet. Thanks in part to 
these epistles, Hardy’s novels “display their textuality in an unusually overt fashion,” introducing 
multiple points of view and undermining the normative or naturalizing impulses of classic realism 
(7).  
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absent from both Giordano’s and Buckley’s understanding is any mention of labour or 
work, but the notion of a hero “making his way independently” in the big city hints at 
something we all know about Victorian development narratives: in the nineteenth-century 
metropolis, “making one’s way” means finding a way to make some money. This is 
increasingly true even for the more comfortable classes, as Trollope’s catalogue of 
foppish ne’er-do-wells suggests. Typically of good blood and shallow pockets, Trollope’s 
heroes face the quintessentially novelistic problem of finding a profession, or, failing that, 
finding a source of “ready money.” However, the most memorable Victorian 
Bildungsromane are not Trollope’s, but Dickens’s—or perhaps, Charlotte Brontë’s—and 
the heroes of these works are not members of the aristocracy or even of the professional 
class but of the aspirational lower ranks of society. For characters like Jane Eyre, Pip, 
and David Copperfield, work is a critical ingredient in personal formation. The narrative 
arc of Jane Eyre is unthinkable without Jane’s stint as a governess, as is that of Great 
Expectations without Pip’s disdain for the humble forge-work that is, initially, his destiny. 
As I noted in the previous chapter, the tension between a widespread cultural fantasy of 
transcending the necessity of work and the tremendous quantities of work needed to 
transform England into a leading industrial economy remained an ideological sticking-
point for much of the period. It is an especially powerful force in the Bildungsroman, 
given the genre’s focus on the formation of individuals as members of a “society”—a 
concept that, by the middle decades of the century, seemed more or less inseparable 
from “economy.” As the previous chapter suggested, one of the greatest challenges for 
the producers and curators of middle-class culture was striking a balance between the 
positive and negative connotations of work, both of which were important ingredients in 
England’s nation-building process. Casting work as a noble and ennobling end-in-itself 
helped pundits justify the immense sacrifices that were needed to turn England into the 
advanced world power it became, and yet, no matter how proud one was of one’s work, 
the possibility of rising above that work to join the leisured ranks of society had to remain 
in place, since the whole idea of a civil, affluent society depended (and still depends) on 
the fantasy that every member can reap its benefits. Put simply, Victorian nation-building 
needed its foundation of working people to be content with their lot so that there would 
be no interruptions to the flow of labour, but it also needed them to buy into the dream of 
upward mobility that was the ultimate promise of capitalist modernization. 
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 What makes the Victorian Bildungsroman Victorian, I would argue, is its 
commitment to this balancing act. Franco Moretti makes a similar though not identical 
point in The Way of the World: noting the “stability of narrative conventions and basic 
cultural assumptions,” he claims that the English Bildungsroman is more conservative 
than its continental cousins (181). Where French, German, and Russian examples of the 
genre were “sensitive to major historical changes,” the English Bildungsroman remained 
steadfastly committed to social “conformity” (181). Moretti omits the British industrial and 
financial revolutions from the category of major historical events, arguing that these 
“specifically English transformations” could not have had the same effect on the 
structure of the novel as, say, the Napoleonic wars or the French Revolution (181). My 
understanding differs from Moretti’s primarily in the kinds of history I take to manifest in 
literary form: domestic relations are, for me, as significant as geopolitical ones, and I 
think that subtle variations in the rhythm of daily life can sometimes becomes waves of 
world-altering magnitude. Although Jude’s plots centre on the misery of subjects 
enslaved by the very conventions Moretti complains of, the implications of Hardy’s 
critical realism are, I think, more radical than Moretti’s characterization of the English 
Bildungsroman allows.  
 I differ from Moretti on one other point, as well: taking Wilhem Meister’s 
Apprenticeship as his representative example, Moretti declares that the Bildungsroman 
“conspicuously places the process of formation-socialization outside the world of work” 
(25). This strikes me as being not quite true of the Victorian Bildungsroman. After all, the 
genre was introduced to British readers by the century’s most outspoken champion of 
work, Thomas Carlyle. Carlyle’s translation of Goethe’s Wilhem Meister appeared in 
1827, fifteen years before his major statement on the modern condition, Past and 
Present (1843). The latter work contains Carlyle’s now famous philosophy of work, the 
influence of which can be felt in the writing of countless Victorian authors, including 
Gaskell, Eliot, Dickens, Ruskin, and Trollope.97 Below is one of Carlyle’s most 
memorable declarations: 
                                                
97 The influence on Trollope was primarily negative: where the other authors in my list more or 
less sanction the Carlylean understanding of work as inherently ennobling, Trollope was more 
ambivalent, rejecting most of Carlyle’s ideas on the grounds of their distorting hyperbolism. “We 
do not put much faith in Mr. Carlyle—or in Mr. Ruskin,” he writes; “the loudness and extravagance 
of their lamentations, the wailing and gnashing of teeth which comes from them, over a world 
which is supposed to have gone altogether shoddy-wards, are so contrary to the convictions of 
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All work, even cotton-spinning, is noble; work is alone noble: be that here 
said and asserted once more. And in like manner too, all dignity is painful: 
a life of ease is not for any man, nor for any god. The life of all gods 
figures itself to us as a Sublime Sadness,—earnestness of the Infinite 
Battle against Infinite Labour . . . For the son of man there is no noble 
crown, well worn or even ill worn, but is a crown of thorns! (153) 
If we take Carlyle at his word, life is an Infinite Battle against Infinite Labour. Carlyle’s 
trademark hyperbolism may temper the claim for some readers, but it is hard to deny the 
influence of the set of ideas undergirding it. Max Weber wrote what is still considered 
one of the founding works of sociology on precisely this topic: in The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), he argued that the ascetic tendencies of 
Protestantism (and particularly of Calvinism) permitted the consolidation of modern 
capitalism in northern Europe. This form of Christianity naturalized a set of values—self-
supervision, rationalization, delayed gratification—without which primitive accumulation 
could not have occurred on a scale large enough for capitalism to become the dominant 
economic system (Protestant Ethic 153-4). This ideological justification (or “education,” 
in Weber’s terms) was successful because it permeated so much of the culture, because 
it reached the average person not only through the official channels of the state or the 
church but through the polemics of figures like Carlyle, and through the popular fiction of 
Dickens, Gaskell, and others. The making of labour into an “absolute end in itself, or 
‘calling,’” Weber observed, “cannot be evoked by low wages or high ones alone, but only 
by . . . a long and arduous education” (62)—and popular fiction undoubtedly provided 
this education for many.  
In light of Weberian analysis, the Bildungsroman seems the perfectly rational 
product of individual thinkers striving to make sense of a society that was hurriedly 
transitioning to full-blown market capitalism. This is, indeed, the way that many modern-
day critics have interpreted it—but what is the final result? Is the genre necessarily a 
conservative one, in which the hero struggles against society but is eventually absorbed 
                                                                                                                                            
men who cannot but see how comfort has increased, how health has been improved, and 
education extended—that the general effect of their teaching is the opposite of what they have 
intended” (Autobiography 218-19). Chapter three explores the roots and the fruit of this 
ambivalence at greater length, concluding that Trollope’s exploration of the immaterial labour of 
gentlemen rendered Carlyle’s Christianized toil theory of value untenable. The value of intangible 
forms of work is, ironically, for Trollope, more material than the ideal value Carlyle theorizes, 
residing not in the worker’s breast or in some hypothetical dimension (or afterlife) but in the real 
relations between people. 
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by it? Which subjects qualify for the position of Bildungsroman “hero,” and what kinds of 
“work” count toward the goal of his or her “formation?” 
In response to these questions, there is no critical consensus. While Giordano 
hints that the tragic ending of Hardy’s novel inverts the typical conclusion of the 
Bildungsroman, Buckley is ambivalent about the importance of the expected “happy 
ending.” The latter critic also stretches the historical boundaries of the Bildungsroman to 
include novels by D. H. Lawrence, a move that puts him at odds with others like Moretti 
and Lorna Ellis, who insist that the genre reflects historical realities specific to the early 
decades of the nineteenth century. Moretti is adamant that George Eliot wrote the last of 
the English Bildungsromane, but Ellis turns the clock back even further: with mid-
Victorian characters like Tom and Maggie Tulliver, she insists, the balance between 
personal freedom and social integration tips toward the former, resulting in a new kind of 
story that breaks with the classical Bildungsroman (163). 
Compounding this historical debate are conflicting ideas about the relationship 
between European and English traditions, and about the place of women in the 
Bildungsroman. 98 As Giordano’s and Buckley’s definitions imply, there is a strong bias in 
criticism toward the consideration of male heroes, but even those who focus exclusively 
on female protagonists disagree about whether their subjects belong in the mainstream 
tradition or exceed it.99 This point is particularly important with respect to Jude, which, I 
argue, includes two Bildung—one male, and one female. In fact, Hardy revises the 
Bildungsroman in several ways, not only through his gendered bifurcation of the form, 
but also by reimagining the role that labour plays in a person’s development, and by 
problematizing the notions of choice and agency that, in the traditional Bildungsroman, 
propel the hero’s growth.  
                                                
98 As noted above, Moretti makes a compelling—though not completely convincing—case for 
distinguishing between European and English traditions. According to Moretti, the relative 
insularity of English culture and geography sheltered it from the effects of some of the more 
momentous shifts that were happening on the continent, resulting in a more consistent and 
conservative version of the Bildungsroman than we find elsewhere in Europe (181). 
99 In Unbecoming Woman, Susan Fraiman argues that the “female ‘apprentice’ novel” is inevitably 
“split at the root,” for the parameters of Georgian and Victorian womanhood “preclude the goals of 
progress and mastery” that are at the heart of the apprentice narrative (6). In what Fraiman 
prefers to call “novels of female development,” a new tradition emerges, one that figures “growing 
up” as a dialogue, and identity as a “complex set of social relationships” rather than a matter of 
individual choice (29). Like Fraiman, Lorna Ellis attends to the qualities that make female-
centered narratives unique, but she concludes that the similarities between these narratives and 
the male Bildungsroman are more striking than the differences (8). 
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These innovations emerge from what begins as a fairly conventional adaptation 
of the form. As we might expect from any Bildungsroman worthy of the name, Hardy’s 
novel follows its hero on a journey to maturity that is shaped by a series of goals, 
mistakes, and revelations. The early chapters of the novel acquaint us with Jude’s 
heartfelt desire to follow his mentor and former teacher Mr. Phillotson to Christminster, a 
city of learning and fictional stand-in for Oxford that becomes proportionately more 
entrancing with Jude’s growing awareness of the obstacles that stand in his path. We 
learn, also, of Jude’s dedicated if misdirected attempts at self-education: an orphan 
under the care of his working-class aunt, Jude is in no position to pursue his scholarly 
inclinations. He lacks the means to hire a tutor or even to procure his own books, and is 
dependent on Phillotson’s good will for a supply of introductory materials. Devastatingly, 
when this supply arrives in the mail, he discovers that he is incapable of extracting the 
longed-for knowledge from its contents (29). Turning the pages of the Greek and Latin 
grammars Phillotson has sent him, Jude is struck by the realization that there will be no 
direct transfer from book to brain; the path to enlightenment will be rather longer and 
more arduous than imagined. The episode is merely the first in a series of challenges to 
Jude’s hopes for the future, and as Richard Dellamora points out, it exposes the overlap 
between cultural and class ambitions. In this scene, Latin stands in metonymically for the 
“elite education” of the upper-middle and aristocratic classes (460); just as one cannot 
“transmute” Latin phrases directly into English, so the working man cannot by any 
“cipher” or degree of effort become one of the class he envies (Dellamora 460-1).  
Jude’s tussle with Latin is a serious setback, but it is not enough to extinguish his 
dream of a better life. There is little doubt in his mind that he does not belong in the 
village of Marygreen; like the heroes of prior Bildungsromane, his unique psychology 
renders village life oppressive and, at times, unbearable. After Phillotson’s departure, he 
falls to ruminating and is soon the victim of an overdeveloped sympathy that sets him 
apart from the other members of his community. Though he has been hired to keep the 
crows off of a neighbouring farmer’s land, his loneliness causes him to feel a degree of 
kinship with the birds, and in a fit of passion, he throws his noise-maker to the ground so 
that they can eat their fill (15). Unfortunately, Jude’s employer witnesses his negligence 
and beats him for it, permanently dismissing him from his work. On the tearful walk back 
to his aunt’s bakery, Jude’s shame and remorse are interrupted only by his concern for 
the earthworms strewing the ground beneath his feet. No ordinary child, he is overcome 
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with sympathy for these lowly creatures: the narrator tells us that “though Farmer 
Troutham had just hurt him, he was a boy who could not himself bear to hurt anything . . 
. He carefully picked his way on tiptoe among the earthworms, without killing a single 
one” (16).  
This sensitivity remains an important aspect of Jude’s personality as he grows 
older. It is one of the things that binds him so tightly to Sue, and it continually animates 
his pursuit of the education that he imagines will complete his development, lifting him to 
the “herculean” heights of human achievement, and allowing him to replicate the vaguely 
defined “mighty undertakings” of the esteemed “men of old” who fill his imagination (30, 
26). For D. H. Lawrence, Jude’s commitment to education is not reducible to vanity or to 
the desire to possess knowledge or wealth (112); instead, he argues, Jude seeks a kind 
of transcendence, an ultimate form of self-realization or “conscious expression for that 
which he held in his blood” (112). As Lawrence and many other readers have observed, 
this education is not merely formal: like his generic predecessors, Jude must learn the 
language of love before his development is complete, and (again following the formula) 
he does this by choosing the wrong woman first, and subsequently the right. For Jude, 
this means a compressed courtship and shotgun marriage to the pig farmer’s daughter, 
Arabella Donn, and later, an intellectual, emotional, and finally physical affair with the 
woman he regards as his equal, Sue Bridehead.   
There is more to be said about the roles both women play in the novel, but first I 
want to ensure that Jude’s engagement with the tradition is clear. Not unlike Dickens’s 
David Copperfield, Jude is seemingly only able to appreciate the value of Sue’s inner 
qualities after first succumbing to the lure of Arabella’s charms. Sue’s mysterious, 
shape-shifting spirituality and her “sparkling intellect,” her slender figure and articulate 
manner, contrast sharply with the “amplitudes” of Arabella’s body, and with the latter 
woman’s vocabulary of “Pooh’s!” and “Haw’s.” Sue strikes Jude as timeless, as 
alternately “modern” and “medieval” (128), but the very intelligibility of this impression 
rests on the fleetingness of Arabella’s attractions, epitomized by her talent for creating 
temporary dimples by sucking the insides of her cheeks to her teeth (57).  
It is as the story barrels toward its conclusion that it begins to diverge from earlier 
Victorian Bildungsromane. Unlike David Copperfield, Jude finds little lasting happiness in 
his second union, and the failure of his university ambitions serves not to teach him 
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humility and contentment with his lot, but to expose the injustice of a society striated by 
class. The bitter pronouncement Jude utters upon his return to Christminster in the 
second half of the novel makes this abundantly clear: “it was my poverty and not my will 
that consented to be beaten,” he exclaims, “my impulses—affections—vices perhaps 
they should be called—were too strong not to hamper a man without advantages; who 
should be as cold-blooded as a fish and as selfish as a pig to have a really good chance 
of being one of his country’s worthies” (310). The misery in Jude’s words is palpable, but 
he sinks still lower as the novel enters its final act. Where David Copperfield closes with 
a fond backward glance at the “road of life” travelled in the company of friends and 
family, and with the image of the cherished woman “shining” on David like a “Heavenly 
light by which to see all other objects” (866-70), Jude’s final pages tell of its hero’s 
solitary demise. Barely thirty years old, the three children Jude has fathered—four, 
counting Sue’s miscarriage—are already dead. His university dreams are dashed, and 
illness robs him of his bodily strength. Moreover, Sue has left him to assuage her guilt at 
the death of the children. Again in the care of his first wife, to whom fate has consigned 
rather than reconciled him, Jude reflects on a life of misfortune and missed chances:  
I felt I could do one thing if I had the opportunity. I could accumulate 
ideas, and impart them to others . . . I hear that soon there is going to be 
a better chance for such helpless students as I was. There are schemes 
afoot for making the University less exclusive, and extending its influence. 
I don’t care much about it. And it is too late, too late for me! (378) 
It is not long before he succumbs to his illness, dying quietly—if not peacefully—while 
Arabella is out carousing with the quack doctor she has in mind as his replacement 
(384). If the Bildungsroman typically culminates in its hero’s arrival at self-knowledge, 
acceptance, and some degree of happiness, Hardy gives the tradition a brutal twist, 
ironizing a deep-seated Victorian investment in self-improvement, and pointing to the 
ideological function of cultural narratives of progress and social mobility, themselves vital 
to the Bildungsroman.   
Making Room for Sue  
In more recent years, critics have sought out glimpses of optimism in Hardy’s 
most devastating of novels. Jill Ehnenn, for instance, finds reason to celebrate the grim 
fate of his heroes, taking their unconventional romance as a form of resistance that 
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undermines that normative function of the traditional Bildungsroman.100 Gillian Beer and 
Caroline Sumpter stress the impact of evolutionary science on Hardy’s thought, arguing 
that the optimism of his texts is to be found not in the lives of individuals, but in the larger 
life of the species.101 These readings shed necessary light on Hardy’s adaption of the 
Bildungsroman genre, but they leave some corners of his critique unexplored. Of vital 
importance to the novel—and arguably, to the genre more broadly—is the process of 
creating, refining, and reproducing the specific form of subjectivity that is assumed by 
free market capitalism and liberal democracy. Crucially, this is a process that continues 
today, and with our active participation. When the novel exposes the limits of liberal 
individualism, it demands answers not just from the Victorian past but from the twenty-
first-century present as well. By the same logic, the possibilities that leaven, from time to 
time, the deterministic grind of Hardy’s plot are still possibilities for us now. They are 
paths that we did not, but might have, and might still take.  
Moreover, in reading the novel as a Bildungsroman, critics have tended to 
overlook its sharpest plaints, which are found not in Jude’s monologues but in the more 
oblique expressions of his cousin and partner, Sue. Jude may be the novel’s hero, but I 
agree with Boumelha that “Sue Bridehead and marriage are the very impulse of the 
                                                
100 Ehnenn describes the relationship between Jude and Sue as a form of queer practice, existing 
outside the law because they are not married, and outside the codes of heteronormativity 
because, at least for a time, they avoid penetrative intercourse (“Reorienting the Bildungsroman” 
161). In her view, the pair’s rejection of normative roles (wife, husband, etc.) transform the 
Bildungsroman from a “primarily didactic genre” into one that sanctions and even celebrates 
difference (164, 154). Ehnenn locates her reading at the “intersection” of queer and disability 
studies, and perhaps for this reason, the terms “crip” and “queer” overlap significantly in the 
article (152). That overlap implies a troubling conflation of queer and disabled experiences, and I 
doubt that Jude’s story is “unintelligible,” even by Victorian standards. Nonetheless, I agree with 
Ehnenn that the novel turns the Bildungsroman on its head, if more as a result of Sue’s actions 
than Jude’s.   
101 For Sumpter, Jude the Obscure contains “glimpses of evolutionary optimism” (680); she 
interprets Jude’s claim that he and Sue were born “too soon” as evidence of Hardy’s “tentative 
hope that an ongoing process was bringing the world gradually closer to universal sympathy” 
(684). In her view, the novel implies that the world will one day adopt the enlightened views of its 
protagonists. Beer makes a similar claim: she finds Hardy’s abiding interest in the individual to be 
in constant tension with “recuperative energies” that serve “the longer needs of the race and are 
part of a procreative energy designed to combat extinction” (224). While the single human life 
rarely outlasts the suffering that is, in Hardy’s world, an inevitable part of life, life itself operates on 
multiple scales, many of them far vaster than the human. Beer points to descriptions of ancient 
fossil remains and of living, thriving, writhing forest floors as examples of Hardy’s expansive 
sense of time and restless vitalism (236). These qualities, she argues, encourage us to see the 
fates of his characters as threads in a much larger tapestry of “devious . . . resourceful, and 
constantly reassembling life” (229). 
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novel, [and] not an afterthought” (138). Boumelha notes many of the parallels between 
the novel’s two main characters, symbolically expressed through their cousinship (141). 
The “deadly war . . . between flesh and spirit” unfolds in the lives of both characters, but 
it is literalized in Sue’s story, insofar as her desire for sexual freedom comes up against 
her horror at the “involuntary physiological processes of conception, pregnancy, and 
childbirth”  (Hardy 39, Boumelha 147). She is, then, as Boumelha suggests, the very 
“centre” of the “irreconcilability” that Hardy wished to explore, but the particular emphasis 
she receives in Boumelha’s reading is uncommon (147). In fact, until the later twentieth 
century, she was often thought a foil or a decorative flourish in the story, and an ill-
conceived one at that. Although recent readings take her more seriously, she remains 
very often in Jude’s shadow, particularly in readings that focus on genre. When Jude is 
read as a Bildungsroman, for example, the focus of analysis skews toward Jude, and 
Sue is evaluated primarily according to the effect she has on him. Dellamora, in a 
powerful reading of the importance of male relationships in Jude’s development, edges 
Sue almost out of the narrative by arguing that she refracts Jude’s desire for Phillotson. 
Sue’s sexual submission to Phillotson implies for Dellamora an unrepresentable tryst 
between the two men: the “sadistic” undertones of the scene and the “Shelleyan 
twinning” of Jude and Sue, he argues, allow “violence against Sue” to be “visited, 
metaphorically but vividly, upon Jude’s racked body” (456).  
This is not to say that Sue’s suffering has gone unnoticed: Hardy’s heroine has 
drawn her share of critical attention, but an interesting shift characterizes readings that 
focus on Sue. No sooner does Sue take centre-stage than Jude sheds its status as 
Bildungsroman, transforming instead into a “New Woman novel.” The distinction is 
crucial, because it affects the kinds of questions that are asked of the text. As a “New 
Woman novel,” Jude becomes useful evidence in a strain of biographical criticism that 
aims to determine Hardy’s degree of sympathy with early feminist movements.102 Some 
readers are less interested in Hardy’s sympathies than in the accuracy of his portrayal of 
the New Woman, a rubric under which both Hardy and his creation tend to come up 
                                                
102 In this vein, William A. Davis asks whether or not Hardy “liked” the New Woman, and whether 
Jude was “written to support her at a time when journalists . . . were enthusiastically criticizing 
her” (66). Margaret Elvy, in considerably more approving tones, dubs Jude a work of “heartfelt 
protofeminism” (35). 
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short.103 Individual assessments of Sue run the gamut from glowing approval to bitter 
disappointment, but one thing most readers agree on is that she fails as a convincing 
portrait of late-century womanhood.104  
While probably fair, that conclusion risks diverting us from some of the novel’s 
most interesting ideas, moving us out of a critical register where we interrogate ideology 
and into one where we primarily evaluate fiction against history. As I hope is clear by 
now, this project attempts to read cultural objects and history dialectically, and for this 
reason, I hesitate to judge Hardy’s novel on the merits of its representation of any 
actually existing historical phenomenon. Hardy is widely recognized as a master of 
realism and an exemplar of stereotypically Victorian earnestness, but his fiction 
consistently undermines its own artistic claims to sincerity.105 Moreover, the historical 
phenomenon here held out as the original for art to imitate was itself highly mediated. 
According to Sally Ledger, Talia Schaffer, Angelique Richardson, and Gillian Sutherland, 
the New Woman depicted in fiction of the 1890s and lampooned in magazines like 
Punch was largely a media construct. For her detractors, she was a bogey-man, and for 
her supporters, a “utopian feminist vision of the future” (Schaffer 40). This is not to say 
that women in the final decades of the nineteenth century did not ride bicycles, attend 
college lectures, work as typists, and agitate for political and economic reform—of 
course, they did. However, as Sutherland notes, the real New Woman led a life 
considerably less sensational than that of her media avatar. She was more likely to have 
                                                
103 Rosemarie Morgan, for example, calls Sue’s militant rejection of marriage a “radical” move 
more in line with twentieth-century suffragettism than fin-de-siecle feminism (80), but Karin 
Koehler argues the very opposite point: she sees in Sue a conservative image of Victorian 
womanhood, pointing out that her “ability to criticize moral conventions and societal norms is 
countermanded by the frequency with which she yields to them” (121). 
104 George Egerton is an exception, one of the few readers who not only admired Sue, but found 
her a convincing picture of contemporary womanhood. In an 1895 letter to Hardy, she praised 
Sue as a “marvelously true psychological study of a temperament less rare than the ordinary 
male observer supposes” (qtd. in Watts 496). The “truth” of Hardy’s picture undoubtedly owed 
something to the stories of female experience in Egerton’s Keynotes (1893), several passages of 
which Hardy copied into his 1894 notebook (Literary Notebooks vol. 2, 60-1). 
105 In The Power of Lies, John Kucich explores a proto-modernist “aestheticization of truth-telling” 
in Hardy’s work. According to Kucich, the novels contain a “systematic diagnosis of honesty’s 
inadequacy as an ethical ideal,” but one that conceals “a contradictory attempt . . . to reaffirm a 
domain of pure truth-telling that [Hardy] identifies with aesthetic consciousness” (201). In other 
words, the disingenuousness that is so typical of Hardy’s characters, along with the ways in which 
their ideals (often drawn from art) mislead them, collides directly with Hardy’s unflinching realist 
aesthetic, which he often justified to critics in moral terms. This complex, contradictory 
relationship to truth-telling should form part of any reading that claims authenticity as a Hardyan 
quality. 
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attended Normal School than Girton College, and frequently ended her career in 
marriage (13). She remains a key context for any reading of Jude the Obscure, and one 
we will encounter again, but we must not reduce Sue to Hardy’s take on a particular 
historical type. In fact, we may have more to learn by comparing her to the character 
with whom she is most often compared in the novel: Jude.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the twin trope that runs through the novel, Sue is as 
highly suited to the starring role of the Bildungsroman as her cousin and partner. Like 
Jude, she exemplifies the uniqueness and deep psychology that readers familiar with the 
genre expect. Gradually, we learn that she was as unconventional in youth as in 
adulthood, and that she, like Jude, endured mistreatment and misunderstanding 
because of it. Aunt Drusilla recalls a younger Sue who would surely have sympathized 
with the boy beaten for feeding the crows on Troutham’s land: a “pert little thing” with 
“tight-strained” nerves, Sue often had to be “smacked . . . for her impertinence” (104-5). 
The word that the narrator settles on to describe both characters is “supersensitive,” and 
it is certainly apt: Sue can no more bear the suffering of other beings than Jude, and 
several of the most powerful scenes in the novel involve the two lovers conspiring to 
deliver trapped animals from pain. Sue also shares with Jude a tendency to ruminate: 
though T. R. Wright complains that we do not see her motives as clearly as we see 
Jude’s, they are not exactly withheld, either.106 On the contrary, Sue frequently and 
exhaustively narrates her mental processes. A philosopher in her own right, she invests 
heartily in what Giordano describes as the ultimate horizon of the Bildungsroman—“the 
full realization of human potential” (582)—criticizing the outmoded institutions so dear to 
Jude and trumpeting the achievements of human ingenuity. In a characteristic scene, 
she balks at Jude’s suggestion that they make an afternoon of visiting the Melchester 
cathedral, responding, “Cathedral? Yes. Though I think I’d rather sit in the railway station 
. . . That’s the centre of town life now. The Cathedral has had its day!” (128)   
                                                
106 In Thomas Hardy and the Erotic, Wright argues that Sue is “portrayed mainly through men’s 
eyes,” especially Phillotson’s, Jude’s, and the narrator’s (120). “To an unprecedented extent,” he 
writes, Hardy allows the perspective of his hero to “dominate the story” (120). Certainly, Jude’s 
opinions and values are given ample space in the narrative, but the degree to which they 
“dominate” it is another question. To claim that they do, I think, awards too much power to the 
writer, and not enough to the reader. Jude is a flawed character, and Sue an enigmatic one, but 
nothing in the text guarantees that the reader’s perspective will align exclusively with one 
character or the other. As Wright himself admits, Sue is highly articulate and communicative 
(125); if we authorize Jude’s warped vision of her, we cannot claim there was no alternative.  
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More importantly, Sue’s apprenticeship is as central to the plot as Jude’s. Both of 
Hardy’s heroes pass through multiple occupations and love affairs in the first half of the 
novel. Jude’s early marriage to Arabella is relayed to the reader in all its painful brevity. 
We witness the courtship and the marriage itself, and even the scheming by which 
Arabella successfully feigns pregnancy, and later, abuse, to entrap Jude. Meanwhile, a 
few miles away in precisely the kind of cultured, urban scene that Jude dreams of 
inhabiting, Sue rooms with a university graduate, never named in the novel but 
memorialized for his devotion to her. Though Sue assures Jude that the relationship was 
not consummated, its romantic undertones are clear: in fact, Sue speculates that her 
companion’s early death may have had something to do with the intense sexual passion 
that she was then unable to return. “He wanted me to be his mistress,” she claims, “but I 
wasn’t in love with him . . . He said I was breaking his heart by holding out against him 
so long at such close quarters” (141). The unfortunate scholar is as vital to Sue’s 
formation as Arabella is to Jude’s, instructing her in the ways of love and passing his 
expensive education on to her second-hand. However, in typical Bildungsroman fashion, 
both early relationships are delegitimized by the absence of genuine sympathy between 
the parties.   
Parallels in Hardy’s design link the professional as well as the romantic paths of 
his two characters. While Jude gives up delivering his aunt’s bread to be apprenticed as 
a stonemason, dreaming first of Christminster and “an intellectual labour which might 
spread over many years” (33), and then later of the “ecclesiastical and altruistic life” of a 
“humble curate” (123), Sue moves from her first job painting letters in an Anglican 
bookshop to the Teacher Training School at Melchester, and then to her fraught term as 
Phillotson’s wife. That the last of these three employments counts as a form of 
employment, there is little room to doubt. Central to the controversy about the New 
Woman was the charge that in nourishing career ambitions outside the home, the 
woman neglected the real job of tending to her children and spouse. As Hardy’s friend 
Lady Jeune put it in an invective for the Fortnightly Review, “marriage is the object of 
women’s existence . . . long ago it was the only aim woman had, and her training, 
education, and life were framed on that supposition” (272). The habits of the New 
Woman, her “life of excitement,” which could encompass work in shops, bars, and 
professional settings, as well as the often-parodied pastimes of cycling, smoking, and 
hunting, posed a direct threat to the family, or so Lady Jeune and other detractors of the 
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movement believed. “We are already beginning to see,” Jeune insisted, “the effect it is 
going to have on future generations, in the numbers of delicate and weakly children that 
are being born” (“Women of To-day” 558). Importantly, whether defending traditionalist 
views à la Lady Jeune or pushing for reform, opinion writing on the New Woman relied 
on the presentation of wife- and motherhood as a valuable, skilled labour, a strategy that 
paradoxically raised its status in public discourse by aligning it more closely with the 
masculine vocations.107  
In addition to the contemporary debate about women’s place in society, there are 
indications within the novel that Sue’s stint as a wife shares the status of her previous 
employments, and belongs in her Bildungsroman. In his 1912 postscript to the novel, 
Hardy described marriage as a “profession” (qtd in Davis, 62), and Jude goes so far as 
to compare it to another form of women’s work: “prostitution” (342). Just as the male 
hero of any Bildungsroman must learn to make his way in a harsh and competitive world, 
so Sue approaches her courtship with Phillotson in a manner that is willful, pragmatic, 
and deeply alienating, as she eventually admits to Jude. She encourages Phillotson’s 
interest, she claims, out of an “inborn craving . . . to attract and captivate” (335), but also 
because she recognizes that the opportunity to share in the running of a schoolhouse, 
“as married schoolteachers often do,” is a good one, and that she is unlikely to come 
across better prospects (128). She even specifies the “good income” she expects the 
two of them to command (128). When she is expelled from Teacher Training School for 
returning late from a day trip with Jude, the prospect of becoming a housewife for 
Phillotson takes on new appeal, and she rashly agrees to expedite their marriage.  
The near immediate regret Sue feels after making this decision has led some 
critics to wonder if the “choice” to marry Phillotson is an informed one. Morgan, for 
instance, suggests that her platonic courtship with the older man could not have 
prepared her for the sexual expectations he entertains once they are married (87). Sue, 
though, is not naïve: in an earlier scene, she balks at the notion that “Solomon’s Song” 
                                                
107 The slippage between the approved female profession of marriage and its more controversial 
alternatives is apparent in the writings of many famous suffragettes, among them Millicent Garrett 
Fawcett, who was another of Hardy’s friends. Advocating for women’s right to work, Fawcett 
leverages the same serious, ennobled vision of marriage that was held by many of her 
opponents: “Is it not for the benefit of society that women who have the greatest naturally fitness 
for marriage should marry, whilst those who have fewer natural qualifications for the endurance 
and enjoyment of the special pains and pleasures of married life, should find other honourable 
and useful careers open to them?” (qtd. in Morgan 81).  
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could be about anything but sex, and she has no trouble understanding the nature of 
Jude’s desire for her (145). Her nervous attachment to chastity, not just in her 
relationship with Phillotson but in the later one with Jude, is more complex than this 
characterization allows. It is linked, as I explain below, to her bodily autonomy and sense 
of freedom, but repeated acts of renunciation also serve as a counterbalance to the 
demeaning pragmatism that curtails so many of her actions, allowing her to reimagine 
“wifehood” as a vocation or calling, emptying out its mundane realities so that it can take 
on mythic or even biblical resonances. This contradictory pattern of thought is what 
allows her to speak with deep reverence of her “solemn” commitment to Phillotson at the 
same time as she reviles the man and the institution of marriage (326). Later in the 
novel, it gives her a way of explaining the senseless tragedy of her children’s death. 
While Jude finds her re-conversion to Christianity at this crucial moment to be a baffling 
reversal of values, it is consistent with some of the most definitive points in her 
character. Sue is an interpreter, a meaning-maker; this much is clear in the beginning of 
the novel, when she purchases figures of Venus and Apollo for a makeshift shrine, or 
when she explains to Jude that she has cut up her copy of the New Testament and 
reassembled it in an order she finds more satisfying (89, 144). Her reconversion is yet 
another example of sense-making and self-making: at a time when Sue is powerless, 
when she is met at every turn with arbitrary cruelty, religion offers answers, patterns, 
significance. The enigmatic beauty of Catholic ritual is a human alternative to what 
merely and brutally exists, and it is the lingering scent of incense, a “strange, 
indescribable perfume or atmosphere,” that first alerts Jude to Sue’s new habit of 
attending services at St. Silas (328). Later, when he finds that she has fled to the church 
in the dark of night to prostrate herself before the “huge, solidly constructed Latin cross . 
. . suspended in the air . . . set with large jewels,” she tearfully explains her reasons 
(332). “I see marriage differently now,” she concedes, “My babies have been taken from 
me to show me this! Arabella’s child killing mine was a judgment—the right slaying the 
wrong” (332). Sue’s pronouncement is horrific, but we can imagine a belief in divine 
judgment being easier for her to stomach than the possibility that her children died for no 
reason. Somewhat less obviously, the return of this once devoted Liberal and free-
thinker to Catholicism indicts the failure of Enlightenment rationality to transcend the 
ideological limits of religion. Liberal theory has not and cannot free Sue from the material 
structures that limit her freedom; the negation of religious control turns out to be secular 
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control, and so that, too, she negates. Sue’s error and misfortune is that she halts her 
dialectic there.   
 My primary point, though, is that Sue shares with Jude—and indeed, with the 
hero of any Bildungsroman—the need to establish some degree of control over the 
narrative of her life, and it is no wonder, given the many ways in which her poverty and 
sexual position strip her of power. A fragile, self-made sense of purpose—something 
capable of outlasting the empty promises of New Woman-hood—is a necessary though 
insufficient balm, and she clings to it all the more desperately when it comes time for her 
to perform a wife’s work. The periods she spends cohabiting with Phillotson are brief, 
and the descriptions of those times accordingly so, but we do get a glimpse of the labour 
she performs “muddling helplessly in the kitchen” and “scrubb[ing] the stairs” (373). 
Though we are told at several points that Sue is a gifted teacher, she is decidedly “not a 
good housewife,” and relies heavily on Mrs. Edlin for guidance (373). Just as Jude 
comes to realize near the end of the novel that he was “never really stout enough for the 
stone trade” (378), Sue discovers—too late—that the domestic calling is not hers. In fact, 
she discovers that it is not really a “calling” at all, but mundane, thankless, unending 
labour.  
The novel, then, is not just about Jude’s thwarted Bildung, but about Sue’s, as 
well, and it is by reading the stories together that we discover Hardy’s greatest 
challenges to the assumptions underlying the genre. The novel challenges the 
boundaries between the kinds of work included in Jude’s vocational journey and those in 
Sue’s path to marriage.108 Domestic labour, manual labour, intellectual labour, and even 
sexual labour are tested against the Victorian ideal of virtuous, formative, and self-
                                                
108 Representations of labour in the novel frequently cross the imaginary lines demarcating the 
“separate spheres.” An obvious example comes in the middle of the novel, when Sue and Jude 
are living together in Aldbrickham with Jude and Arabella’s son. Unable to support themselves on 
Jude’s salary alone, they seek opportunities that will allow Sue to contribute to their income. 
Accordingly, Jude takes up “working and lettering headstones,” and in the “intervals of domestic 
duties” Sue “mark[s] out the letters in full size for him, and black[s] them in” (247). In one of the 
final Aldbrickham scenes, the two are busily employed in a churchyard when little Father Time 
wanders into the scene. When Sue asks why he is not at school, he admits that he is being 
bullied by the other children. In the pages that follow, both parents are obliged to split their 
attention between the work they are being paid to do and the task of soothing Father Time (284). 
There is nothing remarkable about this juggling act; on the contrary, it is quite an ordinary thing, 
and yet it is crucial that Hardy makes it the subject of his art. In the middle of a novel that many 
critics have taken to be about a man’s frustrated journey to maturity and professional fulfillment, 
Hardy places a scene of cooperative parenting, in which the dependent child’s needs temporarily 
overtake the demands of “work.” 
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effacing work, but after a period of exaltation, each form falls short of the ideal, revealing 
itself in some way or another as toil. This pattern structures Sue’s contradictory 
relationship to her domestic duties, but it holds for Jude’s schemes as well: the 
scholarship that initially seems so ennobling, the ecclesiastical study that he later 
imagines will purify his soul, turn out to consist in reality of wearisome and potentially 
pointless work, the dollar value of which matters more than the spiritual one Jude 
fantasizes about in youth.  
This realization strikes Sue much earlier than it does Jude, but it is made clear to 
the reader at the very beginning of the novel. Jude’s relationship to work is represented 
with a kind of knowing irony, and his frequent conflation of “work” and “leisure” serves to 
emphasize the absurdity of his enslavement to the ideal. We are told that he “anticipates 
much pleasure” in the nightly reading he conducts in advance of his pilgrimage to 
Christminster (41), but that reading is incredibly onerous, an “expenditure of labour that 
would have made a tender pedagogue shed tears,” and one which Jude sets about with 
rigorous discipline (31). He does not exchange this work for pay, and thus it is not 
alienating in the way that the tasks he performs for his aunt or for Farmer Troutham are, 
and yet at several points he indicates his awareness that, should the course of his study 
succeed, it will become so. In Jude’s world as in ours, knowledge and money are forms 
of capital, and he learns early on that they can be exchanged for one another. In fact, in 
one of the first conversations he has about Christminster after Phillotson’s departure, a 
cart-driver informs him that the men inside the university are paid for their scholarship: 
“as we be here in our bodies on this high ground,” the driver tells him, “so be they in their 
minds—able to earn hundreds by thinking out loud” (24).  
The scene comes early in the novel, and Jude has hardly yet conceived his 
university dream; at this point, it is only the faint, glimmering outline of a dream. Yet even 
now, as the dream is taking shape, as Jude makes idols of Phillotson and Christminster, 
climbing to the tops of barns to catch sight of the distant city lights and to fantasize about 
the exalting research he will one day conduct, the debasing influence of money intrudes, 
threatening to expose the calling that pulls at Jude’s breast for what it is: a job. Skirting 
this realization, Jude accepts that his entrance to the university will require capital, and 
commits to “accumulating money and knowledge,” recognizing that “wisdom is defence, 
and money is a defence” (83). Thus in short order he becomes known to the residents of 
Marygreen for his odd manner of “combining work and play,” propping volumes of Virgil 
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and Horace open at the helm of the cart he drives for Aunt Drusilla, so that the work of 
study need not be interrupted by the work of selling bread (30-1).  
In Working Fictions, Carolyn Lesjak explores a similar blurring of the boundary 
between work and leisure in the fiction and political works of William Morris. Morris, she 
writes, saw the capitalist division of labour in terms of “the compartmentalization of 
individual men and women” (144); treated as parts of machines rather than people, 
workers could hardly derive any creative satisfaction or pleasure from their work. Yet 
Morris believed that creativity and enjoyment were latent in work, and that both could be 
unlocked through a dramatic reorganization of the relations of production (145). As he 
demonstrated in News from Nowhere, a socialist society would render the work/play 
binary obsolete: no longer subordinated to the profit imperative, labour’s yield would 
become an “intersubjective value” (164), a human set of connections in place of reified 
ones. Jude, though, is realist, and not a work Utopian science fiction; there is no 
socialism in Hardy’s novel, and though the work/play binary still unravels, the process 
looks a little different. In fact, it is very much the opposite of what Morris imagined. Jude 
does not discover pleasurable, unalienated forms of work; instead, he learns to savour 
alienation, much as Sue learns to enjoy or at least derive meaning from acts of self-
harm. The novel, then, prompts an addendum to Lesjak’s argument: while she claims 
that, in the Bildungsroman, “work is almost always performed offstage, seemingly 
beyond the borders of the novels’ domains,” and that, within this configuration, “labour is 
offset against pleasure [and] the realm of bourgeois pleasures becomes a cordoned-off 
space, topographically and ideationally separate from work” (164), Jude shows that the 
genre is capable of absorbing some forms of  “work” with relatively little interruption to its 
program. This is certainly the case for Jude, who can go on cherishing a dream of 
individual achievement and completion even as he is starved, beaten down, and worked 
to the very bone in the stonemason’s yard. The liberal promise of the Bildungsroman, 
however, registers far greater tremors in Sue’s narrative, and it is these that finally 
destroy it.   
Double Standards 
If Jude’s definitions of work and play are unusual, Sue’s are nearly impossible to 
determine. Even her notions of pain and pleasure are strangely blended: as obstacles 
pile up and opportunities disappear, as friends turn their backs on her, and as her 
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growing family makes the climb out of poverty seem impossible, Sue learns to cultivate 
and even enjoy her own suffering. It is a perverse survival strategy, and one that has 
proved as baffling for readers as it is, in the novel, for Jude. In their efforts to explain 
Sue’s self-abnegating behavior, many critics echo Jude’s certainty that there is 
something broken or lacking in her character. D. H. Lawrence claims that Sue is 
“missing” her sexual essence, and Wright—nearly a century later—describes her as a 
kind of void in the novel, the blind spot of the narrator’s masculine gaze (113, 144). More 
overtly feminist readings, some of which I examine below, assume that Sue is ignorant of 
or repressing her sexuality, and Jude, for his part, calls her a “phantasmal, bodiless 
creature,” utterly lacking in animal passion (290). These disparate claims share an 
assumption that I will go on to problematize—namely, that a complete human being 
possesses a legible, “normal” sexual drive—but let us suppose for the moment that 
Sue’s experience really is a negative or lacking one. What does this mean? Is negativity 
always a dead end, or can it produce positive knowledge? In what remains of this 
chapter, I explore the critical-creative potential of Sue’s negativity, figuring her most 
puzzling actions as determinate negations that expose the insufficiency of the 
Bildungsroman’s ideological premises. If her penchant for contradiction makes her seem 
a waffling or infirm character, its larger narrative function is to puncture the hubris of the 
self-development plot. Her negativity causes problems for the other characters, and has 
done so for many readers, but a problem is never only a problem. When we consider the 
many traps lining the Bildungsroman hero’s path to enlightenment, Sue’s negativity 
comes to seem more fully enlightening, for it unveils alternatives to modern liberal 
subjectivity.  
The clearest manifestation of Sue’s negative impulse is her aversion to the man 
she marries. In numerous scenes, Sue shrinks from Phillotson’s touch, and even jumps 
from a window when he surprises her one night in the bedroom (215). However, in 
flagrant disregard for the rules of conventional romance, she treats the lover she prefers 
in almost the same way, dodging his embraces and dissolving into tears when she 
learns that he has reserved only one hotel room for them to stay in on the first night of 
their elopement (231). It is easy enough to attribute Sue’s dislike of Phillotson to a lack 
of attraction, but her behavior toward Jude is more puzzling.109 Her peers at the Teacher 
                                                
109 Phillotson is older than Sue and, as his name implies, somewhat philistine in his tastes and 
mannerisms. While these qualities alone do not explain Sue’s aversion, there are other 
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Training School fancy that they might have risked their own expulsion “for the pleasure 
of being kissed by such a kindly-faced young man” (134), and Arabella’s friend Anny 
describes Jude as a “nice-looking chap” whom Arabella ought to “ha’ stuck un” (277). 
More to the point, Sue admits to loving Jude “grossly” (373), but that recognition does 
not reconcile her to the affair. Regarding Jude alternately with interest and icy disavowal, 
she advances their flirtation through a dizzying chain of meetings and letters that leave 
him in utter confusion as to his standing with her. Rejection (“You mustn’t love me. You 
are too like me—that’s all! [148]) is immediately followed by remorse and acceptance 
(“when you were out of sight I felt what a cruel and ungrateful woman I was and it has 
reproached me ever since. If you want to love me, Jude, you may!” [148]) only to give 
way to another cycle of the same: 
O you have been unkind to me—you have—to look on me as a 
sweetheart without saying a word, and leaving me to discover it myself! . . 
.  I’ll never trust you again! (150) 
And then, a few paragraphs later: 
Forgive me for my petulance yesterday! I was horrid to you; I know it, and 
I feel perfectly miserable at my horridness . . . Jude, please still keep me 
as your friend and associate, with all my faults. I’ll try not to be like it 
again. (151) 
This exchange comes early in the novel, but it sets a pattern that their relationship will 
continue to follow. Sue frequently indulges her desire for Jude’s attention, but each time 
she does so she is horrified at her lapse in control, and punishes herself and Jude in an 
effort to repent. In the beginning of the novel, this punishment takes the form of revoking 
Jude’s permission to see and correspond with her, an act that harms her as much as it 
does him, since she has no other source of camaraderie or emotional support. As the 
level of her distress rises, she turns to more extreme forms of self-injury, including 
fasting and self-mutilation, as we learn from her declarations to Jude at the end of the 
novel. In response to his plea that they run away together, she tells him, “I’ve wrestled 
and struggled, and fasted and prayed. I have nearly brought my body into complete 
                                                                                                                                            
indications in the novel that he is not a favourite among women. The ever-frank Mrs. Edlin has to 
say of him, “Lord! . . . there be certain men here and there that no woman of any niceness can 
stomach [and] I should have said he was one” (181). D. H. Lawrence’s depiction is hardly more 
flattering. In his Study of Thomas Hardy, he offers the following thoughts on Phillotson: “the whole 
process of digestion, masticating, swallowing, digesting, excretion, is a sort of super-mechanical 
process. And Phillotson was like this. He was an organ, a function-fulfilling organ, he had no 
separate existence. He could not create a single new movement or thought or expression” (113). 
Later in the work, he likens Phillotson to a newt (114). 
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subjection. And you mustn’t—!” (369). As it turns out, Jude beats her to the grave, but 
only by a narrow margin; at his wake Mrs. Edlin informs Arabella that her husband’s 
former lover has almost completely wasted away, the result of an unhappy life to which 
she seems inexplicably committed (387).  
Sue’s behavior is mystifying to Jude, but it is not long before he begins to project 
his confusion, transfiguring his own lack of understanding into a seemingly objective, 
fatal flaw in her. In numerous scenes, he describes her as “cruel,” “unconventional,” “a 
disembodied creature,” and a “tantalizing phantom” (228-32), concluding at last that she 
is “not worth a man’s love” (369). Even Hardy seemed loathe to forgive her at times, 
though he did on a number of occasions defend her against the harsher accusations of 
reviewers. In an 1895 letter to Gosse, he described her as a special “type of woman” to 
whom he had always felt an “attraction” (20 November 1895)—but whatever the 
“attraction” Sue held for Hardy, the novel’s penultimate scene makes it seem as though 
Jude’s death is her fault, for it is during their final meeting, in response to Sue’s adamant 
refusal to leave Phillotson, that Jude loses his will to live, trudging back to the train 
station through the pouring rain, and ensuring that his cold becomes a fatal case of 
pneumonia (371). In the scene, the firmness of Jude’s resolution stands starkly against 
Sue’s apparent hysteria: he makes a reasoned argument about the falsity of their legal 
ties, but she can respond only by choking back tears (369). When he entreats her to 
elope, she turns away, fearful of temptation, and though the sound of his labored coughs 
nearly penetrates her resolve, she endures, “stop[ping] her ears with her hands till all 
possible sound of him had passed away” (370). In Jacobus’s interpretation, Sue’s 
breakdown “accentuates Jude’s strength and his fidelity to the values which originally 
inspired their struggle . . . As she blinds and shackles herself, he becomes ever more 
clear-sighted” (323). The “shackles” that Jacobus implies are imaginary, I think we can 
see as real: Sue has already tried living out of wedlock with Jude, and has paid a high 
price. She knows now that ideals cannot protect her from poverty and prejudice. That 
said, I agree with Jacobus that Hardy’s even-handed treatment of the two characters 
comes under new pressure in this late scene. Generous in his depiction of most of Sue’s 
foibles, he cannot forgive her for refusing Jude’s love.   
The significance of the aborted romance—its placement at the end of the novel, 
its steep emotional pitch, and its role in hastening Jude’s death—suggests that Sue’s 
greatest sin might just be her refusal to affirm masculine desire. Hardy resisted the 
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charge that his novel was biographical, but many have noted the parallels between his 
own romantic disappointments and those of his character. One love interest in particular, 
Florence Henniker, is known to have served as a model for Sue, especially in what 
Michael Millgate describes as “her elusive and teasing phases” (324).110 Hardy became 
infatuated with Henniker after meeting her in 1885, and attempted to solicit admissions 
of affection over a long correspondence. However, while Henniker seems to have 
enjoyed their exchanges, she was content in her marriage and immersed in her career, 
and had only so much to give Hardy in return for his attention (Millgate 312). 
Consequently, their connection faded, and the real woman was replaced by the 
captivating, capricious figures that appear in the poems of that period. The exact 
reasons for Henniker’s tepid response may never be known, but they seem not to have 
mattered to Hardy, who attributed the end of their affair somewhat simply to her cruel 
and unloving nature (324). Oddly, given the complexity of his fictional representations of 
women, Hardy’s journal entries and correspondence apply troubling stereotypes to many 
of the women he knew, including Henniker and his wife, Emma. Millgate speculates that 
“think[ing] of Henniker as essentially epicene . . . provided Hardy with a personal 
explanation of the rebuff he had received” (324). In other words, it was easier to think 
that Henniker’s disinclination was her problem—much as Jude, toward the end of the 
novel, loses his ability to see Sue’s actions in relation to larger social forces and begins 
to blame her personally for his injuries.111 
A similar pattern of scapegoating appears in many readers’ assessments of Sue. 
On the whole, Hardy’s contemporaries were her harshest critics. In fact, Oliphant found 
                                                
110 The affair with Florence Henniker is one of many episodes that link Hardy’s life to Jude’s. The 
connection was obvious to many readers, and they were eager to find the roots of the 
controversial romance plot in Hardy’s life, so much so that his second wife, Florence Hardy, was 
still writing letters to quash the rumour twenty years after the novel’s publication (Hands 409). 
111 Hardy’s first wife has been similarly antagonized in some biographies. Millgate positions 
Emma as the cause of a series of disappointments that could hardly have been her fault alone, 
including Hardy’s gradual estrangement from his family and his inability to fit in with the upper 
levels of society to which fame granted him access. Emma’s temper, class ambition, poor taste 
and physical plainness serve as foils to Hardy’s supposedly greater refinement (Millgate 361-5). 
Kucich points out that in sensitive moments Hardy was resentful not only of Emma but of many of 
the women in his life, including the dozens whom he courted unsuccessfully. In the fiction, this 
resentment translates into a pattern of “scapegoating” which “culminate[s] in the expulsion of the 
feminine from the moral identity of art,” thereby allowing Hardy to align “a resurgent form of 
honesty both with aesthetic consciousness and, more generally, with masculinity” (Kucich 204, 
210). However, as Claire Tomalin suggests in her biography, Hardy owed a great deal of his 
success and inspiration to women. See Tomalin on the influence and practical contributions of 
Hardy’s cousins, mother, and romantic interests.    
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her more blameworthy than the lusty, dollar-driven Arabella. In her 1896 review of the 
novel, she called Arabella “a human pig . . . without shame or consciousness,” but found 
Sue “more indecent still” (139). Like Jude at the end of the novel, Oliphant interprets 
Sue’s anxiety and indecisiveness as performances designed to entice men. Even 
Hardy’s more progressive readers were little inclined to let Sue off the hook: writing for 
Cosmopolis, Gosse described her as “a strange and unwelcome product of exhaustion,” 
a woman “poor, maimed, degenerate, ignorant of herself and of the perversion of her 
instincts” (67). Gosse’s reading hints at a theory of sexual inversion that Hardy later 
refuted, but the idea has proved a durable way of explaining Sue’s failure to live up to 
readers’ expectations.112 Some decades after Jude’s publication, Lawrence diagnosed 
her with a constitutional lack, taking her muted sex drive as proof that she is “not alive in 
the ordinary human sense” (113). Her asceticism has alienated modern-day readers as 
well, to the extent that it is sometimes taken as a stand-in for an unrepresentable kind of 
sexual desire, a move that nudges Sue to the margins of the plot and strips her actions 
of their political force, reducing them to symptoms of an individual pathology.113 Michael 
Steig goes so far as to call her a “hysterical character” whose behaviour is essentially a 
“defense against sexual anxiety” (265), and Deanna Kreisel describes a very similar 
character—Elizabeth-Jane of The Mayor of Castorbridge—as a “bloodless, depressed 
heroine with whom it is impossible to sympathize” (179). 
Like Sue, Elizabeth-Jane is distinguished from the majority of Hardy’s female 
characters by her ascetic tendencies and subdued sexuality. According to Kreisel, 
Elizabeth-Jane steals the narrative focus from her stepfather and rival protagonist, 
                                                
112 The term “inversion” was current in late Victorian sexology and usually connoted male 
homosexuality (though Havelock Ellis published a pamphlet on female sexual inversion in 1895). 
Hardy was familiar with the theory, but thought “inversion” the wrong term for Sue. In an 1895 
letter to Gosse, he insisted that there was nothing “perverted or depraved in Sue’s nature”; her 
“abnormalism,” he wrote, “consists in disproportion: not in inversion, her sexual instinct being 
healthy so far as it goes, but unusually weak & fastidious” (Millgate 103). 
113 Jane Thomas and Richard Dellamora claim that Sue’s reticent sexuality makes sense only as 
a stand-in for same-sex desire between men. Sue’s “self-mortification and masochistic desire,” 
Thomas writes, “seem distinctly psychopathic in a heterosexual context” (356). Both critics 
suggest that Jude’s strongest desire is for Phillotson, in whom they see a model of Hardy’s own 
mentor, Horace Moule. There is little evidence to suggest that the relationship between Moule 
and Hardy was sexual, but Moule himself was “sexually ambiguous,” and his suicide in 1873 was 
a serious blow to Hardy (Thomas 356). Moreover, Hardy’s late novels coincide historically with 
the Wilde trials and the accompanying debate about the validity and legality of male/male desire. 
These are important contexts, but my own reading has focused on the novel’s critique of 
acquisitive desire, which I think applies regardless of the gender of the desired object.  
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Michael Henchard, emerging at the end of the novel as the privileged perspective. 
However, in Kreisel’s reading, there is something amiss about the novel’s conclusion: 
though Elizabeth-Jane is shown to be morally superior to her erring stepfather, she is not 
nearly as “sympathetic” as he is. In fact, she calls Elizabeth-Jane “a miserable failure as 
a figure of sympathetic identification,” one who strikes the reader as “more annoying and 
peckish than anything else” (177). The reason for this, Kreisel suggests, is that it is 
“extraordinarily difficult to sympathize with someone without desires” (179). One of the 
aims of the present chapter has been to explore the foundations of that assumption, and 
to ask why we find it difficult to sympathize with non-desiring characters. Kreisel links our 
discomfort to the spectre of economic stagnation raised by characters who do not desire 
when they should (179). As soon as Elizabeth-Jane moves to the centre of the narrative, 
there is simply no story to tell, so the plot withers and the novel ends. However, as I 
have been arguing here, the threat posed by women like Elizabeth-Jane and Sue is 
larger even than what Kreisel suggests. Sue, especially, undermines the form of 
subjectivity upon which capitalism depends. It is not simply that a lack of desire could 
cause the economy to stagnate (Kreisel’s argument), but that it could expose “the 
economy” as an unnecessary or invalid way of understanding human relationships, a 
point I will revisit in the final section of this chapter.  
Strikingly, even those who aim to rescue Sue from her history of moral 
condemnation encounter a version of the same problem. A common assumption in 
otherwise invigorating feminist readings of the novel is that Sue represses her sexual 
desires unknowingly; however, like twentieth-century diagnoses of hysteria, this 
assumption individualizes conditions that are better understood as social. So, when 
Karin Koehler describes Sue as a “creature incapable of accepting her own corporeality 
and embracing her physical needs and desires” (125), or when Rosemarie Morgan 
emphasizes her “staunch efforts to intellectualize, rationalize, and politicize an issue 
which she dare not confront in all its sensuousness” (89), the experience of sex that Sue 
seems, at times, almost desperate to explain—the traumatic, frightening, and 
occasionally disgusting subordination of one body to another—disappears from the 
discussion.114 Theories of repressed sexuality add much-needed nuance to Victorian 
                                                
114 For both critics, Sue is motivated by a fear of the body, the roots of which lie in her 
subordination to the masculine Law. The problem, they insist, is that she has no other language 
than the language of patriarchy with which to express her desires. Morgan takes this line of 
argument to its extreme, linking Sue’s sexual timidity to the childhood experience of “being taught 
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and early twentieth-century pathologizations of Sue, but in their efforts to affirm the 
disruptive power of sex, these critics undermine sex’s negative content—both the 
ontological negativity that characterizes the transformation of subject into sexual object, 
as well as the concrete negativity of bad sex. To put this in more provocative, Adornian 
terms, the negation of sexuality that is implied by the repression argument is “not 
negative enough” (160). Against the cultural dominance of positivism and “positive 
forces,” Adorno claimed that “the seriousness of unswerving negation lies in its refusal to 
lend itself to sanctioning things as they are. To negate a negation does not bring about 
its reversal; it proves, rather, that the negation was not negative enough” (Negative 
Dialectics 159-60). The negative dialectic gives us an alternative to understanding Sue 
as repressed: if “repressed” sexuality negates a theoretically existing, positive sexuality, 
a negative dialectic of sex would negate that negation. This is what Sue’s stubborn 
refusals and unpredictable changes of heart achieve: where critics like Morgan and 
Koehler transform Sue’s negations of sex into indications of recoverable, positive 
sexuality,115 I argue that her negations demolish the very premises of sex, especially the 
acquisitive, willful form of subjectivity assumed by liberal political theory and free-market 
capitalism. 
A dialectical reading of Sue provides a critique of post-Enlightenment subjectivity 
that is obscured by well-meaning efforts to mine positive content from what she 
                                                                                                                                            
to hate her mother and identifying with the father who both hates the mother and rejects the 
mother’s daughter” (92). Wright’s reading of Sue is similar: he claims that she “fails . . . to 
overcome the problem of liberating herself from male expectations without repressing her own 
sexuality”; despite her intellectual emancipation, she cannot be completely free because of her 
“deeply ingrained fear of sexuality” (120). Readings like these seem to me alarmingly—if perhaps 
unintentionally—apolitical: while there is a nod to the social constraints conditioning sexuality, the 
implied solution is individual sexual liberation. However, the problem is social, not individual: 
individuals cannot liberate themselves from a global system of production in which sexuality and 
sexual labour are alienated.  
115 Claire Jarvis makes a similar move in her book, Exquisite Masochism (2016). Like Morgan, 
Jarvis moves Sue’s experiences onto a symbolic plane, arguing that her final refusal to elope with 
Jude is “not a repression of sexual hopefulness but . . . a recommitment to an exquisite, 
suspended, version of sexuality” (96). According to Jarvis, Hardy participates in a broader trend 
within nineteenth-century realism in which masochistic sexuality is expressed through “deep 
erotic description” of objects, events, and interactions (2). Gratifying realizations of the sexual 
impulse are indefinitely postponed, replaced by slow, textured recreations of ostensibly non-
sexual phenomena. In Jude, she argues, this peculiar formal eroticism is intended to preserve the 
romantic dyad, and to keep it from mutating into the less glamorous form of the bourgeois family 
(97). Surprisingly, given the title of her book, she says little about the masochistic behaviours that 
are actually represented in the novel, such as self-flagellation, fasting, or Sue’s decision to yield 
herself to a man she abhors. Her interest lies in the metaphoric potential of the behaviour and not 
in the behaviour itself. 
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experiences as devastating. Radical affirmations of bodily pleasure and expression have 
been important tools in feminist literary criticism, but the danger in applying these tools 
to a text like Jude is that they comply too readily to a narrow understanding of what 
counts as a politically and intellectually worthy experience of sex. Sue’s perspective 
exceeds the celebratory, sex-positive paradigm that readers like Morgan, Koehler, and 
Wright bring to bear on the novel. While it is important to counter the sex-shaming 
tendencies of Hardy’s original readers, we must not neglect Sue’s claims about what sex 
has meant to her. In fact, doing so runs the risk of diverting us from the most obvious 
and material explanations for her behaviour. Sue fears the body, but not because of her 
relationship with the absent Mr. Bridehead, or because of any investment in the fused 
subjectivity of the romantic dyad.116 As Boumelha points out, she simply cannot afford to 
become pregnant. Moreover, her capacity to be interested in sex is limited by other 
material conditions, including her physical state. The narrator frequently comments on 
her anxious temperament and physical thinness, describing her in one scene as “the 
slim little wife of a husband whose person was quite disagreeable to her, the ethereal, 
fine-nerved, sensitive girl, quite unfitted by temperament and instinct to fulfill the 
conditions of the matrimonial relation with Phillotson, possibly with scarce any man, 
[who] walked fitfully along, and panted, and brought weariness into her eyes by gazing 
and worrying hopelessly” (207-8). The effects of physiological factors like stress and low 
body weight (or more specifically, low body fat) on the libido are well known; in the case 
of Sue, whose sexual timidity has puzzled critics from the nineteenth century until the 
present day, they are worth emphasizing. At one point in the novel, she confesses to 
Jude that the students at Teacher Training School are practically starved, and when he 
asks her how he might treat her on one of their first outings together, she begs not for a 
romantic rendezvous but for a hearty meal (127). As the plot unfolds and her troubles 
grow, she develops an increasingly ascetic attitude toward sex, and—at the same time—
something that we might today call an eating disorder (“I’ve wrestled and struggled, and 
fasted and prayed. I have nearly brought my body into complete subjection” [369]). While 
                                                
116 Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory contains a critique of psychoanalytic criticism that is pertinent to 
many of the readings of Jude that I have explored in this chapter. The “narrow-mindedness” of 
classic Freudian psychoanalysis, Adorno claims, “in spite of all the emphasis on sex, is revealed 
by the fact that as a result of these studies [psychoanalytic interpretations of art], which are often 
offshoots of the biological fad, artists whose work gave uncensored shape to the negativity of life 
are dismissed as neurotics” (8). Sue is, in fact, an artist, but even as art—as an artistic creation—
she gives shape to the “negativity of life,” and has been labeled “neurotic” because of it. The 
other artist in this case—Thomas Hardy—escapes most of these accusations by scape-goating 
his female character.   
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it is possible to argue that sexual shame causes Sue’s disordered eating, it is also true 
that disordered eating, through its effects on the mind and the body, reshapes sexuality. 
My aim here is not to diagnose Hardy’s fictional character with any specific mental or 
physical illness, but to remind us of the complexity and contingency of what we call, as if 
it had a stable referent, “sexuality.” It seems plausible to me that in many of the novel’s 
“romantic” scenes, Sue just has more pressing things on her mind than sexual 
gratification, including, chiefly, the struggle to survive. For a variety of reasons that Talia 
Schaffer explores in her recent book, Romance’s Rivals (2016), this possibility is not one 
many present-day readers have been willing to explore.117  
My take on Sue’s sexuality might seem to owe something to the method of 
“surface reading” propounded by Sharon Marcus and Stephen Best in their 2009 
polemic against ideology critique (“Surface Reading: An Introduction”), insofar as I take 
Sue’s negative declarations seriously on their own terms.118 However, my aims are 
different from those Marcus and Best align with surface reading: I am trying to 
foreground the material conditions that shape Sue’s decisions, and these are irrevocably 
linked to the social order and the relations of production in which she is enmeshed, none 
                                                
117 Schaffer claims that reading desire “not as central, not as repressed, not as perverse, but 
simply as relatively unimportant is extraordinarily difficult for modern literary critics” (31). The 
reason, she claims, is that critics have assumed “that all relationships are predicated on desire, 
so that if a character contracted a marriage without obvious sexual attraction, his or her sexual 
story must be a hidden, problematic one” (9). She traces this tradition of reading through the 
period of Freud’s greatest influence in the first half of the century, through the “liberated 1960s 
and 1970s,” and eventually through the more recent turn to what she calls a “post-Foucaultian 
queer theory in which desire [is] seen as endlessly fascinating, complex, and self-masking” (9). 
Schaffer does not address Jude specifically, but her assessment is highly applicable to the critical 
reception of that novel. That said, I reach different conclusions about Sue than Schaffer does 
about any of the subjects of her study, all of whom opt for companionate marriage over romantic 
marriage, celibacy, or suicide. The latter fates remained common ones for the heroines of late-
Victorian fiction, and they fall outside the bounds of Schaffer’s focus on companionate marriage. 
118 This article, which headed a special issue of Representations in 2009, spurred a lively debate 
in Victorian studies that is ongoing today. Broadly, Marcus and Best argue for an alternative to 
what they perceive as the dominant disciplinary paradigm of ideology critique. Where Marxist and 
Freudian methods of “symptomatic reading” assume that “the most significant truths are not 
immediately apprehensible and may be veiled or invisible,” surface reading attends to “what is 
evident, perceptible, apprehensible in texts; what is neither hidden nor hiding” (4, 9). This 
“immersive” proximity to the surface of texts is supposed to be “a kind of freedom,” liberating the 
critic from “political agendas” and “adversarial relations” to the objects of criticism and allowing 
him or her to produce “more accurate knowledge about texts” (16-17). I applaud and to some 
extent join Marcus’s challenge to a disciplinary tendency to interpret intimacy in a narrowly sexual 
way, but unlike Marcus, my approach belongs under the heading of ideology critique, since I 
understand the acquisitive, “romantic” sexuality we are accustomed to seeking in novels as an 
element of the superstructure of liberal democracy and free market capitalism. In other words, I 
have a political agenda.     
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of which are immediately present on the surface of the text. We ought to be more 
respectful of Sue’s non-sexual needs than Jude is, but if the diversity of human needs is 
not a compelling reason in and of itself, there are many others. The repression thesis—
the idea that Sue is somehow ignorant of or in denial of her sexuality—occludes the 
commodification of her body and complies with a patriarchal logic that discredits her 
reproductive labour. Given the novel’s focus on the economic hardships both of its 
protagonists endure, the more plausible explanation for her diminished interest in sex is 
that she recognizes the exploitative nature of all of her relationships with men. New 
Woman or not, she tarries with the expectation that she will marry or at the very least, 
love, and yet she is aware of the economic burden that is likely to follow from even 
temporary physical gratification (a difficulty she later explains to Father Time, with 
devastating consequences). In the early part of the novel, we see her pursue many of 
the educational and professional opportunities that were becoming available to women, 
but these opportunities dwindle after her marriage and subsequent affair, and they all but 
disappear following the birth of her children. No less than Jude, she is a casualty of the 
division of labour: just as he is born into a line of work that more or less condemns him 
to poverty, and for which he has no particular talent or liking, so she is destined to 
produce and care for children, her inclinations and abilities aside. Given the sacrifices 
her circumstances require of her, its no wonder that she comes to view her body as a 
source of suffering—even, to borrow Silvia Federici’s term, a “prison” (16). She admits 
this much in conversation with Mrs. Edlin, rejecting a well-intentioned compliment with 
the cry, “this pretty body of mine has been the ruin of me!” (373) With all of this in mind, it 
should make perfect sense that she seeks shelter in the possibility of non-sexual 
partnerships with men, and yet she is continually reprimanded—by Jude, by Phillotson, 
and even by readers—for her too-feeble passions.  
More than a symptom of thwarted desire, Sue’s oscillation between the poles of 
affection and self-loathing points beyond the bounds of her subjectivity to a social 
position that is both impossible and mandatory. Neither the curse that dooms members 
of her family to misery, nor the incestuous undertones of her relationship with Jude, nor 
even the breaking of laws the two commit through their adultery are in and of themselves 
the causes of her misery; rather, they are hypostatizations of a social logic that both 
demands and punishes desire. Crucially, Sue’s rejection of sex is not just a rejection of 
the reproductive labour her situation obliges her to: on the contrary, her resistance 
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targets a deeper structure than the order of tasks she takes on as a parent and partner 
to Jude. Each time she upsets our expectations, she tampers with the ideological 
patterns by which bourgeois subjects are cut. Failing to feel desire in the proper 
proportions, she challenges a tradition Nancy Armstrong finds at the core of the 
nineteenth-century novel, namely, the attempt to “universalize modern desire in order to 
implant it within every individual as the thing that makes him or her human” (Armstrong 
202). 
According to Armstrong, the role of “modern desire” in the novel is to give 
characters (and by extension, readers) a basis for understanding themselves as 
individuals and not just members of an undifferentiated class. This understanding was 
crucial for the growing middle ranks of Victorian society, for whom upward mobility 
seemed increasingly possible and increasingly necessary. We can take Jude as our 
example: his Christminster dream is both a dream of developing unique, identifying 
talents and of climbing the social ladder. It is also a deeply ideological dream, sustaining 
him at the same time as it resigns him to the alienating conditions of his life as a 
labourer. In Jude’s mind, the university functions as a reward that will one day repay him 
for a life of sacrifice and privation, but as we discover, this reward does not materialize. 
In fact, Christminster is better understood as the carrot at the end of a beating stick. 
Jude’s aspirations are the very thing that bring about his downfall, a point that is made 
clear by the fact that the darkest episode in his tragic life (the murder of his younger 
children by the eldest) occurs when he compels his family to return one last time to the 
city of learning he has idealized since youth. To borrow Lauren Berlant’s term, the 
university—or the idea of the university—houses Jude’s cruel optimism. It is at once the 
object of his desire and an obstacle to his flourishing (Berlant 1). The university don with 
whom Jude corresponds at the beginning of the novel tells him this in no uncertain 
terms:  
Sir,— I have read your letter with interest; and, judging from your 
description of yourself as a working man, I venture to think that you will 
have a better chance of success in life by remaining in your own sphere 
and sticking to your trade than by adopting any other course. That, 
therefore, is what I advise you to do. Yours faithfully, T. Tetuphenay. 
(111) 
Clearly, Tetuphenay recognizes just how long Jude’s odds are; what he cannot know—
but what we certainly do—is the sheer magnitude of sacrifice that will be extracted from 
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Jude in the course of his pursuit. A short list of these sacrifices might include the long 
hours of work, the pennies pinched to purchase books, the solitude that gradually stifles 
his relationships, and the many decisions he makes that are not in his best interest or his 
family’s, but that serve to bring him closer to that unrealizable goal. Jude’s attachment to 
this personal fantasy, moreover, brings about a loss that is even greater than those 
previously named: the investment in merit and self-improvement that Jude’s fantasy 
requires subtly but powerfully estranges him from the other members of his class.119 As 
Dellamora notes, many of Hardy’s novels foreground relationships of solidarity between 
working people, but this is not the case in Jude. Jude’s relationships with other men of 
his class appear to be a source of toxicity rather than strength. Dellamora points to 
several incidents where Jude is goaded into drunkenness and self-sabotage by 
characters like Tinker Taylor and Jack Staggs (459). Both Dellamora and Jane Thomas 
make similar observations about Sue, who seems to lack any other friend than Jude. 
Unlike her predecessor Tess, who forges connections with her fellow dairymaids, Sue 
forms no bonds with her peers at Teacher Training School, and her relationship to 
Arabella is hostile and competitive.120  
Where the two characters differ is in their relationship to desire. If readers have 
found Sue more challenging to come to terms with than Jude, it is because her actions 
do not correspond with the individualistic ethos that drives the Victorian novel and 
Victorian capitalism alike. Both she and Jude long passionately for things that will hurt 
them, but unlike Jude, who is caught hook, line, and sinker by the fantasy of the 
                                                
119 Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb offer a compelling discussion of this phenomenon in The 
Hidden Injuries of Class. According to Sennett and Cobb, “upward mobility” seems to render 
class divisions more permeable, but in fact, it merely translates them into different terms. In an 
upwardly mobile society, “badges of ability” or “talent” become the primary measures of individual 
worth, splitting the privileged few from the undifferentiated masses who are denied the right and 
opportunity to develop themselves as individuals. This emphasis on talent and ability produces 
feelings of powerlessness and inadequacy in the working class, for it emphasizes ideal potential 
for development over actual situations, making it seem as though a person’s success or failure is 
solely the result of personal choices (62). Jude manages to avoid this trap, realizing at the end 
the novel that his failure evinces social and not personal limitations, but this realization comes 
only after he has lost everything and no longer wishes to live. His fate would seem to complicate 
Bruce Robbins’s argument about upward mobility: Robbins claims that upward mobility stories of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrate the compatibility of individualism with the 
common good (6), but in Hardy’s novel, the seductive myth of individualism unambiguously 
destroys solidarity and leads the hero to his ruin. Even the mentor relationship, a crucial and 
largely positive component in Robbins’s understanding of upward mobility stories, crumbles in the 
atomized world Hardy depicts.   
120 For a provocative discussion of Sue’s isolation relative to the female characters in the rest of 
Hardy’s oeuvre, see Jane Thomas’s chapter on “Sapphic Spaces” in Thomas Hardy and Desire. 
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cultivated self, Sue is held in limbo by a debilitating anxiety. We can sympathize with 
Jude’s choices because they affirm values in which we are still very much invested 
today; whether or not we share in his dreams, we can understand them because we still 
live in a society that celebrates freedom, choice, self-betterment, etc., and that prioritizes 
individual desire over collective need. Sue, on the other hand, problematizes the very 
notions of “choice” and “desire.” As countless critics have noted, she is defined by her 
indecisiveness, caught in a bitter struggle to discern what it is that she wants and 
whether it is worth having. Estranged even from her sexual self, she alarms us with the 
possibility that this most naturalized, most human of functions may not be natural or 
human in the context of modern capitalism.  
Negating Love/Sex/ Desire 
From the perspective of virtually all of the characters in the novel, Sue’s problem 
is that she insists on being married to a man she cannot love. The solution seems fairly 
obvious: as both Jude and Mrs. Edlin advise at various points, she ought just to follow 
her heart. When she returns to Marygreen to re-marry Phillotson after her children’s 
death and the dissolution of her relationship with Jude, Mrs. Edlin refuses to mince 
words: 
You ought not to marry this man again! You are in love with t’ other still . . 
. You be t’ other man’s. If you didn’t like to commit yourselves to the 
binding vow again, just at first, ’twas all the more credit to your 
consciences, considering your reasons, and you med ha’ lived on, and 
made it all right at last. After all, it concerned nobody but your own two 
selves. (347) 
In her last remark, Mrs. Edlin is wrong, as Sue knows only too well. The status of her 
relationship with Jude did matter to others—to Phillotson and Arabella, to the children, to 
employers, and even to the landlady who refuses to rent to them when she discovers 
they are not married. However, it is not just the status of her relationship that matters to 
the world but the status of her feelings. When they are together, Jude constantly pleads 
with her to validate his own love by confessing hers in terms that are understandable to 
him:  
‘You do like me very much, Sue? Say you do! Say you do a quarter, a 
tenth as much as I do you; and I’ll be content!’ 
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‘I’ve let you kiss me, and that tells enough.’ 
‘Just once or so!’ 
‘Well - don’t be a greedy boy.’ 
He leant back, and did not look at her for a long time. (228) 
Phillotson does the same thing: when it becomes clear that their marriage is unraveling, 
he tells her, “you are committing a sin in not liking me” (211). Although it is within their 
power to do so, neither man forces Sue’s sexual compliance; what they require of her is 
not necessarily sex but her consent to sex. They are not quite objectifying her, then, as 
we might expect, but demanding that she become a particular kind of subject: a unique 
individual, endowed with desires, talents and the capacity for romantic love. In other 
words, the kind of character we all want to read about in novels.  
For Sue, this position is considerably more fraught than it appears to either of her 
lovers. She may prefer Jude over Phillotson, but she knows that choosing a romantic 
relationship with either man entails significant losses of freedom, including a loss of 
bodily autonomy. No wonder the choice is agonizing: for Sue, it can only appear a 
parody of choice. Consent counts for little when the risks and the labour associated with 
sex accrue overwhelmingly to women. And yet, to withhold consent is not just to vex 
one’s lover but to jeopardize one’s human standing in that lover’s eyes. This paradox 
emerges in one of the frankest conversations Sue has with Jude about her marriage to 
Phillotson. When Jude guesses at her discontent, she responds, “Of course I am 
[happy!] How can a woman be unhappy who has only been married eight weeks to a 
man she chose freely?” (200) Sue’s assertion of the equivalence between the ability to 
choose and personal happiness is, of course, ridiculous, considering her choice is 
between shackles and shackles. A little later in the same conversation, she admits that 
she likes Phillotson “as a friend,” but finds it “torture” to live with him “as a husband” 
(201). Jude jumps rapidly to the conclusion that Phillotson is too old and dry to inspire 
her love, and that he might himself have fared better, but Sue counters his supposition: 
“It is not as you think! - There is nothing wrong except my own wickedness, I suppose 
you’d call it - a repugnance on my part, for a reason I cannot disclose, and would not be 
admitted as one by the world in general!” (202) 
What is impossible for the heroine of this late-century Bildungsroman to express 
is not the presence of sexual desire, as readers have tended to assume, but its periodic 
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absence—or at least, its low priority in the hierarchy of freedoms she is capable of 
imagining. After all, Arabella has no trouble expressing her physical desires; why should 
it be so much harder for Sue? Why has Sue’s asceticism been more offensive to readers 
than Arabella’s assertiveness? At the beginning of the century authors risked censure if 
they chose to represent female desire, but this was no longer the case in Hardy’s period, 
and it is certainly not in ours. On the contrary, Armstrong argues persuasively that by the 
middle of the nineteenth century, female desire had become so much a part of the 
ideology of liberal individualism that it had lost much of its transgressive potential. 
Schaffer’s work supports this conclusion: the form of romantic marriage that occupies 
such a central position in the history of the novel is, she writes, “a relationship of 
modernity . . . based on a liberal belief in each person’s autonomy, self-awareness, and 
ability to maximize pleasure” (80). Sue’s failure to seize this autonomy, along with the 
pressure her actions exert on the concepts of choice and pleasure, constitute serious 
threats to the enabling fantasies of selfhood that the novel and especially the 
Bildungsroman helped to construct. Contrary to what some critics have argued, then, 
Arabella is not a more transgressive character than Sue just because she is better at 
leveraging her sexuality for personal gain.121 She gets her way with Jude, but her 
decisions are circumscribed by a system of productive relations that she leaves 
unchallenged. Thus while she is largely free from the kinds of moral obligations that 
confine Sue, she is not free from the necessity of struggle; after all, even when she 
seems to be taking charge of her body and her life, she is motivated by fear and 
uncertainty about where her next meal is coming from.122  
                                                
121 Katherine Mullin makes this argument in Working Girls (2016). She praises Arabella and the 
class of ‘New Barmaids’ she belongs to for a “volatile charisma” and “performative sexuality” 
(170). Barmaids, she writes, were “pragmatic survivors . . .  capable of negotiating sexually 
charged workplaces with streetwise assurance” (188). In her reading, Arabella’s brand of “playful 
liberation” wins out over the “vanguard feminism” associated with Sue; Hardy, she claims, 
“balance[s] New Woman against New Barmaid to question where emancipation may fully reside” 
(218). She concludes her study with the suggestion that the opposition between these two 
incarnations of modern womanhood foreshadows a twentieth-century debate about 
“postfeminism,” and while she is careful not to take sides in that debate, she approvingly dubs the 
lusty, enterprising Arabella a “manifestation of proto-postfeminism” (239). 
122 Arabella’s pragmatism is on display in an early meeting with Sue, when she advises her 
successor to marry Jude straight away: “life with a man is more business-like after [marriage],” 
she explains, “and money matters work better. And then, you see, if you have rows, and he turns 
you out of doors, you can get the law to protect you, which you can’t otherwise, unless he half 
runs you through with a knife” (255). Even at the end of the novel, when she has married Jude for 
the second time, Arabella keeps one eye open for other opportunities. As Jude lies dying in the 
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Sue shares these fears, but rather than master the system that oppresses her, 
she attempts to reject or withdraw from it entirely. It goes almost without saying that the 
attempt fails: one cannot simply wash one’s hands of society, no matter how fatigued by 
its evils. Sue’s insights inspire no revolution, and at the end of the novel she is hardly 
any better off than Jude. However, her persistent negativity points to a number of 
possibilities that are as radical today as they would have been in 1895. A “New Woman,” 
she has nominal access to a historically unprecedented level of sexual and economic 
freedom, but this freedom little alters the uneven and highly gendered distribution of 
labour that is her daily experience. What is more, that labour is not limited to the minding 
of children or the sexual gratification of men, but includes the less tangible work she 
must perform in service of men’s self-realization. When she abstains from sex, or when 
she refuses to return Jude’s declarations of love, she ceases to do this work, and by 
extension, ceases to reproduce patterns of bourgeois life that could only further her 
oppression. Her negativity quashes the collective investment in futurity that Lee Edelman 
argues prevents us from challenging inequity in the present,123 but beyond this, it 
undermines what is perhaps the most seductive incarnation of cruel optimism: the 
fantasy of sexual empowerment.   
To see why I am calling this “radical,” it is useful to consider how prevalent this 
fantasy continues to be in both mainstream and progressive cultures today. In the 
twentieth and twenty-first century, challenges to the primacy of sexual identity have 
come only from the fringes of feminist thought, and in popular culture, they are virtually 
unheard of. It is only in recent years that a sex-negative critique has found an audience 
                                                                                                                                            
next room, she flirts with the quack doctor she has hired to attend him, thinking to herself, “Well! 
Weak women must provide for a rainy day. And if my poor fellow upstairs do go off . . .  it’s well to 
keep chances open” (380).  
123 In No Future (2004), Edelman argues that politics itself is premised on a disavowal of the 
present and an investment in the ideology of reproductive futurism. The fantastic figure of the 
Child, he writes, “embod[ies] . . . the telos of the social order,” compelling political discourse to 
“accede in advance to the reality of a collective future whose figurative status we are never 
permitted to acknowledge or address” (11). The cost of reproductive futurism, for Edelman, is the 
“limiting of the rights ‘real’ citizens [and especially queer citizens] are allowed” (11). In this light, 
any refusal of the reproductive imperative has the potential to radically disrupt the social order—a 
task Edelman assigns to queer theory and queer practice. While Hardy’s characters are not 
“queer” in Edelman’s sense of the word, many critics have understood them in this way, and 
Jarvis actually cites Edelman in her reading of the novel. For Jarvis, Jude and Sue’s partnership 
is a rejection of the future-oriented institution of the family and a celebration of the “preeminence” 
of the romantic dyad as the “primary system of value” (96). Like Jarvis, I find Edelman’s work 
useful for thinking through late-Victorian anxieties about the family, but I do not think the novel 
privileges romance in the way Jarvis claims it does. In fact, I argue that Sue troubles “romance” 
just as much as she troubles “the family.” 
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among feminists, and even now, it exists in uneasy tension with more mainstream body-
positive and sex-positive movements. While the contributions of the latter movements 
cannot be underestimated, a sex-negative critique—or what I prefer to call a negative 
dialectic of sex—is their necessary correlative, for it can expose forms of exploitation 
that are obscured by the euphoric experience of “empowerment” through sexual choice. 
Far more than its sex-positive counterpart, this negative critique resists absorption by 
consumer culture (it is not news to declare that “sex sells”; is it surprising that sexual 
empowerment also sells?)124 As pseudonym C. E. argues in her article “Undoing Sex,” 
“sex must be understood as something inextricably determined by notions of value” (10). 
C. E.’s critique of sex-positive feminism is worth quoting in full: 
Liberal feminism’s concept of ‘sexual empowerment’ . . . is a demand for 
greater representation within a phallic economy of sex. Radical consent 
takes this demand further until it becomes almost self-parodying: 
everybody may have access to the subject position, and as such 
everybody may benefit from their own value production . . . [but] even if 
for one encounter [sex] can feel mutual, feel decided upon by free and 
equal actors, the underlying mechanics of sex have not been challenged. 
The subject position necessitates the object; any value produced may 
always be appropriated and will always be expedient to appropriate. The 
act of rape will in such a context always be available. (10) 
I think it is fair to imagine a version of this insight flashing across Sue’s mind in the early 
days of her relationship with Jude. She delays consummating the relationship as long as 
possible, and it is only when Jude hints that he could leave her for Arabella that she 
finally relents—hardly the kind of informed, empowered choice we might wish her to 
make. Her protest in response to Jude’s request for marriage is telling: “I think I should 
begin to be afraid of you, Jude, the moment you had contracted to cherish me under a 
Government stamp, and I was licensed to be loved on the premises by you” (245). This 
quotation reveals that for Sue, a marriage license is a license to rape, even when the 
marriage in question is founded on mutual attraction and commitment. To go on “meeting 
by day,” she sighs, would be “so much sweeter—at least, for the woman,” for as she 
hints at an earlier point in the novel, the spectrum of erotic experience includes a great 
                                                
124 Examples of this phenomenon in contemporary culture are so numerous that it is difficult to 
know what to cite, though Cosmopolitan magazine and the television channel Slice both fit the 
bill. A more perverse (and sadly, illustrative) example is the rapidity with which the #MeToo 
hashtag, which originated as part of an awareness-raising campaign about the prevalence of 
sexual harassment, became a tool for marketing beauty products, clothing, and fitness classes to 
women through social media channels like Instagram.  
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deal more than intercourse (245, 142). For Sue, celibacy is no great loss: it little 
dampens the thrill she feels when she reads Romantic poetry, and it cannot mute the 
colours of the flowers she admires at the agricultural fair (142, 280). Hardly the frigid waif 
that Lawrence and others have taken her for, she overflows with vitality and feeling, but 
that experience is not one Jude can share, and because the partnership is important to 
her, she must compromise. Faced with an impoverished set of options for the governing 
of her sexual life, she cannot but recognize the utter contrivance of the romantic plot: the 
assigned roles, the power plays written in advance, and the brutal erasure of any feeling 
or experience that does not confirm the primacy of the acquiring, willful self.  
 Here, I am talking not only about the plot in Jude but about the one into which 
many of us are still coerced today: compulsory heterosexuality, and if not that then 
compulsory sexuality, and if not that then compulsory romance. No version of this story 
is innocent of a certain ignorance about the operation of power within sex. As Catharine 
MacKinnon has argued—albeit controversially—all expressions of sexuality occur within 
and to some extent reinforce dominant structures of authority:  
If women are socially defined such that female sexuality cannot be lived 
or spoken or felt or even somatically sensed apart from its enforced 
definition, so that it is its own lack, then there is no such thing as a 
woman as such, there are only walking embodiments of men’s projected 
needs. (534) 
MacKinnon has been criticized for taking a narrow and even normative view of sex, but 
the paradigm she targets is the dominant one, and the dominant paradigm is normative. 
Besides, what interests me far more than her definition of sex is the implication running 
through her work that neither the reclamation of sexuality nor the subversion of sexual 
mores is in itself an emancipatory act. Understood as something done, sex inevitably 
produces its object, and in many cases it produces more than that. Turned out on the 
streets of Christminster with little hope of finding shelter, a pregnant Sue explains 
falteringly to Father Time that her own thinning life must soon support another (317); or, 
exasperated by Jude’s inability to see things from her point of view, she condemns the 
social axioms dictating sexual availability and responsiveness (202). Both scenes show 
Sue tyrannized by the rules of a sexual contract that the liberal right to choose cannot 
ameliorate. A choice so partial, she knows, is no choice at all.     
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And yet, Sue is no nihilist. She is capable of rejecting the bind in which she is 
caught and of imagining something more.  Her reluctance to take up the reins of her own 
love story introduces a series of cracks into the structure of the Bildungsroman, but 
through those cracks we glimpse a different way forward, not the well-trod liberal path to 
sexual empowerment and self-assertion but a demolition of the grounds upon which 
sexuality itself is constructed. In Sue’s story, the building blocks of gender threaten to 
tumble away: however much Jude might like her to become a receptacle for his 
projected needs, she refuses the offer. Clad in his clothes after her escape from Teacher 
Training School, she declares herself a “negation” of civilization, rejecting gender as a 
system for classifying human beings and claiming to have “mixed with [men] . . . almost 
as one of their own sex” (140). Her break with Phillotson and her willingness to adopt 
Arabella’s son horrify her contemporaries because both acts endanger the family’s 
unquestioned designation as “the social unit” (220).125 Even at the end of the novel, a 
broken woman seemingly resigned to her fate, Sue refuses to take part in the illusion 
that the romantic pair is capable of transcending or escaping the constraints of an unjust 
society. Jude begs her to run away with him—to forget her tie to Phillotson and 
consummate what he considers an extra-social, well nigh spiritual form of love—but she 
says no; “you are mine,” he declares, but in refusing him she exposes the untruth of that 
claim (368). There is no belonging in the world of Hardy’s novel, but under no 
circumstances, not even those beyond the novel’s covers, should we understand people 
as self-identical objects capable of possessing or being possessed. A realist and a 
dreamer at once, Sue shows us what it might mean for Marx’s revolutionary subject to 
be a woman. Her characteristic instability is an assertion of non-identity that topples the 
reifying logic by which both she and Jude suffer. It is true that she does not succeed, but 
it is not true that she was destined to fail. Her resistance is a negation of the negation of 
liberalism; it calls out the bad joke of the free individual, but more importantly, it 
expresses longing for the kind of togetherness-in-diversity that was scarcely imaginable 
in 1895. The project of realizing that state is incomplete, but it is not yet over. It remains 
for us to achieve.   
                                                
125 In this sense, Sue has something in common with Eliot’s Romola, who also undermines the 
patriarchal family by adopting her “rival’s” children and living in a companionate relationship with 
another woman.  
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Conclusion: On Unassuming Work 
This dissertation has argued that realist novels of the nineteenth century 
represent labour and value in ways that challenge our habitual understandings of those 
concepts. In Gaskell’s industrial novel and in Eliot’s historical romance, in Trollope’s 
political saga and in Hardy’s reverse Bildungsroman, the unwaged immaterial labour of 
feminized subjects appears on a level with more conventionally legible—and socially 
valued—forms of work. The aspirational journeys of disadvantaged men like Jem 
Wilson, Tito Melema, and Jude Fawley are shown to depend on the sacrifices of female 
neighbours, lovers, and kin. Similarly, civil society, the product of the ostensibly male 
vocation of politics, exists in Trollope’s Palliser novels thanks to the support of an 
unofficial human resources department run entirely by women. In different ways and 
across contexts, these novels testify to the value of immaterial labour, but as I have 
shown, they also reveal its vulnerability: a necessary if under-acknowledged component 
of economic reproduction, the intangible work of hearts and minds is both alienable and 
exploitable. In this way, it is like any other form of labour commodified under capitalism, 
but to an even greater extent than most labour, the intangible processes of thinking and 
feeling constitute our sense of self. When this labour is alienated, the degrading effects 
that Marx attributed to all forms of alienated labour are multiplied, and the opportunities 
for organization and revolt, more difficult to seize. 
More difficult, certainly, but not impossible: the texts I have studied dramatize the 
grim consequences of intimate forms of exploitation, but they also imagine more ethical 
ways of performing and consuming immaterial labour. Neither the queer marriage that 
concludes Eliot’s Romola, nor Phineas Finn’s respectful if vaguely amorous friendships 
with older women count as “revolt,” insofar as they are small pockets of alternative 
practice that leave the larger social structure unchanged. Nevertheless, they begin the 
task of unfreezing hardened social forms that stand in the way of more substantial 
transformation. Replacing reified notions of value with contingent relationships and 
expanding the category of labour to include the material and ideological reproduction of 
working life, realist novels highlight aspects of economic production that we frequently 
take for granted.  
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Indeed, though this labour is as vital to modern economies as it was to Victorian 
ones, we are still coming terms with its implications for wage labour and for economic 
production more broadly.126 As we have seen, immaterial labour resists quantification 
and abstraction; it makes a troublesome commodity, in that it recalls and foregrounds 
the personal relationships contained in the production process. Its tendency to 
complicate and personalize the act of exchange may be why its presence is so marginal 
in the totalizing models of society proposed by early political economy (Folbre, “Holding 
Hands at Midnight” 214), but this tendency is also exactly why it needs our attention. 
Immaterial labour causes problems for an economic system that is, itself, a problem for 
the vast majority of lives it touches. Understanding the full range of capitalism’s effects—
not just what we are accustomed to thinking of as our work, but on our thoughts, 
feelings, and intimate relationships—can help those of us enjoying the relative comfort of 
Western information economies recognize what a serious compromise our comfort is, 
and not only because it implicates us in exploitative labour practices and destructive 
resource extraction all over the world, though this is of paramount importance, but 
because it cheapens our emotional lives and limits the emancipatory potential of our 
relationships. The fictional texts examined in this project uncover latent hierarchies of 
value that continue to structure our working lives today. From these texts, we can learn 
to recognize forms of exploitation that the ideological packaging of romance and family 
render nearly invisible.  
The unnerving proximity of work and love is one reason I have resisted 
identifying immaterial labour with any single role or task. The texts studied here seldom 
equate care work, scholarship, governance, or sexual performance with conventionally 
waged forms of work, nor do they present compensation as an adequate response to the 
problem of exploitation. On the contrary, in Mary Barton and Jude the Obscure, and to a 
lesser extent, in the Palliser novels, the alienating effects of commodity logic, of the 
                                                
126 In her provocatively titled manifesto, Who Cooked Adam Smith’s Dinner?, Swedish journalist 
Katrine Marçal argues that Adam Smith’s exclusion of feminized labour from The Wealth of 
Nations, and the subsequent construction of Economic Man in classical economics, shapes 
popular understandings of economics to this day. Best-selling airport stall standards like 
Freakonomics (2006) and The Undercover Economist (2006) teach a version of economics in 
which people are rational, utilitarian actors, and the economy itself a predictable, balanced, clock-
like mechanism. The tantalizing promise of these books is that (simplified) economic logic 
explains virtually everything about our lives. As Marçal points out, that vision depends on a 
disavowal of feminized labour and feminized traits (107), an epistemological bias that Marilyn 
Waring famously analyzed in the context of policy development, and Nancy Folbre, Edith Kuiper, 
Drucilla Barker, and many others in academic research and economics curricula.   
208 
flattening of diverse expressions of human creativity into the monolithic form of the 
wage, are shown to extend past the wage, re-shaping even those unassuming forms of 
work whose status as work has been historically denied. The elusive quality of 
immaterial labour, its capacity to evade spatial and temporal containment, is in this 
context a weakness and a strength—a cause for its devaluation, but also, potentially, a 
channel for resistance. Grappling with shape-shifting representations in Victorian texts—
with duty that transforms into freedom in Eliot’s Romola, or with the strange affinity of 
gambling, writing, and governance in Trollope—showcases the tendency of immaterial 
labour to dissolve abstract categories of analysis and to foreground human relationships, 
and this is precisely its value for criticism. Taking immaterial labour seriously can help us 
un-assume work, for it reveals, clearly and irrevocably, the insidious continuity of 
economic exploitation with private life, and the uneven distribution of value among forms 
of labour that share essentially the same fate.  
I have called these revelations immanent meanings of the shift to capitalism, but 
the dialectical thinking we have practiced until now unlocks other meanings as well. 
Indeed, the enclosure of our thoughts and feelings is but one of the numerous intangible 
costs of modern capitalism. An extension of this project might consider how Victorian 
representations of other unquantifiables—such as environmental degradation, or threats 
to national and community identities—reproduce, reinvent, or reject patterns and 
solutions devised to represent immaterial labour. Exciting recent work on Victorian 
ecology has shed light on the period’s strategies for thinking through what Nathan 
Hensley and Philip Steer call the “massively networked . . . violent global systems” of 
Empire and the carbon economy (4). Like the systemic appropriation of immaterial 
labour, these problems are materially consequential, but often absent to immediate 
perception: they must be aestheticized, given a form, just to be seen, let alone 
understood. If the “ecological formalism” under development in our discipline now 
“bridges the false divide between environmental history and criticism of empire” (5), the 
study of immaterial labour, similarly, builds pathways between intimate experiences of 
exploitation and larger social-historical structures. The “problems of interconnection and 
asymmetry, distance and intimacy, system and disaster” that Hensley and Steer 
discover in the conceptual realm of ecology (6) are found, too, in the stories we tell about 
work, about what counts as work and what does not, about which grievances we can 
sell, which ones we can reject, and which ones we must simply bear. New questions 
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emerge at the intersection of these areas of research: the Victorians saw their 
environment change as a result of human labour, but to what extent did environmental 
change shape labour practices? What forms of work disappeared as the planet 
transformed, and what forms emerged? Finally, how were women and feminized 
subjects positioned in and affected by environmental crisis?    
Further opportunities lie beyond the generic bounds of the novel. This project has 
focused on the formal qualities of realism, which, I argue, equip Victorian novels for the 
specific representational challenges of immaterial labour. Realism, because of its 
orientation toward totality, its interest in the relationship between individuals and society, 
and its serious engagement with phenomena we normally class, pejoratively, as private, 
domestic, or subjective, yields a view of the neglected underside of production, of the 
substantial effort by which an economy is maintained and reproduced. Other literary 
forms—journalism, biography, poetry, diaries and letters—are far from silent on this 
topic, and would add new dimensions to the history recorded and interpreted in novels. 
How is work named (or not named) across genres, and how is immaterial labour, in 
particular, defined and understood across class lines? A systematic, cross-genre review 
of Victorian representations of immaterial labour would fruitfully complicate the 
predominantly middle-class perspective of high realism, and expand the story of 
immaterial labour well beyond the canon.  
That story needs to be told, now, I think, more than ever. The Victorian period 
saw work reimagined and reorganized by the forces of industrialization, urbanization, 
Empire and technological advancement. Today in the West, we are palpably on the 
other side of Victorian progressivism, arguably in irreversible decline. But our 
organization of work faces challenges of equal magnitude. Lately, we have had to come 
to terms with a global health crisis and economic catastrophe, and with the loss of an 
established way of life. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, customary divisions 
between home and the office have all but collapsed. Families are reorganizing in 
response to previously unimaginable risks associated with school, daycare, and other 
child-minding arrangements. Job loss and precarity now characterize what were 
previously the most agile and resilient sectors of the economy. No pattern, institution, 
routine, or relationship is left unchanged: what it means to work, to live, to connect, and 
to take part in society is, out of necessity, being renegotiated, and it is still unclear what 
new meanings will emerge. As I complete this project, millions of under-employed 
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Canadians are living at home in relative isolation on the Canadian Emergency Response 
Benefit. How will we choose to understand labour when we are not working?  What is a 
product when no one is buying? What does it mean to concede that the vast majority of 
our work is non-essential, and that essential work is only worth fifteen or sixteen dollars 
an hour? 
Our current predicament foregrounds many of the issues addressed in this 
dissertation. The tacit hierarchies of value that shape our relationship to work and to 
each other fail as explanations for our present. Indeed, as the novels studied here attest, 
they have been failing for a long time. The struggle we are living through now pierces the 
“no-alternative” glamour of neoliberal capitalism, and as such, it brims with utopian 
potential. However, positive and lasting change will not come easily, and the rapidly 
multiplying negative effects of our pandemic reality must be reckoned with as part of any 
attempt to transform emergency response into the foundations of a more equitable, more 
humane society. As my dissertation chapters have shown, no change in the official 
economy is without consequence for the unofficial, unwaged forms of labour by which it 
is maintained. Because that labour is organized by gender, class, and race, so too are 
the consequences, a lamentable, but also alterable truth that is already emerging in the 
fallout of COVID-19.127 Clearly, whatever possibilities the pandemic helps us glimpse—
alternatives to neoliberalism, freedom from compulsory consumerism, the decoupling of 
productive potential from personal worth—those possibilities come alongside problems 
we cannot afford to ignore. If ever there was a time to expand our understanding of 
work, and to shift our definition of value from a limited and exclusive possession to a 
generative and inclusive relationship, that time is now. While we are consciously 
changing our behavior to preserve human lives, let us also work to better them.  
 
 
                                                
127 On the gendered effects of the pandemic, see Alisha Haridasani Gupta’s article, “Why Some 
Women Call This Recession a She-cession” in the 9 May 2020 New York Times. New research 
on the equity and COVID-19 is emerging almost daily. For an overview of equity concerns and list 
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